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| 1. The
role of education in the context of population growth and development |
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Population growth, rising social and economic disparities and
concerns about the depletion of natural resources have led to
a re-examination of the concept of development against a much
broader backdrop than economic growth alone. A more integrated
approach to human development is emerging that involves enlarging
human choices, ensuring universal access to basic social services,
including education and health, and human rights. This broader
view of development, stressing investment in people, has been
the focus of the recent series of world conferences, all of
which, from different perspectives, have underlined the central
role of education as a key to sustainable development, peace,
the fulfilment of fundamental human rights and the improvement
of living standards . This section focuses on the global demographic
context in which the expansion of basic education is to take
place, examines the relationship between demographic and economic
growth in individual countries and considers some of the dimensions
of the debate on population, development and education, including
the potential impact of education on population dynamics, development
and sustainability. |
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| 1.1
Population growth becomes an issue |
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| The
world's population has grown rapidly … |
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The current size of the world population is the result of a
short and unprecedented period of accelerated population growth.
This can be seen when considering that from 1804, when the world
passed the 1 billion mark, it took 123 years to reach 2 billion
people, while succeeding billions took 33 years, 14 years, 13
years and 12 years, resulting in 6 billion people in 1999. |
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| … and
half of it is currently under the age of 24. |
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Between 1970 and 1998 the world child population (under 15)
increased by 29 per cent, from 1.39 to 1.79 billion. The young
population aged between 15 and 24 amounts currently to one billion
and about 50 per cent of the world's citizens are under the
age of 24. Looking towards the future, projections show that
the world population will continue to increase, even if at a
slower rate, growing to between 7.3 billion and 10.7 billion
by the year 2050, depending on different fertility assumptions,
with a figure of 8.9 billion (medium fertility variant) considered
to be most likely. |
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Even thirty years ago, in 1970, when the world population was
well under four billion and the number of children under age
15 in the world was some 400 million lower than now, education
for all would have been a very different enterprise. |
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The recognition of the centrality of education is reflected
in the number of international conferences that made significant
recommendations concerning education during the 1990s. These
include, besides the World Conference on Education for All in
1990, the World Summit for Children held in New York in 1990,
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the World Conference on Human
Rights held in Vienna in 1993, the International Conference
on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994, the World
Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, the
Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, the
International Conference on Child Labour held in Oslo in 1997,
the Fifth International Conference on Adult Education held in
Hamburg in 1997, the First World Conference of Ministers responsible
for Youth held in Lisbon in 1998, and the Second International
Congress on Technical and Vocational Education held in Seoul
in 1999. |
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| Fig. 1.1:
World Population Size, 1750 to 2050: past estimates and projected
fertility variants (in billions) |
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 |
| Source:
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects:
The 1998 Revision |
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| Despite
declining rates of growth, the annual population increase remains
high. |
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Currently the world population is increasing by 78 million people
each year because of the large size of the population of reproductive
age, which in turn is due to the high rates of population growth
of recent decades. Up to 2010-2015 the world population will
have an increase of more than 70 million persons per year and
it is only in 2030-2040, according to the scenario based on
medium fertility assumptions, that the annual population increment
will get back to 46 million, which is the size it had in 1950.
However, the rate of population growth, after having peaked
at 2.04 per cent in the late 1960s, has fallen to 1.46 per cent
per year in 1990-1995, and to an even lower rate of 1.33 per
cent per year in 1995-2000 (World Population Prospects, 1999).
