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| Management of Social Transformations - MOST
Discussion Paper No. 53 |
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NGOs, Governance and Development in
Latin America and the Caribbean
by
Also available in Spanish
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This discussion paper is the basis for the preparation of the seminar on NGOs, Governance and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Montevideo, 28-30 November 2001) as part of UNESCO’s MOST Programme. The author begins by pinpointing the phenomenon of NGOs within the voluntary sector of Latin American and Caribbean civil society, before focusing his analysis on the particular case of “development-oriented” NGOs. He goes on to examine the various meanings of the concept of “governance” in direct relationship with the process of structural change currently under way in the Latin American region. On the basis of these considerations he then turns to the challenges now facing NGOs in the region, in terms of identity, legitimacy and social and financial sustainability, analysing some of the strategies that these organizations have embarked upon in order to deal with the changes in their field of action. Despite the difficulties that many Latin American and Caribbean NGDOs are currently facing in readapting to their new working conditions, the author concludes by noting the major contribution made by these organizations to democratic “governance” and the promotion of sustainable and socially equitable development on the continent.
Over the past three decades there has been a notable increase in the importance of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the field of cooperation and development. Around the world these organizations have been gaining visibility, recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of governments, international organizations and agencies, the media and the general public, not only thanks to their humanitarian aid action on the ground, but also, increasingly, as protagonists in development and social regulation on an equal footing with the State and the private sector. Something similar has occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) where NGOs have for a long time been at the forefront of the fight against scourges such as poverty, famine, illiteracy and social marginalization, but saw their numbers and activities grow swiftly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Since then they have become vital players - albeit not immune to criticism and challenges – in the LAC region, thanks to their work in a wide range of areas including sustainable human development, democratization and the defence of human rights, the strengthening and participation of civil society (CS), preservation of the environment, the search for production alternatives, local development, the promotion of minorities, and the defence of threatened cultures. By some, and to an ever greater extent, NGOs are even recognized and held up as social players of prime importance; yet they are also criticized or denigrated as dangerous groups of activists competing for space and influence, locally and internationally, with States and political parties, companies and trade unions, local authorities and international organizations. However, in reality little is known to date about this fragment of organized CS and much remains to be known about how it can be strengthened or sustained or about its potential to deal with present changes – and even more so future ones – in the field of Latin American development. [1] In the particular case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the presence and actions of these organizations have been particularly affected by the changes that have taken place in the region over the past two or three decades, which have profoundly altered the political, economic, social and cultural contexts in which they traditionally operate. General processes such as democratic consolidation, economic, social and cultural globalization, the rise of neo-liberal politics, the growing interest in and attraction towards a more indifferent but more multifaceted CS, regional integration, State reforms and decentralization, along with more specific processes such as changes and fragmentation in traditional social movements, the new forms of social representation and demands, reduced foreign aid in the region and changes to the ways and means in which international cooperation operates, all maintain, extend and complicate the scope for action by these institutions. [2] Despite all of these changes the set of structural problems that NGOs have been fighting for some time in this part of the world has remained – or, worse still, even deteriorated – including joblessness, violence, illiteracy, poverty and inequalities. Such changes have had marked knock-on effects on the work carried out by these organizations, necessitating a far-reaching revision of the premises on which their aims and strategies used to be defined, their capacities and forms used to develop, their links used to be established and their programmes used to be funded. In addition, not only have the agendas and capital flows changed along with the priorities, scenarios, forms of action and the disposition of their interlocutors, but also, as a consequence, so have the relations between NGOs and the State, other CS players, international funding organizations and agencies - including Northern NGOs, traditional sources of economic aid, companies and the market, the media and academia. Against this uncertain background of changes and demands, LAC NGOs are now reviewing their aims and operational activities, adapting old and acquiring new institutional capacities to increase and boost their contribution to the democratization and development processes, both in individual countries and in the region as a whole (Valderrama León, M. and Pérez Coscio, L., 1998). It is against the background of this change – both in the action and the very world of NGOs – that we are proposing an overview of their specific contribution to the development and democratization of LAC societies, in the region’s current circumstances. This calls for a wide range of questions to be asked about these organizations, questions that for the time being undoubtedly do not have ready answers but which this study will attempt to find. These questions include how the changes in the political, social and economic and cultural context of the region have affected their work in promoting development; in that connection, how these organizations are reviewing their objectives and forms of action; according to what priorities they define their agendas and their aims with respect to the context in which they act; what adjustments and innovations they are making to their structures to guarantee and improve their financial viability and institutional strengths; how they are redefining their relations with other social players (the State, companies, international cooperation and multilateral funding bodies); what new consensuses and links they are forging among themselves and/or with their peers in the North to increase their operational capacities and the scope of their activities, and so forth. In particular, this study sets out to tackle the current problems facing LAC NGOs from the viewpoint of “governance” or “good government”, a concept or expression with many meanings and a wide range of applications concerning basic management and participation problems, linked to a great extent, if not exclusively, with development policies (Alcántara, 1998). [3] From this point of view, whereas “governance” refers to the creation of new links between the State, the market and CS, NGOs are one of the pillars of “good government” which should bring about economic and social development on the basis of new associations between the authorities, the world of private enterprise and the non-profit-making associative sector. This notion, too, is not free of grey areas, not least the very concept of “governance” and the possible role to be played by NGOs in practice. That is why we must begin by clarifying and specifying the suppositions on the basis of which this connection has been established in current debates about development and, in particular, with respect to the particular political and social context of Latin America and the Caribbean covered by this report. Focusing on the main subject to hand this report tackles the phenomenon of LAC NGOs in an attempt to try and distinguish them from other CS Organizations (CSOs) and classify them within their own world, concentrating the analysis on the conditions in which a particular group of these bodies came into being and developed, namely Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs). To that end we shall analyse the aims and internal functioning of these institutions, placing emphasis on their identity, their working dynamics and methodologies, and the ways in which they fund their projects and their institutional sustainability. We shall also take a look at the relations maintained by these institutions with other social players, with the State at its various levels, with companies and multilateral organizations, and with development-related international cooperation agencies. Finally, we shall consider, by way of conclusion, the main aspects tackled throughout the report and pinpoint certain questions about the future of NGDOs in LAC, with regard to the potentials and limitations of this CS sector and a clarification of the main challenges and tasks that they must face if they are actively and effectively to contribute to the region’s development. To a large extent this document is based on a systematic ordering of material written by others who have painstakingly carried out a wide-ranging analysis of this subject, and we wish to express out debt and gratitude to them. It should also be pointed out that this study offers a broad panorama of NGOs in “the whole region” of LAC, in an attempt to summarize and conceptualize realities that often differ from one country to another. It is clear that any analysis or study of the former and new roles played by Latin American NGOs should stipulate the fact that NGOs in the region are not the same and that their actions vary according to a variety of circumstances, largely related to local specificities. It is therefore also difficult to reach conclusions that are valid for all LAC NGOs as a whole, in the light of the prevailing situation in each country, their different institutional forms, and the different aims that these organizations pursue, according to specific local contexts. While special attention has been paid to the major differences between the various national and regional contexts in which these organizations develop their actions, it has obviously not always been possible to consider in detail and with the necessary precision the special features of the phenomenon in each country and region of Latin America and the Caribbean. [4] I. Governance and NGOs: a recent “pluridimensional” link As has been pointed out, referring to other contexts, “NGOs” and “governance” refer to different realities and meanings and although they now seem closely related it was not always thus. The notion of NGOs obviously predates that of “governance” even though the spread of the latter term, especially in the sense of “good government”, has over the past decade contributed greatly to a strengthening of the leading role and public recognition of a player with its own merits and more than half a century of action in the field of development (Ben Néfissa, 2000). A search for the origin of the expression NGO apparently reveals that it was first used, in the late 1940s, in United Nations documents, to refer to a wide range of institutions whose only common feature was that they did not belong to government circles (Padrón, 1982, quoted by Bombarolo, Pérez Coscio and Stein in 1992). As these authors point out, since