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Introduction Dominant attitudes on migration and settlement in the Asia Pacific region Nation-states and globalisation The controllability of difference Defining transnationalism and transnational communities Some consequences of the emergence of transnational communities Transnational communities and citizenship Future perspectives for migrant settlement and transnationalism References Notes Introduction To speak of transnational communities implies taking the ‘national’ as a given.The concept of transnationalism only has meaning in a world divided up into nation-states. This leads to two paradoxes, one global, the other peculiar to the Asia Pacific region. The global paradox is that transnationalism is a relatively new, emerging paradigm, whose discourses are clearly and consciously linked to globalisation–a process which weakens the nation-state. The Asia Pacific paradox is that the nation-state as a dominant political form is, in most countries, quite recent and often still in the process of formation. Young post-colonial states (albeit often with roots in antiquity) are trying to define national belonging and identity in a context not experienced by older nation-states in their period of formation: the context of globalisation, mobile populations and erosion of national boundaries. A core feature of the classical nation-state is its claim to manage ethnic difference–through border control, as well as by means of processes of cultural homogenisation or subordination of minorities. This capacity has been eroded by the mass migrations of the second half of the twentieth century and by the resulting emergence of multicultural societies. Transnational theory points to a new and higher stage of the erosion of the controllability of difference: the proliferation of groups which have affiliations–of a political, economic, social and cultural nature–in more than one country. This may hinder homogenisation, lead to permanently diverse and mobile populations, and recreate on a new level the nemesis of nationalism: groups with multiple identities and divided loyalties. This Conference has set out to explore the existence and significance of transnational communities in the Asia Pacific region. The papers give a fascinating picture of the complexity and diversity of a wide range of new and old communities. In my contribution I will not present further empirical material. Instead I will look at conceptual and comparative dimensions of the emergence of transnational communities, and discuss the applicability of theories largely developed in western contexts for in the Asia Pacific region. I will start by examining dominant attitudes on migration and settlement in the region, then look at the way constructions of the nation-state are changing. The next section will deal with the evolution of ideas and policies on controlling ethnic difference, after which I will discuss concepts of transnationalism and some of the consequences of the emerging phenomenon for the future of migration and the nation-state. A central argument of my paper is that the proliferation of transnational communities makes traditional nation-state strategies for controlling difference ineffective. Transnational theory is therefore of great importance for understanding contemporary developments in international migration, settlement and community formation. However, the forms of such developments in the Asia Pacific region differ from western experiences due to specific historical and cultural contexts. Transnational processes are poorly understood by policy-makers in Asia, so the current migration policies are often ill-conceived, may fail to achieve their objectives, and may indeed have negative consequences.   Dominant attitudes on migration and settlement in the Asia Pacific region Asian and Pacific countries have a long history of permanent or cyclical migration for purposes of trade, work, religion or cultural interchange. Often complex linkages and interchanges between ethnic groups resulted. In pre-modern territorial states with economies based on agriculture, permanent emigration of male workers was seen as desertion and was generally strictly prohibited, except for purposes of trade or temporary work. However, temporary sojourners often turned into settlers. The establishment of colonial states led to migrations for purposes of administration, labour recruitment and trade. Some early migrant groups later returned to their homelands, others settled and became assimilated into local populations, yet others settled but did not assimilate, remaining as permanent ethnic, cultural or religious minorities. Some groups took on the character of diasporas (which we now call transnational communities). The classic example are the Chinese: historical mobility made them an important factor in all Southeast Asian countries, while more recent movements have turned them into a truly global diaspora (Sinn 1998; Wang 1998b). More than half the papers at this Conference are concerned with the Overseas Chinese. One also can see ‘the Malay maritime world’ as a space of historical interchange. Within an area encompassing the Malay peninsular and the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagoes, sea-borne mobility was a fact of life for many centuries, affecting many ethnic groups. Some of these came from the outside, with traders of Arab origins playing a major part in both commercial and religious development. Similarly, the Pacific Islands have long histories of trade, cultural interchange, conquest and migration. (1) It would be anachronistic to call the groups involved transnational communities, since they pre-date national boundaries. Their significance for the study of contemporary transnationalism is that pre-modern migratory patterns often help shape contemporary movements. Certain sending communities are linked by long traditions with certain receiving areas. Attempts by recently established nation-states to control such movements are often hampered by time-honoured customs and cultural affinities–as well as by modern economic, social and political factors. Modern nation-states which have emerged since the colonial period have thus had to contend with complex ethnic relations situations. At the same time, they have been confronted by new factors which have precipitated large-scale migrations: Political instability connected with the Cold War and with processes of state-formation, which has given rise to massive refugee flows in the region. The Asian economic boom and the resulting uneven development, which has led to large labour flows from countries with large labour surpluses and stagnant economies to countries with rapid economic growth and declining fertility. Some of these flows have gone outside the region, especially to North America, Oceania and the Gulf oil countries, but since about 1980 intra-regional flows have grown rapidly. The increasing significance of transnational business activities causing the emergence of highly mobile groups of entrepreneurs, executives and specialists. Although refugee flows have been considerable, the main emphasis in public debates and policy formation has been on economically-motivated migration. A range of differentiated policy-regimes have emerged, generally favouring circulation of highly-skilled personnel (who are often not perceived as migrants at all), while seeking to control labour migration and prevent permanent settlement. By 1996 the OECD put the number of migrant workers in Asia at 5 