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1. The problem situation The relevance of sociology greatly depends on the ability ofsociologists to detect, as Max Weber did, profound changes in "the spirit of time". In the midst of the turmoil after the First World War he warned scientists that the certainty of unifying ideologies was lost. The many small gods of everydaypreferences have grasped the opportunity to wage their devastating wars. All-pervading conflicts and disenchantment have become the norm in a situation of normlessness. Young people had difficulties in findinggeneral orientation (Weber, 1992 [1919], p. 101). In Central and Eastern Europe the situation is comparable. The old and new eschatological visions of the coming end of the conflictual history hardly find believers any more. Life is full of small battles as it always has been - but there is no ultimate meaning. The dust of political rallies of excited millions has settled. The millions tasted the fruits of the promised land. Theyare bitter. What can sociologists learn from this sobering experience? Certainly not to take Francis Fukuyama seriously as suggested (Tiryakian, 1994, p. 134). It is probably more promising to have a closer look at what is described as prekäre Entwicklungen (Glatzer, 1996). And, most of all, to try to adjustconcepts and methodology to a reality in flux. Thus, sociology and sociologists in Central and Eastern Europe are on a professional but also on a moral trial. What is at stake is the integrity of the discipline confronted with extreme circumstances. The societies in the region can be properly labeled as risk societies (Genov, 1996; Berend, 1997). They all are plagued by fundamental disparities between aspirations and need-satisfaction, knowledge and practical action, change and order. In conditions like these sociology cannot escape the fate of being at risk itself. Its cognitive capacities and practical relevance are put on a testin an environment which does not pay too much attention to science. There are various ways to react to this type of extraordinary situations. The most promising one is to turn the challenge into opportunity. In the given context this means to focus on the risks of the ongoing transformations. Risk is further understood as the probablity of negative effects of natural or social processes on individual or collective actors. The reason for the special preference to the concept is not necessarily the view that present day societies are especially prone to risks. Under many circumstances - volcano eruptions, floods, droughts, epidemies or wars, societies in previousepochs have also been risk societies. The real point is that the secularized, individualistic and instrumentally oriented modern societies have developed a specific culture of risk. It lays the stress on the rationally based perception and assessment of risk factors and on the rationalizedrisk management. This culture of risk and its institutionalframeworks are dominated by calculations of risk factorsand by accountability for risks. The context of calculations and accountability is the all-pervading competition taking place under conditions of permanent uncertainty and change. In this context the national transformationsaremajor risk factors since they always bring about uncertainty and instability. There are important cognitive reasons forthe special attention to the relationships between risks and national transformations. The concept of risk allows for a transparent coverage of major dimensions of change shaping our present day and the future social reality. Firstly, the concept of risk allows one to establish a comprehensive picture of the objective and subjective parameters of complex and dynamic situations. The cognitive reduction of complexity comes about by disentagling interrelationships of risk factors and effects. The same holds true for the identification of latent risks and their relations withmanifest risks. Secondly, by elaborating on the concept of risk it becomes possible to clearly identify specific actorsinvolved insituations of risk perception, assesment and management. Who is most at risk?Who might be mobilized to supportrisk assessment and risk management?How do various actors coordinate their efforts in risk management and with what effects? Thirdly, focusing on conditions of risk one is forced to analyze the specific complexity of social relations. What types of social relations (hierarchical or associational, cooperative or conflicting, of mutual trust or mistrust, etc. ) prevailin a specific historical constellation of risk factors? Do risk assessment and management involve larger circles of interested individuals and groups, or is the process basically closed to circles of experts and politicians? Does the spirit of compromise and cooperation guide the procedures of risk management, or, are they mostly guided by competition and confrontation? Fourtly, the continuity of risk perception, assessment and management closely corresponds to major stages of social action as a process. Itopens the view to short- and long-term prospects of production and reproduction of man-made risks. How long does it take to recognise a risk, assess it and to develop and apply an effective strategy of risk management? Is there a substantial time-lag of risk recognition by experts and 'lay' people, by various groups and strata of society? Are the processes of