they do not depend on State administration, in certain cases they may be seen as “private” institutions whereas others prefer not to be defined as such but as “institutions of the third kind” (i.e. neither public nor private) or as “autonomous organizations, or simply set apart as “private organizations of social interest”. [5] In any case, the popularization of the phenomenon of NGOs can be traced mainly to the 1970s when there was a veritable “explosion” in number and scope of these organizations worldwide (Cernea, 1988). [6] The development of NGO activity initially depended on the solidarity of organizations in the developed world of a lay or religious nature and based on international cooperation with organized groups in “Third World” societies themselves. However, from the mid-1980s on, the consolidation of the NGO phenomenon was aided by a change of focus with regard to the dynamics of development operated by the major multilateral funding agencies and the specialized agencies of the UN, in line with the World Bank’s (WB) approach (from 1992 on) to “governance”, which it defined as “the general manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992). [7] From this viewpoint, instead of seeing governments as the main managers of development, these agencies began to look to the private sector to play a central role in the search for more democratic means of government or “good governance”, and in which according to them NGOs would be central players. Along the same lines WB decided that NGOs should play a vital role in promoting responsible government because, among other reasons, they contributed to the construction of more pluralistic institutional systems, creating linkages between the different tiers of society, giving local interests a say and exerting an influence through a very wide range of ideas and values on the framing of state policies (World Bank, 1993). With regard to the LAC region, at the beginning of the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Chilean Senate jointly published a document stemming from earlier work and a major seminar on “Good Government”, insisting upon the fundamental role to be played by CSOs and NGOs in particular. Since then that work has been taken up and added to by different development agencies as a key aspect of action plans for the region, helping to disseminate and promote the use of this concept, of which there exist several definitions, but which, to take the version preferred by UNDP, is “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage countries’ affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP, 1997). The initiators of the concept of “governance” not only contributed thereby to a renewal of the aims of NGOs in terms of optimizing their capacities to assist in emergencies, disasters or wars, but also, by distancing themselves from the prevailing economic dominance of the discourse by international funding agencies, they helped to lend legitimacy to the role of NGOs as agents of development in allowing for the influence of political and social issues over economic ones in the processes of structural reforms being recommended by them. From this perspective, the expressions “NGOs” and “governance” refer mainly to the political phenomenon, the former in a negative sense (non-governmental) and the latter in a positive sense (“good government”). In this sense “governance” is, above all, a tacit way of referring to politics since, although the concept applies to many situations in which it does not refer to a formal political system, it nonetheless implies the existence of a political process: “governance” like “good government” means “creating a consensus, obtaining the consent or acquiescence needed to implement a programme in a scenario where different interests are at stake” (Alcántara, 1998). Thorough investigation (Ben Néfissa, 2000) has already been conducted into the fact that, behind a similar definition, lies a “prescriptive” conception of “governance” whose application entails a set of political and administrative measures of structural adjustment and drastic cuts in State spending, especially in the social field, and therefore also tends to create a favourable environment for developing the private sector. The reforms required by this practice of “good government” call for new links between the State, society and the market precisely related to the new role that, in this context, has been allocated to NGOs [8] . However there also exist – according to the same author - a “standard-setting” dimension and an “analytical” dimension of “governance” making this concept more complicated and requiring a specification of the meaning with which it is being used in each case. The “prescriptive” and “standard-setting” notions of “governance” are the more visible ones: they indicate what is “good” or “better” and “what should be done” in the field of what is known as “good governance”. Here, the measures of good “governance” would be: a decentralized administration responsible for its actions; a lightweight, efficient and transparent civil service; a reliable judicial system; a fight against corruption; the development of civil liberties (of the press, association, etc.) and the respect of human rights in every sense. The third dimension of the concept, the “analytical” one, is related with a new way of approaching politics that is far-flung from the traditional perceptions that strongly focussed on a political and legalistic analysis of the State. In this set-up, the State is not the only – or even the main – player in development (even though it continues to be the central entity thanks to its power and real ability to take action) but alongside it are the market (represented by enterprise, institutions and individuals, producers and consumers) and the important role played by so-called “Civil Society” (CS), corresponding - roughly speaking - to the universe that in the English-speaking world is known as the “Third Sector” or the “non-profit-making sector” including NGOs, cooperatives, mutual assistance funds, trade unions and community-based organizations, foundations, social and sports clubs, etc. In this way “governance” entails a set of reforms aimed at establishing a new linkage between the State, the market and society: it is not an end in itself other than that it facilitates the economic and social development of societies thanks to new relations between the authorities, the world of private enterprise and the non-profit-making associative sector (including NGOs). Nevertheless, despite the difficulty in contesting the “standard-setting” and “prescriptive” notions, “governance”, seen from the analytical viewpoint put forward by Ben Néfissa, is not immune from criticism, especially if it is compared not only with the reality of developing countries but also that of the developed western countries where the liberal political model dominates. In this sense, the notion of “governance” conceals conflicts of interest, contradictions and hegemony; it places emphasis on consensus and involves no reflection on power other than the most efficient means of “managing” society (de Senarclens, 1998). Other more radical criticisms focus on the harmful effects of relations that may be established between “governance”, globalization, democracy and development and, in particular, how these phenomena may combine, increasing the dependence of the least developed countries on external pressures and thereby weakening the legitimacy of nation States whose political prerogatives may be undermined or transferred to other spheres (independent experts, civil servants at multilateral organizations, etc.) (Ben Néfissa, 2000). Similarly, other observations of particular interest are criticisms formulated, in particular, referring to the developing world, with respect to the relationship between the State, CS and the market, and implying the concept of “governance”. Both because of the ability of States to defend themselves and to reconstruct their domination on new bases, and the fact that in many developing countries the State apparatus remains an important economic agent (such that a reduction in its participation in terms of available fiscal resources may weaken the influence of the private sector) it would seem that the theory of good government does not take into account the full complexity of the State. Moreover, the apology of market values underlying the notion of “governance” runs the risk of overvaluing the private sector in terms of its regulatory and management capacities without paying due attention to its limitations. The fragility of States with which “governance” is associated may lead to serious social problems, especially in the developing countries. The appearance of NGOs, experts, bureaucrats and local and regional networks is by no means the answer to the question of political participation and the control of authority. In any case, States are always present and the conflicts inherent to the essence of politics are unlikely to turn for any length of time into a technocratic and administrative form of “governance” (de Senarclens, 1998; Ben Néfissa, 2000). Also taking a critical approach to “governance”, albeit less radical in their objections, other authors maintain that the most important message to be learned from this notion is that the reality of government is undergoing major changes, and that a far-reaching break with the past has taken place. Authors such as Stocker (1998) claim, for example, that “governance” refers to new forms and methods of governing and, at bottom, to a change in the very meaning of government. Stocker adds that the notion of “good government” depends on five propositions: bringing into play a complex set of institutions and agents that do not belong exclusively to the sphere of government; recognizing the loss of clarity in limits and responsibilities with regard to tackling social and economic problems; identifying the interdependence between power and institutions that take action collectively; reliance on autonomous networks of agents set up by themselves and recognition of their ability to get things done, rather than on the basis of government power exerting or wielding its authority; and the idea that government may use new techniques and instruments to govern and guide. [9] This interpretation of the notion of “governance” is quite similar to the one frequently found in political science in which it is depicted as a new approach questioning the vision of a monolithic State overseeing the judicial pronouncements regulating society as a whole. In this sense, the State is nothing other than a set of institutions, players, groups or individuals interacting with each other and whose study cannot be limited to the institutional analysis of public action but requires in addition a sociological study of their action, interaction and conflicts, and of the way interests are negotiated and formed. According to this interpretation, the “analytical” notion of “governance” may help us to understand better the originality of the outward trappings of politics in different counties where they do not adapt to the model of developed countries, from where the “prescriptive” and “standard-setting” content of the notion of “good government” comes, as is analysed above. In other words, an analysis in terms of “governance” in its “analytical” sense should enable us to grasp the originality of politics in the broad sense of the word and its effects on development by highlighting and allowing for the full potential of the role of those non-State players who definitely also contribute to the functioning and regulation of social life (such as NGOs). From this viewpoint and in the light of what has happened in the region in recent decades it is not only quite relevant but it is also necessary to investigate the role of NGOs as players in “governance” and the development of Latin American societies in an analytical sense. The rest of this report is taken up with an exploration of these issues.
