| |
| |
|
|
10. Delivery Mechanisms
|
| |
"To
serve the basic learning needs of all requires more than
a commitment to education as it now exists. What is needed
is an expanded vision that surpasses conventional delivery
systems, whilst building on the best in current practices"
(Declaration: 4).
Funding
agencies and their partners are able to draw upon a range
of instruments by which they can contribute to improving access
to basic education and enhancing its quality. Some of the
factors which influence the selection of instrument will be
examined below, and reflect the importance of the particular
country policy and institutional context, and levels of aid
dependency. In broad terms, however, the late 1990s have witnessed
a growing dissatisfaction among some agencies with more traditional
project forms of support, and increasing enthusiasm for sector-wide
approaches. It is difficult to track this shift in terms of
aid flows, since sector budget support is not currently captured
in the aid statistics of most agencies, but it is nonetheless
apparent from recent agency documentation and correspondence.
This section will look at the delivery mechanism options open
to agencies, the factors influencing their choice, the reasons
for any shift in approach, and some of the potential strengths
and weaknesses of each instrument.
|
| |
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| 10.1
Delivery Mechanisms: Range of Instruments |
| |
|
|
The principal
delivery mechanisms used to deliver support to basic education
include the financing and implementation of discrete projects,
support to area wide programmes (often agglomerations of projects),
technical co-operation within ministries or at local government
level and, most recently, support for sector budget finance.
Agencies
also provide general programme assistance, which may be defined
as 'assistance made available to a developing country, without
specific sector allocation, for general development purposes,
i.e. balance of payments financing, general budget support
and commodity assistance' (OECD 1991:5). Its lack of sectoral
specificity is such that it is excluded from the analysis
here, which naturally examines instruments in terms of their
potential to contribute towards improving basic education.
|
| |
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| 10.1.1
Project Aid: Traditional and Enduring Option |
| |
|
|
Projects
- "discrete time bound interventions with clearly specified
objectives" - have been the dominant mode of channelling agency
support to all sectors, including education and basic education,
since at least the 1960s. Despite its well-documented limitations,
it remains the dominant mode of aid delivery in education,
though this is likely to change within the next few years.
Among the familiar criticisms, three points stand out (OECD
1999):
the
project mode easily leads to the construction of enclaves
with few spread effects to surrounding areas;
it
has usually been characterised by strong funding agency
dominance during the design and implementation phases, resulting
in low levels of financial and institutional sustainability;
project
support often bypasses the Ministry of Finance (and sometimes
the Ministry of Education) in partner countries, which can
distort attempts to plan for a rational use of resources
at the national (or regional) level.
A proliferation
of projects can result in policy fragmentation and duplication,
and management overload through servicing agency missions
(Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999). However, countries with low
levels of aid dependency and a well-developed capacity to
manage and co-ordinate funding agency contributions, have
made successful use of project assistance (e.g. China). Even
where sector approaches are dominant, there is still a need
to finance and implement specific investment projects, and
partner governments may still consider that funding agencies
can play a useful role here. What is essential, however, is
that any project assistance is consistent with the broad education
policy and budget frameworks. It should not be used as a vehicle
for circumventing weak government commitment to basic education,
inadequate budget and management systems or an inability to
co-ordinate agencies. These are core issues which have to
be tackled head on (see Ratcliffe & Macrae 1999).
|
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| 10.2
Sector Wide Approaches |
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|
A growing
recognition of the limitations of the project mode of delivery
has led some agencies to seek other methods for aid delivery,
with a particular accent on methods designed to increase local
ownership and achieve a greater integration of agency and
government effort. Central to this has been the growing emphasis
on sectoral approaches.
The OECD
defines sector programme assistance as 'programme assistance
directed to a specific economic or social sector, such as
agriculture, education, community development and transportation'.
This can include grants or loans which combine a package of
technical assistance and/or investment project financing and
programme assistance, provided that the whole package is provided
as a single transaction. This is a very broad definition,
and more recently two tendencies, albeit overlapping and blurred,
can be seen to have emerged.