|
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| Fig. 1.2:
World population average annual increment and growth rate (medium-variant),
1950-2050 |
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| Source:
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects:
The 1998 Revision |
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The average number of children per woman has fallen from 4.5
in 1970-1975 to 2.7 in 1999 but - again - because of the youthful
age-structure of the world's population, the slowdown in the
average number of children per woman has not yet translated
into absolute figures. Although the fertility level in 1995-2000
was 40 per cent lower than in 1970-1975, the world's average
annual number of births was 8 per cent higher. |
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| Fertility
decline over the next decades will be critical in shaping the
future size of the world population |
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If fertility declines rapidly over the next decades, the world
population would reach a maximum around the middle of the twenty-first
century. If fertility declines slowly, the world population
will continue to increase substantially far beyond this. The
pattern of fertility decline over the next decades is therefore
critical in shaping the ultimate size of the world population
(United Nations, 1999c). |
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| Fig. 1.3:
World average annual number of births and total fertility rate
(medium-variant) 1950-2050 |
|
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| Source:
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects:
The 1998 Revision |
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Meanwhile, the last quarter of the 20th century has witnessed
a remarkable progress in the reduction of mortality at the global
level. The average level of infant mortality dropped from 93
per 1000 live births in 1970-1975 to 57 in 1995-2000 and life
expectancy at birth rose from 58 years to 65 years, respectively,
despite the fact that the tragic impact of HIV/AIDS starts to
appear in the statistics and in the 29 hardest hit African countries
the average life expectancy is estimated to be seven years less
than it would have been in the absence of AIDS. |
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| Ninety-seven
percent of the world population increase occurs in the less
developed countries - which are least prepared to meet the challenge. |
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Even more significant than the rate of growth or the magnitude
of the numbers involved, is the fact that ninety-seven per
cent of the world population increase occurs in the less developed
regions of the world. Every year the population of Asia is
increasing by 50 million, the population of Africa by 17 million
and that of Latin America and the Caribbean by nearly 8 million.
Sixty per cent of the world's population increase is contributed
by only ten countries, with 21 per cent contributed by India
and 15 per cent by China (United Nations, 1999a).
Differential growth rates lead to a redistribution of the
world population among major geographical areas and groups
of countries. In the century between 1950 and 2050, the population
of Africa is expected to be multiplied by a little more than
9, Latin America and the Caribbean by nearly 5, Asia by 4,
Northern America by 2 and Europe by just 1.2. While in 1950,
Europe, North America and Oceania accounted for 28.5 per cent
of the world population, their share of the world total decreased
to 18 per cent in 1998, and will further decline to 11 per
cent in 2050. The shares of Asia and Latin America are relatively
more stable at approximately 60 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively. The share of Africa increased from 9 per cent
in 1950 to almost 13 per cent in 1995, and is expected to
grow further to almost 22 per cent by 2050.
|
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| 1.2
Population and development in the international debate |
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| The
impact of population growth has become a global challenge. |
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While population growth varies considerably across countries
and regions, the impacts of this growth have become a global
challenge and consequently demography has taken on a central
role in the agenda of international co-operation. Under the
auspices of the United Nations five population conferences took
place during the second half of the 1900s, from a technical
meeting held in Rome in 1954, to the third intergovernmental
conference on population and development held in Cairo in 1994,
where 180 nations took part in the finalisation of a Programme
of Action for the next 20 years. Population issues were already
situated in the broad context of socio-economic development
by the World Population Plan of Action agreed upon in Bucharest
in 1974. Twenty years later, the 1994 International Conference
on Population and Development reflected the awareness that population,
poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment
are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered
in isolation: "Sustainable development as a means to ensure
human well-being, equitably shared by all people today and in
the future, requires that the interrelationship between population,
resources, the environment and development should be fully recognised,
properly managed and brought into harmonious, dynamic balance"
(Principle 6 in Programme of Action, 1994, p. 10). On this same
issue, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda
21, adopted in 1997, affirms: "The current decline in population
growth rates must be further promoted through national and international
policies that promote economic development, social development,
environmental protection and poverty eradication, particularly
the further expansion of basic education." |
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| There
is no general pattern in the relationship between population
and development… |
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Whether rapid population growth influences the pace of economic
development positively or negatively, or indeed whether it is
the pace of economic development that influences the rate of
population growth, is a question that continues to attract scholarly
and popular attention. Causal links between population and development