As in all developing countries, in the LAC countries reform programmes have been initiated with a view to ensuring “good government” in the “prescriptive” and “standard-setting” meanings of the notion of “governance” set out earlier in this report. For at least the past fifteen years or so the whole region has seen the implementation of programmes aimed at: reducing the State apparatus; reforming and debureaucratizing the way in which public administration operates; encouraging the participation of the private sector of the economy through wide-reaching and fairly widespread processes of privatizing State-owned companies; promoting – albeit not always with the same will or the same margins of freedom – participation by CS in public management; decentralizing traditionally centralized States; bringing about greater control over and transparency in public management through active citizen management, and so on. “Good government” programmes are linked to a wide range of processes of change and reform that have profoundly affected the economic and market, the State, social entities and the cultural patrons of countries in the region over the past two decades. The process has been extremely intense in some regions of LAC and less so in others and although, in general terms, the features of the process have been similar, there are specific national versions in each country such that, given the progress, hold-ups or reversals noted in different countries or aspects of the reforms, the process of change has led to a radically different panorama in the region to that found at the beginning of the 1970s. To use broad brushstrokes it could be said that the processes of change are four in number: democratic construction; restructuring of the model of development and international integration; social democratization; and the redefinition of Latin American modernity. According to one study “they are the basic processes defining, to a different extent and with differences from one country to another, the current problem or rather problems facing the continent” (Garretón, 1995). None of these processes has been completed and, even though some of them are more advanced in certain countries than in others, generally speaking, the difficulties to be faced in solving these problems in terms of “governance” still cast a shadow of doubt over whether they will ever be completed. On this score, the central political process in LAC over the coming years will continue to be, without any doubt, the construction of solid, participatory and transparent democratic policies. Although the transitions have been concluded in all countries in the region with democratically elected governments, it is certain that the democratization process has not been completed in all countries and even less so has it been consolidated in a stable way, for various reasons. First, because – as recent experience in the West shows us – democratic transition is a very long process, always accompanied by lengthy State reforms and considerable successive efforts of many different kinds. Second, because in several cases there are still “authoritarian enclaves” or, in other words, institutions, authorities, players and situations inherited from the earlier authoritarian regimes; third, because in almost none of these countries has a successful solution been found to the problem of “truth and justice” vis-à-vis violations of human rights committed under the dictatorships; and fourth, because after democratic regimes were set up, in various cases there was a slide back into authoritarian rule or democracy lost substance as a political regime. In such cases, even if democracy was not replaced by another formal regime, it has in some cases been affected by phenomena of “loss of authenticity” or fallen under the control of rival powers, sometimes of legal or institutional origin, but sometimes of a repressive, corrupt or criminal nature. Completing the political transition and ensuring the consolidation of new democracies in institutional terms (as a system of citizens’ rights and standards regulating the competition for and access to power) were the first tasks on which the region’s post-dictatorial governments focussed. However, at present, although democratic policies and institutions are being formulated virtually continent-wide, the consolidation process has switched to the construction of more genuine democracies that guarantee representative government with majority support and that can neutralize rival powers and extend the exercise of citizenship such that every member of society can effectively enjoy their rights and freedoms. No less important from the viewpoint of this consolidation of democracy is the strengthening of party systems, since a representative, stable, functional and renewable system of parties is necessary for an effective democratic exercise: “which means opening spaces in society to form new parties and to consolidate existing ones and not being scared of a multi-party system” (Muñoz Ledo, 1998). Democracy is distinguished from other forms of government by the major role given to political parties in the operation of its institutions; indeed, in countries where they do not exist as national organizations, where they are being constituted or where their “volatility” prevents them from guiding political affairs, the lack of parties has a negative effect on the proper functioning of democratic institutions and, at the same time, on the possibility of tackling the problems and needs of development: “This is the serious flaw in Latin American democracy compared with the experiences of Europe and North America, where the quality of democracy and the good results of its management are determined by the solidity and merit of the political parties” (Hurtado, 1998). The aforementioned situations of democratic regression have a lot to do with the difficulties that reformers have had to face when trying to make the economic and political dimensions of change mutually compatible and to deal (democratically) with the logical increase in demands and reactions related to them. Much of the literature on the transition and democratic consolidation process in the region has been dedicated to an attempt to understand the complex relations between economic reforms, political reforms and social equality. Unfortunately, generally speaking, the material in this bibliography sets off alarms about the effects that reforms may be having on the quality of the democratic regimes being created in the region, especially with regard to the effectiveness of some of the more traditional requisites of representative democracy and its legitimacy (O’Donnell, 1992). [10] The reappearance of the threat of “ungovernability” in the region has at least had the virtue of highlighting the complex meaning behind the democratic formula, which does not only consist in guaranteeing a wider expression and participation of citizens but also means that whoever governs must also have the ability to take decisions. Confronted with the need to construct – or reconstruct – this ability to govern in order democratically to solve controversies involving the different demands and to put some order into the priorities of change, the governments of the region have been testing various formulae in accordance not only with a series of more or less common factors but also with specific national conditions that might be connected with the “analytical” notion of “governance” (such as the conditions in which the transitions are taking place, the type of political regime prior to authoritarianism, the depth of the economic crisis and/or the options made to tackle it, etc.). In the end, this dilemma of democratic governability during the transition might force political players in the various countries to change the institutional framework of their democratic regimes, to redefine the role and weight of the State and to alter the way it functions. Forming a substantial part of the so-called “Washington Consensus”, this reform has meant that, from one country to another, a notion quite similar to the State function is reproduced and fairly similar policies and instruments for public management are adopted. [11] There has also been an attempt to strengthen the institutional framework of fledgling democracies through processes of reforming those constitutions inherited from authoritarian regimes or older constitutions often riddled with amendments and partial revisions. However, the unpopularity of these reforms, the lack of clear parliamentary majorities in favour of the reform programmes and the need to reach vital political agreements in order to carry them out has led to the signing of “governability” agreements and pacts and a second generation of constitutional reforms which, generally speaking, have further strengthened presidential prerogatives. These new pacts and constitutional reforms are probably the expression of a new way of facing the political uncertainties arising from the current changes taking place across the continent but also of a new style of government whose effects on the future of democracy in LAC have yet to be gauged. It seems clear that the problems of consolidating and deepening Latin American democracies are closely linked to the (so far) relative progress made in the field of social democratization or, in other words, in the fight against poverty and other forms of inequalities and exclusion in societies whose fractures and gaps (be they economic, cultural or of another kind) have steadily widened in recent times. While there is no doubt that the process of social democratization may be relatively independent of the political formulae that promote it, in the current circumstances of LAC the achievement of greater political democratization must go hand in hand with the extension of social democracy without sacrificing either or replacing one with the other. After all, during the 1980s, democratization and impoverishment both advanced in LAC and, whereas there was an upturn in the economy in the early 1990s, the 1995 Mexican crisis revealed the fragility of the economic growth and interrupted an improvement which, in any case, was neither deep enough nor fast enough to enable the continent to pay off its social debt inherited from the “lost decade” and, less still, to offset its historical social deficits. [12] Even more serious, thanks to the aforementioned reform plans the LAC States have rid themselves of many of their traditional instruments for economic and social action and regulation, thereby reducing their ability to deal with the increase in those problems associated – though not necessarily or exclusively linked – with the extension of poverty and exclusion (such as the new forms of violence and crime now affecting these societies, for example). This has all resulted in the widespread disenchantment and detachment of Latin Americans vis-à-vis traditional democracy, whether as a political regime or in terms of its various institutions and players. [13] Although this disenchantment does not yet seem to pose a threat to the stability of political institutions, it nonetheless affects the very nature of the democratic regime and is a source of doubt about its future development in that there are more and more contradictions between a market logic, excluding many people both economically and socially, and a “citizens’” logic, going along, and going beyond in many ways, the traditional political channels. [14] On the other hand, the progress made in the field of political and social democratization is not totally separable from the model of development and international integration that various countries, or the continent as a whole, are completing. In the early 1990s when the effects of the foreign debt crisis began to be controlled and foreign capital began to flow into the region once again, a new development model seemed to win acceptance. Measured in these terms various countries in the region showed, at various times in the 1990s, sharp increases in GDP and income per capita. It is obvious that a new growth-oriented regime, both more open to and integrated into the global economy, is developing in many LAC countries as a result of the structural reforms undertaken in the 1980s and most of them have made considerable progress in improving their macro economies since – in a context of openness, eliminated subsidies and regional integration initiatives – investment has increased, businesspeople are more entrepreneurial and less dependent on the State, and elements of an entrepreneurial culture are beginning to emerge, cultivating the virtues of efficiency and competitiveness. However, the succession of crises that have hit the region since the Mexican peso collapsed in 1995 have held up and clawed back the expected progress. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s the foreign debt of the countries in the region increased (doubling in some cases). Rare are the countries that managed in the 1990s to bring about external openness and increase savings and investment at the same time as modernizing and diversifying their production structure, so that they might consolidate in the longer term a new system of sustained and sustainable growth. According to ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, a United Nations body), as part of its general assessment of development in LAC, in spite of the major efforts by the countries in the region, the results of the new “development and environmental models” are unsatisfactory in economic and, even more so, social terms. Moreover much of the population barely enjoys citizens’ rights, which in judicial and political terms means a fundamental inequality in their access to justice and precious little participation in political decision-making, while in the economic and social spheres this is translated into unequal opportunities, precarious employment, low income, obstacles to social mobility (especially for women), no acknowledgement of ethnic or cultural diversity and no protection from hardship. This means that the major challenge facing the region at the beginning of the new century is that of constructing fairer societies: “What is required is a reorientation of the development models in the region around a main axis, equality. The main effort should be to strive towards breaking down educational, vocational, demographic and property-owning structures through which poverty and inequality are transmitted from one generation to the next” (ECLAC, 2000, b). [15] Finally, to sum up the analysis of the processes of change taking place in the region, a model of development that enables the continent’s countries to be stably and quite autonomously integrated into the global system and generates the material bases for a process of social democratization, an ethical precondition and inseparable dimension of political democracy, brings us back to the fourth process mentioned above when defining the current situation in Latin America: namely the redefinition of Latin American modernity. Now, in 2001, albeit with some distinctions, the structural reforms in Latin America are complete, a major historic change in terms of development, imposing on the players those levels of complexity that are characteristic of the globalized economy. It is as if the uncertainty, risk and unpredictability of scenarios were part of the predominant cultural climate of the age. Here, it is worth making at least two general points. First, in the 1970s and 80s there was a crisis of paradigms that helped to explain the reality of Latin American societies in terms of a situation of conflict or a central contradiction (i.e. over the type of development, revolution, modernization, tendency or liberation), especially with regard to the all-knowing pretension of those interpretative schemes that failed to take into account new social processes, the uncertainties that they generate, and the possible future courses. Consequently, the whole idea of a type of “emerging” society vanished into what Latin American nations were becoming (namely modern, democratic or socialist societies), along with the linear motion that had apparently led there. In its place were designed partial utopias that led to the achievement of only some of the principles defining a society (Garretón, 1995). Something similar has occurred with the political and social players entrusted with achieving these historic projects, in the sense that it is not possible to think of the Latin American process in terms of a leading player-subject of historic action (the State, the working class, the revolutionary movement or party, etc). In that case, the actor-subject would be determined by a specific struggle or conflict, since each of the processes and each of the dimensions of social life recognizes different subjects and players that sometimes oppose one another. This also implies that the classical repertoire of forms of collective action and traditional set-ups of organization and representation on the continent, constructed on or centred around principles such as development, labour or revolution, are increasingly inadequate and questionable as models for action; the logical outcome of this is that it disorients the players who not only expect the final objective of a model of social integration but also experience, in flesh and blood, the consequent crisis of their identities. The definition of the new Latin American modernity is related, along these lines, to the constitution – or reconstitution – of collective subjects, and even this possibility seems to have been thrown off course by two centrifugal forces. First, the drama of being prevented from acting as subjects (affecting a huge sector of the population) and second, the imposition of a copied (or media-dominated) modernity taken from other contexts that squeezes collective identities between the models on offer and historical memory (Calderón y Dos Santos, 1995). All the processes analysed here are interlinked but they are not mutually dependent nor is there, apparently, an essential dependency or cause-and-effect relationship except for their ethical imperatives and the aspirations to a better society and living standards. While all are indispensable each is the product of its own struggle, has its own dynamics and its own players, and the achievement or failure of one, in part or in whole, does not necessarily lead to that of the others. In this sense it is highly probable that, in the coming decades, we shall continue to see in LAC major processes of destructuring and restructuring of social life and, as they are defined, there will be progress, stagnation and partial reversals. It is also probable that the changes will take place at different rhythms, and in different areas and at different times will move in opposite directions or have different meanings. As in every process of social change involving many players and concerning different interests, tensions and conflicts are likely to be generated, however, agreements will be reached and there will be alliances between the different agents, institutions and public and private sector, both in the sphere of the State, that of the market and CS in the analytical sense of “governance” outlined above. III. NGOs in the universe of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in LAC As in other parts of the world, and for similar reasons, a great variety of “non-State” organizations, belonging to the so-called “Civil Society”, have made an appearance in recent decades, and been consolidated in nearly every LAC country. [16] These entities have greater numbers of and increasingly heterogeneous responsibilities, and they try, through various kinds of activity, to cooperate in such a way that, in general, their respective societies, and in particular the least favoured and most vulnerable sectors of the population, can face up to their most serious and urgent problems (housing, education, health, employment, etc.). Also, and in an increasingly flagrant way, these organizations are not only characterized by their ability to offer answers to the various needs of sizeable sections of the population but also stand out, among other reasons, for their ability to invent and establish direct relations, for representing a stimulus to participation and dialogue, for the cost/efficiency ratio of their actions, for their sense of responsibility and the way in which they account for their actions, and for being able independently to diagnose problems. That is how, going far beyond its ancient origins, the concept of CS acquired a new relevance at the close of the 20th century and took on innovative meanings, as these organizations emerged as institutional players, whose probability of turning into an autonomous sphere of social interaction does not depend on their size or the quantity of their initiatives but on an ability to generate meaningfulness based on the rationality that breathes life into the entities that they comprise, unlike the other players on the institutional stage where they operate – namely the State and the market. But such a wide-ranging reality as this one makes any attempt to classify or categorize these organizations with a single common label a difficult task. Many of them are non-profit-making organizations – in some cases we speak of the “non-profit-making” sector just as we speak of the sector of organizations with social or solidarity aims. However, cooperatives may promote projects of benefit to the community while yielding profits for their own members, just as more and more “non-profit-making” organizations are coming into play in the field of promoting credit, offering assistance for micro-enterprises or other finance-related activities. Others tend to identify themselves as “non-governmental”; nearly all of them define themselves as non-party or non-religious to denote the independent nature of their action; and a large group portrays itself as part of the so-called “Third Sector”, a term apparently coined some decades ago by Waldemar Nielsen, inferring the existence of two other sectors, the State and the market. Some authors endow this Third Sector with a capacity to mediate between citizens and the State but it is clear that the contacts, links and bonds between all three sectors call into question or at least draw attention to the borders that supposedly divide one from another. For example, the limits are often too vague to enable us to locate in the so-called “Third Sector” those organizations that outwardly have public missions which primarily ought to be assigned to the State while enterprises often take initiatives that might, prima facie, be reserved for social organizations, or create their own machinery or instruments to perform a task of “social responsibility”. (A. Cruz in Cruz; Barreiro (dir.), 2000). This is precisely why we preferred to adopt a more general grouping for these organizations, denoting the fact that they belong to the so-called Civil Society (CSOs), as private entities with public aims, extending the said concept beyond the world of organizations in the so-called Third Sector. [17] In their studies on “Social Capital” in Argentina, UNDP and IDB claim that solidarity, generosity, disinterestedness and love of one’s neighbour lie at the basis of the rationale upon which CSOs operate. [18] This attitude of generosity and reciprocity based on the exercise of democratic participation mechanisms within the entities that make up the sector expresses the citizens’ mandate for constructing a sense of equality and fairness. Cooperation among citizens, their participation in organizations and social movements and their ability to establish reciprocal and collaborative relations in networks of organizations of all kinds emphasize the importance of the horizontal relationships established between members of the CSOs (UNDP-IDB, 1998). It is not our aim here to explore the thought-provoking concept of CS and its organizations in general but, as part of the aim of this study, and with the sole purpose of establishing certain reference points for a later analysis of the phenomenon of NGOs as part of the universe of CSOs, we shall pragmatically assume the validity of a certain consensus that seems to exist among researchers and social leaders who conceive of CSOs as entities with the following features. They are institutionalized organizations in terms of their own organizational structure, regardless of their legal status; they are private in the sense that they are structurally apart from the State and public administration (which means that, in certain circumstances, these organizations cannot receive government support and that civil servants and State employees cannot belong to them); they are non-profit-making, i.e. they do not distribute profits among their members or boards (but they can accumulate profits and/or capital as a product of their operations, but these must be reinvested and used for achieving their specific mission and not distributed among their members); they are self-governing, in other words they have their own governing bodies and maintain autonomy and control over their own actions; they are non-religious, unlike churches or congregations dedicated to the practice and dissemination of a credo, although organizations linked to or promoted by churches are not excluded; they are non-party in the sense that they are not meant to impose any political ideas, they do not field candidates in elections and they do not seek State power, although organizations promoted by political parties are not excluded. [19]
