

Nationalist Extremism and Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque Country, 1979-2001*

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Abstract

Governments regard different policy options to mitigate insurgent nationalist terrorism and extremism. These policies can be tentatively classified according to whether they correspond to either a “public order” frame or a “responsive” frame. This article carries out time-series multivariate analyses aimed at evaluating what efficacy different policies inspired from one or another approach have had with respect to Basque nationalist terrorism and extremism as well as to assess the consistency of a number of well-established hypotheses. The findings suggest that a combination of efficacious, but flexible law-ruled public order policies, together with very substantial doses of responsiveness, explains the ongoing mitigation of these phenomena. However, the results also show that certain specific policy choices have been either inefficacious or counterproductive. There is also the paradox that terrorist violence itself tends to decrease the attitudinal social bases of insurgent nationalist extremism.

0. Introduction

0.1. Insurgent nationalist extremism is one of the main concerns of Spanish governments and citizens. In order to diminish it several public policies have been envisaged, the most standing among which being “public order” and “responsive” policies. In this article I aim at exploring what efficacy different policies inspired from on or another approach have had. For this I make use of the unusual abundance of data that this phenomenon has produced.

0.2. Since the 1960s, different Spanish governments, first within an autocratic context, and then within a liberal democratic one, have implemented a number of strategies that could be labelled as public order policies and responsive policies. The itinerary of the former goes from a rather indiscriminate repression towards Basque nationalism to the selective incrimination of violent activists. Similarly, as for responsiveness, a long-standing rejection of the Basque cultural, social and political differences has changed into a constitutional recognition of Basque nationality, which has provided the Basques with an extraordinary level of political autonomy.

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0.3. This variation in policy sectors, of policy styles, and even political regimes, as well as its duration, optimises the empirical foundations for exploring the short and medium term effects of public order and responsive policies. Given the many variables and their interrelations, it reduces the risk of spurious causal imputations. It is on this basis that I pursue, with a deliberately chosen empirical orientation, a thorough evaluation, though within its own limits, of the consistency of a number of theoretical hypotheses in the literature. It will be suggested that the mitigation of Basque nationalist extremism is best explained through a combination of efficacious but flexible and democratically inspired public order policies, together with substantial doses of responsiveness.

1. Strategies of the State facing Nationalist Insurgent Extremism: Public Order and Responsive Frames

1.1. The study of governmental response to insurgent nationalist extremism tends to confine itself to two areas of study hardly communicating with each other. Mainstream analyses and prescriptions focus either on public-order policies or on responsiveness policies *vis-à-vis* minorities. Nevertheless, here they will be considered as two different but compatible dimensions. The view that authority and force are intrinsic to the nature of the state predominates in the former. By contrast, the latter corresponds to pluralistic views of public power where the authority of the state is viewed as sensitive to social needs and demands, and where communication, attention to the material and cultural bases of conflicts, as well as the search for mutual compromises, are regarded as equally useful or even more useful instruments than force.

1.2. Although a comparison of these two frames could be attempted, inquiring into which is the more effective in reducing insurgent nationalist extremism, one might suspect that the correct picture of the problem is not so much of a disjunction than of a more complex dialectic nature. It is plausible that a strategy combining sanctions and rewards, with a reinforcing effect, tends to be the most efficacious. On the other hand, responsiveness does not need to entail a zero-sum game where improvement for some implies harm for others, but it can supply all the involved actors with a general improvement greater than the eventual costs of renouncing maximalist ambitions.

1.3. In order to limit the question, it must be specified that only “insurgent nationalist extremism” is under consideration here. The term “extremism” denotes a perception of conflict of a warlike nature, i.e. of those who advocate, or at least accept, the use of violent means. The analysis will only consider insurgent nationalist extremism, which for its social group of reference aims at increasing its self-government until secession.¹ Therefore, “surveying nationalist extremism”, though it has been also present in Spain, will not be examined here – this kind of nationalist extremism is typical of actors in favour of the status quo, as well as supporters of regression when faced with decentralising or self-determining processes (Reinares 1998; Domínguez 1999).

Public Order Policies and Insurgent Nationalist Extremism

1.4. Viewed from an historical and international perspective, more usual policies towards any extremism have been those of public order. These interventions develop an

¹ In scenarios of *irredentism*, insurgent nationalism could have as its horizon incorporation into another already existing political system, which also implies a breaking up of the current polity.

intrinsic attribute of the modern state (democratic or otherwise), namely that its authority is supported by violence (legitimate or not, legal or not, monopolised or not, normative considerations aside). By having the use, or threat, of force as its main resource of power, a hierarchic and coercive logic of imposition of values on the social environment tends to predominate in the state's policies.

1.5. Within the subject under study here, authority and force materialise in coercion and eradication of anti-system extremism, all the more so in its violent expression. Furthermore, another ideal-typical attribute of the framework of public order is the reception of conflict in terms of its symptoms. Either reactive or preventive, the objective of those policies is to combat violent or simply threatening *effects* of conflict rather than to face its deep causes (see Table 1). Although much less expeditious, other customary means – such as political acculturation and indoctrination of a reluctant population by means of the education system, military service, and propagandistic use of mass media – also correspond to this framework of authority (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1975).

Table 1: Some ideal-typical differences between public-order policies and responsive policies towards political extremism

<i>Public order policies</i>	<i>Responsive policies</i>
Attention to violence as a symptom	Attention to social causes of violence
Predominance of the principle of authority, hierarchic	Predominance of the principle of inclusion, egalitarian
Predominance of force	Predominance of compromise

Source: Author's elaboration.

1.6. Apart from that, these policies can show a broad heterogeneity. Their character can be reactive (penalising violent behaviour retrospectively) or preventive (with an emphasis on information and protection, dissuasion, or even prior deactivation). Moreover, the use of force can or cannot be limited by the state and international parameters of legality (e.g. with reference to fundamental rights). Also it can or cannot be liable to judicial and/or democratic control, and its social legitimacy can vary in scope. The segment on which force is applied can differ widely, ranging from the more selective and careful persecution of those acting violently to the more general application of force to the whole political environment of theirs, or even their whole social group. The policies can also vary in the judicial and penitential treatment of activists, implementation agencies (in their military or police character, and in their degree of specialisation) and the degree of international collaboration (Reinares 1998; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999). Several hypotheses invoking these factors will be regarded in the third section.²

² A good critical review of the literature focusing on the logic of what I call of “public order” can be found in the Fernando Reinares’ book *Terrorismo y antiterrorismo* (1998). Given the markedly empirical intention of the present article, I refer generally to that work for theoretical and comparative considerations. Another merit of the book lies in its numerous references to nationalist violence and anti-terrorist policies in the Basque Country and the whole of Spain.