are complex and not easily analysed. These causal links and
interrelationships differ between countries so that it is difficult
to identify general patterns. Also the level of economic development
that a country has achieved prior to the onset of rapid population
growth has an impact on the consequences of that growth: in
general, the more advanced the level of development, the less
the impact of population growth (Psacharopoulos, Rosenhouse,
1999). Moreover, the short- and long-term effects of rapid population
growth on development might not only differ but, even, go in
different directions. |
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| … but
on balance slower rates of growth facilitate the economy in
developing countries. |
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However, analytical and empirical findings seem to support the
conclusion that on balance, slower population growth would be
beneficial to economic development for most developing countries
(National Research Council, 1986, p. 90). Another question at
the centre of the debate is whether economic and social progress
is a prerequisite for the demographic transition from high to
low rates of mortality and fertility or whether, with current
means for birth control and the reduction of mortality rates,
demographic change will take place in any case, even in the
poorest social groups. As research into demographic transition
has developed, it has become clear that there is no single historical
pattern. On the contrary, there is a high degree of variation
in different situations since modalities of demographic transition
are largely dependent on historic and cultural circumstances,
with the resulting need to pay greater attention to contextual
factors. However social development has been recognised as "an
absolute requirement for a genuine demographic transition" given
that "a durable reduction in fertility rates requires improved
standards of living" (Cosio-Zavala, 1999, p. 97). |
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| 1.3
The interplay between demographic and economic trends
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In general, it is where population growth outpaces economic
growth, and thus Gross National Product (GNP) per capita declines,
and where population growth reinforces social and economic disparities
that pressure on economic stability and social cohesion occurs. |
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| The
world economy has grown much faster than the world population
… |
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Taking a global perspective, economic growth and wealth creation
in the last century have been spectacular. While over the three
centuries from 1500 to 1820, world GDP roughly tripled, during
the 170 years after 1820 it increased more than 40-fold (OECD,
1999). Against this background, world population growth seems
modest. |
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| … but
not all people have benefited equally from this. |
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However, there has been much less success in distributing wealth
than in creating it - not just across but also within countries,
creating new imbalances and problems to be faced. |
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| How
did demographic and economic trends interact in different countries? |
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It is therefore instructive to examine the way in which demographic
and economic trends have played out and interacted in different
countries. While population factors cannot account for short-term
economic fluctuations, there has been persistent interest
in the longer-term economic effects of demographic change.
For many years, empirical studies have failed to find evidence
of strong or consistent relationships, either positive or
negative, between demographic change and subsequent economic
growth. However, recent analyses, based on data since the
end of the 1970s, have revealed fairly large negative associations
between rapid population growth and growth rates of per capita
output (Blanchet, 1999). Lately, the predominant view is that
slower rates of population growth can buy more time to adjust
and can increase countries' ability to attack poverty, protect
and repair the environment and build the basis for future
sustainable development (United Nations 1999d). The countries
examined are the nine high population countries (Bangladesh,
Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan)
that came together in New Delhi in 1993 to follow up the Jomtien
conference and are collaborating with one another and with
UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP and the World Bank in order to
achieve the goal of education for all. These countries, which
have subsequently been referred to as the E-9 countries, together
comprise more than half of the world's population and over
70 per cent of the world's illiterate adults.
Table 1.1, which presents population, fertility rates, contraceptive
prevalence and the annual percentage of population growth,
reveals that in only two countries, Nigeria and Pakistan,
the average woman now bears more than four children during
her reproductive years. In the 1960s and 1970s, this was the
rule in nearly all developing countries. The other seven countries
are at different points in the demographic transition. Each
country has had its own unique experience, but all seven appear
to be following a common pattern.
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| Table 1.1:
Population, TFR, natural increase and contraceptive prevalence,
1998, E-9 countries |
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Country
|
Population
(in million mid-1998)
|
Total
Fertility Rate
|
Natural
increase (% per year)
|
Contraceptive
prevalence (%)
|
|
China
|
1,256
|
1.8
|
1.0
|
83
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|
India
|
982
|
3.4
|
1.9
|
41
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|
Indonesia
|
206
|
2.7
|
1.5
|
55
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|
Brazil
|
166
|
2.5
|
1.4
|
77
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|
Pakistan
|
148
|
5.6
|
2.8
|
18
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|
Bangladesh
|
125
|
3.3
|
1.8
|
49
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Nigeria
|
106
|
6.5
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3.0
|
15
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|