Most of the studies and research carried out internationally have highlighted the fact that this sector is far broader, in terms of its structure, and more complex, in terms of the quality of its institutional work and achievements, than was supposed a few years ago; it has also been demonstrated that its characteristics vary within and between countries. With regard to LAC, from 1995 to 1996 the IDB’s Regional Programme of National Consultations for Strengthening Civil Society in Latin America conducted a process of consultation in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, designed to establish bases for dialogue between State, Market and CS (Valencia, Winder, 1997). The findings of the Programme – according to which CS covers all non-profit-making organizations and activities of mutual assistance by citizens dedicated to the issues affecting them and concerning the common interest, including groups operating for the benefit of their own members and those benefiting others – show that in the region there is a strong and heterogeneous associative phenomenon involving millions of individuals and carrying out multiple tasks. [20] It can be fairly easily concluded from all this that NGOs are a sub-category in the associative world of CS and that they can be readily identified as belonging to the fourth category of the classification set out above (i.e. support organizations). But any attempt to take the analysis further immediately begs other questions about this particular type of CSO: What distinguishes or differentiates NGOs from other CSOs? What are the objectives and characteristics of their actions? What is known about their origins, trajectories, profiles and projects? In what areas do they work and what are the functions that they actually perform? What are the problems that they must face in LAC at present (and how many such problems are there?) and how are they facing them? What kind of relationships do they establish with the State and enterprise, with other social sectors, parties, churches and what situations are presented in each of these relationships? How do they finance their activities and what relations do they have with the market in general? And so forth. These are some of the questions that the next part of this report endeavours to answer. IV. LAC NGOs and the specific case of Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs) NGOs as a form of CSO In LAC there is a fairly long tradition of NGOs dedicated to elaborating and executing research and action programmes designed to tackle the various social problems affecting the region, especially those resulting from the underdevelopment in which a large proportion of the population lives. Some of them have solid experience and have contributed to the search for alternative development models in their respective countries, with a great sense of fairness and justice. Others, on the other hand, more fragile institutionally, carry out small-scale work projects, without making a major quantitative or qualitative impact upon the social issue they deal with. In quantitative terms, the world of NGOs is continually changing. In recent years the number, kind, variety and heterogeneity of NGOs in the region has been on the increase and become increasingly diversified, coinciding with a constant increase in the recognition and support that they receive, especially from international organizations, both in terms of the quality of the resources financing their projects and their increased presence and participation in the forums and other bodies that discuss and elaborate development proposals. The same is true of their growing role as leading players in a whole range of social, economic and political scenarios, and the attention that they are paid by governments, the media, academia, etc. Yet in reality it is also harder to speak of NGOs in LAC as a whole. As has already been pointed out “a glance at the catalogues of NGOs produced in some countries is almost like leafing through a telephone directory: the number of NGOs has been over-inflated including, as it does, every imaginable kind of institution: philanthropic associations and charities (…), cultural associations, sports clubs and even companies and consultancies disguised as NGOs. The whole gamut of the Third Sector in other words. The origin of this confusion lies in the very way in which the concept of NGOs was defined in the first place, by negation (non-governmental) rather than an affirmation of their task in a positive way”, i.e. the set of activities, links and contributions that should be decisive for identifying this sector (Valderrama León, 1998). That is why various authors have tried to differentiate NGOs from other CSOs as entities dedicated to promoting and carrying out development projects favouring the least protected sectors, economically and socially speaking. However, these same definitions change from one country to another, although in all cases there seems to be a search for a name that better qualifies the bodies known as NGOs and would define these organizations more accurately. Yet, even when they are looked at from different perspectives, there are some common denominators in all these definitions, for example in the majority of the definitions it is stated “from which part” of society NGOs operate, and it is made clear that they do not belong to the government (non-governmental, private, autonomous, etc., although sometimes they may include organizations created by certain LAC governments with a view to supporting and complementing their policies). It is also clearly stated “for whom” they work, making it clear that the people benefiting from their programmes are not the members of the institutions themselves but other persons or groups, in particular the poorest sectors of the population (the “working classes”, the poor, grassroots groups, popular movements, etc). Finally, it is always stated “why” they do their work, namely to improve the living conditions of these sectors, but with different terms used according to the particular case (development, promotion, support, education, training, etc), invariably without aiming to make a profit (although it is not excluded that members of the organizations might strive towards their own development or economic and occupational sustainability). Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs) Even if we categorize the universe of NGOs in this way vis-à-vis the broader world of CSOs, for a more satisfactory study of the relations between the organizations and the issue of development in the region, we shall have to focus on a sub-category of NGOs of special importance: Non-Governmental Promotion and Development Organizations, more usually known simply as Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs). This sub-category makes the distinction among NGOs between those that offer assistance or charity and those that offer promotion and social development. According to Mario Padrón, NGDOs are specifically involved in the study, design, execution and assessment of development programmes and projects, in direct action with social groups and organizations (Padrón, 1985). While the former do not see the process of community participation as a means of giving the groups involved in the projects more social power, the latter direct their actions not only at meeting the one-off needs of individuals, families, groups or communities but also at promoting values and attitudes that go beyond the immediate needs of those at whom their actions are targeted. They achieve this by means of material and social mediation, in order to achieve greater community participation (based on the criteria of fairness, solidarity and democracy) and as an instrument to influence the variables determining the living conditions of the poor (Padrón, 1985). Strictly speaking, this is a small group of organizations accounting for no more than 10% of the total of CSOs, but from the 1960s or 70s onwards they have come to play an increasingly important role in dealing with various economic and social issues, consolidating democracy and proposing alternatives for development in the region. They may emerge from various sectors of the ideological spectrum (they may, for example, be linked to the Catholic Church, universities or independent groups of professionals) and they are dedicated to research, action and/or training in quite different subject areas (housing, poverty, social exclusion, health, education, democratization, employment, childhood, environment, gender, etc), but they are all fundamentally made up of technicians and professionals and seem to have a formal structure with which, thanks to national and international funding, they can carry out programmes and projects that aim to promote social and economic development in the least favoured sectors of society. As such, we might take on the definition of NGDOs as “non-profit-making entities essentially made up of professionals and technicians and not administered by governments, whose beneficiaries are the poor and/or excluded sectors of the population and, in particular, whose institutional mission is not only to meet one-off health, education, housing etc. needs but also to promote values and attitudes among the beneficiaries of their work and among other social players (States, international bodies, media, etc.) on the basis of the criteria of social justice, fairness, real democracy, participation and solidarity .” (Bombarolo, Pérez Coscio, Stein, 1992, p. 32-33; Valderrama León and Pérez Coscio, 1998). Their area of action covers a wide range: offering services (health, education, housing, etc.), generating or supporting productive activities (farming, crafts, state-of-the-art technology, business consultancy, etc.), full-time training and awareness-raising about problems and how to solve them, support for organizing and consolidating the weakest social sectors, etc. The way in which these sectors work is based on the criteria of organization, participation, self-help and self-management, and is channelled through development projects, programmes and policies. [21] Although there are well-known differences in the process of their generation and development from one country or region to another, the advent of the first NGDOs in all LAC countries is a phenomenon dating back several decades. Over time, their evolution seems to have been strongly marked by a tendency to deal with a relatively constant set of problems affecting the region, but has also responded to the appearance of new themes and agendas, and an ongoing process of review and adjustment of strategies and intervention approaches, style of work, institutional capacities, access to resources, recognition, links at local and international levels, etc. Any finely detailed tracking of the trajectory of NGDOs in the LAC region should take into account these thematic and generational differences. That enterprise far exceeds the aims of this study and the findings of research into this have been published for quite some time. They have provided this part of our work with information and we refer to them for a farther-reaching assessment of the issue (Bombarolo, Pérez Coscio, Stein, 1992; Valderrama León and Pérez Coscio, 1998; Valderrama, Benavente, Bombarolo, Cunha, 2000). Although the appearance of these organizations may be explained by specific socio-political and economic circumstances in each country in the region, over the past four or five decades there seem to have existed certain characteristic historical correlations in the different regions of LAC thanks to which we may identify some common traits and itineraries regarding their origin and development. This might be relevant to the present situation and the challenges of the future. The first generation of NGOs began to develop in LAC towards the end of the 1950s, in direct relation with the emergence of a new economic and social scenario in the region. [22] Sectors of the Catholic Church, with a business and/or professional approach, looked at the social issues and offered assistance to poor communities, albeit in a collateral way, bearing in mind the powerful presence of the nation State in social policy. It is in this context that the idea began to be propagated of strengthening the solidarity-based unity of efforts and help for the weakest in society, which would later be the ideological basis of many NGDOs. The period from the 60s to the 70s was characterized by an explicit “compromise with the poor” and the organization of the people and various concepts – predominantly anti-State – oriented the actions of the region’s NGOs. One of them was the so-called “conscience-raising” (à la P. Freire) that promoted education or training for the people and social organization while aiming to bring about change; another was that of “community