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Nuclear decommissioning: a problem that won’t go away Nicholas Lenssen, Energy specialist and former Senior Researcher at Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C.-based policy research unit. Portions of this article are drawn from work done by Worldwatch. |
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Critics of current waste
disposal and power plant dismantling schemes believe that the legacy of nuclear power
generation may impoverish and endanger future generations for millennia to come In nearly all industries, the disposal of antiquated plants and equipment is a straightforward and relatively low-cost operation. But the high levels of radiation present in retired facilities make it extremely complex and costly for nuclear power. Upon final closure, a nuclear power plant is converted from an asset generating electricity that can be sold to energy users, to a concrete and steel mass of radioactive waste awaiting eventual dismantling and isolation from humans and the biosphere. Although it is unlikely that a scenario such as that envisioned above will occur, the fact remains that human societies have yet to determine just what will happen with retired nuclear power plants. François Chenevier, the director of the French nuclear waste agency, admonished in 1990 that “it would be irresponsible for us to benefit from nuclear power and leave it to later generations to deal with the waste.” Yet that situation had already occurred, and will likely continue into the next three or so decades. Although nuclear reactors are expected to operate for between 30 and 40 years, their radioactive legacy—including the physical structure of retired reactors—will remain for thousands of years. The problem of what to do with shuttered reactors is growing steadily. As of the beginning of 1999, 94 nuclear reactors had been retired. At the same time, only 429 reactors were in operation, meaning that one out of every 5.5 reactors that has ever been built has already been permanently closed. Yet only a handful of these have actually been taken apart. This lack of progress in decommissioning reactors is partly planned. Some countries, such as Japan and the United States, have announced policies that would have them dismantle closed reactors within a decade or two of closure. Other countries, such as Canada and France, intend to wait several decades. At the extreme, the United Kingdom has decided to wait more than 100 years before finally tearing down any reactors at all. Thus, old reactors could become a near permanent fixture in some countries. The irony in tearing down nuclear power plants is that the longer they run, the more radioactive their interiors get from neutron bombardment. And the higher the radioactivity, the more difficult, dangerous, and expensive it is to dismantle the plants, and store or bury the residual radioactive waste. Thus, waiting decades or longer between closing reactors and actually tearing them down makes the task that much easier and safer to undertake. Still, the radioactivity of the actual buildings—particularly the reactor’s core vessel in which the nuclear reaction takes place—will last for hundreds of thousands of years. The radioactive substance nickel 59, for example, is found in the reactor’s core, an area that has experienced the heavy bombardment of neutrons from fission’s chain reactions. Nickel 59 has a radioactive half-life of 80,000 years, meaning that it takes roughly a million years before it is safe. Current plans are to bury the waste, isolating it from humans and the biosphere until it becomes harmless. However, no country has yet taken political action on just where it will bury these materials. Some scientists assure the public that the problem of radioactive waste can be solved through such burial, although others debate whether it can be “solved” in the normal fashion at all. Waste cannot be destroyed, nor can scientists prove that it will stay out of the biosphere if buried. Proof of a hypothesis, via the scientific method, requires demonstration. Yet with radioactive waste, such proof would require hundreds of human generations and entail extensive risks. Critics, from aboriginal people to scientists, have often noted the presumptuousness of our civilization’s willingness to reach forward in time, borrowing from the future that which we can never repay. To leave a legacy that does not merely impoverish future life but may endanger it for millennia to come, constitutes an act of unprecedented irresponsibility. Ignoring early warnings Politicians traditionally have been reluctant to tackle an issue that will not come to the forefront until after their political careers have ended. Indeed, both government and industry have long ignored warnings about radioactive wastes, including the problem of decommissioning nuclear power facilities. In 1951, Harvard University president James B. Conant, former administrator of the wartime Manhattan Project to develop a nuclear bomb, spoke publicly of wastes that would last for generations. In 1957, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences panel cautioned that “unlike the disposal of any other type of waste, the hazard related to radioactive wastes is so great that no element of doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety.” In 1960, another Academy committee urged that the waste issue be resolved before licensing new nuclear facilities. Such recommendations fell on deaf ears, and one country after another plunged ahead with building nuclear power plants. Government bureaucrats and industry spokespeople assured the public that decommissioning and nuclear waste could be dealt with, yet few resources were dedicated to these issues. Working with radioactive waste was “not glamorous . . . nobody got brownie points for caring about nuclear waste,” according to Carroll Wilson, first general manager of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. So the issue was figuratively, and almost literally, swept under the rug until the late 1970s when safety problems and accidents, questions about health effects, soaring costs, and eroding public confidence slowed reactor construction. Still, most people probably believe to this day that the problem of dismantling retired reactors and disposing of their wastes is not an issue to be concerned with. That may be true, but even if an engineering or social solution, such as a nuclear priesthood that will protect the biosphere, is found, there remains a huge, unpaid bill for achieving it. Despite some early real experience with the cost of decommissioning plants, it still remains uncertain just what those costs will be—and who will pay. Estimates of the dismantling cost have ranged from 10 per cent of the initial capital investment to 40 per cent, and even 100 per cent. This translates into costs ranging from $50 million to more than $3 billion for a large reactor. Who’s going to pay, and how much? In fact, one smaller reactor, the 167-megawatt Yankee Rowe of Massachusetts, which cost $186 million (1993$) to build in 1960 ended up having a dismantling bill of more than $350 million three decades later. Indeed, if governments and utilities have had a difficult time justifying the cost of building and operating reactors, closing them could be an even harder sell. In the United Kingdom, the government-owned utility insisted for years that the cost of tearing down redundant plants would be relatively small. Then, in 1989, when the government was in the process of a failed attempt to privatize the country’s nuclear industry, the utility admitted that the decommissioning cost was roughly four times that it had previously stated. Similarly, though most countries require their operators to collect funds for decommissioning during a reactor’s operation, most of these funds consist of only “bookkeeping” funds. That is, the utility credits a decommissioning fund with money, but the actual cash is spent on other activities. Thus, there is no guarantee that when the utility actually needs the money for decommissioning, it will have it. Yet even with systems that require actual cash reserves to be created shortages can easily mount, if reactors are shut down before the end of their original expected lifespan, as has been more the rule than the exception with the nearly 100 reactors now permanently closed. In fact, the early retirement costs of reactors in the United States’ electricity markets could run to more than $15 billion. In recent years, Sweden’s government raised the amount of money utilities need to collect for decommissioning. No one can say for sure just how much it will cost to handle the waste legacy from nuclear power, though so far the estimates continue to climb upward. In other countries, including France and most developing countries, governments intend to provide public funds to dismantle reactors when the time comes, ensuring that the current generation that uses the power from nuclear plants will pass on to future generations the cost of disposing of them. In the end, decommissioning could become the largest remaining expense facing the nuclear industry and the governments who have supported it, particularly if efforts to confine radioactive waste fail. Even if no more nuclear waste is created, dealing with existing waste will require attention and investments for a period that defies our usual notion of time. The challenge before human societies is to keep nuclear waste including the actual remnants of shuttered plants in isolation for the many millennia that make up the hazardous life of these materials. In this light, no matter what becomes of nuclear power, the nuclear age will continue for a very long time. |