million(OECD 1998, 46). In addition to the migrant workers there were millions of family members and refugees. (2) The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-99 led to an interruption in labour recruitment. Indeed some immigration countries announced policies of large-scale repatriation. However, actual departures were limited, and migrant populations did not fall sharply. In the meantime, economic growth and labour recruitment have resumed. The results of the Crisis have been not an end to migration but rather a shift in its characteristics– perhaps similar to the changes that occurred in Western Europe after the 1973 Oil Crisis (Battistella and Assis 1998; Böhning 1998; Skeldon 1998a; Supang 1999). Migration to East Asian countries with growing economies and rising incomes is perceived by Asian policy-makers as temporary labour migration, and is not expected to lead to permanent settlement. This understanding matches the wishes of most of the main actors: employers seek low-skilled workers to meet immediate labour needs; many migrant workers wish to work abroad for a limited period to improve the situation of their families at home; sending country governments do not want to lose nationals permanently; and receiving country governments are strongly opposed to settlement. Ideas of ethnic community formation, growing cultural diversity and the emergence of multicultural societies are anathema in Asian labour-importing countries, while turning immigrants into citizens is unthinkable. Yet all these things could have been said of the European ‘guestworker’ recruiting countries of the 1960s. Even new world countries open to permanent immigration did not envisage the development of multicultural societies. In the meantime, the dynamics which transformed temporary migrants into new ethnic groups and multicultural citizens are well known (see Castles 2000a; Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles and Miller 1998; DeWind, et al. 1997). This experience has been analysed by Asian scholars and policy-makers, particularly in Japan (Weiner and Hanami 1998). They generally conclude that ‘Asia is different’ and that labour migration will not lead to major social and cultural changes in sending or receiving countries. There are two main reasons for this. First, the volume of migration relative to population is generally lower in East Asia than in western countries, which is thought to reduce social and cultural impacts. Second, legal frameworks and policy settings differ. Important factors in turning temporary migration into settlement in western countries included strong legal and human rights guarantees, which facilitated family reunion and hindered large-scale deportations in the 1970s and 1980s, even when migrant labour was no longer wanted. Moreover, strong welfare states encouraged further immigration and settlement, despite poor employment prospects. Such factors are generally seen as absent in East Asia. Thus the dominant policy model for dealing with migration and ethnic diversity in Asia Pacific countries can be summed up in the following principles. immigrants should not be allowed to settle; foreign residents should not be offered citizenship except in exceptional cases; national culture and identity should not be modified in response to external influences. The question is whether the assumptions on which these principles are based will prove valid under conditions of globalisation. I will turn now to a discussion of globalisation and transnationalism, to show how such trends may undermine the assumptions on which Asia Pacific migration regimes are based.   Nation-states and globalisation The first issue is the way globalisation is changing the changing state, and what this means for Asia Pacific nation-states which are still in a process of formation. The contemporary international political system consists of about 200 states, and has its origins in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, which ended a long period of war in Europe. The core characteristics of the modern state up to the mid-20th century can be summed up as follows. (3) State sovereignty over a specific territory guaranteed through international treaties, and through mutual respect of territorial sovereignty by other states within a ‘world of sovereign states’. State autonomy in controlling the economy, culture, and environment and society within a bounded territory. A state’s laws and policies were not subject to external scrutiny. State control over its borders. The state had final control of all flows across the borders, whether of capital, commodities, cultural products or people (provided, of course, that it had the capacity to enforce this control). However, in the course of its evolution and expansion in Europe and North America the modern state became a nation-state. This was linked to the successful struggle of economically-powerful middle classes against absolutist forms of government, and the resulting emergence of democracy. If the people became the sovereign, which could express its collective will through elections and democratic institutions, then it was essential to define who belonged to the people or nation (Habermas 1996a). This development inevitably led to struggles not only for political rights, but also for social rights, because genuine participation in the political process required certain minimum standards of education and welfare (Marshall 1950). Thus, the modern nation-state acquired the following additional features. The rule of law, democracy and citizenship as indicators of political legitimacy. The democratic revolutions had established the principles of constitutionally guaranteed rights for citizens and democratically-elected law-making bodies. The dream of ‘a space for each race’ (Cohen 1997, 175): the linking of the state as a territorial political community with the nation as a cultural community, and thus the linking of citizenship with nationality. Citizenship depended on membership of the nation, seen as a cultural community, whose members were held together by bonds of solidarity, based on shared history, values and traditions. However, since the great majority of nations were the result of amalgamation or incorporation (often by conquest) of diverse ethnic groups, the shared identity was often the result of suppression of minority identities–sometimes leading to resistance and separatist movements. Two principles existed for defining membership of the nation: ius soli (literally: law of the soil), according to which anyone born in a territory could belong; and ius sanguinis (literally, law of the blood), according to which belonging was based on descent from an existing citizen (Castles and Davidson 2000, 85). The emergence of the welfare state. Struggles by labour and social movements established the principle that full participation in nation-states required basic economic, social and educational standards. The need to secure mass loyalty, especially during the World Wars and the Cold War, forced states to take responsibility for guaranteeing such standards. State sovereignty and autonomy played a crucial part in making it possible to regulate labour markets and provide social services. These six characteristics can be seen as constituting an ideal-type of the modern nation-state at the height of its development around the mid-20th century. In practice, few states lived up completely to the ideal, and key aspects were always contested, such as the principles of popular democracy and welfare. In the context of a discussion