development” (Veckemans-DESAL). From the mid-70s on, and mainly under dictatorships, NGDOs began to take off in LAC. The 1980s were marked by a process of institutionalization of NGOs and the development of new areas of work: technology, women, human rights, survival strategies, etc. The return to democracy that began at that time in the whole region created new areas and opportunities in local management and in the planning of alternative development policies, against the background of a major economic crisis throughout the continent, associated with the problems of repaying the countries’ foreign debt and the gradual advance of neo-liberal government action models materializing in “structural adjustment” policies. Alienated in many cases from assistance practices, developmentalism, or dogmatic, theoretical schemes, institutions were then created that sought alternative ways of solving the crisis based on a direct relationship with the working classes, with more complex operational mechanisms, with more systematization and less improvisation. The 1990s seem to have been marked by the hegemony of the economy and by neo-liberal concepts in practically the whole region. NGOs began to be more involved in new areas such as microfinance or ecology and the environment. These new NGOs tended to be more pragmatic and lacked the ideological discourse of the NGOs at the foundational stage, were promoted by financial supplies and were more highly specialized and professional. Private enterprise also created NGOs and began to receive resources from international cooperation agencies. Alongside the process of State reform and minimization, small NGOs were founded, mostly by former civil servants. The classification of NGDOs is another point that has been tackled by the different authors studied and their presentation is of interest if we wish to go into greater detail about their distinctive features (the kind of tasks that they perform, their beneficiaries, their fields of action, etc.) or specify the different issues that affect them. Bearing in mind that each NGDO can be analysed from different viewpoints and may be defined at the same time according to different criteria, some possible classifications, according to the variable regarded as the most pertinent and useful for analysing this type of organization, would be:
Nor is it easy to estimate the numbers of NGOs in Latin America and even more so to specify the number of NGDOs. In the mid-1990s, a study based on a survey of national directories put the number for the whole region at around 10,000 [24] while a more recent study that more narrowly defined NGDOs put the figure rather lower than that (Valderrama and Pérez Coscio, 1998). [25] This difficulty in specifying the number of NGDOs in the region at present might also be linked in some cases to the identification of these organizations as “Third Sector”, as pointed out in the study by FLACSO (Filmus, 1997). This has often led to methodological inaccuracies. But the confusion between the concept of NGOs and “Third Sector” not only has statistical consequences but also ideological ones, since NGOs have often incorporated as an essential part of their identity the search for democratic alternatives for development based on the concept of social justice, differentiating them from other more assistance-related institutions. As we have already seen in some detail, in recent times there has been a tendency for NGOs to change their beneficiaries and to broaden their alliances with other social sectors, which has led to many of them to seek refuge in the so-called “Third Sector”. They therefore are more numerous but they obviously lose some profile, especially that won during the 1970s and 1980s as the mouthpieces of the excluded and marginalized.
V. Current issues and prospects for LAC NGDOs After forty years of democracy, LAC NGDOs have undergone a noteworthy increase in numbers and important qualitative changes associated with the intense transformations experienced by LAC economies and societies over the past decades. Recently, despite the variations between country and region, or special cases, we have been able to detect certain general trends of change in LAC NGDOs which are, according to a recent study on the subject of change and institutional strengthening of NGOs in nine countries in the region, carried out by the Latin American Association of Promotion Organizations (ALOP) and the Programme for the Institutional Strengthening of Latin American Non-Governmental Organizations (FICONG), as follows. The new leading role of the market for organizations – where previously there was a marked rejection of the market logic, they now seek to be incorporated into it in the best conditions (for example, those excluded from the market are now resorting to credit mechanisms, marketing, dissemination of technologies, etc.); closer relationships with the State (both central government but also and especially local governments) and multilateral and bilateral funding agencies and entrepreneurial sectors; the reduction in traditional foreign aid and the increase in operational costs, which mean that the subject of the economic survival of these organizations is becoming a priority concern – this is also felt in the search for formulae that ensure their sustainability and self-financing, forcing many NGDOs to take part in business-generating utilities, the sale of services or contracting their projects; a change in the communities at whom these organizations target their activity in keeping with the changes that have taken place in the organizational forms and types of demands of popular organizations (before, NGDOs used to channel their proposals through popular organizations but now they have a new role as players); some lines of work are losing their importance (e.g. popular education and trade union consultancy) while others are gaining in importance (technical assistance, microfinance management and local development, for example) and they are changing the main ideas that orient the organization’s work: before these were dominated by concepts such as social forces, political movements and popular democracy but today the buzzwords are consultation, citizenship, “governance”, social policies and poverty. Since NGDOs came into being, their established “mission”, and an essential part of their identity, has been the search for democratic alternatives for development based on the concept of social justice, something which has set them apart from other “assistance” institutions. Recently there has been a tendency for NGDOs to change their beneficiaries and to broaden their alliances with other social sectors. As a result, many of these organizations seem to be increasingly associated with and less differentiated from other types of institutions with very different raisons d’être and specific interests. Their numbers seem to be on the increase but that this may result in a loss of identity and a loss or dilution of their special powers to make proposals or negotiate, powers that were gained through their past actions (Bombarolo and Pérez Coscio (1998) and Valderrama León (1998)). However, it is clear that the development of NGDOs in various LAC countries is not uniform and is marked by the national and regional contexts in which they take their action. For example, while the adjustment processes appear to be a common phenomenon throughout the region, there are countries where they are taking place less forcefully or more gradually. For example, in the Cono Sur (southern South America) the dictatorships defined the context in which the NGDOs first developed, and the return to democracy has led them to reconvert and even compromise on their former proactive stance (as other players have increased their presence or because many agencies have come to think that the solidarity of the dictatorship era is no longer justified or because they prefer to channel some of their resources into supporting the actions of governments so as to support the consolidation of the new democratic regimes). In Central American countries civil wars were one stage in their institutional lives whereas the peace accords marked another, and the natural disasters that have affected the region in recent years have also taken their toll. In Colombia and Peru political and social violence and subjects such as drug trafficking create special situations in the respective national scenarios. All these factors may affect the evolution of NGDOs and give rise to different concerns and action plans. Against this background there seems to be a generalized agreement about the need to focus the problem of the identity of these organizations as a central point of their agenda. That is why Eduardo Ballón (Ballón, 1997) set out to discern three plans of analysis or three sets of questions referring to: first, a crisis or refocusing of the visions of development on which NGDOs base their action in the region; second, the social legitimacy of NGDOs which used to stem from their alliances with leading popular organizations, now weaker in many countries, since the changing spectrum of social organization has obliged them to adjust their links, alliances and bonds (with other sectors and social organizations – churches, companies, trade unions, universities, etc, with the State, political parties, funding agencies, etc.); and third, with regard to their sustainability, given the cuts in international cooperation resources which have highlighted the external dependency of NGDOs, some of which are now struggling to survive and must find new sources of income. In the light of the changes that have taken place in international cooperation and North-South relations it is obvious that we need to rethink the whole concept of international cooperation and that the notion of development, central at the beginning of cooperation, is undergoing a crisis. The application of adjustment policies and reforms is defining not only the new configuration of Latin American economies but is now also affecting the reference framework for their social organization too. They further concentrate power, they entrench the unequal distribution of wealth, they fail to fight massive poverty and the lack of decent employment while abolishing acquired rights and seriously undermining the concepts of solidarity and fairness. It is imperative for Northern and Southern NGOs alike to find alternative approaches to economic and social development and to deal with the problem of inequality. [26] What are the current concerns of NGDOs in this regard? One of the most important is that of improving the way they receive resources which, in addition to strengthening individual abilities of receiving resources, means developing consultation strategies between the Northern and Southern NGOs and public awareness activities to reverse the trend towards declining aid. [27] The effects vary from country to country. The impact of the reduction in resources affects some more than others. The cut in foreign aid to NGDOs has been more dramatic in countries with a higher level of economic and social development such as Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and Venezuela whereas countries like Bolivia and El Salvador have seen an increase. Even countries like Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru whose populations mostly live in poverty have suffered cuts in the amount of international cooperation funding they receive. Work by NGDOs is being affected not only by the variations in the volumes of cooperation but also by the changes in the criteria for approving projects and the types of relationship with Northern funding agencies. Short-term projects now dominate and there is a certain erratic tendency in the agencies when defining agendas and priorities for countries and topics. This all counteracts institutional development aimed at the medium term and sustainability. As is pointed out in a study by the OECD (Smillie; Helmich, 1993), NGDOs around the world are currently experiencing financial insecurity of a kind that would have bankrupted any company. The processes for the approval of projects are lengthy and complicated, based on criteria that have nothing to do with the needs of those receiving aid and undermining the professionalism and the continuity of the organizations’ activities. Moreover the dialogue between Northern and Southern NGOs has deteriorated. Notions such as “solidarity” and “partnership” have lost their vigour; relations are increasingly based on criteria and conditions imposed from the North, dominated by a greater pragmatism and the predominance of projects and premises for action in the short term instead of real development programmes. This panorama of instability in the funding of NGDOs has enhanced the relevance of the proposal to create funds to