One tendency
is often named the Sector Investment Programme (SIP), which
has for several years been dominated by the World Bank. However,
several bilateral agencies, notably Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and the UK, among others, participate in SIPs, but
give preference to sector wide approaches (SWAp). Both have
in common the fact that they are designed to create a supportive
framework for the delivery of services to clients. This alternative
tendency, the SWAp, hinges on improved co-ordination among
funders, increased trust between partners, and sufficient
implementation capacity of the partner government. The
SIP approach, the most common until now, retains the identification
of individual agencies with particular components of the programme,
which remain in this sense projects. The process of putting
together a SIP has tended to involve quite active brokerage
by the World Bank, and an element of conditionality remains
in terms of 'buying' policy reform, as well as some restrictions
on the use of funds (see Oxford Policy Management 1997). The
Bank's current support of sector programmes generally entails
providing investment lending which is earmarked to specific
expenditures and subject to World Bank project lending procedures
(see Foster and Naschold 1999).
The SIP
model presents risks, identified by Ratcliffe and Macrae (1999)
as:
a danger
that all the weaknesses of a project approach could be reinvented;
limited
opportunities for continual strategic review and/or negotiation;
and
little
incentive for regular monitoring/review Moreover, one agency
suggested that practice and principles diverged:
|
| |
| Table
10.1 Sector Investment Programmes in principle and in practice |
| |
|
|
Characteristics
in Principle
Sector-wide
in scope
Based
on a clear sector strategy and framework
(all)
local stakeholders in charge; All main agencies participating
in the funding
Common
implementation
Reliance
on local capacity
|
| |
|
|
In
practice
Restricted
in scope
Collection
of sub-sectoral strategies with little integration
Little
non-governmental involvement
Collection
of ear-marked projects
Separate
arrangements
Excessive
reliance on external consultants
|
| |
|
| The alternative
SWAp model involves fewer pre-defined activities, a greater
focus on outcomes and strategic frameworks, and less earmarking
of agency funds; indeed, in the pure programme case, the agency/lender
seeks no control over its aid; and provides general budgetary
support for general development purposes (OECD, 1991). Perhaps
the greatest change is that whilst dialogue between the funding
agency and partner governments used to focus on macro-economic
issues and or various educational sectoral concerns with little
linkage between the two, discussion now centres on improved
public expenditure management and the role of the government
in service provision (including education). The relationships
can be portrayed as follows: |
| |
|
| Table
10.2 (not available) |
| |
|
|
One major
difficulty is that bilateral agencies often require that 'their'
aid should be identifiable, even though the principle was
to combine it with government budgets, because agencies say
that they need to be able to account for the use of their
funds. In practice, as Gould, Takala and Kokkala (1998) say
"the free merging of funds in a recipient controlled funding
basket does not yet occur anywhere".
However,
it is important to distinguish between divergences in the
way in which financial support is provided (common pool versus
narrowly attributed discrete projects, and everything in between),
and the related policy dialogue and conditionality. There
is a growing consensus among agencies on the importance of
accompanying sector support, of whatever kind, with dialogue
designed to promote a more favourable policy and institutional
environment. It is recognised that an agency can "no longer
push its own policy priorities through project support but
will have to build their arguments and priorities into the
policy dialogue" (Lexow, Fergus and Dalseng, 1998).
In principle,
sector wide approaches can focus greater attention on education
sector performance, intra-sectoral linkages, and outcomes
and service quality by giving greater weight to improving
the policy, budgetary and institutional context in which education
services are delivered. SWAps are seen as providing a better
mechanism for effective government-agency partnership, including
enhanced national leadership and ownership of reform plans,
and improved mechanisms for joint government-agency dialogue
and performance review. Sweden has been a strong advocate
for SWAps, and its views on the potential advantages offered
by SWAps are indicated in Box 10.1.
|
| |
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|
Box
10.1: Potential Advantages of SWAps
encourage
the recipient government to take the leadership and to use
the foreign exchange provided in accordance with government
priorities;
secure
a realistic and constructive agency-government dialogue;
contribute
to better agency co-ordination;
achieve
a better connection between the financing of the sector
development and the macroeconomic objectives;
make
the use of resources spent in a sector more transparent
and subject to dialogue;
facilitate
long term financial sustainability in the sector (Sida 1995
|
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|
To be
successful, however, agencies need to give the government
sufficient time to develop its own strategy, which may take
two or three years (as in Ghana health sector). Government
ownership and government ability to co-ordinate agencies is
likely to be seriously undermined if agencies are too eager
to start disbursements, or if too many agencies feel the need
to highlight 'their' individual contributions (OECD 1999).
Other
agency-side obstacles may prevent education SWAps from realising
their full potential. Most agencies are, in practice, slow
to agree on the harmonisation of procedures and reporting
requirements, or having agreed to fund only activities that
figure in government expenditure plans may undermine this
by lobbying for the inclusion of their own projects in those
plans.