of the nation-state in the Asia Pacific region at the beginning of the 21st century, some important reservations and modifications must be noted. In their historical evolution, western nation-states expanded by destroying the sovereignty of other states through conquest and colonialism. The principle of respect for sovereignty did not apply to non-western states. Democracy and prosperity in western countries was based on repression, exploitation and racism in the colonies. It is only since 1945 that decolonisation has created the conditions for proliferation of the nation-state model in the Asia Pacific region. However, by the late 20th century, the democratic nation-state based on the rule of law had become a global aspiration–even though the reality again often falls far short of the ideal. In the Asia Pacific region state formation and nation formation have gone hand in hand, and this process is taking place under the conditions of decolonisation, the Cold War, and rapid but uneven industrialisation. Asia Pacific states can be generally regarded as nation-states, since they have sought to define who belongs and who does not belong to the state’s people–i.e. the nation. They have mostly adopted the principle of ius sanguinis: belonging by virtue of descent, which generally also implies ethnic belonging on the basis of shared culture, language, traditions and history (Singapore is an exception here). This has led to complex processes of inclusion, partial inclusion or exclusion of minority groups. Asia Pacific states generally do not make it easy for immigrants to obtain naturalisation and become citizens (Davidson and Weekley 1999). Beyond this common feature of simultaneous processes of nation-state formation, Asia Pacific state show enormous diversity, on the basis of history, culture, religion, language, political institutions and economic development. A key difference relates to the colonial experience: populations of countries that were colonised tend to have different attitudes and policies on migration and ethnic diversity compared to those which were not. Another (often related) distinction concerns the high degree of ethno-cultural diversity of Southeast Asian and Pacific states compared with the lesser diversity of Northeast Asian states like China, Japan and the two Koreas. This makes it easier to sustain ideas of cultural homogeneity in the latter–even through these are really myths since even here there are significant minorities. On a more general level, since the late 20th century all nation-states have been affected by processes of globalisation, characterised by the rapid increase in cross-border flows of all sorts, and by the formation of transnational networks in the economic, cultural, political and social spheres (Castells 1996; Castells 1997; Castells 1998; Held, et al. 1999; Hoogvelt 1997). Globalisation threatens to undermine all the key characteristics of the nation-state. Sovereignty is reduced by international law and human rights principles which legitimate intervention within states by the ‘international community’ (as in former Yugoslavia). Autonomy is limited by the power of transnational corporations and supranational bodies, which reduces a state’s capacity to make and implement economic, political and social decisions. Border-control is undermined by burgeoning cross-border flows of capital, commodities, migrants, environmental factors and ideas. Democracy may be reduced if elected parliaments no longer make key decisions, because these have moved to the supranational level, where there is no popular representation. The crucial link between the national and the citizen is undermined: where there are diverse and mobile populations with affiliations in more than one state, there can no longer be ‘a space for each race’. Welfare states decline when international markets and transnational corporations have the power to restrict government intervention, and to demand deregulation and privatisation. Globalisation is particularly significant for Asia Pacific nation-states. Western nation-states could develop over fairly long historical periods in which they gradually became the dominant entity for organising politics, economic development, culture and identity. Asia Pacific nation-states are being formed in the era of globalisation in which the nation-state form is under great pressure. Globalisation leads to a compression of time and space (Bauman 1998), so that leaders of Asia Pacific nation-states have had to struggle to create political institutions and national identities in very short time-spans and under strong cross-border influences. Migration and formation of transnational communities is one of these. Another is the growing salience of international law and human rights regimes. The UN intervention in East Timor in September 1999 is having important repercussions. Discussions at the recent ASEAN Summit (July 2000) on finding ways of collaborating on such issues without undermining principles of non-intervention were highly significant. Finally, globalisation goes hand-in-hand with the proliferation of transnational communities. This results from the increased cross-border mobility of populations and increasing possibilities of maintaining close links with the homeland and with co-ethnics elsewhere, due to improved transport and communication technologies. Transnational communities can also be seen as an expression of the erosion of border-control and the decline of the link between the national and the citizen (see above). Moreover, transnational communities can undermine the principle of territorial sovereignty, by creating durable cross-border links, multiple identities and divided loyalties. This questions the most fundamental tenet of the nation-state.   The controllability of difference International migration and ethnic minorities have always presented problems to nation-states, since they threaten ideologies of cultural homogeneity (Castles and Davidson 2000, Chapter 3). Since import of migrant labour has for centuries been an important part of industrialisation, national authorities simultaneously encourage the creation of ethnically-diverse populations and seek ways of controlling such populations. Strategies of labour import are usually motivated by short-term economic considerations. Potential long-term social and political consequences are often ignored–particularly where migrant workers are seen as temporary entrants, who will be allowed to stay. In other cases, governments do anticipate permanent settlement, but believe that this will not bring about major changes in their society and culture–as in ‘classical immigration countries’ like the USA and Australia. In varying ways, such official attitudes share an underlying belief in the controllability of difference. Governments think that they can prevent ethnic diversity becoming a force for social transformation through policy approaches which mainly fall into two categories: assimilation or differential exclusion. A third approach—multiculturalism—has only become significant quite recently (Castles and Miller 1998, chapter 9). Assimilation means encouraging immigrants to learn the national language and to take on the social and cultural practices of the receiving community. The underlying belief is that the immigrants’ descendants will be indistinguishable from the rest of the population. Assimilationist practices prevailed in some19th century European labour-importing such as Britain and France. When new waves of migration started after the Second World