encourage more sustainable development along strategic lines, namely: support for self-funding activities; the generation of income and jobs through micro-companies; funds for micro- and small-scale production, etc., for anything needing funding from a wide range of funding sources. [28] What is certain is that the dizzying changes taking place, the questioning of the old paradigms and the reduction in resources have all thrown NGOs, in North and South alike, into a crisis that is jeopardizing their attempts to redefine their identity, a task which is not, of course, a necessity exclusive to NGDOs in the South. The representatives of the NGDOs in the South recognize the importance of their relationship with those of the North, since they have a long trajectory in common and share the same aims, a relationship that it might not be easy to transfer to the new form of interaction that is developing with bilateral and multilateral agencies. That is why it is important to establish new forms of dialogue enabling them to face the new situation creatively. In this framework of North-South relations, we should highlight the importance of global strategic alliances, in other words, consultation and cooperation among NGOs around the world and between them and Northern NGOs, along with links with other sectors of society and an opening up of areas of dialogue with State and multilateral organizations. Work by the International Forum on Capacity Building of Southern NGOs is one example of this kind of interrelation as is that of the NGO-World Bank working group and many other examples related with the international campaign Jubileo 2000, the mobilization of NGOs around the Multilateral Investment Agreement at the World Trade Organization, etc. [29] Among the changes (“re-engineering”) taking place in the management system, many important changes have been under way in the internal organization of NGDOs as part of the new requirements imposed by international cooperation. These changes include: greater rigour in the planning systems with the application of modern techniques; new institutional assessment mechanisms; the inclusion of business management elements in institutional management; and a rationalization of resources and staff adjustments. At the same time, to deal with the greater uncertainty due to growing economic instability (systems of funding based on short-term, extremely “volatile” resources, from many different sources, and with different themes and conditions), projects are becoming more short-term, cuts are being made in permanent staffing and sizeable budgets cuts are being made (with more and more short-term contracts or contracts for individual projects or programmes that have been specifically funded and ever decreasing institutional “overhead” margins”). This is all leading to greater dispersal and a lack of focus in the organizations’ work, which hampers efforts to make medium-term institutional plans and requires a continuous, time-consuming search for new resources. The sustainability or survival of NGDOs is a source of concern for those working in or studying this important sector of CS. Self-funding is still more an idea than a reality but some progress has been made in the sale of services, contracts with the State and in specific fields, such as micro credit. The incursion into the business world (one group of NGDOs ventured into business activities to obtain facilities) is in the early stages and the results so far have been contradictory: some NGDOs have succeeded in setting up efficient, profitable companies but others, following initial success, are now facing virtual bankruptcy. In some cases it has been difficult to combine the social aims of NGDOs with business dealings, and they have found it hard to keep certain aspects apart or to link them up where necessary. In some countries funding has been made available from the business sector for NGDO work. Primarily funding for assistance work and those NGDOs most closely linked to the business sector, but also philanthropic funds have been directed at a wider range of sectors. In many cases, NGDOs are becoming contractors working on projects masterminded by the State or by multilateral or bilateral cooperation agencies. They run the risk of turning into mere instruments of policies and losing their ability to command alternative proposals. Another problem concerning the direct funding of NGDOs through multilateral and bilateral organizations and States is that these sources of funding generally do not pay the administrative costs nor those connected with social aspects (organization or education of beneficiaries). This type of funding conspires against the possibilities for an institutional development of NGDOs and a strengthening of CS. On the other hand, it is clear that institutional sustainability is not limited to the issue of funding. It concerns the way in which NGDOs’ activities interact with the social fabric, the alliances and coordination that are established with other social sectors and their social impact. On the subject of relations with social players, it should be remembered that the raison d’être of NGDOs used frequently to be associated with their alliance with “popular” (or working-class) organizations. However, in recent times many of the historical counterparts of NGDOs have withdrawn to the background or disappeared completely, although the process of the ebb and flow of social organizations is probably far more pronounced in some countries than in others. At the same time, however, throughout LAC new spaces and new social interlocutors are appearing in the activity of NGDOs. One of the main areas, for example, is the local area where, thanks to the processes of administrative and budgetary devolution taking place in various countries, there is an interaction with locally based organizations, governments, decentralized public sector bodies and even, in some cases, the business sector. NGDOs are no longer envisaging their work exclusively in terms of their relations with working class players and see themselves as social players with their own profiles and as fully paid up members of CS – this means, in turn, that they attach greater importance to their own presence in public arenas, such as research and communication. Even so, NGDOs’ strategy vis-à-vis the rest of CSOs is neither explicit nor clear and coherent and the same goes for the policies of consultation and cooperation that they are establishing in local arenas (municipalities, provinces and regions) (Valderrama, 1999). Another serious fact for the historical trajectory of NGDOs is that they lack an X-ray vision of the new profile of working class organizations, their demands, and their operational approaches – all of which are priorities for any institutional strengthening on their part. Many NGOs arose in the context of and as a response to authoritarian regimes (frequent in the countries of Cono Sur – southern South America – and in some Central American countries). This made them anti-government and in many cases the vision of the State as an instrument for dominating the working classes led many NGOs to distance themselves from it even when they mobilized together with working class organizations to make certain demands on the State. The return to democracy in the region and the peace agreements, but also State reforms, meant that the dynamics behind the relationship between the State and NGDOs have been heading in different directions: in some countries the executives of these organizations or those close to them have access to the Government, while in other countries the leaders of working class organizations have taken up positions of responsibility in local government and even, in the new democratic dynamic, the opposition are now called upon to make proposals for viable public policies. The pressure for them to work with the State is not disconnected with the process of State reform itself and the subsequent tendency for tasks and resources to be hived off to the private sector. State reform entails privatization of the health, education and other services, which often gives resources to NGDOs, while the programmes of social investment to offset the effects of the adjustment programme have led to a widespread tendency to subcontract NGDOs to carry out projects or provide services. Despite these strategic considerations, there are repeated references to problems of coordination with the State, the lack of continuity in State initiatives resulting from changes of government, ministers or heads of programmes, and the problems of excessive red-tape and delayed payments. In the LAC region numerous efforts have been made by NGDOs to coordinate. Undoubtedly the most consolidated NGDO network in the region is the Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción or Latin American Association of Promotional Organizations (ALOP). It has been in existence for over twenty years, uniting 50 of the region’s mightiest private organizations for the promotion of development, and it has been responsible for wide-reaching, intense activity for promoting and strengthening Latin American NGDOs. [30] But we should not overlook other thematic regional networks such as the Consejo de Educación de Adultos de América Latina – CEAAL (or Council for Adult Education of Latin America), with its head office in Mexico City; its central thematic axis is education, but it has also been setting up working groups on related subjects. Others include regional feminist networks: Red contra la Violencia (or Network against Violence) and Red de Salud de las Mujeres (or Network for Women’s Health). Based in Costa Rica is the Fondo Latinoamericano de Desarrollo – FOLADE (or Latin American Development Fund) which includes some twenty NGDOs working on micro credit and is responsible for wide-ranging conferences attended by many bodies involved in micro finance; it is promoting an investment fund. Then there are Latin American thematic networks in the fields of human rights (for example Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo – or Inter-American Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development, based in Bolivia), housing, the environment, and so forth. Special mention should also be made of subregional NGDO networks such as “Concertación Centroamericana” (or Central American Consultation and Cooperation) created during the conflict that affected the region and intended to bring about peace accords and democratization. Various Central American NGDOs dedicated to popular education joined the “Alforja” (or “Knapsack”) network which has its head office in Costa Rica. In the Caribbean there is the Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES or Regional Coordinator for Economic and Social Research) which brings together research centres and NGOs promoting economic and social research in order to extend the participation of CS in the integration process in the region. In most LAC countries there are associations of national NGDOs and a variety of thematic and regional networks, while it is interesting to note the appearance of new kinds of networks such as those for citizen initiatives (“Viva la Ciudadanía” or Long live citizenship, in Colombia; “Propuesta Ciudadanía” or Citizens’ proposal, in Peru; “Ciudadanos por la Democracia” and “Alianza Cívica” – Citizens for Democracy and Civic Alliance – in Mexico, but also the “National Campaign of Citizens’ Action against Hunger and Poverty and for Life” in Brazil, and two Nicaraguan networks: “Grupo Positivo de Cabildeo e Incidencia” – defined as a CS coordination body aimed at making sustainable development proposals to solve the problem of social exclusion, and “Iniciativa por Nicaragua”, a network aimed at involving public opinion in discussions of subjects of national interest; finally, with regard to the new concern with citizenship issues, we should refer to “Poder Ciudadano” or Citizens’ Power, one of the most active organizations in Argentina in recent years. These networks, we can see, play a positive role in promoting the work of NGDOs, enabling them to improve their links with CS and facilitating dialogue with other bodies, such as the State, universities, international cooperation bodies, Northern NGOs, etc. However, the potential and dynamisms of these networks varies and we should therefore also examine in what conditions some networks operate dynamically and have a noticeable impact on society while others become bureaucratic bodies. It would seem that networks are more dynamic when they act on behalf of wide-ranging interests and movements (hence the high number of human rights networks in countries with high rates of violence, for example) while it seems that their survival is linked to their ability to tailor their strategies to changes of context.