However
these difficulties and the emerging tensions between SIPs
and SWAps are not unbridgeable. Possible ways forward include:
promoting
an open exchange of views on concerns over government management
systems through Joint Steering Committees and annual reviews;
the
gradual dovetailing of existing project assistance within
agreed policy frameworks;
agreeing
a timetable for the phasing out of multi-track financing
mechanisms, including agencies with the greatest difficulties
(e.g. Germany (GTZ), Japan (JICA) and Canada)13
|
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| 10.2.1
Education SWAPs: Some Risks |
| |
|
|
The extent
to which education SWAps realise their potential depends on
how far developing country authorities and their funding agency
partners are able to avoid certain pitfalls. SWAps, including
education SWAps, have tended to concentrate exclusively on
the government's role, and without paying greater attention
to the potential role of the private sector, NGOs and local
communities SWAPs may reinforce centralisation and the power
of government administrative structures - even though the
intention is the reverse (see Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999).
The risks
can be reduced by involving the private sector, NGOs and community
groups in the planning and implementation of reforms, and
defining more clearly the respective roles and responsibilities
of the private and public sectors. Relatedly, the incorporation
of assessments of the institutional capacity-building needs
of the private sector and NGOs should be incorporated into
education sector programmes. To reduce the risk of over centralised
and top-down approaches, SWAp design needs to address the
need to stimulate bottom-up demand. This has occurred successfully
in the Primary School Facilities programmes implemented in
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Tanzania and Uganda (see Ratcliffe and
Macrae 1999).
Additional
'risks' to the successful implementation that have been mentioned
by some agencies are:
weak
leadership, commitment, ownership and management capacity
obtains at central and district levels;
education
users are not consulted on the issues (especially with regard
to equity and poverty);
there
are not good links between the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Education;
information
is not shared.
|
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| 10.3
SWAps in Practice |
| |
|
|
Although
no longer 'new', the implementation of sector wide approaches
largely remains in its infancy. There are a number of examples
of education sector approaches in practice, including the
reasonably positive example of Uganda. Ratcliffe and Macrae
(1999) outline the main characteristics of the Ugandan sector
investment programme as being:
clear
links between education policies and broader development
objectives (such as improved governance systems, decentralisation
and poverty reduction);
development
of agreed sectoral and sub-sectoral policies and strategies,
including definition of public spending priorities and clear
roles for the public and private sectors in education management
and financing;
clear
definition of the medium-term resource requirements, including
linkage with forward budget plans and the broader macro-economic
outlook;
strengthening
of common management and audit arrangements for fund disbursement
and procurement of services;
institutional
reforms and development and broad decentralisation in line
with civil service and Local Government reform policies
and plans'
agreed
joint Government/funding agency structures and processes
for strategic negotiation and sector performance review.
an
evolutionary way forward, through periodic review (twice
yearly), rather than a blue print model. Thus ESIP is not
'written in stone'.
a strong
partnership or compact between the government and a consortium
of agencies, who agree to pool aid funds to support comprehensive
plans developed by the government. The aim is to 'put governments
in the driving seat.
This positive
impression accords with the findings of Foster and Naschold
(1999), who have analysed the positive steps taken to ensure
financial accountability to parents, governments and agencies
in Uganda's education sector programme. Nevertheless, there
remain difficulties, which are likely to be encountered in
other programmes. In particular, the monitoring of compliance
with financial management and accounting requirements was
judged to be weak and measures to strengthen financial management
have been proposed. These suggestions may be of relevance
to other SWAps, and highlight the kind of attention to practical
issues that is required if education SWAps genuinely to benefit
the population. Measures included:
enhanced
Budget Framework Paper process, integrating recurrent and
development planning, sectoral and local;
action
plan and skills development for introducing outcome oriented
budgeting;
mechanism
for decentralised funding of development activities by local
governments;
staff
development plan in financial management at centre and local
level, including non-salary measures to improve motivation
and recruitment'
computerisation
of local accounts;
improved
audit and audit follow up, including supporting accountability
to Parliament, supporting Parliamentary Accounts Committee;
performance
monitoring support for statistics, economic and poverty
data systems (within Ministry of Finance), support to delivery
surveys.
|
|
| 10.4
Early Lessons on SWAps in Practice |
| |
|
| Since
many SWAps are still in progress it is difficult to evaluate
whether and in which ways they genuinely represent an improvement
on previous ways of doing business. Not surprisingly, therefore,
many of the 'early lessons' cited by Foster (in Box 10.2) are
not much more than a reiteration of the supposed advantages
of SWAps if carried out properly. |
| |
|
|
Box
10.2 Sector Approaches: Some Early Lessons
SWAps
may be better placed to internalise external factors, especially
macro-economic and institutional concerns.