Mexico
|
96
|
3.1
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2.2
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65
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Egypt
|
66
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3.6
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2.2
|
48
|
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| Source:
Chesnais, 1999. Based on Demographic and Health Surveys, 1998. |
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The following charts (Figures 1.4-1.12) present the annual rates
of growth of the population, of GNP and of GNP per capita on
one scale (1970-1980-1990-1997), thus allowing the comparison
of demographic and economic development within countries, and
the GNP per capita converted using Purchasing Power Parities
(PPP) on the other scale, in order to adjust for price differences
across countries, thus allowing to compare levels of wealth
across countries (Source: World Bank, 1999 World Development
Indicators). |
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| Some
countries have seen consistent growth in national income that,
coupled with decreasing rates of population growth, can translate
into higher standards of living. |
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| Figures
1.4 - 1.12: Demographic and economic growth in the E-9 countries
(1970-1997) |
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China appears to be at one extreme. The "one child" population
policy that China has sought to apply since the 1970s has been
widely implemented in the cities and, to a lesser extent, in
the countryside. As a result, total fertility rates dropped
from 4.9 in 1970-1975 to 1.8 in 1995-2000. The total population
grew from around 800 million in 1970 to over 1.2 billion in
the 1990s. However, the annual rate of population growth declined
from 2.2 per cent in 1970 to less than 1 per cent in 1998. Over
this period China has seen consistent growth of national income
although the rate of economic growth has varied somewhat over
the years. In 1997 the annual growth of GNP per capita in China
(8.47 per cent) exceeded population growth (0.96 per cent) by
far. While this has allowed China to raise the average standard
of living greatly, not all people have benefited equally from
this development: the 20 per cent of the population ranked lowest
by personal or family income accrue just 5.5 per cent of national
income, whereas the 20 per cent ranked highest accrue almost
half the national income. |
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The case of India depicts another trend: the decline in fertility
also began in the 1970s and has persisted, although at a much
lower rate than in China with the consequence that the total
population in India grew from 500 million in 1970 to over 900
million at the end of the 1990s. Total fertility rates declined
from 5.4 births per woman in 1970 to 3.4 in 1998. From the first
Quinquennial Plan launched in 1952, the Indian Government implemented
a population policy aimed at reducing the birth rate but limited
governmental support and strong cultural resistance to family
planning limited the effects of this reform. The global rate
of contraceptive prevalence (including the use of traditional
methods) remained at just above 40 per cent in 1998. India also
had a consistent growth of national income, both when considering
the economy as a whole and when measured by GNP per capita.
However, income is also distributed unequally, with the lowest
ranking 20 per cent of the population accruing less than 10
per cent of national income and 40 per cent of it being allocated
to the highest-ranking 20 per cent of the population. |
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In Indonesia current fertility rates are lower than in India,
with 2.7 births per woman in 1998 and a contraceptive prevalence
of 55 per cent. The total population went from some 120 million
to 200 million between 1970 and 1997. Annual population growth
rates declined steadily from 2.4 to 1.6 during the same period,
due to a population policy aimed at limiting the number of children
per family to two. Annual rates of GNP growth and GNP growth
per capita exhibited an inverse trend going from 7.9 to 8.8
and from 5.4 to 7.0 respectively, between 1970 and 1990. Despite
the overall favourable economic and demographic situation, GNP
growth and GNP growth per capita dropped in 1997 due to the
Asian financial crisis and subsequent political instability.
During the 1990s, the lowest ranking 20 per cent of the population
accrued 8 per cent of the national income, whereas the highest
ranking 20 per cent accrued 50 per cent of it. |
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The total fertility rate in Bangladesh also fell sharply during
the last two decades, from 6.6 to about 3.3 children per woman.
The annual rate of population growth, as well as the annual
population increment, peaked during the 1970s, while it is now
well below 2.0. After a decrease of GNP growth and GNP growth
per capita around the beginning of the 1980s, the economic growth
outpaced the declining population growth during the 1990s. |
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Latin America underwent striking demographic changes between
the end of the 1960s and the end of the 1990s, due to the implementation
of effective family planning policies. In Brazil, fertility
rates were at 4.7 in 1970-1975, while by mid-1998, the average
number of births per woman had dropped to 2.5 and contraceptive
prevalence had reached a maximum of 77 per cent. The annual
rate of population growth halved between 1970 and 1997, declining
from 2.5 to 1.3 percent. With the exception of the economic
crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, due to the rise of the
oil prices and the increase of the cost of foreign debt, the
economy has grown steadily, at a faster rate than population
growth, resulting in increased GNP per capita. Between 1990
and 1997, GNP growth and GNP per capita growth increased reaching
3.3 and 1.9 per cent, respectively. However, income distribution
was and remains highly unequal. The lowest ranking 20 per cent
of the population accrued just 2.8 per cent of national income
in the 1970s and its share was further reduced to 2.5 per cent
in the 1990s. Conversely, the highest ranking 20 per cent of
the population accrued 62 per cent of the income in 1970 and
this share was further expanded to 64.2 per cent in the 1990s.