Responsive Policies and Insurgent Nationalist Extremism

1.7. The term “responsive policies” alludes here to those policies oriented at reducing the social and political causes that lie in the background of political extremism as well as reducing their effects or symptoms. Unlike public-order policies, which have a more enclosed classification, responsive policies imply much more diverse domains and means – hence my choice of an atypical qualifier. The approach that predominates in them is inclusive, typical for the pluralist democratic approach and, more generally, for sensitive regimes – though this could be in a paternalistic manner – and the need and demands of every social group.

1.8. For this reason, its instruments, rather than force, are: (a) the recognition of either material or perceived conflicts; (b) reciprocal communication and compromise; and (c) a disposition to share, to some extent, material resources, prestige positions, and even power. Authority tends to be conceived in a pluralist and consensual manner, sensitive and responsive regarding the various social needs and concerns. In the face of the emergence or risk of extremist behaviour, the authorities pay attention to its social bases, both structural and cultural (see Table 1). The rulers are ready to engage in a dialogue with the dissatisfied groups, ready to listen their demands, and even try to anticipate them. The rulers are also ready to negotiate and cooperate with them in pursuit of mutual benefit.

1.9. It should be stressed that responsiveness does not necessarily entail weakness and unilateral concessions as well, therefore, it does not necessarily satisfy any claim. Nor does this approach have to be the result of certain ultimate principles or values, since it can also, for simply instrumental reasons, be developed in a tactical fashion.

1.10. As for the sectors, levels, and manners of action, these policies can be extremely heterogeneous. According to the roots of the conflict, responsive policies can involve many different policy fields (e.g. culture, religion, education, etc.) as well as the very distribution of public power. As for their juridical rank and degree of institutionalisation, they can be enforced in the form of constitutional engineering policies, as common legislation, or even as simple administrative decisions (cf. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999).

1.11. From explanatory political science, the most outstanding example of a responsive approach is the “consociational” model of Arend Lijphart (1984 and 1999). In his works one can find an analysis of institutions that induce the protection, possibility of expression, and possibility of decision of minorities in plural societies. These institutions are also directed towards enabling these groups to participate in power and also towards increasing the integration of political systems that otherwise tend to break up and/or to have a low performance. However, I use the concept of responsiveness instead of “accommodation” because political integration is not always based on an institutionalisation of minorities’ rights and power. Other opportunities rest on pluralist policies (Dahl 1971) and on attempts at co-optation seeking the assimilation of minorities into the majority in exchange for economic and prestige advantages – less theorised but often put into practice (see Bloom 1990; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999).

2. Dimensions of Insurgent Nationalist Extremism in the Basque Country

2.1. The inclination to use violence for influencing public power I have called “political extremism”. The most prominent materialisation of the Basque nationalist extremism is terrorism, in which Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Euskadi and Freedom) stands out, almost incomparably. ETA is one of the most long-lived terrorist organisations in the Western world, with more than forty years of existence, more than thirty years of personal attacks, and about a thousand homicides (Reinares 1998; Domínguez 1999). I employ the term “terrorism” here in a simple descriptive and precise sense of the use of violence for intimidating a social group beyond the sub-group of direct victims, without evaluative connotation (Reinares 1998).

2.2. Still, manifestations and consequences of extremism do not limit themselves to terrorism, however implacable and persistent it can be. Extremism must be observed from a broader perspective: to begin with, because the extremist repertoire of actions able to destabilise the political system is broader than terrorism; and then because, if one wants to give an account, specifically, of armed struggle, one should try to understand the conditions in which it is formed and sustained.

2.3. The destabilising effects of extremism upon the official political system is not confined to terrorism. First of all, not all violence is “terrorist”, in the sense that it intimidates a social group beyond its direct victims. Secondly, there exist varieties of equally destabilising non-conventional, but also non-violent types of political behaviour – e.g. general strike, petty sabotage and civil disobedience. Thirdly, extremism can obstruct institutional performance and destabilise the system from within the system itself, by means of conduct that is formally legal but is actually contrary to the principles of the political regime. Finally and, more generally, the presence of impenetrable political subcultures, strongly internally structured and antagonistic, makes cooperation and coordination in favour of the whole society exceedingly difficult.

2.4. On the other hand, ETA’s origin and persistence could not be understood without its exchanges with the broader environment. Like other organisations, its own internal dynamics explain, to a large extent, its persistence and autonomy (organisational culture, opportunity costs for its members, internal incentives and sanctions, etc.) Nevertheless, its interaction with the broader social context becomes crucial. Its obvious aspect is the success or failure of the police in arresting ETA activists and in the protection of ETA targets. However, the inputs that favour ETA are no less important. ETA’s reproduction for decades has required, above all, regular generational replacement of its commandos. In the same way, the role of the environment in the provision of information, ammunition, infrastructure and moral support cannot be neglected (Reinares 1998).

2.5. In this sense, in the Basque case at least, it is possible to consider a system of concentric circles. In the centre, there are the terrorist organisations. In a broader circle, there is a network of interconnected support organisations, including political parties, trade unions, associations (among them, prisoners relatives associations), mass media, even firms, which are often called the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV). Next, there are the voters for those parties. The external circle corresponds to those who share ideas of rejection towards Spain, independence for the Basque country, and come

to terms with violence as a means. In the case of ETA and the MLNV, this portrait is consistent with a hierarchical relation empirically documented (Domínguez 1999; Reinares 1998). I will now consider three indicators of Basque nationalist extremism that, approximately, correspond to these circles or levels.

