Bosnia and Herzegovina: an impossible reconciliation? James Lyon, director of the International Crisis Group (ICG) project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This private, multinational organization, which aims to strengthen the capacity of the international community to understand and respond to crises, produces analytical reports targeted at key decision-makers. (http://www.crisisweb.org)

Timeline 1991: Slovenia and Croatia, two of the six republics of the Yugoslav federation, declare their independence. 1992: In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat and Muslim communities press for the independence of their republic. They are opposed by Bosnian Serbs who lay siege to Sarajevo and seize 70% of the country. Massive “ethnic cleansing” begins, mostly conducted by Bosnian Serb forces. 1993-1994: After the rejection of a peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs, the UN declares six “safe areas”, but ground hostilities persist. Formerly allies, Croats and Muslims clash before signing an accord in March 1994. The UN Security Council creates an International War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia based at The Hague (Netherlands). NATO goes into action against the Serbs. 1995: In July, Bosnian Serbs take over Srebrenica and Zepa “safe areas”. In August, NATO bombs their positions around Sarajevo. The Dayton (USA) peace agreement in November ends hostilities. The republic is divided into two associated entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51% of the land area, including Sarajevo) and the Serb Republic. A NATO force monitors application. In this conflict some 200,000 people were killed and almost 200,000 were displaced. Around 600,000 refugees have returned to their homes.

A once ethnically diverse population lives in a climate of fear and distrust fuelled by nationalists In November 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Accords, a document designed to create a new unified state comprised of two multi-ethnic entities. It would have a functioning central government, hold democratic elections and adhere to international human rights standards. Displaced persons were to be allowed to return to their homes and indicted war criminals were to be arrested and turned over to the International Tribunal of The Hague. Today’s reality is dramatically different. The country consists of three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper. Most indicted war criminals remain at large. Nationalist political parties, including many of the ethnic cleansers who were responsible for the war in the first place, remain securely in power. Nationalist extremists–often backed by the ruling political parties–still bomb and torch the homes of returning refugees in certain areas. Contrary to the pronouncements of local nationalist politicians or international officials wishing to avoid taking responsibility, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims lived together relatively peacefully in Bosnia and Herzegovina for hundreds of years. All three groups respected each others’ religious customs and holidays and intermarriage was common. But something changed when all sides committed grievous atrocities during the war. These crimes were not an accidental by-product of the war. Rather, they were a tool to achieve its primary aim: ethnic separatism or domination of one ethnic group over another. By the war’s end in early 1996, all three sides had retreated into ethnically pure areas, controlled by their respective armies. Today, the Croat and Serb politicians insist on remaining separate. In fact, it is those very groups responsible for the worst crimes who insist most vehemently on ethnic separation. The lack of consensus on a multiethnic society plays into the hands of Muslim extremists, who also practice a more subtle policy of ethnic exclusion. All three groups have formed their own school curricula, which reinforce ethnic hatred, blame the other groups, and glorify their own mythology. Each has begun religious instruction in the schools, which often takes the most primitive form of ethnic indoctrination. All this only serves to cement the wartime ethnic cleansing. The sad truth is that four years after Dayton (see box), neither side is any closer to reconciliation than in late 1995. Many Bosnians of all nationalities will state openly that they can stop hating, but that they will neither forgive nor forget what happened during the war. And many add that they wish to be left alone with their own ethnic group. After what the other groups did to them, they no longer wish to live with them anyway. In a political climate that works against the emergence of any reliable non-nationalist reference point, members of all communities still fear first and foremost for the survival of their ethnic identity and place group interests above all else. Rather than work toward calming nationalist passions and anger, local politicians use these fears to further their own political agendas. This is seen particularly in the cases of the Serb and Croat populations, both of whom look toward a mother country outside the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and dream of eventually seceding and uniting their region with it. From Belgrade and Zagreb, politicians continue to fan the flames of nationalist desire. The continued insistence of nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, urged on by nationalists outside, on creating ethni-cally pure territories stands as the greatest obstacle to reconciliation. Until the outside forces live up to their obligations under Dayton and stop pushing for “greater” national programmes, little progress will be made in the reconciliation of the country’s pre-war ethnically diverse population. And until that time, its citizens will live in an environment of fear of the other ethnic groups. The UNESCO Courier