War, both countries at first emphasised assimilation, as did several other European immigration countries. The 19th century US ‘melting pot’, which was meant to ‘Americanise’ immigrants from Europe, was crucial both for industrialisation and nation-building. Canada and Australia encouraged mainly British immigration up to 1945, and assumed that the relatively small numbers of other European would be culturally absorbed. When large-scale non-British immigration started from the 1950s, there were explicit policies of assimilation. Indeed many sociologists have viewed assimilation as an inevitable and necessary process for immigrants (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes, et al. 1999, 228-9). In the Asia Pacific region, there are plenty of historical examples of assimilation. However, assimilation policies are hardly to be found in contemporary Asia, with a few exceptions, such as policies towards highly-skilled migrants in Singapore. The emphasis remains on temporary labour migration. Differential exclusion means accepting immigrants only within strict functional and temporal limits: they are welcome as workers, but not as settlers; as individuals, but not as families or communities; as temporary sojourners, but not as long-term residents. In this model, immigrants are integrated (temporarily) into certain societal sub-systems such as the labour market and some aspects of the welfare system, but excluded from others such as political participation. This approach was developed in Germany and Switzerland from the 1870s, as a way of recruiting and controlling Polish, Italian and other foreign workers during industrialisation. In post-1945 Europe, the differential exclusion model in the guise of the ‘guestworker system’, played a major part in several countries, yet failed in its central objective of preventing settlement and minority formation (Castles 1986). Contract labour systems in the Gulf oil countries and Asia are based on this model. One can also consider use of undocumented labour as an extreme form of differential exclusion: where states accept or even create ‘back doors’ and ‘side doors’ for irregular migrants, they are tacitly exploiting the rightlessness and vulnerability of this group. Such practices are to be found in Japan (Komai 1998; Mori 1997), Malaysia (Jones 2000; Pillai 1999) and elsewhere. Both the assimilation and differential exclusion model share an important common principle: that immigration should not bring about significant social and cultural change in the receiving society. Ethnocultural diversity is seen by political elites as a threat to the integrity of the nation, which could seriously weaken it in the event of economic recession, war or other catastrophes. However, they also believe that difference is controllable: either the immigrants will be absorbed into an unchanged national community (assimilation); or they will be sent away as soon as their labour is no longer needed (differential exclusion). It was not difficult to sustain such views in earlier times: when transport and communication were slow and costly, the long-term persistence of ethnic communities with strong links to their homelands was not considered likely. In the classical immigration countries of North America and Oceania, assimilation was the dominant model until the 1960s or 1970s. In Western Europe, the assimilation model predominated in some countries (UK, France the Netherlands), while differential exclusion was the rule elsewhere (Germany, Switzerland, Austria). In all these places, such models lost their effectiveness and were being replaced by new approaches from the mid-1970s. There were several reasons: after the 1973 Oil Crisis, it became apparent that temporary migrants were turning into settlers. States based on the rule of law and human rights proved incapable of deporting large numbers of unwanted workers. Nor could immigrants be completely denied social rights, since this could lead to serious conflicts and divisions. The result was family reunion, community formation and emergence of new ethnic minorities. The expectation of long-term cultural assimilation proved illusory, with ethnic communities maintaining their languages and cultures into the second and third generations. Immigrants began to establish cultural associations, places of worship and ethnic businesses, which further strengthened ethnic community infrastructures. The introduction of policies of multiculturalism (under a variety of labels) seemed the best way to manage increasingly diverse populations (Castles and Miller 1998, chapter 9). Multiculturalism means abandoning the myth of homogenous and monocultural nation-states. Yet it can still be seen as a way of controlling difference within the nation-state framework, because it does not question the territorial principle. It essentially assumes that migration will lead to permanent settlement, and to the birth of second and subsequent generations who are both citizens and nationals. Thus multiculturalism maintains the idea of a primary belonging to one society and a loyalty to just one nation-state. Hyphenated Americans are still Americans when it comes to war or other conflicts. In Australia, the Liberal-National Government looked set to abandon multiculturalism in 1996, but has since reconsidered. Following a review by the National Multicultural Advisory Council (chaired by a prominent businessman), it came to the conclusion that multiculturalism was the only suitable policy for Australia’s highly-diverse society. However, the review redefined the model as ‘Australian multiculturalism’ (implying that it is unique and distinct from other national models) with an explicit expectation of undivided loyalty to Australia (NMAC 1999). Again the late and incomplete process of nation-state formation in the Asia Pacific region implies a special problematic: no country in the region except the white settler colonies of Oceania have had the historical opportunity to work through the various models of migrant incorporation. The dominant approach is still that of differential exclusion, based on the notion that migrant labour will remain temporary and there will be no significant settlement of community formation.   Defining transnationalism and transnational communities At the dawn of the 21st century, globalisation and the proliferation of transnational communities undermines all the modes of controlling difference premised on territoriality–even the most recent one: multiculturalism. Increasing mobility; growth of temporary, cyclical and recurring migrations; cheap and easy travel; constant communication through new information technologies: all undermine the idea of the person who belongs to just one nation-state or at most migrates from one state to just one other (whether temporarily or permanently). Transnational communities are groups whose identity is not primarily based on attachment to a specific territory. They therefore present a powerful challenge to traditional ideas of nation-state belonging. Research on transnational communities is a new area of the social sciences, closely linked to studies of migration, ethnicity and nationalism. There is considerable variation in concepts, definitions and analyses. These complex debates cannot be summarised here, but it is important to mention a few conceptual issues. Transnational communities are one aspect of transnationalism. According to Vertovec, ‘transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (Vertovec 1999, 447). Portes defines transnational activities as those