Flexible
budgetary support needs to secure additionality to sector
funding
A long
term vision (not blueprint) is critical showing clear linkage
between strategic targets and realistic resource envelopes.
SWAps
for education needs to be set within broader civil service
and local government reforms; sector ministries alone cannot
lead from processes.
General
attention needs to be given to outcomes and outputs, rather
than simply resource shifts, linked to reliable data collection
and monitoring systems.
Early
commitment to SWAps can build up confidence, trust and capacity,
while accepting the need for flexible adjustment to strategy
and budgeting.
Agencies
need to show more trust in Government systems, linked to
reasonable accountability and audit mechanisms within Government.
Source:
Foster 1999.
|
|
| The lessons
highlighted serve to emphasise that SWAps do not provide a one-size-fits-all
solution. Their design needs to reflect particular country circumstances
and partner needs and priorities. Similarly, they are likely
to be effective only under certain circumstances, and once particular
favourable conditions have been satisfied. USAID suggest criteria
for when a SWAp is appropriate: |
| |
|
| Table
10.3 |
| |
|
|
Success
of PA or Non PA
Project
Activities Strategies:
In that
it aims to support the provision of services central to the
education reform, such as planning, budgeting/accounting,
teacher training and curriculum.
Focused
on strengthening institutional capacity to create better functioning
systems that deliver better services (e.g. curriculum budgeting
and accounting, personnel, procurement).
Supportive,
in that it provides for elements such as special studies,
workshops and technical assistance - that are not conventionally
or routinely covered by the education budget.
|
|
| |
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|
Non-Project
Activities
Basic
capacity and structure within the ministry of education to
deliver education services.
Adequate
host country management and accounting systems in place.
Commitment
from the country to support the reforms, so that it is prepared
to provide adequate public financing for the education sector
reforms. Mutually agreed upon performance conditions between
the government and agencies that reflect the country education
policy framework.
When
one or more of these conditions is absence, the use of NPA
should be postponed, and PA can be used to create the requisite
conditions.
|
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|
| Source
: USAID 1998 |
| |
|
| A preliminary
analysis by the Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure at ODI
concludes, for example, that countries with strong management
capacity in the sector concerned, high aid dependency and a
good macro-economic and budgetary framework, are likely to benefit
particularly from SWAps. However, countries with a weak overall
framework, poor sector policies and management might benefit
from modest levels of technical co-operation to strengthen policy
development at macro and sector levels. Altogether, they identify
16 different cases, which demand correspondingly nuanced approaches
(see Table 10.4). Needless to say, this is intended only as
a broad guide and material for reflection, rather than as a
rigid blueprint to govern agency approaches. |
| |
|
| 10.5
Implementation at the Country Level: Some Challenges |
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|
| There are
considerable risks of the move towards a SWAp from the perspective
of the partner countries: § If many countries are not considered
to have the right policy framework or capacity for a SWAp, they
may see aid to education and, a fortiori, to basic education
decline (See Box 10.3). |
| |
|
|
Box 10.3 Commitment to Implement Reform
In a report
on Guinea Bissau, Pehrsson, concludes that there remain fundamental
questions about the role of school and say "In a situation
where there is neither a Basic Law, nor a Curriculum Plan,
which sets out the objectives of the educational systems and
identifies the beneficiaries, it is difficult to interpret
the role of the school. There does not appear to be a political
will to implement a basic reform (although over the last twenty
years, there has been a huge effort to redesign curricular
and to produce new books)" ... It is not productive for either
side to maintain an expensive sector programme ... when such
fundamental questions remain undefined and the organisation
of the systems blocks the necessary changes.
Pehrsson
1996
|
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|
Agencies
acting together may push SWAps on countries that are indeed
not ready for a comprehensive sector reform programme, and
where project and targeted technical Co-operation would
be a better option.
The
preoccupation with institutional reform, with system management,
may result in insufficient attention being paid to the actual
delivery of services and their impact on poor and marginalised
groups.