Victims of Terrorism

2.6. Violence must be regarded as a dimension of extremism. All the more so when, by acquiring the form of terrorism, the perpetration of homicides results from the desire for public impact, and when terrorist organisations exert an outstanding ascendancy over the whole extremist movement. An annual number of fatalities denotes, to some extent, the operability of the Basque nationalist terrorist organisations and their capability of psychologically influencing great numbers of people. I refer basically to ETA, but also to its several factional splinter groups, such as the ETA-m (“military”), the ETA-pm (“political-military”), and the Anti-capitalist Autonomous Commandos. As a measurement, this turns out somewhat unsatisfactory, since from a propaganda angle, the impact of every victim – a First Minister or an ordinary member of the public – is not identical, and from an operative angle, a massive attack with a car bomb, which is relatively safe, produces many more victims than one directed at a protected public personality, which is much more risky. However, these are the best available data both for their validity and time scale.³

Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok Voting

2.7. Extremism can also obstruct institutional performance and destabilise the political system while formally respecting legality. Here the evolution of the voting for the coalition Herri Batasuna (HB), related to the “military ETA”, the only remaining branch of the terrorist organisation, will be considered – For judiciary reasons HB changed its name to Euskal Herritarrok in 1998, and *tout court* to Batasuna in 2001.

2.8. The voting for HB provides us with three types of information. For one thing, by being a coalition that advocates the independence of the Basque Country, accepting the use of violence and including many convicted ETA members on its electoral roll, the votes for HB publicly express a disagreement with the fundamental rules of the political system, thus delegitimatising it.

2.9. In the second place, these ballots are closely related to attitudes towards terrorism. In 1979 Linz and his team (1986) surveyed the Basques about their perception of ETA members. They observed the rate of voters that considered ETA members as “patriots” (instead of “manipulated” or, even worse, “criminals”, or lack of expressed opinion): at least, six out of ten HB voters, a third of Euzkadiko Ezkerra (EE) voters (related to ETA’s “political-military” branch, self-dissolved in 1982), and one out of ten Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) voters. Applying these percentages to actual voters for every organisation, it came out that about 140,000 people (14 per cent of the active voters and 9 per cent of Basque enfranchised citizens) judged ETA militants favourably. This was the fertile ground for ETA. Nevertheless, in 1989 the perception of ETA members as patriots had decreased from 9 to 5 per cent (Llera 1994).

³ Apart from that, any attempt at weighting attacks would turn out quite controversial. The data on victims come from police sources.

2.10. Finally, these votes give to some convicted terrorists and, more generally, to extremist politicians, access into the European, Spanish and Basque parliaments, Basque city councils, even some mayorships. These representatives and authorities often utilise their positions to challenge constitutional legality, obstruct the political process and/or allocate public resources, both in the symbolic and the material domains.

Basque Exclusivist Identification

2.11. At the basis of the extremist behaviour under consideration here lies a system of beliefs that constitutes a clear example of a political subculture. It is a consistent and stable system of rejectionist attitudes towards Spanish identity, while adhering to a Basque national identification, preferences for secession and an inclination to violence.

2.12. A quite reliable expression of Basque extremist subculture lies in the exclusive identification with the Basque Country, expressed on a bipolar scale of identification preferences, rejecting multiple social identifications.⁴ As Linz and his collaborators (1986) have shown, these attitudes are closely associated with each other, both in the degree of “sovereignism” and the perception about ETA members. Specifically, the perception of ETA militants as patriots or idealists is much more likely to occur among citizens inclined towards Basque rather than national Spanish identification than among the rest. Moreover, the proportion of acquiescent attitudes towards ETA kept quite stable among the former during the 1980s (Llera 1994). Thus, although a part of these identifiers do not sympathise with terrorism, I will consider the percentage of people feeling themselves to be Basque only.⁵

3. Dimensions and Indicators of State Policies in the Basque Case

3.1. As stated above, the repertoire of state policies is extremely wide. Nevertheless, within this mixture, public order frameworks and responsive frameworks stand as two relevant dimensions. Let us now look at what the main hypotheses and indicators are.

Public-order Policies

3.2. The public-order approach includes the development of police, military, judiciary and foreign policies. All of these have varied greatly in relation to Basque nationalist extremism. The better quantified ones are: (a) the number of arrests of alleged ETA members; (b) the number of imprisonments; (c) a ratio denoting police “efficiency”, denoting the scope of repression; (d) the number of arrests in France, a consequence of foreign policy and international judicial and police collaboration; and (e) the number of

⁴ Subtle differences aside, the offered answer options and the essential meaning are constant. For example, “Which of the following sentences better express your feelings: ‘I feel Spanish only’; ‘More S. than Basque’; ‘As much S. as B.’; ‘More B. than S.’; or ‘Basque only?’”; DK; NA.

⁵ I have compiled and treated these data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, collecting frequencies in an almost exhaustive way and, often, resorting directly to the original data matrices. In addition, while trying to avoid mixing data from different sources, I have checked in some cases surveys with too reduced samples, and completed the series during deficit periods. Then, in order to clarify the trends, where there is more than one survey per year, I have resumed the series by calculating a monthly and quarterly estimated average for that year. I have also interpolated for some gap periods of up to two years long (Martínez-Herrera 2002).

reintegrated terrorists, product of a judicial policy.⁶ Even the type of political regime (autocratic or pluralist) can be included in this dimension inasmuch as the former usually have less constrictions administrating force (Reinares 1998). Moreover, I shall consider what effects state terrorism against ETA and its environment has had.

3.3. However, there are also other factors that, despite being described qualitatively, cannot be overlooked. These are the increase in the relative strength of the civil police in the anti-terrorist struggle (*vis-à-vis* militarised units), the introduction of a regional police force (both in recruitment and direction) broadly replacing the state corps, as well as direct negotiations with ETA with a disposition to penal concessions.

3.4. Two general hypotheses can be postulated about the links between these interventions and extremist behaviour. In the first place, there is the position that the more efficacious – for example, in the number of imprisonments – the repression of violent conduct is, the likelihood of this conduct taking place would be reduced. Throughout history, this hypothesis has often been taken, in practice, as an assumption, from which a prohibition of any expression and organisation, even peaceful, of extremist views has followed. A second consequence of this would be a loss of influence of the core group of extremists over their social environment, and consequently the reduction of extremism among the population.

3.5. This proposition, however, can be substantially amended if one considers that the efficaciousness of the whole policy will be greater in so far the violence of the state is considered legitimate in the relevant contexts, such as in the social milieu where force is applied and an international environment where human rights and political freedoms are highly valued. This involves aspects related to the public image of the whole policy, such as accuracy in the application of force, type of agencies implementing it, and the respect of fundamental rights.