In this case, the economic crisis that occurred in the region
during the 1980s seems to have prevented, at least temporarily,
the country from benefiting from the demographic decline. The
reduced population growth, however, may be one of the factors
explaining the speed and size of the economic recovery during
the 1990s. |
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At the beginning of the 1970s, Mexico had, among the E-9 countries,
the fastest population growth, with an average growth rate of
3.2 per cent and a total fertility rate of 6.5 births per woman.
In the period 1995-2000, fertility decreased, on average, to
less than 2.8 children per woman and in 1997 population growth
dropped to an annual rate of 1.7 per cent. Before the financial
crisis that occurred in Latin America during the 1980s, the
sharp decline in the annual rate of population growth, which
halved during the twenty-seven year period between 1970 and
1997, was coupled with rapid economic growth. Growth in GNP
per capita went from 3.9 per cent in 1970 to 5.2 per cent in
1980, before dropping to –8.2 per cent in 1990. However, economic
recovery, during the 1990s, was even faster than in Brazil,
bringing economic growth rates to an even higher level than
in 1980, with GNP per capita growth at 6.3 per cent. Income
distribution is similar to that observed in Brazil, with a share
of 3.6 of national income for the lowest ranking 20 per cent
of the population and 58.2 per cent for the highest ranking
20 per cent of the population. |
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In Africa, there are marked sub-regional variations among countries.
Fertility reduction in Egypt was gradual, declining from 5.5
in 1970-1975 to 3.4 in 1995-2000. The total population count
went from 35 million in 1970 to 44 million in 1980, to 56 million
in 1990 and was projected to be 68 million in 2000. The annual
rate of population growth started to reverse its trend during
the 1980s, going from 2.8 to 1.8 between 1980 and 1997. Economic
growth outpaced population growth considerably between 1980
and 1990. Between 1990 and 1997, conversely, following the decade
with the highest population change, GNP growth and GNP per capita
decreased from 16.7 and 14.1 per cent respectively, to 6.4 and
4.5. |
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| In
some countries economic development cannot meet the pace of
population growth |
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|
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| Nigeria
depicts the situation of Sub-Saharan Africa countries, with
a fertility rate that in 1998 was still at 6.5 births per woman
and a population growth rate of 2.9 in 1997. The population
doubled between 1970 and 1995, going from 50 million to 99 million
and, according to the medium-variant projections, will double
once again by 2030, reaching 197 million. A decrease in GNP
growth and GNP per capita growth corresponded, during the 1980s,
to an increase of the population growth rates. Although GNP
growth and GNP per capita growth rates increased during the
1990s, they lagged behind the changes in population growth. |
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Similarly, with a fertility rate of 5.6 in 1998, Pakistan stands
out and its demographic situation resembles that of India and
China at the beginning of the 1970s, before the demographic
transition commenced. Despite high rates of economic growth
during the 1970s and 1980s, it appears that the increase in
national income in Pakistan can no longer sustain the fast population
growth. Population growth decreased by just 0.6 percentage points
in thirty years, while GNP growth and growth of GNP per capita
exhibited increasingly negative changes in the period from 1970
to 1997, declining from 11.9 and 8.6 per cent to 0 and –2.4
per cent, respectively. Political instability and the absence
of an active family-planning programme may contribute to the
explanation of these trends. Income distribution follows the
pattern of the countries examined before, with 9 per cent of
income accruing to the lowest 20 per cent of the population
and 45 per cent to the highest 20 per cent. |
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|
To sum up, population continues to expand in all developing
regions of the world, even if at a reduced pace in most of them.
Based on the data of the E-9 countries for the period between
1970 and 1997, population growth and economic growth appear
to be interrelated, beyond the influence of global financial
events that may explain sudden, temporary drops in national
incomes. In countries such as Pakistan or Nigeria, where the
rates of growth of the population remain high, economic growth
and wealth per capita cannot keep up with the annual expansion
of the population. Conversely, countries such as China, Indonesia,
Brazil and Egypt, with a population that is growing at slower
rates and where the demographic transition is underway, benefit
from increasing rates of economic growth and exhibit an increased
wealth per capita. However, one of the recurrent issues is that
of an uneven distribution of wealth that leaves a consistent
share of the population in poverty. Although any conclusion
is preliminary in this domain, the evidence presented seems
to confirm a negative association between rapid population growth
and growth rates of per capita outputs. |
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|
Concern with rapid population growth has led researchers and
policymakers to examine the determinants of fertility change.