that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants Such activities may be conducted by relatively powerful actors, such as representatives of national governments and multinational corporations, or may be initiated by more modest individuals, such as immigrants and their home country kin and relations. These activities are not limited to economic enterprises, but include political, cultural and religious initiatives as well (Portes 1999, 464). This definition indicates the close relationship between transnationalism and globalisation, which also refers essentially to the rapid expansion of cross-border transactions and networks in all areas of life. (4) The notion of a transnational community puts the emphasis on human agency: such groups are the result of cross-border activities which link individuals, families and local groups. In the context of globalisation, transnationalism can extend previous face-to-face communities based on kinship, neighbourhoods or workplaces into far-flung virtual communities, which communicate at a distance. Transnational communities do not necessarily refer to migrants, since cross-border groups with common cultural, sporting, political or other interests might well consider themselves a community. However, in practical terms, groups arising from migrations are the most significant type, and most research on transnational communities refers to these. The key defining feature is that such groups are based in two or more countries, and engage in recurrent and significant transactions, which may be economic, political, social or cultural, over long periods. Portes emphasises the significance of transnational business communities, (whether of large-scale enterprises or of small ethnic entrepreneurs), but also notes the importance of political and cultural communities. He makes the useful distinction between transnationalism from above–activites ‘conducted by powerful institutional actors, such as multinational corporations and states’–and transnationalism from below–activities ‘that are the result of grass-roots initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts’ (Portes, et al. 1999, 221). A main focus of research is on the transnationalism from below of migrant groups who are disadvantaged or discriminated in some way. Transnational communities can develop countervailing power to contest the oppressive power of corporations, governments and inter-governmental organisations. Some transnational communities can develop formal organisation structures, but more frequently they function as informal networks, with multiple nodes of control. This diffuse structure makes it harder for states to control them, giving rise to a great deal of anxiety on the part of governments. Indeed, informal linkages in the form of migration networks often undermine official migration policies which ignore the interests of migrants. This helps explain the frequent failure of official migration policies– even of the most powerful states–to achieve their objectives (Castles and Miller 1998, 24-6). The term transmigrant may be used to identify people whose existence is shaped in important ways through participation in transnational communities based on migration. ‘People who live their lives across borders, developing social, familial, political, economic and religious networks that incorporate them into two or more states can be considered to be "transmigrants"’ (Schiller 1999, 203). Inflationary use of the term should be avoided: the majority of migrants still do not fit the pattern. Temporary labour migrants who sojourn abroad for a few years, send back remittances, communicate with their family at home and visit them occasionally are not transmigrants. Nor are permanent migrants who leave for ever, and simply retain loose contact with their homeland. . The key defining feature is that transnational activities are a central part of a person’s life. Where this applies to a group of people, one can speak of a transnational community. Individuals can be seen as members of a transnational community if this group forms the main context of their life, even if they themselves are not directly involved in the transnational activities. A key research question is therefore to work out which migrant groups become transmigrants, and to establish what conditions bring about or hinder this outcome. Types of transnational community include: Transnational business communities based on the use of cross-border ethnic connections as a resource to run businesses of many different types and sizes. The small ethnic business that trades in homeland products and services in the ethnic neighbourhood, and sends back host country goods and possibly capital is an example of transnationalism from below. (5) The multinational corporation that creates its own transnational corporate culture and abandons the base country or ‘headquarters’ mentality (Ohmae 1991) is a form of transnational from above. Examples of transnational business communities of all kinds are abundant in the Asia Pacific region. Transnational political communities, which involve the use of solidarity with co-ethnics in two or more countries, usually to bring about change in the homeland, though sometimes also to improve the situation of the group in settlement countries. Transnational political diasporas are often the result of forced exoduses from the homeland. This often leads to multiple migration and a strong consciouness of being a refugee or exile (Van Hear 1998). Political or refugee diasporas were significant long before contemporary discourses on transnationalism, playing major parts in the creation of modern China, Greece, Armenia, Israel and other nations. An important example of a refugee diaspora which now often functions as a political, business and cultural community is the Vietnamese who left their country in the 1970s and 1980s. Transnational cultural communities seeking to maintain the homeland heritage and language among settler group. They also often seek recognition from homeland authorities that the diaspora is still part of the nation. Demands for voting rights while abroad or for dual citizenship are typical. In such cases there is no clear distinction between the cultural and the political community. Again, there are many examples in our region. Transnational social communities. These exist in situations in which transmigration becomes part of normal life for people from a certain place, for instance where there is regular cross-border migration from a village or town of origin to a specific destination. Transnational social communities are often referred to as transnational migrant communities or as labour diasporas. Sometimes migration becomes a normal part of life for substantial elements of a whole society, so that the transnational social community includes most or all of a nation (either as migrants, their relatives, or as people whose lives are influenced in some way by the process). This could have been said of Italy between the 1860s and the 1960s, or of the Philippines today. In such cases, emigration takes on an important role in defining the nation. As Aguilar points out, this can be in the negative sense of ‘national shame’, because the nation-state is incapable of providing a livelihood to its citizens and protecting them adequately (Aguilar 1996). It can also be in the positive sense of finding ways of including emigrants in the nation, even if they take up the citizenship of the receiving country, as the special status of Balikbayan for Philippine emigrants