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Tune
into the “new conscience of Islam”
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One
Islam, a mosaic of believers
Slimane
Zéghidour, journalist for the French weekly La Vie, author of Daily
Life in Mecca, published in French in 1990 by Hachette |
The
five countries with the largest Muslim population in each of the world’s main regions. |
Allah
is one but Islam is a mosaic. The Muslim world is a linguistic tower of Babel, an
ethnic patchwork, a geographical puzzle and a political kaleidoscope offering a picture
of extraordinary doctrinal diversity
The word Islam derives
from the Semitic root slm, which means both “peace” and “prosperity.” Even much earlier
than the Koran, that root could be found in the name Salem, the Canaan deity who
became the god of Ur-Salem, the City of Salem, Jerusalem. Names such as Salomon,
Salome, Salmanassar (the king of Assyria), and the word shalom (a greeting that means
“peace” in Hebrew and Aramean) and salam in Arabic, also stem from slm. For Muslims,
“Islam” means “surrender,” entrusting onself to the will of God. According to the
Prophet Mohammed, its basic ethic can be summarized by “worshipping God without associating
anything with Him, observing the canonic prayer, paying the mandatory alms, fasting
during the month of Ramadan, offering food to the hungry and the greeting of peace
to neighbours as well as strangers.”
Today Islam refers to both a religion and a civilization, but the faithful would
rather use the term umma when referring to the Muslim world (the community of the
faithful), or the expression dar el-islam (the house of Islam).
That spiritual dwelling stretches from Indonesia to Morocco, the Arctic Circle to
the Tropic of Cancer. It encompasses 57 states with very different political systems
ranging from the medieval emirate to the constitutional republic and everything in
between: ultra-conservative, Islamic-Christian, modernist and secular regimes. These
countries are divided into allies and enemies of the United States, free-market and
socialist economies, rich and poor.
Few people are aware that one in three Muslims lives in countries dominated by other
cultures, including Catholicism (France, Belgium), Protestantism (United Kingdom,
United States), Orthodox Christianity (Russia, Macedonia), Judaism (Israel), Hinduism
(India), Buddhism (Sri Lanka) and Confucianism (China). In all, Mohammed’s disciples—Turks,
Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Malays, Berbers, Slavs, Chinese and Africans—are spread out
over a vast area, from the Javanese jungle to the Sahara desert, the Himalayan mountains
to the steppes of Central Asia.
The same diversity can be found on the level of doctrine. As Mohammed himself predicted,
Islam has split into 73 different persuasions, currents, denominations, confraternities
and sects, including Sunnites, Shiites, Kharijis, Zaydis, Alawites, Ahmadis, Alevites,
Ibadis, Bohras, Qadianis, Bektashis and Druzes. One in ten believers is Shiite, while
the majority are Sunnite. Although this branch is considered “orthodox,” it is divided
into four major legal and theological schools (Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, Hanbali),
each of which dominates one swath of dar el-islam. As a result, the umma has as many
faces as Christianity.There is no single, accepted authority. That accounts for why
it is difficult, if not impossible, for a consensus to emerge on any point of faith,
dogma or politics.
Islam has no equivalent of the pope nor of the Vatican, but there are several intellectual
centres. The Shiite world, which is limited mostly to Iran, has a veritable clergy
led by an ayatollah, the highest “rank” in the religious hierarchy. Sunnite Islam,
in contrast, has no hierarchical structure. However, El Azhar, the theological university
in Cairo, serves as an intellectual centre for ulemas (the doctors of Islamic law)
around the world. Nevertheless, El Azhar is a state institution whose rector is appointed
by the Egyptian president. In Tehran, Cairo and elsewhere, religion remains very
closely linked to political power, when it does not outrightly contest it. |
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Philippe
Fargues*:The end of patriarchy?
A radical
change is underway in North Africa and the Middle East: fertility rates may still
be just above three children per woman, but they are falling rapidly. In Lebanon,
Tunisia and Iran, the rate has already dropped below the reproductive level of 2.1
children per woman. Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Egypt follow close behind.
A major divide no longer separates both shores of the Mediterranean. In Tunis, the
figure stands at 1.55 children per woman, the same as in many European cities. Muslim
culture can no longer be called an obstacle to modern demographic behaviour. Iran,
under an Islamic regime, witnessed the most dramatic change of all—a drop from 6.4
children per woman in 1986 to 2.06 in 1998. In 12 years, the country travelled the
distance the West took more than a century to cover.
Special circumstances such as civil conflict, wars, embargoes and the economic crisis
have certainly contributed to reducing fertility rates. But the decline has more
to do with irreversible worldwide trends—the growth of towns and cities, more children
(especially girls) in school and the increase in service sector jobs.
The trend is undermining the patriarchal order that has governed family structures
since time immemorial and left its mark on political allegiances. It rests on two
pillars—obedience of the younger to the older and of women to men. Lower fertility
rates challenge the first: an only child has no younger sibling to watch over.
The second, still part of legislation based on the sharia law, is threatened by changes
in society. Girls have better access to education and are marrying later. Through
work, they’re entering a world of men outside their own family. And there are more
single women—something hitherto unknown.
The advent of the two-child family does not mean that the days of zero population
growth are here. Birth rates were at their height between 1980 and 1990 and their
spectacular fall since then will not be felt on the labour market until between 2005
and 2015.
But there is cause for optimism. For a very brief moment in history, 25-year-old
adults are in an exceptionally privileged position. They are more numerous than ever
to share the burden of caring for their elders. Given their low fertility rates,
they can count on their savings and investments going towards improving their living
standards, rather than being absorbed by population growth as in the past.
But to convert this theoretical advantage into something concrete, this generation
must have a chance to put savings aside, which implies having work. In most countries
of the region, tremendous improvements in education and an increase in the number
of graduates have fuelled ambitions. But all too often, youth find themselves confronted
with unemployment, or forced to opt for jobs that are below their qualifications.
* Senior
researcher at the French National Institute for Demographic Research in Paris, author
of a recent work on demography in the Arab world.
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