Among the factors associated with fertility decline are contraceptive
prevalence, economic well-being, decline in levels of child
mortality, increased education among women and changing marriage
patterns. |
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|
Even if education is only one of the factors involved in the
demographic transition, it is one factor that is amenable to
change through public policies. Public authorities can, for
example, mandate school attendance, invest in school buildings,
libraries, public television and radio and indeed, take a whole
range of decisions aimed at extending the reach and improving
the quality of education. Education, thus, is one of the most
effective as well as acceptable means through which policy-makers
can intervene with regard to the population problem. |
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|
| Rising
levels of education can play an important role on population
dynamics … |
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|
The relationships between education and population dynamics
are complex and multifaceted and they evolve over time. The
impact of the first over the second includes direct effects
on knowledge, skills, values and dispositions, as well as indirect
effects such as those on work and life opportunities and the
age of marriage. Usually, education does not work in isolation,
but as an intervening variable acts through, or in combination
with, other variables to affect both population dynamics and
development. Yet, both historical experience and empirical evidence
suggest that education has the power to influence the process
and pace of demographic change. |
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| … by
reducing fertility rates … |
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|
Among the most consistent relationships identified by demographic
studies is that between the education of women and fertility
(Bledsoe, 1999). Aggregate data at the country level show that
lower levels of fertility are associated with higher levels
of education (United Nations 1973 and 1989). Survey data confirm
the finding that better educated women tend to bear fewer and
healthier children than women with little or no education. Data
from the World Fertility Surveys carried out in the 1970s show
that women with seven or more years of education have, on average,
3.9 children at the end of their reproductive lives, while those
with no schooling would have 6.9 children, that is, almost 80
per cent more (United Nations, 1987). Similarly, data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys carried out in the 1980s and
1990s show that women with no education would have twice the
number of children of women with ten or more years of schooling
(United Nations, 1995d), although the association has been found
to vary in relation to the socio-economic context. |
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|
In the following chart (Figure 1.13) total fertility rates,
that is, the average number of children that women aged 15-49
bear, are plotted against the estimated female adult literacy
rates by country. |
|
|
|
| Source:
UNESCO World Education Report 2000 |
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|
Even a simple indicator such as literacy, which measures the
ability to access and produce written information as a dichotomous
variable rather than a continuum as it is in reality, has proved
to be associated with fertility. In almost all countries where
50 per cent or more of women are still illiterate total fertility
rates are higher than four children per woman. Conversely, in
most of the countries where 80 per cent or more of women are
literate women bear on average less than four children.
|
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|
The World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Health Surveys
suggest the existence of education thresholds associated with
a significant reduction in fertility rates. Figure 1.14 shows
total fertility rates according to years of education for selected
developing countries. |
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| Fig. 1.14:
Total fertility rates according to women’s years of education
in selected countries |
|
|
|
| Source:
United Nations, World Population Monitoring. Selected Aspects
of Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Health, Table 22, New
York, 1996. |
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When primary education is not completed, there does not appear
to be a strong relationship between education and fertility.
But the magnitude of fertility differentials by education varies
considerably between countries. Peru is an extreme case, with
women without any education bearing on average 7.4 children
and women with ten or more years of education having an average
of 2.5 children. While the impact of education on fertility
is less powerful in other countries, the chart shows the tendency
for fertility rates to decline as levels of education rise.