"A serious
challenge is to make sure that the process of negotiating
support to [Education Sector Development Programmes] does
not hijack the national democratic procedures of the host
country. External partners have a tendency to forget the policies
and budgets, i.e. long term programmes are supported to be
debated and approved by national parliaments and their constituencies"
(Sida 1995).
Allsop
(1999) argues that, during their own development, no agency
country would have tolerated the kind of intervention into
their own economies and policies which are implied by the
SWAps for current recipient countries. A poignant illustration
was provided at a recent Education and Development Conference
in Oxford, UK (September 1999), when the partnership aspects
of SWAps were being explained by an agency official. A Minister
of State of Education for Uganda said that the 'partnership'
felt more like going naked into the Conference Chamber: the
next day, he was asked to respond to an Anglo-American perspective
on empowerment!
A further
challenge concerns the possible need for an approach which
bridges sub-sectors or, indeed, makes linkages with sectors
outside of education. Many agencies argue for supporting secondary
education in parallel to support for the primary sector, because
education "operates as a system". A country's overall educational
framework has to be capable of "absorbing" such a large impact
at the primary level - which, according to some agencies,
may itself also have a deleterious effect on quality. Some
go further to argue that higher education is also essential
and is complementary to (not incompatible with) the overall
emphasis on basic education in development
A number
of agencies identify the need for an intersectoral approach
which makes linkages with other sectors, such as health. If,
for example, one wants to understand the factors affecting
the success rate of children, one has to take account of health
status, cultural and social environment at home and socio-economic
conditions in the community, as well as any data from the
education system itself.
For the
Swiss, sector policy for basic education is primarily an orientation
and management tool to be effective, it must be geared to
the local situation and main principles. "Basic education
must not be allowed to become an isolated programme, it has
applications in health demography, gender balanced development
and vocational training" (SDC 1996:23).
The emphasis
on an all-encompassing sectoral approach is sometimes negated
by the exclusion of specific educational components. Whilst
this is clearly relevant for capacity building and training
included in the support to other sectors, it also has a particular
implication for the focus here on basic education. Thus, for
example, whilst early childhood development is naturally recognised
as being part of the education sector by nearly all agencies,
adult education is often taken up in other sectors both by
the agency and by the recipient country (see Chapter 8).
For example,
the Educational Sector Investment Programme in Uganda did
not include discussion of the government's (and some agencies)
rather substantial commitment to the Functional Adult Literacy
programme, simply because the latter is organised by and under
the responsibility of the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Community
Development. On the agency side, the Belgian point to the
difficulty of isolating their aid to basic education from
aid to public health.
|
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|
| 10.6
How Far have SWAps been Adopted? |
| |
|
|
Agencies
vary considerably in the extent to which they have embraced
SWAps as an important approach, ultimately, their preferred
instrument for delivering support to the education sector.
Although many agencies have adopted or are supportive towards
a pro-SWAp policy, some of the smaller agencies say that the
restricted number of the staff mean that it cannot (yet) be
implemented. Moreover, many agencies, even if they have adopted
a SWAp approach, still have projects and programmes: Netherlands
and Norway both say that over 50% of their current budget
is committed via projects.
General
tendencies are summarised in Table 10.2, though the reality
is considerably more complex. Thus, for instance, Finland
notes that SWAps represent a 'practical solution to the problem
of translating political and economic dialogue into long-term
development programmes' (see Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999: 27).
In addition, Finland in practice provides significant support
to sector programmes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal and Zambia.
There is also ongoing intensive preparation for implementation
of SWAps. A similar situation prevails for Denmark. France
and USAID have been less ready to support SWAps, but more
recently have been shown to be increasingly willing to join
SWAp partnerships, including in Uganda and Cambodia respectively
(Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999).
|
| |
|
| Table
10.4 |
| |
|
| Pro SWA
as a policy ADB UK EC Norway Sweden UNDP |
|
| ADB UK
EC Norway Sweden UNDP |
|
|
Generally
Supportive
Denmark
Finland France Netherlands Switzerland USAID CDB UNICEF
|
|
|
Less
Supportive
Austria
(restricted staff) Belgium CIDA (restricted staff) GTZ JICA
(moving towards)
|
| |
|
| Source:
agency documentation |
| |
|
| 10.7
Implications for Agencies of the Move from Projects to SWAps:
Policy and Practice |
| |
|
|
There
are several possible implications of a move from projects
to SWAps:
how
do SWAps 'fit' with decentralisation
the
kind of partnerships with NGOs and the ownership by governments.
equity
and gender issues
link
to the variety of possible delivery systems
what
is the status of basic education within education and the
status of education versus any other sectors.