developing risk perception, assessment and management mostly legally and organizationally formalized or mostly informal? Fiftly, using the risk concept, one may attempt a systematic qualitative and quantitative assessment of potential negative effects of the major factors determining social interaction. For instance, the results of empirical studies emphasize the relevance of the cultural conditioning of risks (Dake and Wildavsky, 1993, p. 51f). What are the cultural models guiding the perception, assessment and management of risks? What is the magnitude, relevance, manageability, etc. of various risks accordingto experts and to 'lay' people? It is impossible to search for answers to the whole range of above questions in a particular study. The task is even more complicated since the national situations of intensive risks are not isolated. How to focus on risks in the current Central and Eastern European transformations when keeping in mind their embeddedness in regional processes and in world-wide trends? The simple answer is: By focusing onprocesses which obviously have universal dimensions. One of themis individualuzation. To put it bluntly, what is going on in the Central and Eastern European region might be shortly defined as the triumph of individualization. Previous limitations imposed by the allmighty state on mobility, self-expression, and communications suddenly disappeared. We are witnessingthe triumph of a cultural and institutional pattern which originated in Western Europe in the XV and XVI centuries, evolved more and more sophisticated and irradiated all over the world. Themodernization implemented under various regional and national conditions proved that individualization is an evolutionary achievement. It might be delayed or interrupted by dictatorships, by nationalistic or religious models of "return to community" politics. But it cannot be stopped. Individualization is a universal trend, it is a "diagnosis of our times" but even more "music of the future" (Beck and Beck-Gernshein, 1994, p. 16). Scientists studying the trend of individualization in advanced societies overwhelmingly share the viewthat in its course individuals are increasingly over-exposed to the permanent stress of change. Unstable transitional situations in personal biographies are becoming the rule. Multiple identities are often schizophrenic situations. The dynamics of identities turns intoa lack of continuity and integration. As seen exactly from the point of view of individualization one may regard advanced societies as risk societies offerring risky freedoms (Beck and Beck-Gernshein, 1994) to individuals. The growing autonomy of individuals has anomic implications which lead to individual disorientation and deviance coupled with organizational pathologies. Contrary to trends typical for the sixties and seventies, deepening inequalities signal the appearance of new social divisions in parallel with the individualization process. This background can provide some clues for understanding current processes in Central and Eastern Europe. 2. Individuals in profound transformation At the time Scorpions' 'Wind of Changes' was on the top of hit-parades, the blessing of new openings seemed uncontested and in the reach of everybody in Central and Eastern Europe. New biographies had to be written hastily, new norms coined and institutions established. Many cherished the hope that the key point of all the changes had to be the institutional recognition of the unrestricted development and expression of individuals. Warnings about theneglect of civilizational achievements in the region were rare (Genov, 1991). Now it is the time to look at the preliminary bottom line of the transformation. The effects ofindividualization are most clearly visible in the changes of legislation. The Constitution of Bulgaria passed in 1972 was a typical state socialist one. It was focused on the common good broadly understood as state owned property, political unity and national identity. But it included a number of provisions for social security of individuals as well. While taking the common good as an important point of reference, the Constitution passed in 1991 has a rather different focus. It is the issue of the individual human rights. The strategic difference between the two Constitutions exemplifies a profound change from collectivistic institutional arrangements towards institutionalized individualism. One might assume that the major problem of opening opportunities for unrestricted personal development and actualization has been thus resolved in the country. A closer look at realities helps understanding that they are more complex and complicated than the generalized legal provisions. 2.1. Individualization under institutional disarray The major factor determining the peculiarities of individualization
all over Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 is the institutional instability
marking the transformationprocess. The most fundamental problem of present
day 'transitional' societies is the high intensity of risks and the often
lacking institutional capability of managing them effectively. The resulting
erosion of trust in public institutionsis an important feature of the situation
(Sztompka, 1996). This is well exemplified by the steep dispersion of answers
obtained fromnation-wide samples to the direct question about the efficiency
of major Bulgarian institutions1:
Table 1.
