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• Culture and Civilizations
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International
Conference on CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY Paper
presented by H.E. Mr. Ahmad Jalali, ------------------------------------------------------- Dialogue
among Civilizations, Identity and Otherness I
would like to open my contribution to this session with some general remarks
on the subject. Let
me begin with some comments on the concept of dialogue among civilizations
itself. Depending on which angle we choose to attack it from, this question
rends itself to two separate but complementary interpretations, which I shall
refer to as historical and normative. According to the historical
interpretation, Dialogue Among Civilizations is nothing totally new, but
rather an ever-present process. Civilizations have always engaged in dialogue
with each other and even the bloodiest wars and hostilities have never
completely prevented this. If
we look the problem from this point of view, in order to obtain a clear idea
of the concept of dialogue among civilizations we have to make a survey of the
ways and methods of dialogue among civilizations throughout history. This is a
colossal task that necessitates at least two essential methodological changes. The
first change concerns our approach to history. History has been, and is, often
seen as an inventory of antagonisms and wars, and unfortunately this aspect
has been given most prominence. That is why general histories seldom talk of
dialogue, preferring to leave this to specialized branches of history such as
the history of ideas, of philosophy, of science, and of arts. General
histories rather refer to exchange between civilizations, and what they mean
by this word is often the exchange of material goods, techniques, and other
such components of material life. Thus to look at history from the vantage
point of dialogue is tantamount to a methodological change, that is, a shift
of axis from conflict to dialogue, to search in history for elements of
dialogue, and to attempt to rewrite history as a history of dialogue. It goes
without saying that this change of approach should not blind us to the more
brutal facts of history. The
second methodological change is the change from an ethnocentric concept of
culture and civilization to a concept in which transfer and give-and-take
occupy the foreground. In the ethnocentric view of the development of cultures
and civilizations, these are both supposed to grow in a more or less closed
environment, limited by national or ethnic boundaries. External interventions,
and above all wars and invasions, undermine their “organic” growth and put
their very existence in danger. It is true that the metaphor of civilization
as an organic whole has a certain advantage: by comparing civilization to a
living body, we seem to underline its relations to its environment. However,
what is usually implied by this metaphor is the relation of interdependence
between internal elements of a culture or civilization rather than their
dependence on their environment. Our
problem is thus to define cultures and civilizations as open systems, in such
a way that transfer, exchange and dialogue enter into their very definition. Notwithstanding
these conceptual obstacles that stand in its way, such a survey is a necessary
prerequisite for the realization of “dialogue among civilizations”,
according to the normative interpretation of this term. In this
interpretation, which is the first one to come to mind, dialogue among
civilizations is an ideal, a project put forward to the world community as an
alternative to the dominant approach in international relations which often
underlines the points of antagonism and hostility. This dominant approach is
best exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the clash of
civilizations, and for this reason the thesis of dialogue among civilizations
is often seen as a response to Huntington’s view. However,
how can we hope for a fruitful dialogue among the different civilizations of
today, if do not possess a more or less clear idea of how this kind of
dialogue has been conducted in the past? This is why the two interpretations
of the concept of dialogue among civilizations are inextricably related. On
the one hand, if we are not well-informed about the experience in the past, we
can not begin, or rather continue, this experience in the present. On the
other hand, any research into the past is somehow limited by our perspective
of the present world and of the role different civilizations play in its
constitution. Both
concepts of dialogue among civilizations are thus interrelated. Moreover, both
are intrinsically bound to the question of identity and otherness. This
relation is through the role culture and civilization play in composing our
identity. In
its most general sense culture is what distinguishes human beings from other
animals and, as such, forms an integral part of our human identity. In fact,
we are equipped not only with a biological survival kit, but also with a set
of behaviors, customs, and beliefs superimposed on our biological make-up.