Kenya illustrates the case found usually in the poorest most
illiterate societies with overall high fertility, in which a
small amount of education can be associated with an increase
in fertility, due to an increased ability of women to give live
births, probably because of improved health, better nutrition
and the abandoning of traditional patterns of breastfeeding
and postpartum abstinence (Cochrane, 1979). Conversely, large
differences in fertility rates are always found between women
who have completed at least seven years of education and women
who have not completed primary education. |
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The hypothesised specific connections between education and
fertility have been classified in many ways. One classification
distinguishes the effects of education that act on the demand
for children and those that affect the supply of children. The
first include the desired family size, with more educated couples
opting for a small family norm and the acquisition of a style
of child-rearing that is relatively costly to the parents, in
time and money. The effects of education that act on the supply
of children include age of marriage, which is delayed along
with increasing educational attainment, increased access to
information about family planning, increased knowledge and use
of contraceptive methods and consequently a reduced number of
unwanted children (United Nations, 1987). |
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| … by
contributing to the decline of maternal, infant and child mortality
… |
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Education also exerts both an indirect and a direct effect on
the decline of maternal, infant and child mortality (United
Nations, 1998c). In the following chart (Figure 1.15) infant
mortality rates, that is, the number of deaths of infants under
1 year of age per 1,000 live births, are plotted against the
estimated female adult literacy rates by country. |
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| Fig. 1.15:
Infant mortality rates and estimated female adult literacy rates
by country, 1997 |
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|
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| Source:
UNESCO World Education Report 2000 |
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In general, education is associated with higher levels of income
that, in turn, give access to safer and more comfortable conditions
of life and better nutrition and health care. However, even
when health care is available to all, the individuals and families
that seek care are those with higher levels of education, (Hobcraft,
1992). By one estimate, a ten percent increase in girls’ primary
enrolment can be expected to decrease infant mortality by 4.1
deaths per 1,000, and a similar increase in girls’ secondary
enrolment by another 5.6 deaths per 1,000 (UNICEF, 1999). The
protective influence of education of the mother continues throughout
childhood. One of the most pervasive and consistent effects
of maternal education is its impact on the nutritional and health
care provided to children. Empirical evidence has shown that
the education level of the mother is strongly associated with
survival of the children between the ages of six and 60 months
(Cleland and Harris, 1998). |
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The results of multivariate analyses indicate that providing
mothers with seven or more years of education might be associated
in some regions with a 40 per cent decline in overall child
mortality (United Nations, 1994). |
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Lower mortality rates, as already noted, are in turn associated
with lower fertility rates. Women often cite poor infant survival
as a reason for maintaining high fertility, and many studies
have confirmed the association between fertility and infant
and child mortality. |
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| … and
by promoting greater gender equity. |
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|
Education in a broad sense can also help eliminate the tragic
situation of "missing girls and women", on which the International
Conference on Population and Development focused international
attention. There remain many societies in which there is a pervasive
tendency for females to be disadvantaged with respect to men
(United Nations, 1998c). At an early age, when children are
dependent for their survival upon the care and attention of
others, this discrimination can prove to be fatal. Education
is a means for eroding traditional sex-biased attitudes and
encouraging more egalitarian views and more equal treatment
of boys and girls. |
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The reduction of high fertility and mortality rates, an egalitarian
view of persons of both sexes, as well as the improvement of
health and living conditions, are among the so-called "social
benefits of education". For a long time, the main argument for
justifying education has been based on its direct economic effects.
However, progressively, increasing awareness that the effects
of education spread beyond direct economic effects to include
social benefits for individuals and society at large has developed.
"Such benefits include a better way of taking care of ourselves
and consequently creating a better society in which to live"
(Behrman and Nevzer, 1997, p. 1). |
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Against this background, education and investment in human resources
have assumed overarching importance. |
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|
The Jomtien conference contributed in this process, having marked
the emergence of an international consensus that education is
the single most vital element in protecting the environment,
controlling population growth, combating poverty, promoting
human rights and democracy and creating equality between the
sexes (Amman Affirmation in UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank
1996). |
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The World Declaration on Education for All is based on the recognition
that education "is a fundamental right for all people, women
and men, of all ages, throughout the world", "is an indispensable
key to, though not a sufficient condition for, personal and
social improvement" and "can help ensure a safer, healthier,
more prosperous and environmentally healthier sound world, while
simultaneously contributing to social, economic and cultural
progress, tolerance, and international cooperation". Education
as a goal is an outcome of development, while as a means it
can be an engine of development and an indispensable tool for
improving the quality of people’s lives. |
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The relationship between education and population assumes even
greater weight when discussed in the broader context of development
and sustainability |
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This dual role of education is also reflected in the Programme
of Action of the International Conference on Population and
Development that defines education as a "key factor in sustainable
development", being at the same time "a component of well-being
and a factor in the development of well-being through its links
with demographic as well as economic and social factors". |
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The notion of sustainable development emerged in the 1980s,
drawing the attention to the relationship between social development
and economic opportunity on the one hand, and the requirements
of the environment on the other. The goal is to improve the
quality of life for all, especially of the poor and deprived,
within the capacity of supporting ecosystems. Many of the major
environmental dangers, as those of global warming and the loss
of bio-diversity, as well as the depletion of natural resources,
are related to population growth. The link between population
and the environment was recognised as far back as 1974 when
the World Population Plan of Action adopted by the first World
Population Conference in Bucharest pointed at the interrelationship
between population, resources, environment and development.