Thus, public opinion reacts adequately to the paralysis of institutions which has been experienced during the first half of the nineties. The reaction indicateswhat can be defined as an anomic developmenthaving numerous causes and reasons. Some of them like the world-wide economic recession at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties are as objective as natural events. Others are, however, due to basically avoidable human errors or to ill-intended advice and decisions. Keeping to the Bulgarian case, crucial technological schemes in industrial cooperation were destroyed in 1990-1991. The liberalization of domestic prices and of international trade (February, 1991) was guided by the illusionary hope that the "big bang" would immediately re-arrange economic relations thus unleashing private initiative and responsibility. Little thought was given to the lack of market-oriented banking system and stockexchange, insurance and pension schemes, provisions for unemployment. The restructuring of industry in terms of technological and market priorities, ownership and environmental considerations was permanently postponed. The destructive effects of the influx of subsidized agricultural products on the low-productivity national agriculture were not a matter of careful deliberation in advance. The administrative dissolution of agricultural cooperatives evolved into the illegal privatization or devastation of their assets. The expectation of a fast re-vitalization of small-scale private agriculture was unrealistic from the very beginning. It underestimated the legal problems concerning land ownership, the type of the available technology and infrastructure, the lack of credits and the demographic structure of the rural population. So both industry and agriculture became sources of long-term unemployment. The political reforms were carried out in a context of intensive confrontation on strategic issues. Demoralized by voluntaristic re-organizations, lacking control and low incomes, state officials at all levels lost incentives for administrative performance. Corruption became the unavoidable outcome. The economic polarization grew fast in conditions of institutional instability anddecline of the gross domestic product. Because of the rapid impoverishment of large groups and the weakening of state institutions crime became omnipresent and a genuine threat to everybody. Against this background it is not surprising that theprofound destabilization
of the institutional framework of society resulted in intensive feelings
of uncertainty. This might be recognized in the perception of problems
facing the national society. The assessments of crime and unemployment
havestable andhigh values over the years of transformation. Following the
trend of economic polarization the concern about its effects is on the
rise.
Figure 1.
 The situation causes perplexity. How to react to the risks at the level of ultimate values? And how at the level of instrumental orientations and actions? The issue of ultimate values seems to become a crucial one under conditions in which instrumental action takes the lead. The reason is the massive disenchantment in every kind of ultimate values with the exception of some having an immediate personal relevance like health and family. As seen from this point of view the question arises: Is it possible to establish and maintain a stable social order dominated by instrumental rationality at the expense of the autonomous rationality of the ultimate ends? Cultural uncertainty is also maintained by contradicting processes in the very structure ofvalues and norms. In the first half of the nineties, in parallel with private entrepreneurship and political democratization, principles of individualist ethics were quickly embraced. Their development into instrumental activity of black market and crime together with the painfully felt weakening of institutions that embody and protect the commom good nurtured traditional anti-individualist attitudes. The affirmation of universal values collided with blatant instances of pursuing individual and group interests in economy and politics. The result was a sharp clash between traditionalist and modernist, between individualist and collectivist cultural orientations. Given the institutionaland the value-normative disarray, it is not surprising that the overwhelming trend is to search for individual solutions to the severe problems confronting the majority of the population in the transition period. Thus under a permanent economic, political and cultural uncertainty it seems that it is exactly individualism that is taking the lead. Therefore, the dispute about the priority of the individualist Americanand the institutionalist Swedishmodel of social and economic organization seems to have been settled in favour of the former. Thus, another crucial problem arises: Can a stable social order be established and maintained by the efforts of extreme individualists? Put in other words, are thepost-real-socialistsocieties moving from the instability of a social order dominated by the collectiverationality of the national needs and goals, as it was the official ideology before 1989, to another unstable social order dominated by the rationality of the individual needs and goals? The question has no clear answer yet. In general terms, Bulgarians long
for de-regulated private initiative of the American type, on the one hand,
and for a strong state regulation of the Scandinavian type. This is a typical
Central and Eastern European dilemma in the mid-nineties. It is also typical
that the reliance on the state involvement in major spheres of social life
is strong, while the positive expectations towards the private initiative
are rather weak. The deep mistrust in the state institutions that are not
believed to manage the common good effectively goes hand in hand with expectations
to haveefficient state control on an easily accessible common good:
Figure 2.