Responsive Policies

3.6. Responsive policies appear in a plurality of domains. In relation to Basque extremism and its social background, an historical dynamic of political centralisation and decentralisation synthesises and articulates most of these sectoral policies. After the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the winning side dismantled most Basque self-government institutions, minimising the responsive framework. Contrary to this, however, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Basque Autonomy Law (with the rank of constitutional law) of 1979 enacted an extraordinary, unprecedented political autonomy.

3.7. This juridical frame establishes a Basque parliament and a Basque executive chosen by universal suffrage. The matters over which they have jurisdiction include education, health, culture and social services, as well as the collection of the most important taxes, a share of which is then passed on to the central state, after mutual agreement. Moreover, the Basque Autonomous Community (CAV) has also a regional police force that has largely taken over from that of the state. As a consequence, its administration has a considerable volume of staff, physical assets and financial resources (Aja 1999).

⁶ The data on detentions, imprisonments and social reintegration draw from Domínguez (1999 and personal communication for updating), except for detentions in 2001, which are taken from the daily newspaper *El País*.

3.8. Responsiveness, however, also stands up in other domains. Accompanying its organisational dispositions, the current Constitution also shows a symbolic intention, since it recognises the existence of “nationalities” within the “nation” (Spain) and establishes, as a doctrinal fundamental principle of *état de droit*, the protection and fostering of minority languages and cultures.

3.9. Another factor is the type of political regime. One of the motives that originated nationalist extremism was the dictatorial context, which in the collective *imaginaire* associated the idea of “Spain” with the idea of oligarchic domination (cf. Pérez Díaz 1993). It could thus be possible that the dissolution of such conditions has contributed to the mitigation of the rejection towards the Spanish political community. Even so, the type of regime entails a certain paradox, since in each one of the considered dimensions it would influence in an opposed direction: whereas autocracy has more “operability” in the administration of available force, it tends to provoke a greater rejection. The opposite, in both dimensions, seems to happen in a democracy.

3.10. In addition, the established electoral system particularly facilitates the representation of minorities that are territorially concentrated. Hence, during several legislatures, the parties ruling at the Spanish level (both social-democrats and centre-right parties) but lacking the absolute majority in Parliament have reached agreements on investiture, even on legislature, with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). There have also been many coalition governments in the CAV between this party and the social-democrats. In turn, both types of inter-partisan agreements have eased multilevel government collaboration (Aja 1999).

3.11. Prospects about an association between responsiveness and extremism can be briefly expressed as a negative hypothetical causal relation. It is possible to expect that every government action satisfying a need (articulated or not as a demand) or making up for a motive of reactivity in different domains (culture, self-government, economy) of the social bases of Basque extremism and the extremists themselves, will contribute to the reduction of both rejection towards Spain and support for insurgent nationalist violence.

3.12. The search of some Basque nationalist governments of an agreement with the organised extremist movement which could integrate the latter into the political system and thereby reducing its inclination to violence is also noteworthy. There have been dialogue round tables, meetings and certain agreements, including one concerning the investiture of the autonomic president – even if, for this investiture agreement in 2000, other reasons could have had a greater weight, the result of an advance in integration would not have differed greatly.

3.13. Finally, in a general manner, it could be possible to reflect on the way in which responsiveness occurs: whether it tends to be impelled from a unilateral cooperative willingness or, on the contrary, it is part of a bilateral exchange (coordination) process that, eventually, leads to a dynamic of reciprocal cooperation. Whereas the first interaction structure could allow for incrementalism and constant claiming from the insurgent movement and related parties, the latter could supply greater stability.


4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. In order to reject spurious causal relations and to unveil hidden relations, after observing graphically the evolution of the main variables, some standard multivariate regression analyses have been produced. In order to reach a relatively broad public technicalities have been reduced to the minimum in the main body of this article.⁷

The Development of Violence

4.2. In this part of the analysis, I aim to explain changes in time-series of the number of physical victims of ETA attacks, including fatalities (deaths and casualties) from 1969 to 2001.⁸ The maximum activity took place between 1978 and 1980, coinciding with the delicate period of transition to democracy, and the trend since then has been decreasing (see Fig. 1). The task is to explain this development through attending to the possible impact of the different state policies. In the first place, hypothetical relations between variations in fatalities and several public-order interventions will be examined, then those involving responsiveness. Table 2 summarises the main variables in the analysis and their hypothetical relations to the number of ETA's victims. It is important to note that the analysis only accounts for changes since 1979, due to the lack of prior information about several factors.

Figure 1: Victims of ETA, 1968-2001.



Source: Author's elaboration of police data

4.3. The first general hypothesis is that public-order policies should reduce violence directly by removing active actors and indirectly by increasing the subjective cost of those actions. Most prominent aspects of a punitive policy are arrests and imprisonments. Both variables are related to the number of victims. However, given a

⁷ A more detailed report on the statistical procedures followed, including additional tests, and replications can be obtained from the author upon request.

⁸ According to former social-democrat Spanish minister Professor Ernest Lluch, the first homicide occurred in 1961, when a baby died in an explosion of a device placed at a train stop. ETA, who disclose the death of an alleged policeman torturer in 1969, has not confirmed that information.

close correlation between imprisonments and arrests, but more information about the latter, after several trials I have chosen the arrests for statistical analysis.⁹

4.4. Understandably, police activity increases when a terrorist attack occurs. However, it would be more interesting to know the reverse impact of arrests on attacks. The foreseen relation should be negative and its effect should have, at least, a delay of one year, since the substitution of commands needs some time. This relation does not show up at the first glance.¹⁰

Table 2: Variables Utilised in the Modelling of the Number of Victims

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Observed period</i>	<i>Expected relationship</i>
No. of victims of ETA	1968–2001	
<i>Public-order variables</i>		
No. of arrested in Spain	1977–2001	Negative
No. of arrested in France	1975–2001	Negative
No. of reinserted	1982–1990	Negative
Algiers negotiations (1989)	Dummy	Negative
No. of victims of GAL and BVE	1978–1987	?
Bidart intervention (1992)	Dummy	Negative
<i>Responsiveness variables</i>		
Constitution	Dummy	Negative
% “Basque only” identifiers	1975–2001	Negative
<i>Exogenous Variables</i>		
Coup d’ état (1981)	Dummy	Negative
Olympic Games (1992)	Dummy	Positive
ETA Truce in 1992	Dummy	Negative

4.5. However, an effect of the measurement method could influence the results. In an organisation with a hierarchical structure, the arrest of a leader should have a greater impact than, say, the arrest of a militant in charge of logistics. Because of this, a (dummy) variable representing the detention of major ETA leaders in Bidart (French Basque Country) at the beginning of 1992 has also been computed.¹¹ These arrests were the result of international cooperation, as French judicial police carried them out after an investigation by the Spanish Guardia Civil. Its outcome was a drastic decrease in fatalities, apparently definite, possibly due to the organisational problems this implied for ETA in the short and long run, as well as the information obtained by security

⁹ They are 25 observations against 19. Correlation between arrests and imprisonments in Spain between 1982 and 2000 is 0.93 (p=.000). Taking their first differences, 0.85 (p=.000).