The first
issue is considered in the following two sub-sections; and
the second in Section 10.8. Although the other issues are
likely to be important, information is not available from
the survey to cover them. As Ratcliffe and Macrae (1999) remark,
there is little discussion in agency documentation of how
communities or representatives of different groups should
be included in discussions about SWAps. There are discussions
about the appropriate curricula. The recent emphases on thematic
approaches, although relatively new, does not appear to be
logically linked to SWAps. Similarly, whilst it is emphasised
that all approaches - however diverse can be brought within
one envelope, experience from other sectors suggests that
the minority concerns will tend to be squeezed out if their
funds are not ring-fenced. Finally, some commentators have
remarked that basic education might get lost in the Sector
Approach; but again there is little concrete experience.
|
| |
|
| 10.7.1
In-Country Decentralisation |
| |
|
| SDPs/SIPs
are predominantly in the sectors where the public sector role
is dominant. In principle, the development of sector-wide programmes
should parallel the progress of decentralisation especially
in federal systems (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999) as programmes
are implemented holistically at each level. However, there is
a danger that, without adequate involvement, of the private
sector, NGOs and local communities, SDPs will reinforce centralisation
and government administrative structures. Based on discussions
with Finnish and Swedish officials, Ratcliff and Macrae (1999)
ask how can parental, private and community involvement be calibrated
and counted and Macrae (1999, footnote 4), remarks on the significant
omission of the children and their parents from the beneficiaries
of sector activity who needed to be included in the discussions. |
| |
|
| 10.7.2
Agency Decentralisation: Implications for Basic Education Policy |
| |
|
|
The extent
to which development agency expertise and decision-making
authority is concentrated in agency capitals or located in
developing countries has implications for their capacity to
focus effectively on basic education. There is clearly no
simple correlation between decentralisation and effectiveness,
and indeed potentially there are both advantages and disadvantages
(see Table 10.2).
Some agencies
consider that having empowered staff at the country level
is an absolute requirement for effective partnerships in basic
education; but this itself has implications with, for example,
SIDA realising that neither their staff nor many of the consultants
on their registers have the appropriate skills, and so need
retraining. Such staff are seen as better placed to identify
the opportunities for promoting education and specifically
basic education agendas and engaging in country-level influencing
of government, civil society groups, and other agencies (including
the multilaterals).
|
| |
|
| Table
10.5 Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Agency Decentralisation |
| |
| |
|
Potential
Advantages
helps
understanding of political context and country specific
knowledge; complexities of poverty
helps
dialogue and partnership - and co-ordination
may
make more responsive to emerging opportunities
may
strengthen team-working across disciplines
involvement
of civil society § strengthen government standard procedures
|
| |
|
Potential
Disadvantages
may
dilute message from centre (bad if the message strongly
supports basic education; good if not, and the flexibility
allows BE proselytisers to flourish)
possible
loss of objectivity
may
be harder to recruit skills needed for basic education focus
higher
running costs
hampers
the exchange of experience and good practice, and dissemination
of principles of developing basic education
|
| |
| Source:
adapted from Cox (1999) |
| |
|
The increased
emphasis on sector-wide approaches is also seen by several
agencies as requiring more staff at the country level, able
to engage fully with the government and other agencies over
the two-to-three-year development process. This period, when
policies and institutional reform are designed, is seen as
very intensive, requiring trust and support, which some felt
that even advisers at the regional level could not supply.
The potential disadvantages of decentralisation were felt
by many to be less weighty, and could be mitigated by careful
attention to systems of accountability and lesson-learning.
However, some of, especially, the smaller agencies realise
that they do not have the capacity to have 'mini-agencies'
in each recipient country (e.g. Canada) indeed, that has used
as a reason for not adopting the sectoral approach
Finally,
whilst there has been considerable agency decentralisation
from the metropolis to the recipient countries, the hugely
increased need for 'policy advice' across the sector has spawned
a new breed of TA policy advisors (e.g. ADB).
Cox (1999)
provides a rough guide to the extent of decentralisation of
many agencies - referring to the proportion of staff located
in overseas offices and the degree to which these staff have
decision-making authority. Only a minority can be classified
as highly decentralised (Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
UK), with the remainder evenly split between the moderately
decentralised and the mainly centralised.