The practical problem is not primarily the illusion to paradoxically combine what cannot be achieved simultaneously. The crucial problem is that what is typically regarded as social and psychological tension, risk, uncertainty facingindividuals in the advanced societies is being multiplied by stress factors in Central and Eastern European societies because of the intransparence, inefficiency, instability and unreliability of major social institutions there. Organizations only partly manage to reduce uncertainty facing individuals in the region. The tremendous opening of potential opportunities for individualization clashes with tremendous problems in the actualization of these opportunities. 2. 2. Openings and closures At the beginning of the period the promise was to be heard everywhere,
that the country was moving from a situation, in which everybody was equally
poor, to a situation, in which everybody would be well-to-do, although
not to one and the same extent. Due to the economic constraints facing
individuals and households, the typical assessment of life in the mid-nineties
and in the late eighties is not in favour of the recent situation. The
critical view is especially strong in villages and smaller towns:
Figure 3.
 Against the background of the high level of risks facing Bulgarians
in their day-to-day life, the lowering of aspirationsin the personal
action strategies is of a prime importance for the diagnosis of the current
situation. In the context of the crisis mass ambitions are minimized. Almost
every second citizen over the age of eighteen relieson a survival strategy.
An important factor determiningdifferences is the availability of more
opportunities for personal initiative and realization in the large cities
and especially in the capital city. Age structure also influences life
strategies. They show negative trends inrural areas because of the predominantly
aging population there. Despite the differences, the overall picture reveals
substantial constraints on aspirations as a reflection of the limited real
opportunities for choice and self-realization.
Figure 4.
 Of no less concern is the time-scaleof the personal strategies. The
predominant personal strategy in surmounting the problems of the crisis
situation is short-term. In the critical 1996 (Genov, 1997) every second
Bulgarian voter kept to the day-to-day survival strategy. The result displays
insecurity, disorientation and, in many cases, complete helplessness.
Figure 5.
 So the conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis of the individualization process in a society currently undergoing profound transformation is categorical. Instead of the desired rapid expansion in the opportunities for choice before every individual, for the majority of Bulgarians these opportunities have declined. Instead of the strongly desired increase in material standards, everyday life for the majority of people is now dominated by economic insecurity and deprivations. Instead of contentment with the effectiveness of the democratic political institutions, large groups of the population are suffering from their destabilization and the resultant expansion in crime. Instead of conditions for a higher quality ofpersonal development, in many cases the problems of recent years have lead to personal and group degradation and to destruction of the human capital of the nation. This development provides abundant evidence supporting the point that "rights, which impose demands on community members, are effectively upheld only as long as the basic needs of those community members are attended to" (Etzioni, 1996: 8). As seen from another angle, Bulgarianslike the majority of Central and Eastern Europeans have proved to be unprepared to cope with the transformation. They turned out not to be able to effectively cope withthe transition from a society with restricted but clearly formulated opportunities for choice, to a society in which orientation, choice and personal realizationrequire great personal efforts in the conditions of unclear regulations and frequently of a complete lack of legislative norms. This is a typical situation in which the moral and the institutional frameworks of communal life are undermined. Using the current terminology, not the Western European and North American, but the Central and Eastern European societies are risk societies per se. This is a bad foundation for their participationin the global competition. It is widely acknowledged that national developments which throw a substantial part of the population below the standards which are typical for industrialized societies has detrimental effects on the national competitive power on international scale (Brock, 1994, p. 71). The anomic developments in Central and Eastern Europe have many determinants. Some of them are directly