VI. By way of conclusion: the numerous dynamic links between NGOs, “governance” and development in Latin America and the Caribbean NGDOs are only one of the many players and social forces making up the complex – and ever richer – fabric building Civil Society in our countries. Nor are they the panacea for solving the problems of development and the practice of “good government” since they cannot be expected to do more than they can effectively offer, within their scope of action. Their role, however, in spite of the difficulties facing these organizations at present, is vital for enhancing democracy and promoting sustainable, socially equitable development continent-wide. The findings of recent experience of structural adjustment in most countries in the region would indicate that, as far as an overall assessment of development in LAC is concerned, despite the considerable effort made by the countries in the region, the results of the new “development models” and environmental models are unsatisfactory, economically and, even more so, socially. It should be recalled that this situation is accompanied, for much of the population, by a lack of exercise of citizen’s rights, manifested in legal and political terms via a fundamental inequality in access to justice and feeble participation in political decision-making, while in the economic and social areas it is translated by unequal opportunities, occupational instability, low income, hindrances to social mobility (especially for women), no recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity, and lack of defence from hardship. That is why, despite the progress that may have been made in political and macroeconomic matters in the region, it may be stated that the LAC countries now find themselves in an ambiguous, contradictory situation in respect of the development model being created on the continent as a result of the “exclusive modernization” taking place there. On one hand, thanks to progress in the democratization process and economic modernization, by the late 1990s, Latin America had become a quite different place to what it had been some twenty or thirty years earlier. On the other hand, despite that progress, a whole range of political and social problems still awaited solution and their persistence suggested a continuity with the past that recent reforms had failed to alter. How, after all, is it possible to build a democracy with social cohesion in countries where poverty, marginalization and social exclusion are on the increase? Or when, despite economic growth, instead of decreasing, social differences are becoming deeper and wider in terms of the distribution of profits and whole swathes of the population are excluded from the production and consumption systems? Or when the improvements in international competitiveness and exports occur alongside an explosion of the hidden economy and a steep increase in precarious jobs, while violence and crime are rocketing and more and more people are expressing their disenchantment with, and a distancing from, the democratic regime and its institutions and other representative mechanisms? Obviously there is no single answer to such questions, and one-track predictions (whether they foretell catastrophe or express ingenuous confidence in the immanent virtues of economic growth and the functioning of democratic institutions) are certainly not valid solutions. It is clear that LAC needs to develop a model of production and accumulation that would enable it to enter the world economy competitively, but it must also overhaul its internal mechanisms so that its whole population has access to welfare; find stable ways of representing and articulating a growing diversity of interests and demands; and consolidate a political order that guarantees the exercise of rights and freedoms. Solutions seem to lie beyond the mere implementation of policies to offset the more negative social effects of the structural adjustment: what is needed is the construction of a new paradigm of life and political and social organization or, to put it another way, a reformulation of the relationship between State, the market, the market and CS, the ingredients and the areas of development for any development strategy. As CEPAL itself has warned: “there needs to be a reorientation of the development models in the region around a central axis, equality. The main effort needs to focus on breaking up the educational, occupational, demographic and property-owning structures through which poverty and inequality are transmitted from one generation to the next” (CEPAL, 2000, b) [31] . In other words, an all-out social change is called for: the exercise of power and possession of wealth need to be redistributed, and new ways of exerting political and social control over economic activities that have nothing to do with social class or politics should be found. That control must be democratic, not necessarily ruling out all conflict but nonetheless applied within an institutional framework and based on fundamental consensus. The “analytical” version of “governance” may enable us to grasp the very originality of politics and its effects on development by highlighting and enhancing the role of non-state players – including NGDOs – in the quest for the broadest, fairest, most responsible and most transparent consensuses possible. It is obvious that NGDOs have for decades focused on assisting and helping the less favoured categories of LAC societies while in recent times they have concentrated on increasing the effectiveness of the compensatory programmes that have accompanied the structural adjustment and have been taking on missions that used to belong primarily to the State, in areas such as education, health, poverty eradication and so forth. They can help to meet basic survival needs by promoting social participation to tackle the practical problems facing LAC societies, especially the working classes – but increasingly the whole of society. These societies are experiencing the knock-on effects of what is happening in the rest of the world along with the effects of Latin America’s diverse social origins. Traditionally LAC NGDOs have handled all these problems, but in addition to these social functions – which they will undoubtedly continue to carry out – NGOs are now being called upon to play, in the “analytical” sense of “governance”, a more global role in development matters. They may contribute to the democratization process in their respective societies and create, maintain and expand the existing forms of democracy without forgetting what in English are known as “advocacy societies”, i.e. the main social and humanitarian causes such as human rights, the environment and so on. NGDOs have also demonstrated their efficiency in supporting popular participation at municipal level and in providing technical solutions at local level. We can also assert that their function as development protagonists covers virtually all fields: employment, company start-ups, the implementation of farm projects, the development of vocational training and fundamental urban services (transport, water, waste, cleaning, etc.), fighting pollution, combating corruption and calling for transparent and efficient administration, to name just a few. In the face of such demands is it possible to go as far as to assert, on the basis of the concepts set out earlier, that the CSO sector, and NGDOs in particular, may now tackle all of these problems while proving to be players able to contribute to the practice of “good government/governance” in LAC? We are not sure that it is, but there is no doubt that, without the presence and action of NGDOs in LAC societies, there would probably be less pluralism, participation, solidarity and democracy. NGDOs are now rediscovering how to “do politics” in LAC, working from the basis of CS and employing more complex, more pluralistic styles. The changes that have taken place in the popular organization of our countries have called into question the old radical approaches; they are changing the ways that grassroots organizations are organized, their claims and their conscience, obliging NGDOs to plan anew their working methods. The new strategies are by no means clear. NGDOs lack a specific diagnosis of the situation of this popular movement, and the strategies for strengthening CS and building a new democratic set of institutions are as yet imprecise. NGDOs increasingly suffer from staff shortages whereas previously they could r |