There
is considerable variation in practice and capacity. Denmark,
for instance, has a substantial range of expertise in its
embassies, as do the Dutch whose embassy formulates a sector
plan on the basis of an analysis of the education sector,
the sector policy and the main economic, political and social
factors influencing its implementation. The World Bank has
located some country directors overseas, but only a small
number. Officials consider that this makes them more client-driven
(although this is not necessarily consistent with an emphasis
on basic education, with country directors able to call on
a range of expertise as they need it. However, most Bank expertise
remains located in Washington. UNDP traditionally has been
more decentralised than many agencies, but has sought to increase
decentralisation, while trying to improve accountability.
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| 10.8
The Role of Technical Co-operation as a Delivery Mechanism |
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| In those
contexts where sector policies are weak but macro-economic and
sector management is stronger (Box 3 in Table 10.4), there is
a case for agencies providing technical support, for firm engagement
in dialogue, in particular with Ministry of Finance and education
sector officials to strengthen sector policy development. Foster
and Naschold argue that where a medium-term budget framework
approach is used, this can be helpful in clarifying the importance
of making policy choices designed to match aspirations to resources.
There may also be a case for project support to develop pilot
projects to test the potential of reformed approaches to service
delivery. An education sector wide approach could follow, but
would require a judgement as to whether the pro-reform forces
within the ministry, local government and other institutions
are sufficient to actually implement the improved policies (Foster
and Nashold 1999). |
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| 10.9
Agency Co-operation and Co-ordination |
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| All agencies
recognise the need for improved co-ordination and co-operation
with partner authorities and between themselves. An analysis
of practice at the country level concerns: § what types of co-operation
and co-ordination exist with respect to education and basic
education in particular. § how these have changed over time,
especially in the light of the move from projects to SWAps §
how this reflects/relates to Jomtien § what are seen as the
problems. § case studies of best practices. |
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| 10.9.1
In-country Co-ordination |
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|
Historically
in most partner countries where there are several agencies
in the education sector, there have been regular inter-agency
meetings to co-ordinate their aid programmes (or at least
to know when they are stepping on each others toes). The Jomtien
Conference moved this approach along in respect of basic education
through the Round Tables sponsored by UNESCO in order to promote
Education for All and the advent of SWAps here, of course,
forced agencies to discuss a joint package of aid together.
According
to UNESCO (1992), of the 121 countries from whom information
was collected by the Secretariat to the International Consultation
Forum on Education for All in 1992, sixty seven (53%) had
already organised at least one post Jomtien national level
EFA policy meeting; and the same number had organised some
form of public information campaign. Most countries (87%)
had announced EFA goals and nearly all (90%) had a strategy
or plan of action to achieve EFA. However, only 12 countries
(105) had reported a significant increase in the allocation
for basic education in the national budget since Jomtien;
and 34 countries (28%) had organised meetings with agency
agencies (excluding the usual bilateral contacts) to seek
external funding for basic education. JICA, in assessing whether
or not they should move towards SWAps, reviewed the status
of SWAps in 12 African countries, in terms of the strength
of local institutional capacity both centrally and locally,
the number of other major agencies and the extent of agency
co-ordination between themselves and with the recipient government.
They found that there is no apparent relationship between
the strength of institutional capacity and the extent to which
the recipient country's government is involved in co-ordination
mechanisms; an interesting commentary on the practical importance
of the country's institutional capacity and on the criteria
advanced by, for example, USAID as to when a SWAp is appropriate.
Agency
co-ordination ought to be driven by the governments of the
partner countries; but agency co-ordination is complicated
by various philosophies, agendas, modalities and bureaucratic
procedures (e.g. disbursement mechanisms, technical assistance
recruitment, and reporting practices) of the different agencies
and funding agencies (USAID 1998).
The process
of implementing SWAps should be carefully assessed to ensure
that the outcome is that the nature of the burden on government
evolves from managing relations with a plethora of agencies
to managing the core business of government.
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| 10.9.2
Other Forms of Co-ordination |
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|
The formal
institutions for co-ordination outside the country context
are well known.
OECD
Development Assistance committees with regular three monthly
meetings although education is only occasionally on the
agenda.
IWGE
(International Working Group in Education) sponsored by
UNDP, UNESCO, World Bank with the secretariat at IIEP (International
Institute of Education Planning) with regular 6 monthly
meetings. It brings together representatives of the main
agencies and ministries of education from Sub-Saharan Africa.