¹⁰ None of the attempted specifications with delays at the bivariant level has given a significant negative coefficient. Apparently, repression could be behind violence much more than being the cause of its reduction. However, non-apparent relations that require a proper control to emerge often exist. Moreover, if first differences of both variables are considered (isolating variations between successive periods in the long-term tendencies of both series), the result is more consistent with the hypothesis: VicDf = -3.90 - 0.04 * ArresDf (-2); t-values: -1.00 and -1.68. R² = 0.14; Adjusted R² = 0.09; N = 20.

¹¹ The dummy Bidart scores 0 till 1990 and 1 since 1991, hence modelling an effect of the “abrupt-permanent” type (McClearly and Hay 1980).

agencies. Once its impact controlled, ordinary detentions in Spain show a negative effect with a delay of two years, though more than thirty arrests would have been required to save one victim (see Table 3, especially Model 5).¹²

Table 3: Regression of the number of victims of ETA

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
Constant	111,77 ***	4,75	87,66 ***	21,72	113,26 ***	5,76	87,47 ***	22,09	87,38 ***	22,64
Arrested Spain(-2)	-0,03 **	-2,72	-0,03 ***	-3,33	-0,03 ***	-3,30	-0,03 ***	-3,52	-0,03 ***	-3,57
Constitution(-2)	-41,66 ***	-5,48	-32,81 ***	-5,08	-42,10 ***	-6,48	-33,29 ***	-5,45	-33,66 ***	-5,68
Basque Only(-5)	-0,41	-0,63			-0,45	-0,86				
Reinserted(-6)	-0,94 ***	-3,40	-0,76 ***	-3,62	-0,94 ***	-3,56	-0,63 ***	-2,89	-0,71 ***	-4,36
GAL-BVE(-2)	0,99 .12	1,72	0,91 *	1,92	1,02 *	2,03	0,91 *	1,93	0,93 *	2,02
Arrested France(-2)	0,00	0,06			0,00	0,08				
Coup d'Etat	-13,36 **	-2,28	-13,92 **	-2,32	-13,10 **	-2,49	-13,75 **	-2,33	-13,54 **	-2,36
Ajuria Enea Agreement							-2,38	-0,57		
Alger Negotiations	0,96	0,13	2,90	0,41						
Bidart	-43,16 ***	-5,23	-37,44 ***	-6,08	-43,33 ***	-5,57	-35,35 ***	-5,82	-36,52 ***	-6,56
Olympics	15,88 **	2,87	14,33 **	2,56	16,02 ***	3,08	14,77 **	2,62	14,21 **	2,63
Cease-Fire	-24,40 ***	-3,72	-22,74 ***	-3,10	-24,49 ***	-3,93	-24,65 ***	-3,02	-22,54 ***	-3,17
Sample(adjusted):	80-01		79-01		80-01		79-01		79-01	
N	22		23		22		23		23	
R ²	0,97		0,97		0,98		0,97		0,97	
Adj. R ²	0,95		0,94		0,95		0,94		0,95	

Sign.: *** .01; ** .05; * .10; other in figures

4.6. Thus another relevant factor is international coordination and collaboration. For many years ETA benefited from a de facto sanctuary in France. For this reason Spanish governments have considered as a priority in their foreign policy to persuade the neighbouring country to prosecute the activities of the organisation and to extradite its activists. Even more, as Reinares (1998) and Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (1999) plausibly argue, this could become a key element of an efficacious antiterrorist policy. In 1983/84 a shift in French attitudes occurred that led to increasing anti-terrorist collaboration, in both the police and judicial domains (Domínguez 1999). However, apart from a clear effect of the intervention in Bidart, French ordinary arrests (from 1988) do not show a statistically significant effect (Models 1 and 3).¹³

4.7. Another device employed early by democratic rulers was the social reintegration of fighters. By the mid 1980s, Spanish governments thus supplied an outlet for almost 150 activists, most of them from the “political-military” ETA splinter group, which had unilaterally renounced its armed struggle in 1982. 86 amnesties were added between 1982 and 1990 (Domínguez 1999).¹⁴ In this manner sanctions derived from past actions

¹² The proper length of delays has been identified by means of the method of McCleary and Hay (1980). The main step has been to take the strongest cross-correlation between the number of victims and the number of arrests once the series were differentiated, since both of them were non-stationary.

¹³ Correlation between arrests and imprisonments in France between 1988 and 2000 is 0.683. Taking their first differences, 0.677.

¹⁴ The handled data series on social reintegration considers 86 reinsertions, plus 10 amnesties conceded in 1990 (I do not have the data for when the remaining reinsertions and amnesties were produced).

were removed, hence important opportunity costs that could cause them to persist were avoided. This policy could produce, moreover, other three delayed effects: (a) an interruption of active recruitment by this faction; (b) a modification, among “military” ETA members, of the perception of their opportunities structure; and (c) a lower probability of new recruits, owing to an effect of reduction of the critical mass of armed collective action. The regression analysis gives consistency to this hypothesis. For each reintegration, there seems to be a victim less six years later (Model 5).¹⁵ However, the killing by ETA of a reinserted prominent former leader (“Yoyes”) in 1986 seems to be the main motive to terminate this policy (Domínguez 1999).

4.8. Nevertheless, during the democratic period assassinations of ETA members or their sympathisers were carried out or organised from the structures of the state, too. The so-called “dirty war” almost always took place in the French Basque Country and was aimed at eliminating ETA’s refuge there. Two periods can be distinguished. From 1978 to 1980, while the Unión del Centro Democrático, was in power seemingly uncontrolled members of the security forces who gave themselves the names of Batallón Vasco Español (BVE) and Triple A committed ten murders. From 1983 to 1987, under social-democratic rule, the newly arrived Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) committed 28 homicides more, which caused several policemen and politicians to be imprisoned including one former Minister of the Interior (Domínguez 1999).

