Fertility Is Declining, But Unevenly
The number of births per year rose from 98 million in 1950 to a peak of 134 million in the late 1980s, and is projected to remain just under 130 million for the next 20 years while death rates slowly rise as the global population ages.
Although only a very few countries have declining populations, 61 countries (with about 44% of the world’s population) already have below-replacement fertility rates (less than 2.1 births per woman). The number of such countries is projected to grow to 87 by 2015, encompassing about two thirds of the world’s population.
On the other hand, in 2050, 130 countries will still have positive growth rates, 44 of them above 1% per year, about the rate observed in more-developed regions in 1965.
In 1950-1955, the average fertility rate in the more-developed regions was 2.8 children per woman; it has since dropped to 1.6 and is projected to begin a slow rise, to 1.8, by the middle of next century. In the less-developed regions, the fertility rate was almost 6.2 in 1950; it was slightly less than 3 by 1999, and is projected to fall to less than 2.1 by 2045.
Fertility has declined most quickly in Latin America and Asia, less rapidly in North Africa and the Middle East, and much more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa. Asia’s fertility fell sharply in the last 50 years, from 5.9 to 2.6 children per woman. Sub-Saharan Africa’s has dropped much more slowly, from 6.5 to 5.5. Latin America and the Caribbean have seen a decline from 5.9 to 2.7, North Africa and Western Asia from 6.6 to 3.5.
Europe’s fertility rate fell from 2.6 to 1.4, well below replacement level. On the other hand, Northern America’s fertility fell from 3.5 in 1950-1955 to 1.8 in the late 1970s, and then rebounded to the 1.9 to 2.0 range, where it has remained. It is projected to stay around 1.9 to the middle of the 21st century.
Variations between and within regions, and among different population groups within countries, remain considerable. Some nations, such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea, have moved swiftly to near-replacement level or below; others, such as Nigeria and Guatemala, have seen only a slight fall in fertility rates. However, the pace of decline has varied dramatically in different parts of both Brazil and Nigeria.
Hopes of finding a simple and consistent explanation for the demographic transition have been repeatedly dashed by the realities of data on local experiences. In fact, there is no tight statistical link between development indicators and fertility rates, and the reasons for fertility decline are widely debated by demographers, economists and policy makers. While development is still considered an important factor, it remains unclear why fertility transitions occur earlier in some places than others. The pace of development does not appear to affect the initiation or the rate of fertility transition. However, once a transition has begun, fertility declines more rapidly in countries with higher levels of development.