ADEA
(Association for Development of Education in Africa) with
regular (6 monthly) meetings about progress in respect of
the problems and opportunities for the development of education
in Africa. It has ten working groups focusing on different
areas of policy.
Horizon
2000 Meetings of Education experts organised between the
EU Commission and Member States which has produced examples
of best practice and the Code of Conduct for agencies working
within the education sector.
The latter
three groups have grown up in the last decade and have been
substantially influenced by the Jomtien agenda. The secretariat
of the IWGE has published three reviews of trends in aid based
on these meetings and they include statement of each agency's
position. ADEA is an even more open forum in that it invites
(academic) researchers to present and discuss at its meetings.
In addition to these formal fora, there are often informal
meetings:
EU-Africa/Africa-Africa
inter university co-operation (Benin April 1999; Anglophile,
Africa)
New
Zealand recommended that regular trilateral meetings between
the Cook Islands Government, New Zealand and ADB be formalised
according to an established procedure and timetable.
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| 10.9.3
Partnerships |
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| Although
the term 'partnership' is very frequently used, what one agency
means by partnership is very different from another (see Table
10.7.) |
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| Agency-based
tertiary institutions and NGOs: Belgium, Finland, Ireland, UK
|
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| Recipient
Country based Tertiary institutions and NGOs: Austria, Canada,
Germany (DSE), Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, WB |
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| Recipient
Governments: Canada, Portugal, Sweden, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Denmark, Switzerland?, UK, USA, WB |
| |
| |
| Note
The development banks deal largely with recipient governments
and multilateral agencies such as UNESCO and UNICEF deal with
the whole range of organisations. * the UK specifies dealing
with all these groups in their 1997 White Paper |
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| 10.10
Conclusions and Outstanding Issues |
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|
The problems
with purely project support to one aspect or another of the
education system or to the basic education sub-sector are
almost universally recognised. The late 1980s and 1990s have
seen a shift, partially borne out in spending, in favour of
sectoral 'packages' of support. These potentially offer significant
opportunities to deliver support to education that is institutionally
and financially more sustainable, and reflecting an increased
recognition of the importance of ownership by country partners.
However,
these advantages will only be delivered in practice if key
challenges are overcome. These include ensuring the involvement
of private sector, NGO and community actors in the process
of design and implementation, in order to ensure solutions
meet needs and the dangers of excessive centralisation are
mitigated. Attention to stimulating bottom-up demand is likewise
required. Further elements include the extent of partner country
"readiness" for comprehensive sector support through the budget
(including appropriate financial systems, such as a medium
term expenditure framework). Effectiveness will also hinge
on the ability of agencies to subsume their individual ambitions
within a nationally developed framework of priorities and
actions.
From the
partner government's point of view, sectoral approaches involve
massive reform challenges which usually appear on the agenda
simultaneously. The need for financial accountability in sector
wide approaches places considerable demands on national financial
and budgetary systems. A step-by-step approach allowing space
for partner governments is required, since SWAps may require
the implementation of a comprehensive cross-sectoral and sometimes
inter-sectoral change. Capacity building and institutional
development measures need very careful consideration to ensure
that they do not add to the strain by taking away key officials
for training.
The move
towards SWAps, whilst welcomed in principle by many agencies,
has posed problems for them: firstly in terms of accountability;
and second in terms of the resources required to implement
their aid programmes. The
more intensive policy dialogue in-country has meant that the
in-country embassy staff of each agency have to be aware and
conversant with the sectoral wide approach in general and
those adopted by their bilateral colleagues working in the
same country in particular. In turn, this has led to many
agencies themselves going through a process of decentralisation
of their central office staff. One smaller agency commented:
"The
move towards SWAps is causing increasing difficulty to the
smaller agencies in terms of the increased amount of in-country
co-ordination required. The proliferation of fora for external
co-ordination has not necessarily helped this problem".
Further
challenges include the danger that sector-wide approaches
imply an emphasis on the education sector as a whole, with
the attendant risk that this may lead to a downgrading of
basic education within that. Several agencies have mentioned
re-introducing support to tertiary education as part of the
package of support to basic education. However, this may equally
be an opportunity as well as a risk. An effective approach
might involve working to improve the policy and institutional
environment of the education sector as a whole, but underlining
the importance of allocating very significant (and usually
increased) resources to basic education within that.
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