“Carrobomba” by Colombian artist Fernando Botero depicts an all-too familiar occurrence.
Colombia
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Timeline
1948-1957:
After a civil war that claimed 300,000 lives, Conservatives and Liberals agree
to a power-sharing deal that lasts until 1978. All other political parties
are suppressed, leading to the growth of guerrilla groups including the Movimiento
19 de Abril (M-19), the pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and the National Liberation Army (ELN).
1980s: The rise of the drug lords threatens to undermine the authority of the
government.
1984: A state of siege is declared in response to the escalation of political
and drugs-related violence.
1986: The Patriotic Union (PU), FARC’s political arm, wins seats in general
elections. Paramilitary squads start assassination campaigns against PU politicans.
Drug traffickers invest their illicit wealth in land and form their own private armies
to fight the guerrillas.
1989: M-19 announces an agreement with government and forms a political party.
1994: Ernesto Samper rises to power amidst allegations of campaign contributions
from the Cali cartel, unleashing a prolonged political crisis and rising tensions
with the U.S.
1996: The legislature votes not to impeach President Samper.
1998-1999: Conservative Andres Pastrana elected president and proposes ambitious
peace plan. An area the size of Switzerland is ceded to FARC control. Paramilitary
death squads declare Colombian human rights advocates as military targets.
2000: The U.S. approves a $1.3 billion military and civilian aid package as part
of Plan Colombia, a drugs-fighting scheme. FARC suspends peace talks and warns that
it will step up military action.
2001: Negotiations underway to cede land to ELN.
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However
bad a government may be,
there is something worse–the removal of government.
Hippolyte
Taine,
French historian and philosopher (1828-1893)
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Key
figures
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Population:
41.5 million (1999)
GNP per capita:
$2,250 (1999)
GNP per capita
annual growth rate:
1.5 % (1990-98)
Life expectancy
at birth:
70 years (1998)
Adult illiteracy rate:
8.8 % (1998)
Sources: World Bank, UNDP. |
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In
the absence of a legitimate state, guerrillas, paramilitary forces and organized
crime have each managed to lay down their law, says Colombian economist and philosopher
Libardo Sarmiento
Violence in Colombia
claimed 38,000 lives last year and created 10 times that number of refugees. What
is the Colombian state doing about this?
Colombia does not have a classic state where rule of law prevails, as is known
in Western democracies. Neither is there any agreement over what kind of state is
needed to get out of the present crisis. What exists is a skeletal state, run by
an elite, and a few state projects. We’re a country adrift in the wind.
Is that because everyone is working at cross-purposes?
In the last few years, the country has been arguing over two opposing models.
One is a classic state that could implement a set of neo-liberal policies–in other
words, a small, efficient state aimed at strengthening private capital. Applying
this model over the past decade has caused a deep crisis in agriculture and industry
as well as a progressive decline in living standards.
On the other side are those who want to build a state which would entrench the social
rights established in the 1991 constitution and feature a degree of decentralization
and citizen participation. It would be a more interventionist state, one that would
guarantee not just civil and political rights but social, economic and cultural ones.
It would be more environmentally conscious, and would lead the way to a genuine participatory
democracy, not just one where power is delegated.
The clash between these two visions has generated huge polarization right in the
middle of a civil war that has sharply escalated since 1995. So far, neither model
has managed to come up with institutions that would usher in a law-governed state.
As a result, the state has become very weak and now has precious little legitimacy.
What are the implications?
In the absence of the state–or rather because of the perverse way the state behaves–parallel
authorities have sprung up with the aim of controlling political, social, economic
and military life over great swathes of the country, thus “balkanizing” the national
territory. These authorities or groups settle disputes and impose their own binding
rules. All this, of course, lies outside the country’s legal institutions. Paramilitary
forces and left-wing guerrilla groups control vast areas of land, while organized
crime holds sway over parts of the big cities. In some places these groups set up
a real “state within a state,” with all that the notion implies: they make and enforce
laws, collect taxes from business people, industrialists and landowners, and even
regulate people’s daily lives. The result is a completely fragmented country with
no connection between state and nation.
You have argued that “the Colombian state does not enforce any binding rules.” What
do you mean by this?
Each citizen follows his or her own code of conduct and rejects those held by
other people. Someone who is honest but has no links with powerful people cannot
survive. This happens at all levels, even when you queue up to sort out a simple
piece of paperwork. So in Colombia’s case, I think the problem is not just drug smuggling
but also institutions and a culture built on illegality and force, sometimes armed
force. Today the issues are trafficking drugs or people and embezzling public funds,
but tomorrow it could be any other illegal activity that leads to easy money.
So Colombia is not a nation-state either?
No, and I don’t think it can be under present circumstances because of the high
level of fragmentation and lack of state legitimacy. According to the classical concept
of a nation-state, the state must serve the national interest. But in Colombia the
state has always served the ruling class, except for a brief period in the middle
of the 19th century. There’s no shared political sense of nationhood. Because of
the history of the provinces–notably the constant clash between the interests of
local and central governments and the weakness of institutions–a nation-state built
democratically from below, from the local and regional level, has not emerged.
Even in the most advanced democracies, the state is expected to play a mediating
role between powerful pressure groups. Does it do this in Colombia?
In our country, government policies are closely linked to corporate and private
interests. The powerful groups–economic, political, military or even some trade unions,
such as that representing civil servants–use the state for their own purposes. As
a result, policies, laws and public spending do not cover the entire range of Colombians’
interests. It’s not a state with a broad democratic or collective interest in the
common good.
Although that might seem very theoretical, it nevertheless has serious effects on
Colombians’ daily lives.
Indeed. People find it extremely hard to get any kind of business or work going
because they cannot rely on the social capital of trust. A citizen also starts from
the assumption that he or she cannot count on any real support from the state and
knows it will not defend any constitutional rights.
Can you give us some examples?
There’s no security for opposition political parties. In the last 15 years, more
than 3,000 members of the left-wing Patriotic Union party have been murdered. About
90 percent of all crimes go unpunished. The judicial system is also profoundly class-biased:
more than 50,000 poor Colombians are languishing in prison, while powerful people
involved in corruption cases are simply put under house arrest. All the politicians
mixed up in the scandal surrounding the election of President Ernesto Samper (1994-98),
whose campaign was funded by drug barons, clearly profited from this elitist system
of justice.
What has kept the country together despite all this?
It might seem odd, but the one thing that has acted as a lifeline for national
institutions amid these conflicts is the use of the state budget as a kind of cake
to be sliced up, as spoils of war to be handed out to regional politicians.
So it will be a big job for Colombians to establish a social democratic state...
We have the same pressing needs as any modern globalized society though we have
not managed to build either a state or a nation. Nor have we carried out major democratic
reforms to entrench basic freedoms and civil, political, social, economic, cultural,
environmental and indigenous people’s rights. The society has many conflicting groups
but no centre or shared agenda.
Human rights and peace with social justice must underpin any such shared agenda.
Participatory democracy and local and regional autonomy are indispensable for the
reconstruction of a Colombian state and nation fit to cope with the new demands of
a globalized society. The other big challenge is education–building institutions
dedicated to the common good, bringing about a culture of democracy and modern citizenship. |