Almost twenty years later, the Rio Declaration on Environment
in 1992 affirmed that: "States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate
demographic policies" (Principle 8). "If development is to be
sustained in the long term, it demands first and foremost that
a balance be struck between the world population, its needs
in terms of resources of all kind and its environment. It therefore
requires that population growth be slowed down, that the population
itself be better distributed and that the ecological costs of
growth be reduced, particularly by bringing urbanisation under
control and by effective management of migration" (Major, 1999).
|
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Education serves the pursuit of sustainability in several ways.
In general, the role of education is especially important in
winning acceptance for new ideas that involve unfamiliar concepts
and require unconventional ways of thinking. Education’s role
in such undertakings is not only to make people more knowledgeable
and better informed, but also more ethical, responsible and
critical. |
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Within the macro world of education, population education projects
and programmes are specifically focused on population, health
and development issues with the general goal "to provide young
people and adults with an awareness of the interrelationships
between population and development, especially those factors
constituting the quality of life" (UNESCO, 1999c). The overarching
importance of gender concerns is underlined and the reproductive
health education of adolescents is being increasingly addressed.
Population education also focuses on urgent problems such as
HIV/AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Drug and Substance
Abuse, smoking and alcoholism. Finally, increasing attention
is given to education for sustainable development. |
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| Education
is more than just schooling and formal training
|
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In this perspective, "educating" means more than teaching people
to read and write. It means empowering people with the knowledge,
skills and dispositions to participate actively in the development
process. Education therefore covers not only the learning that
takes place in schools, but also the critical acquisition of
knowledge, values and attitudes that occur in homes, work places
and communities as well as through the mass media. |
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The importance attached to education in the achievement of population
and development goals reflects a major paradigm shift in the
debate on population and development during the 1990s, with
regard to the way population and development policies and programmes
were to be formulated and implemented. The shift places human
beings and their individual well-being and rights at the centre
of all development programmes, addressing population issues
through people-centred policies rather than top-down targets.
|
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| Individual
well-being and rights are now recognised as the central focus
in addressing population and development issues
|
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The 1992 Declaration on Environment and Development stated that
it is human beings that are at the centre of concerns for sustainable
development and that they are entitled to a healthy and productive
life in harmony with nature. Similarly, the Programme of Action
of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
affirmed that the human being is the central subject of development
and endorsed a strategy that focuses on meeting the needs of
individual women and men, rather than achieving demographic
targets. In the same direction, at the beginning of the 1995
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, the heads of State
and Government acknowledged that "for the first time in history"
they had gathered in order "to recognise the significance of
social development and human well-being for all and to give
these goals the highest priority". They further agreed on the
goal of creating a framework for action to "place people at
the centre of development and direct economies to meet human
needs more effectively". |
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At the end of the 1990s, it was affirmed with renewed strength
that human beings as individuals are the ultimate goal of all
policies and the improvement of their living conditions is the
measure for assessing the appropriateness and success of the
implementation of such policies. |
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"Population means people. People means numbers, too. While numbers
matter, they do not matter in themselves. Numbers are important
because of the effects they have on many elements of the quality
of life. It is all too often that people are forgotten in favour
of abstract, macroeconomic targets: low inflation rates, balanced
national budgets. If population is considered in numbers alone,
isolated from the other aspects of life this is wrong in both
human and scientific terms. The quality of life of population
as people, therefore, should be the central focus of all policy
making. (…) Policy regarding population-as-numbers cannot overlook
its primary goal – improving the quality of life of population
–as-people" (Independent Commission on Population and Quality
of Life, 1996, p. 15). |
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