indicates(Aguilar 1999; Blanc 1996). (6) Of course, other categories based on family, religion or other factors could be added. Many groups indulge in several or all of these types of activity, or shift their emphasis over time from one type to another. Transnational communities are not new, although the term is. The diaspora concept goes back to ancient times, and was used for peoples displaced or dispersed by force (eg. the Jews, African slaves in the New World), as well as trading groups (the Greeks in Western Asia and Africa, or the Arab traders who brought Islam to South East Asia), and labour migrants (Indians in the British Empire; Italians since the 1860s) (Cohen 1997). There is no clear demarcation between the notions of transnational community and diaspora: some authors use them as synonyms, others to refer to different types of group. (7) Due to its history, the term diaspora does have strong emotional connotations, while the notion of a transnational community is more neutral–and therefore probably preferable for social scientific use. The new factor which justifies the emergence of a new field of study is the rapid proliferation of transnational communities under conditions of globalisation. As Vertovec points out: Transnationalism (as long-distance networks) certainly preceded ‘the nation’. Yet today these systems of ties, interactions, exchanges and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread throughout the world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect such networks with increasing speed and efficiency. (Vertovec 1999, 447) The implication is clear: transnationalism is likely to go on growing fast, and transnational communities will become an ever-more important way to organise activities, relationships and identity for the increasing number of people with affiliations in two or more countries. This is likely to have important consequences, which we are only just beginning to understand.   Some consequences of the emergence of transnational communities An obvious consequence of the rise of transnationalism is the end of the nationalist dream of the homogenous nation, as Cohen points out: What 19th century nationalists wanted was a ‘space’ for each ‘race’, a terrritorialising of each social identity. What they got instead is a chain of cosmopolitan cities and an increasing proliferation of subnational and transnational identities that cannot easily be contained in the nation-state system (Cohen 1997, 175) Since more and more countries are experiencing migration, the implication would be that the old nation-state state project of ethnic homogenisation has no chance any more. That in itself should lead to a fundamental rethinking of some basic tenets on national identity and political culture. Patriotism based on emotional identification with national symbols may be declining in power as a means of integration and mobilisation for multicultural or transnational populations. A related consequence could be a rethinking of modes of immigrant incorporation into host societies. The idea of assimilation as the norm for migrant incorporation seems to be losing its validity, even in its heartland, the USA. Perhaps, however, the idea of assimilation into a society as a whole has always been misleading. Portes argues that assimilation has always meant incorporation into a specific segment of society. Selectivity on the basis of economic and social factors, as well as stereotypes and discriminatory practices has caused certain groups to experience ‘upward assimilation’ and others ‘downward assimilation’ (Portes 1999);(see also Zhou 1997). In the USA, this might mean assimilation into the white population for privileged groups (such as Europeans or Asians with high human capital) as against assimilation into the black underclass (for Mexican and Central American labourers and low-skilled Asian migrants). The new opportunities offered by transnationalism from below may be a source of strength to disadvantaged immigrant groups. Low social status and lack of rewards may be compensated through higher status in the transnational community or in the homeland community: Transnational economic enterprise offers opportunities to immigrants of modest origins to escape dead-end menial jobs and find their way into the middle class… Participation in transnational political activities can empower immigrants and invest them with a sense of purpose and self-worth that otherwise would be absent… Socio-cultural transnational activities can have similar effects, reinforcing self-images and collective solidarities. Involvement in these activities does not block successful integration into the host society, but facilitates it by endowing second-generation youths with cultural anchors with which to face difficult external challenges. (Portes 1999, 471-2) Thus the construction of transnational communities can be seen as reactive ethnicity: the use of ethnic resources, solidarity and symbols to survive in a situation of exclusion and disadvantage. It is because the democratic state does not live up to its promise of equal opportunities for minorities that people constitute themselves as transnational communities. In the US context, Portes believes that this will not, in the long run, lead to separatism, because transnational activities will help individuals overcome class barriers and participate more fully in society. Transnationalism could replace assimilation as the main paradigm for immigrant incorporation, because it prevents ‘downward assimilation’. In this interpretation, transnationalism does not necessarily social and political cohesion. However, this presupposes the willingness of the host society to offer assimilation and citizenship–a condition not usually present in Asian immigration countries. An alternative consequence of transnationalism could be the emergence of what have been called deterritorialised nation-states (Basch, et al. 1994). Where migrants cannot achieve equality and recognition within the host society, they may well base their identity on links with people of the same origins, wherever they live. In the extreme case of a group that has been completely dispersed from its homeland (like Jews until recently or Kurds at present) this would mean basing identity on ethnicity only, since no territorial base exists. However, this situation is perhaps better captured by the concept of a nation without a state, which implies the dream of return, through regaining the homeland and building a new nation-state. A more common situation of nation-state building by diasporas exists when only a minority of the population of an area is dispersed abraods, but these migrant groups develop a strong and active national consciousness. The role of Chinese overseas in helping to create the Chinese Republic in 1912 is an important example, but there are many other cases of groups that experienced the power of the western nation-state model through emigration, and sought to import it to their homelands. Some authors have referred to such political diasporas as deterritorialised nation-states but the term is perhaps misleading, because the imagery of a bounded national territory always remains significant (Schiller 1999, 211). However, the notion of the deterritorialised nation-state has another highly important implication: if a nation’s identity cannot be based on territory then its sole source is likely to be ideas of belonging together on the basis of origins, culture, language and so on. Thus transnationalism can lead to a revalorisation of ethnicity and