Thus culture, in its broadest sense, is both a unifying and a distinguishing
element. On the one hand, it helps us become aware of our differences with the
animal world and, on the other, it is a means by which we know each other and
enter into meaningful relationships with one another. Nevertheless,
human culture in this general sense remains rather an abstraction, a concept
which presents itself when we try to define the human world in
contradistinction to the natural world. When we pass from this abstract level
to concrete human societies we find ourselves in a much more complicated
situation. Instead of a unified human culture, we are faced with a variety of
cultures. It is true that no human society can be reduced to its natural
environment, but every human group distinguishes itself in its own way, so
that cultures enable a human group to distinguish itself not only from the
natural world but also from other human groups. A
human group forges its own identity through its culture. As a consequence,
those who share this identity are treated as insiders, and those who do not
share it as outsiders. It is in this context that the problem of “we” and
“others” arises on a social level. In the same way that we are aware of
our uniqueness through our personal identity, our cultural identity reminds us
that we belong to a specific human group. History
presents us with ample evidence of how cultures have served as elements of
solidarity within specific human groups and as a differentiating factor
between different human groups. Moreover, it teaches us that neither the focal
point around which identities are constituted nor the frontier lines along
which human groups are separated from each other, remain the same. Sometimes
it is language which has played this double role. We are informed that the
ancient Greeks considered those who did not speak their language were
“barbarians”. The pejorative meaning that this term has acquired during
the course of history has something to do with its linguistic origin; from the
very beginning, the use of this term implied that those who speak other
languages do not speak at all, but simply make noises. Thus, speaking another
language, they are beyond the reach of communication.
In
some other societies this unifying and differentiating role was played by
myths. People believed themselves to be descendants of certain mythical heroes
or gods, and so in this respect different to other ethnic groups who were
believed to have other mythical origins. In the middle ages, this role was
relegated to religion and in modern times this function has been taken up the
modern concept of nation. The salient point is that, despite these shifts of
axis, each of these social entities is accompanied by a corresponding culture
that acts as the cement of the society or social group, levelling out the
differences existing inside it and highlighting the points that differentiate
it from others. Thus we have religious cultures, ethnic cultures and national
cultures. Once more, this point underlines once more the role of culture in
the formation of our social identities. The
view presented above could be known the standard perspective of social
identity. According to this point of view, even if some outer aspects of the
life of a group change, there is a hard core which always remains constant. If
this core is threatened by external events, the group ceases to exist as a
self-sustaining unit; it is either absorbed by other groups or simply
vanishes. This view corresponds to the standard conception of personal
identity in which every individual human being forms a unique and indivisible
unit. What guarantees this uniqueness is his or her personal identity, as
something which is not subject to change during his life-time.
This
definition forms one of the two extreme definitions which apply to identity.
At the other extreme one finds the so-called post-modern concept of identity,
in which a person or a social group is seen simply as a node in a network of
relations. According to this concept, what are generally considered to be
different manifestations of an unchanging core are nothing more than the
different relations in which a person might find himself. These
definitions both suffer from a lack of historical dimension. On the one hand,
by its emphasis on the invariable aspect of the life of a person or a social
group, the standard definition belittles the changes brought about by varying
circumstances; in fact, these changes are sometimes so profound that one
cannot hold that their effects are solely limited to the outer aspects of
life. On the other hand, the post-modern concept of identity ignores the
survival of some elements of the life of a person or a society even when the
conditions that have given birth to them cease to exist. Both
these concepts are based on a unitary conception of identity. Both suppose
that every person or social group should have a unique identity, the negation
of which would naturally lead to the negation of the very concept of identity.