4.9. On this issue two competing hypotheses exist: on the one hand, the responsible policemen and politicians could have thought that the illegal violent campaign would restrain ETA, forcing it to be much more cautious in its French refuge. On the other hand, Reinares (1998) has argued that this actually provided new arguments to ETA when its social legitimacy was in crisis. The statistical analysis seems to agree with the latter, since every BVE, Triple A or GAL murder seems to produce, two years later, one ETA murder more than could have been expected without the intervention of this factor.

4.10. Other factors, albeit more difficult to operationalise, deserve equal consideration. In the political domain, the anti-terrorist pacts of Ajuria Enea (Basque Country) and Madrid were reached in 1988, establishing a broad anti-terrorist front that included all Basque nationalist parties except Herri Batasuna, besides statewide parties. Those agreements aimed at increasing collaboration between regional and Spanish police, and de-legitimising violence. A reduction of violence could hence be expected. However, the impact of this factor is not significant (Model 4).¹⁶

4.11. Another hypothetical factor consists of attempts of communication with ETA to negotiate reintegration of its members, a reduction of their sentences, or the attenuation of other consequences (particularly, transferring convicts to prisons near their social milieu), in exchange for an end to violence. The most important meeting between government and ETA representatives occurred in Algiers in 1989. Although a cease-fire was not reached even during the negotiations, the number of victims that year was relatively low. However, this decrease could also be connected to a period of insurgent weakness, since there was an equal number of victims in 1988. The statistical effect of those talks is not significant (Models 1 and 2).¹⁷ Furthermore, at about the end of 1998

¹⁵ The statistical significance of this appears when considering other factors simultaneously.

¹⁶ The Ajuria Enea and Madrid agreements are specified through a dummy (score 1 between 1988 and 1998). Both contemporary and delayed effects have been considered.

¹⁷ The dummy variable scores 1 in 1989.

and until the middle of 1999, ETA proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire, represented as being inspired by the Ulster agreement and driven by a will to negotiate.¹⁸ Although the trend could suggest another period of operative weakness, its coefficient predicts far fewer victims than could be expected without the truce.

4.12. As seen above, various public order interventions account for a good deal of variation in the number of victims (especially, the arrests in Bidart and social reintegration). Even so, it is also possible to concede plausibility to other factors located in the political, structural and cultural frame. In this sense, an impact of Basque autonomy and democratisation should occur. Their clearer effect could be the above-mentioned self-dissolution of the “political-military” ETA. Along with the judicial facilities for reintegration of their activists, the realisation of a substantial part of their political goals, as much as an induction of incentives for putting into practice confrontational forms far less costly, could contribute to explaining the political integration of these activists and the social segment that supported them. Their subsequent devotion to the Euskadiko Ezkerra party seems to speak for this hypothesis. For this reason, a (dummy) variable considering that the Constitution and the Autonomy Law of 1979 (*vis-à-vis* the dictatorship and the centralised state), which should produce a substantial change in violence levels, has also been included in the displayed regression models. This factor seems to account for a change in level of thirty-four victims from two years later up to the present day.¹⁹

4.13. On the other hand, the “military” ETA cease-fire is the single variable able to account for the decrease in 1999. Police pressure and massive mobilisation in favour of peace occurring by the end of 1998 must be regarded against the background of that decision, but also some factors of a political nature.²⁰ Immediately after the cease-fire announcement, important agreements of institutional collaboration between EH, PNV and EA were reached, including the investiture of the President of the Basque government. The persistence of the truce for almost a year seems, to a large extent, to be due to that *rapprochement*.

4.14. Finally, during the process of identification of this model I observed a pronounced temporary reduction in 1981. My *ex post* interpretation is that this could be due to the failed *coup d'état* attempt of that year. On the one hand, the leadership of “military” ETA precisely sought polarisation, the coup being the most unequivocal expression at that time of its apparent success, and also an occasion for having a rest. On the other hand, many activists, especially those of the “political-military” ETA faction, could take stock of the situation and ask themselves whether a return to dictatorship was what they actually wanted. The important thing is that this factor accounts for a decrease of thirteen victims that year. Secondly, during the second half of 1991 and the first month of 1992 ETA carried out a huge campaign of attacks aimed at achieving negotiations

¹⁸ The cease-fire in 1998 and 1999 has been operationalised with scores 0.25 and 0.75, respectively.

¹⁹ The length of this delay has been identified by the method of McCleary and Hay (1980); see note 11 above.

²⁰ Peaceful mobilisation against terrorism tends to be useful in several ways. In some contexts, however, these actions can be useless, or even counterproductive. In a society divided into hermetic blocks, mobilisation of an opposed group can plausibly encourage insistence on and entrenchment of their own positions to counterbalance that mobilisation. Despite this, I agree that collective action increases the costs for those attracted to extremism, while helping to organise the collective action, both coordinative and cooperative, of those harmed by violence and its many other consequences.


with the government within the horizon of the Olympic games. This implies fourteen murders more than could have been expected in 1992.

4.15. It is worth ending this section by summarising its main findings. The number of ETA victims has decreased dramatically since the beginning of the 1980s, putting forward an unequivocal decreasing tendency. According to the statistical multivariate model supplied, this development is the result of a combination of certain responsive and public-order approaches: the twofold political change in establishing democracy and the Basque Autonomous Community (a responsive policy), police efficacy (ordinary arrests, and above all, the intervention in Bidart), and the reintegration of combatants (a flexible but persevering public-order policy). Another factor is ETA's cease-fire, which can either be considered as a consequence of political factors or – in a tautological but plausible manner – as a consequence of those very police actions. In turn, state terrorism seems to have produced more ETA homicides. The failed *coup d'état* in 1981 (as a theoretically exogenous variable) and the campaign of attacks before the Olympics add to these factors.

Development of Basque Extremist Nationalist Voting

4.16. From the statistical point of view, the vote for HB/EH is distributed along time in a discrete and irregular manner, and only supplies twelve observations, taking regional and general elections together. This deprives us of a regression analysis like the preceding one. Despite that, observing its development in a descriptive manner is still revealing.