race. This seems contradictory, for, as argued above, the transnational phenomenon generally undermines traditional forms of national identity. Generally transnational groups have dual or multiple identities, based on having important links with more than one society. But if their status in the host society is one of exclusion and discrimination, it cannot be a source of self-esteem and identity. In these circumstance ethnic, racial or national identification may develop as a reaction. In other words, being a member of a transnational community, can, under conditions of racism and exclusion, lead to strengthening or even creation of nationalism. As Wang Gungwu has pointed out, Chinese nationalism did not really exist before the encounter with the West. Chinese migrants’ exposure to the nationalism and racism of western countries helped create Chinese nationalism, which was then reinforced by the external threat to China culminating in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 (Wang 1998a). In my view, it is more common today for transnational activities to lead to a decline rather than an increase in nationalism and racism. However, both outcomes are possible, depending mainly on the policies and attitudes of the host country. Repressive policies towards migrants actually create the separatist consciousness that policy-makers fear–a classical self-fulfilling prophecy. Where immigrants and their descendants can obtain rights and opportunities they are less likely to emphasise their ethnicity. In the past there might then have been an expectation of assimilation. Under conditions of globalisation, transnational consciousness and multiple identities are the probable outcome.   Transnational communities and citizenship Recognising transnational belonging has important consequences for the way in which societal belonging is defined. The main instrument for this is citizenship. The multiple identities resulting from transnationalism can be institutionally recognised through laws allowing dual or multiple citizenship. Indeed, there is a clear trend in this direction: in recent years many emigration and immigration countries have changed their laws to permit dual citizenship. Emigration countries do so as a way of binding emigrants to the home country, because this brings benefits in the forms of remittances, technology transfer, political allegiance and cultural maintenance. Immigration countries do so as a way of improving the social integration of minorities, because it has been found that insistence on renunciation of the previous affiliation blocks naturalisation for many immigrants, who remain foreigners–even into the second and subsequent generations where the ius sanguinis principle prevails. The existence of permanently disadvantaged minorities is unacceptable, because it leads to social disadvantage and divided societies. This linking of ethnicity with social class is at the root of ethnic conflicts and racism. This is why even ‘guestworker’ importing countries which practised differential exclusion have now changed their citizenship laws to encourage naturalisation. The new German citizenship law of 1998, which represents an important (though still incomplete) move towards the ius soli principle, is a significant milestone(Castles 2000a; Castles and Davidson 2000). According to Vertovec, half the world’s countries now recognise dual citizenship or dual nationality (Vertovec 1999, 455). Portes points out that this is a ‘remarkable departure from earlier times, when emigrants were almost regarded as defectors and where naturalisation in another country entailed the automatic loss of the original citizenship’ (Portes 1999, 467). The recent recognition of dual citizenship by the Mexican Government has led to a rapid growth in the dual citizen population of the USA. The hope of gaining political influence in powerful immigration countries can be very important to homeland governments as Schiller points out for Asian countries (Schiller 1999). In some cases, homeland governments are so keen on this role that they support the asylum applications of their own political exiles, as Portes describes for Salvadorians and Guatemalans in the USA (Portes 1999, 467-8). Transnationalism from below applies with regard to citizenship too. Where governments refuse to recognise this right it becomes a major focus for migrant struggles, as has been the case in Western Europe. Gender rights play an important part here: since the 1960s increasing numbers of states have recognised inheritance of citizenship through the mother as well as the father. The growing number of cross-national marriages automatically create dual citizens. Where states fail to recognise dual citizenship, ordinary people often discover loopholes. Germany, with its large Turkish immigrant population. was estimated to have 1.2 million dual citizens in the early 1990s (Çinar 1994, 54). Transnationalism will inevitably lead to a rapid increase in multiple citizenship–creating the phenomenon most feared by nationalists: the potentially divided loyalties of people with an instrumental rather than an emotional attitude towards state membership. The growth of transnational communities may in the long run lead to a rethinking of the very contents of citizenship. Differentiated forms of state membership may be needed to recognise the different types of relationships transmigrants have with different states–such as political rights in one place, economic rights in another and cultural rights in a third. Such debates are too complex to pursue further here. (8)   Future perspectives for migrant settlement and transnationalism Recognition of transnationalism, easy naturalisation and dual citizenship are still distant dreams for most migrants in the Asia Pacific region. Emigration countries authorities may well encourage some forms of transnationalism as a way of retaining the loyalties of emigrants. Dual citizenship or quasi-citizenship (that is special rights for emigrants who have taken the citizenship of immigration countries) can have important economic, political and cultural benefits for emigration countries, as the Balikbayan policy in the Philippines demonstrates (see above). On the other hand, governments of emigration countries may well fear the potential role of transmigrants as agents of political and cultural change. Immigration country governments in the region are highly unlikely to recognise transnational communities in the foreseeable future. The perception of migrants as temporary workers who will not settle is still very much the conventional wisdom for Asia Pacific elites. Immigrant settlement is not officially permitted anywhere (with some exceptions for people with high levels of financial or human capital). Immigrant settlement and community formation are seen as threatening. For instance in Malaysia, immigration is perceived as having the potential to destabilise a delicate ethnic balance devised to deal with the consequences of colonial divide-and-rule policies. In Japan, increased immigration and settlement forces people to confront powerful myths of homogeneity and racial superiority (Yoshino 1992). Immigration and settlement have the potential to upset established ideas on national identity. In this climate, rights for migrants are granted grudgingly–if at all. Undocumented migration is still widespread, making it easy for authorities to turn a blind eye to all sorts of abuse and exploitation. Even legal migrants have no rights to family reunion, secure residence permits, welfare benefits, political