What I would like to propose here is a pluralistic view of identity, in which
every person or every social group belongs to a multiplicity of traditions and
cultures. These traditions should not be confused with passing historical
circumstances that do not affect the core identity, and nor should we suppose
that the identity of the person or of the group could be solely reduced to
theses passing elements. In
my view, that this pluralistic concept of identity not only solves some
theoretical issues but also forms the only framework in which the possibility
of dialogue can be assured. A
monolithic conception of identity and otherness is the greatest obstacle to
dialogue. How is it possible to enter into dialogue with those with whom we
have nothing in common? It is true that some general characteristics are
shared by all human beings and by all human societies. But, as has been
previously noted, these serve to distinguish human beings from other living
creatures. Even some general concepts, such as liberty, human rights, and
human dignity are not precise enough to serve as a basis for dialogue. The
problem with these ideas is that while no one seems to oppose them, there
seems to be little agreement on their exact meaning. Dialogue
can begin on the basis of what we have in common not only as an ideal -- as is
the case of human rights -- but as a concrete shared experience. Moreover,
dialogue can only be conducted through a common language. However, a language
cannot be created ex nihilo and in a matter of months or years. The
thesis I wish to put forward is that if we admit that every identity is a
composite one, in the sense that it consists of different, even disparate,
elements, then the problem of identity will become relative: any two persons,
any two cultures, can be identical in some respects while being different in
others. However, if absolute identity does not exist, neither does absolute
otherness. I
my view, most historical entities show this composite nature. Among these
entities, this composite nature is best exemplified by civilizations. As is
well known, civilizations are large-scale historical identities that go beyond
ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries. To put it more precisely, by
focusing on one these aspects, every civilization creates the possibility of
pluralism in other domains. Civilizations based on religion have normally been
tolerant in linguistic or ethnic issues, and those with an ethnic basis have
normally created suitable conditions for those with different religions or
different languages to live together. This is the reason why civilizations
have played an important role in the formation of some composite historical
identities. Nowadays,
many different entities hitherto belonging to the same civilization are
independent nations living within national boundaries. Most of them define
themselves solely in nationalistic terms, and this emphasis put upon unique
national or ethnic characteristics has given rise to many antagonisms,
disputes and even wars. In fact, the disastrous effects of the ideology of the
pure race are being produced, in our time, by the ideology of a pure nation or
a pure culture. The ideology of ethnic cleansing (in French: purification
ethnique) has its roots in the idea of a pure nation, a pure ethnic group
or a pure culture. To
remind these modern entities of their common historical past is tantamount to
making them aware of their composite natures, to remind them that those who
live on the other side of their national boundaries are not absolute
outsiders, are not absolute others. I
would like to conclude these remarks with a historical example. In recent
years Islamic and Western civilizations have sometimes been represented as
completely separate entities, based on different, and even mutually exclusive
world-views. I do not wish to discuss the origins of this misunderstanding,
but the fact remains that the problem is not a new one. It can be traced back
to the middle ages, when these two religions were engaged on a merciless
struggle on military, religious and cultural fronts. However, the point often
overlooked is that, even in medieval times, these two civilizations were not
as totally separated as is usually supposed. Both of them possessed composite
identities, in which many things were held in common. Apart
from their common religious background, that is to say the same monotheistic
tradition to which they belonged, they were both heirs of the Greek and
Hellenistic cultures. This common intellectual tradition provided a shared
language through which all medieval thinkers, in spite of their confessional
differences, could communicate with each other. Thanks to this common
heritage, the world-view and the intellectual categories of someone such as
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) in Iran and Saint Thomas Aquinas in the far West were very
similar. Despite the fact that these two thinkers belonged to different
religions, societies and cultures, they concerned themselves with the same
problems, according to almost the same intellectual categories, even if they
proposed totally different solutions. This was true not only for great figure
such as Ibn Sina and Saint Thomas, but for any enlightened and cultured person
belonging to the scientific elite of Islamic society or of late medieval
Christian society. What united them was their common scientific and
philosophical culture, a culture going back to the Greek and Hellenistic
thinkers. To
search for these shared points between the different cultures of today is an
urgent task, a task that can be completed only by transcending the existing
cultural, national and ethnic barriers. It is in this way that we can overcome
the ethnocentric concept of culture and history and the monolithic conceptions
of identity and otherness which are almost its logical consequences. This is
how the concept of civilization can be brought to bear upon the concepts of
identity and otherness. |
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