Figure 2: Extremist Votes and Victims of Terrorism



Source: Author's elaboration of voting data of Díez-Medrano (1995) and www.eleweb.net; for violence, police data.

4.17. Observing the number of ballots in favour of this coalition out of the total electorate, a remarkable stability can be noticed, even though there is a certain downward slope from the mid 1980s (see Fig. 2). When compared with the number of


victims of ETA (divided by two for a clearer display), there does not seem to be any correlation. No correlation is suggested either with most of the theoretical factors considered above. However, there is an exception of the ETA cease-fire (1998 and 1999) that, along with the agreements between the Basque nationalist parties, which included a campaign in favour of “national self-determination”, certainly improved the results for this organisation in the 1998 elections, and whose finishing relatively accelerated the smooth decreasing trend in HB electoral support.

4.18. This core of nationalist extremist sympathisers remains quite unaffected in the face of the several factors considered, supporting the thesis of the existence of a strongly autonomous socio-political subculture and substructure autonomous within the social system. However, the frustration of a part of that movement’s twofold expectations of peace and self-determination seems to explain that the greatest electoral success of HB/EH (1998) was followed by its worst result (2001) and a split from the coalition (Aralar) (Pallarés 2002).

Development of Rejection towards Spain

4.19. The several policies in the face of extremism, adopted from the angle of both public order and responsiveness, could have an effect on the systems of belief from which behaviour then flows. Given this observation over more than twenty years and its close correlation to extremism, it has been considered as an indicator of the rejection towards Spain within the personal feelings of belonging.²¹ Its trajectory can be observed in Figure 3. Between 1969 and 1982 approximately 40 per cent of Basques expressed this attitude in a number of surveys. However, since 1984 the average of “Basque only” identifiers is around 25 per cent.

Figure 3: Basque Only Identifiers and Victims of Terrorism



Source: Author’s elaboration of survey and police data.

²¹ It is noteworthy that the risk of “ecological fallacy” is very small. In the first place, a study by the present author demonstrates that the trends are practically equal for all generational cohorts. Secondly, immigrants’ entries practically ceased by the late 1970s (Martínez Herrera 2002). Thirdly, here the proportions of immigrants and autochthons among interviewees are controlled.

4.20. As summarised in Table 5, it was initially previewed that contemporary arrests could foster the refusal towards Spain, while social reintegration of fighters and the establishing of Basque autonomy and democracy could reduce it. On the other hand, the effect of violence has also been considered, leaving it as an open question. Moreover, the proportions of immigrants and autochthons' children are also included, a necessary control due to the fact that the family geographical origin is the most discriminating variable at the individual level (Martínez-Herrera 2002).²² Nevertheless, the analysis will only account for variations since 1979, due to the lack of prior information about most factors.

Table 4: Variables Utilised in Basque Exclusivism Modelling

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Observed Period</i>	<i>Expected relationship</i>
per cent of “Basque only” identifiers	1975–2001	
<i>Public-order variables</i>		
No. of Arrested in Spain	1977–2001	Positive
Efficiency	1982–2000	Negative
No. of Reinserted	1982–1990	Negative
No. of Victims of GAL and BVE	1978–1987	Negative
Erzaintza	Dummy	Negative
No. of Victims of ETA	1968–2001	?
<i>Responsiveness variables</i>		
Constitution	Dummy	Negative
<i>Exogenous variables</i>		
% of Immigrants	1979–2000	Negative
% of 2nd Generation Basques	1979–2000	Positive
<i>Coup d'état</i> 1981	Dummy	Positive

4.21. Regarding the results of Models 1 and 3 (Table 5), institutional change (“Constitution”) leads to a decrease in the average of ten percentage points with a delay of five years,²³ while reinsertions and amnesties policies implemented between 1982 and 1990 show the predicted impact with a year’s delay. By contrast, the detentions in Spain show an insignificant effect (Model 1).

4.22. With regard to detentions it has been argued that their indiscriminate character causes hostility among the population towards authorities (Reinares 1998; Hoffman and Morrison-Taw 1999). For this reason, at the very least, it would be desirable to carry out arrests in a more selective manner, and sticking both to legality and what common

²² These variables do not project co-linearity, because they are complemented with the ratio of autochthonous children of immigrants and mixed couples. Although this is not the right place to discuss this, the surprising finding that the more immigrants, and fewer autochthons' children there are, the more frequent exclusivism is, seems to be consistent with theories of ethnic competence (see Díez Medrano 1994).

²³ The length of this delay has been identified by the method of McCleary and Hay (1980); see note 11 above.

people consider legitimate in their own social milieu. In turn, insurgent movements can, precisely because of this, try to increase support for their cause spurring on the state to apply its violence indiscriminately on the whole population. In the case of ETA, its doctrine of “action-reaction-action” is well known. What is significant is that the security agencies acted as if pursued by ETA during the dictatorship and till the mid 1980s. Part of the explanation rests on the bad organisation of the police information services at that time, so that interrogations were their main source of information in that sense (Domínguez 1999).

Table 5: Regression of the percentage of “Basque only” identifiers

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t
Constant	-34,90	-1,54	5,28	0,52	1,62	0,18
% of Immigrants	2,08 **	2,97	2,19 ***	4,01	2,52 ***	6,36
% of Autochthon Offspring	0,21	0,31	-0,67	-1,74	-0,81 **	-2,45
Constitution(-5)	-10,42 ***	-3,40	-9,59 ***	-5,18	-10,37 ***	-7,99
Arrested in Spain (-1)	0,00	1,40				
Efficiency of Arrests(-1)			-0,03	-0,71		
Victims of ETA (-1)	-0,13 ***	-4,47	-0,13 ***	-3,99	-0,14 ***	-5,23
Reinserted(-1)	-0,37 ***	-5,54	-0,33 ***	-5,95	-0,36 ***	-8,50
GAL-BVE(-2)	0,51 *	1,92	0,37 **	2,19	0,43 **	2,72
Coup d'Etat	4,35 **	2,38			5,14 ***	2,91
Etzaintza1(-1)	0,16	0,76				
Etzaintza1(-2)	-0,01	0,00				
Etzaintza1(-3)	0,51	0,29				
Etzaintza1(-4)	4,16 *	1,86				
Sample(adjusted):	79-00		83-00		79-00	
N	22		18		22	
R ²	0,98		0,91		0,97	
Adj. R ²	0,96		0,85		0,96	