participation and so on. Access to citizenship for immigrants is not even on the political agenda in most places. Yet there are reasons to believe that such exclusionary policies will be unsustainable in the long run,. Trends to increased migration, long-term settlement and formation of transnational communities have become inescapable, as I have argued elsewhere. International migration is just one aspect of much broader processes of globalisation and social transformation. The increasing porosity of borders to various types of flows (capital, commodities, ideas, people) makes it much harder for governments to control migration and settlement. Growing regional cooperation also makes it harder for immigration countries to enforce draconian control policies. The failure of mass repatriation policies during the Asian Crisis made such constraints on national sovereignty clear to many policy-makers. Economic motivations remain strong for workers to move from areas with large labour surpluses but slow employment growth (such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Indo-China, South Asia and China) to fast-growing economies with slow or negative labour force growth (Japan, the tiger economies, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, etc). Governments of labour-surplus countries will probably continue to see labour export as economically and socially beneficial, and to include it into their development plans. Employers and governments in labour-deficit countries may see labour import as an easy solution to labour shortages that might otherwise slow economic growth. A continuation and expansion of temporary labour migration seems probable. The smaller than predicted fall in migrant worker employment during the 1997-99 Asian Crisis, and the rapid resumption in mobility since confirm such expectations. Migration tends to create structural dependence for both emigration countries and immigration countries. Emigration countries need continuing outflow of workers to alleviate unemployment and remittances to support their balance of payment. This is one reason why the Philippines has not been able to drastically reduce emigration, despite major political pressures to do so. Immigration countries need continuing inflows because nationals will not move back into menial jobs in plantations, factories or the services, even in the event of recession and unemployment. That is why authorities in both Malaysia and Japan have been very half-hearted about deportations of undocumented workers, despite the rhetoric of political leaders (Skeldon 1998a). Employers form powerful lobby groups to retain good workers and to obtain new ones. This structural dependence gets translated into interest group politics, which leads to a politicisation of migration (Pillai 1999). In addition, migration networks and the transnational migration industry help organize and perpetuate migratory flows, even if governments wish to stop them (Castles and Miller 1998, 25-27). They also play an important role in processes of settlement and community formation, as research in Malaysia (Kassim 1998) and Japan (Komai 1995; Mori 1997) has shown. Trends to democratisation in Asia Pacific countries also help stabilise immigrant populations, even though such processes are uneven and uncertain. Japan fulfils all the criteria of procedural democracy and the rule of law. Increasing use of legal and human rights guarantees by immigrants and their supporters, particularly in the many NGOs, may help stabilise the situation of settlers, and eventually facilitate family reunion and community formation (Kondo 1998; Kondo 2000). In Malaysia, democracy and human rights guarantees are far less developed. Nonetheless, civil society organizations are campaigning for the rights of migrants, and using the legal system where possible (Jones 2000). Similarly welfare rights can play a major part in stabilising immigrant populations. Again there are clear signs that this is happening in Japan, with increasing access to general and special social services by immigrants. Such trends are not much in evidence in Malaysia or other immigration countries. However, the development of social safety nets is on the political agenda following the Crisis, so change is possible. If we put all these trends together, there is every reason to expect that transnational communities will play an increasingly role in the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, the failure of state policies to come to terms with settlement and community formation may actually encourage the proliferation of transnational communities. Where states deny rights to permanent settlers, they force them into a state of permanent marginalisation. This leads to reactive ethnicity (see above), in which discriminated groups use ethnic resources as a means of survival and upward mobility. Under conditions of globalisation, this strengthening of ethnic ties is likely to strengthen transnational linkages, and may well help reduce the power of nation-states to control their borders and to manage difference within them. The refusal of Asia Pacific elites to accept that labour migration will lead to some degree of settlement and community formation is therefore counter-productive. It will not prevent the development of transnational communities, but is likely to force them into oppositional or even separatist positions. It would be better to recognise the existence of transnational communities, and to take steps to break the nexus between minority ethnicity and disadvantaged social positions. 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This is summed up in Epeli Hau’ofa’s notion of ‘our sea of islands’ in which the Pacific Ocean does not divide peoples, but provides routes to link them (Hau'ofa 1993). 2. See also: (Castles 1998; Castles and Miller 1998, Chapter 6); (Huguet 1995; Martin, et al. 1996; Skeldon 1998b; Stahl 1999). Regular analyses are provided in the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (Scalabrini Migration Center, Quezon City, Philippines). Up to date material is provided by Asian Migration News, available on the Scalabrini Migration Center Website: http://www.scalabrini.org/˜smc 3. For an history of the modern state and an analysis of its contemporary characteristics see (Held, et al. 1999, 32-86). 4. A useful definition of globalisation is: ‘A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions–assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact–generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.’ (Held, et al. 1999, 16) 5. A fascinating use of modern transport and communication technologies to run small ethnically-based businesses by Cape Verdian women is analysed in (Marques, et al. 2000). 6. For a summary of the Philippine example see: (Castles 2000b, 7-11). 7. For instance diasporas may be seen as peoples dispersed by force or by disasters, who have a strong consciousness of belonging together, while transnational communities are a broader category, including economic migrants. Others simply regard transnational communities as straddling borders while diasporas are more wide-flung groups. See discussions in (Cohen 1997; Van Hear 1998). 8. Some of the best discussions of these issues are to be found in: (Bauböck 1994; Bauböck, et al. 1996; Bauböck and Rundell 1998); (Gutmann 1994); (Habermas 1996b). Such debates are examined in (Castles and Davidson 2000), and specifically for the Asia Pacific region in (Davidson and Weekley 1999).

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