connected with extreme and destructive forms of individualization due to unavoidable differentiation processes in economy, politics and culture. Others are due to functional disintegrations which, at least in some cases, could be avoided by well prepared and implemented organizational measures. Still others are caused by the abrupt rupture of community bonds at various levels. In the last case one may apply the diagnosis of civilizational deficiency. Whatever the causes and reasons of the rise of extreme individualization in Central and Eastern Europe at the expense of functional integration and community bonds, it is obvious that the management of this risk factor for social life will take a rather long period. At the surface, what is to be handled appears as a value-normative problem first of all. In reality, it is mainly an organizational problem whose core is the functional disintegration. Only its reestablishment might bring bring about long-lasting repair to the community bonds. One can only speculate if the damages of the overhasty individualizationare not irreparable. The problem of balancing personal autonomy and community orders is so complex and complicated that it will permanently be at the very heart of social scientific and philosophical debates. One of the major reasons for the centrality of these debates is that they focus on two major trends in present day human civilization, namely the trends towards individualization and community-building. The problem of balancing both trends is not a cognitive task alone. It is a practical and, more precisely, a political task as well. Therefore, the theoretical importance of the above debates will be strengthened by their practical urgency. Many intriguing developments in both directions still lie ahead. It is a challenging task to test new options for mobilizing individuals, communities, organizations, national societies and global society for the solution of problems of sustainable development, for instance. Indeed, the prospects of integration via mobilization for risk management seems to be most promisingfor keeping individualization, communities and organization aside from anomy and pathologies. 1 All data stem fromannual cumulative studies on Risks in Modern Society carried out by a team headed by the present author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.
Beck, U. and E. Beck-Gernsheim (1994a) "Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften - Perspektiven und Kontroversen einer subjektorientierten Soziologie", in U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim, Eds. Riskante Freiheiten. Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 10-39. Berend, I. T. , Ed. (1997) Long-Term Structural Changes in Transforming Central & Eastern Europe (The 1990s). München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft. Brock, D. (1994) "Rückkehr der Klassengesellschaft? Die neuen sozialen Gräben in einer materiellen Kultur", in: Ulrich Beck and Elisbeth Beck-Gernsheim. Eds. Riskante Freiheiten. . . . , pp. 61-88. Dahrendorf, R. (1994) "Das Zerbrechen der Ligaturen und die Utopie der Weltbürgergeselschaft", In: U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim. Eds. Riskante Freiheiten. . . , pp. 421-436 Dake, K. and A. Wildavsky (1993) "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?", In: Edward J. Burger, Jr. , Ed. Risk. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 41-58 Etzioni, A. (1996) "The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perspective'. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, N 1, February, pp. 1-11. Genov, N. (1991) "Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Paradoxes of Social Rationalization". International Social Science Journal, N 128, pp. 131-141. Genov, N. (1996) "Transformation Risks: Structure and Dynamics", in H. Best, U. Becker, A. Marks, Eds. Social Sciences in Transition. Social Science Information Needs and Provision in a Changing Europe, Bonn, Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften, 1996, pp. 39-54. Genov, N. , Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Glatzer, W. , Ed. (1996) Lebensverhältnisse in Osteuropa. Prekäre Entwicklungen und neue Konturen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Parsons, T. (1978) Action Theory and the Human Condition. New York: The Free Press. Sztompka, Piotr (1996) "Trust and Emerging Democracy. Lessons from Poland". International Sociology, Vol. 11, N 1, March, pp. 37-62. Tiryakian, E. A. (1994) "New Worlds and Sociology: An Overview", International Sociology, Vol. 9, N 2, June, pp. 133-148. Weber, Max (1992[1919]) "Wissenschaft als Beruf", in Max Weber. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 17. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) |
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