Sign.: *** .01; ** .05; * .10; other between brackets

4.23. Here an annual ratio between the number of detentions and the numbers of those finally processed has been calculated. This indicates not so much police efficacy as its “efficiency”, in the sense of avoiding unintended de-legitimising effects. Fig. 4 shows the improvement of security agencies ‘precision in this task. From this the prospect of an improvement in the legitimacy of the Spanish political system will follow.²⁴ However, substituting the number of arrests by their accuracy does not seem to have had an effect on Basque exclusivism (Model 2).²⁵

4.24. There are also expectations that the substitution of the Spanish security forces in common police tasks of by another one called Ertzaintza, run from the Basque government, and generally made up of Basques, should reduce the social de-legitimising of Spain (cf. Aja 1999). For this I have considered the several phases of the deployment of this agency, created in 1981 and completed in 1995.²⁶ However, it does

²⁴ Arrests are now included in police efficiency.


²⁵ A statistically significant effect is lacking, either contemporaneous or with a yearly delay.

²⁶ It is a battery of dummies where the baseline is the period when autonomic police did not yet exist; the first dummy encompasses the period from its creation in 1981 onwards; the second, from 1986, when four phases of deployment had been produced and twelve police stations had been created, onwards; the third, from 1989, when this agency formally incorporated to the anti-terrorist struggle, onwards; the last one,

not seem to have had any significant effect (Model 1), though this result is perhaps due to the obvious shortcomings of the available information.

4.25. As for the “dirty war”, as it has been often argued (e.g. Reinales 1998), the killing of ETA members by security agents calling themselves BVE, Triple A or GAL supplied the extremist nationalist discourse with new legitimising arguments. The statistical analysis suggests that these murders increased the rejection towards Spain.

Figure 4: Police “Efficiency”



Source: Author’s elaboration of data in Domínguez Iribarren 1999.

4.26. Finally, the impact of the number of victims of violence has been also examined. Paradoxically, this seems to reduce exclusivism (with an annual lag), eroding the bases of the secessionist movement against ETA’s political strategy itself. In this sense, it is noteworthy that in the last few years, a growing part of the ETA’s social basis questioned the practice of assassination. Pacifist methods might improve Basque national pride and the morale of this societal segment, thereby renewing their trust in secessionism, and vice versa.²⁷

4.27. To summarise, the rejection towards Spanish self-identification has been significantly reduced from the first half of the 1980s to the benefit of some sort of shared identification with Spain. In the light of the data managed here, the explanation seems to rest, above all, on responsive policies, namely, on the twofold process of democratisation of the Spanish political system and its political decentralisation, that provides the Basques with an extraordinary political autonomy. Furthermore, from the domain of public-order policies, the social reintegration of fighters renouncing armed struggle stands out for its effects on the Basques’ national identification, while state terrorism became much more counterproductive. It is also worth underlining that the number of arrests since 1977, its “efficiency” since 1982, and the replacement of state-wide security agencies by others that are locally ruled and recruited, seem to be

from 1995, when the deployment was completed, onwards (Domínguez Iribarren 1999: 238–40).

²⁷ I have also tried to observe the effect of the cease-fire in 1998/99. However, in 1999/2000 the CIS did not ask for details of national identity, hence the data for that period are an interpolation, which prevents me from observing a hypothetical immediate effect.

irrelevant in relation to the process of subjective integration of the Basques in Spain. In turn, the number of ETA victims seems to reduce, albeit moderately, the population's attachment to the idea of rejecting Spain.

5. Implications for Theory and Policy

5.1. The addressing of Basque nationalist extremism has been based on policies placed in two dimensions: one of public order and one of responsiveness. By relying on available data with a multivariate statistical approach, much of the analysis has focused on the evolution of terrorist violence, and particularly on the efficacy of the struggle against it. The evidence is consistent with a combination of the perspectives of public order and responsiveness. Responsiveness, materialised in the twofold establishment of democracy and a Basque Autonomous Community, and a perseverant law-ruled but flexible order policy, materialised in the detention and the reintegration of fighters, appear as the main means. On the other hand, it is more difficult to attribute the effect of ETA cease-fire in 1998/99 to one or the other policy approach, since it is possible to attribute it to both previous police efficacy (interpreting the truce as a tactical retreat due to ETA deterioration) and the agreements between nationalists parties and ETA during that two-year period. Contrarily, state terrorism seems to have caused even more ETA violence. Therefore, this article backs a responsive policy that does not neglect public order in the sense of police efficacy but gives it more flexibility, allied with some generosity.

5.2. The study of voting has been limited by the nature of the data. However, the conclusion is that Basque nationalist extremist voting demonstrates great autonomy with respect to the factors under consideration. The social section closer to the extremist nationalist movement appears entrenched, firmly persistent within a hermetic socio-political subculture (and substructure). However, the twofold disappointment after two failures in pacification and in the widening of the nationalist front that happened around the end of 1999 seems to explain the certain fall-off of this vote in 2001 and some subsequent splits produced in the Euskal Herritarrok coalition.

5.3. Finally, the refusal of self-identifying with Spain has significantly decreased over the last twenty years. Analysing the matter within the theoretical frame of this article, the findings suggest that, above all, responsive policies of democratisation of the country and the instauration of the Basque autonomous community and of the flexible order policy of social reintegration of combatants have reduced that rejection. On the contrary, the so-called "dirty war" developed by the state and the failed *coup d'état* intensified it for a time. In turn ETA violence, ironically, has seemed to reduce it as well, against the very objectives of the movement supporting violence. However, although another factor usually considered important, namely the substitution of statewide by regional security agencies with regard to ordinary police functions, does not find support here, perhaps better data could do it. Thus, the combination of a relatively flexible order policy with the satisfaction of demands of the extremist movement's social milieu seems to explain the increase in subjective integration of the Basques in Spain.

5.4. In short, the results in this article support the hypothesis that a combination of public order and responsive policies, rather than an exclusive choice of only one of them, accounts for the mitigation of two basic dimensions of the Basque insurgent

nationalist extremism. A one-sided public-order approach to public order, especially in the more rigid sense that it had in the past, seems to be counterproductive. In turn, a one-sided approach of satisfying demands without demanding in exchange a commitment to accepting certain rules (including limits) of the game, does not seem theoretically plausible.

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