

# Educational effect of selected social protection programmes

Chapter 3 of this report argues that to mitigate the negative effects of poverty on education, governments and donors need to scale up social protection measures to help poor households manage risk without compromising their children's long-term welfare. The table below reviews evaluations of a range of social protection programmes

throughout the developing world, including conditional and unconditional transfers of cash and food. Differences between programmes and in evaluation methodology mean that comparisons have to be made with caution, but overall the evidence points to positive effects on enrolment and attendance, and, in a few cases, on cognitive development and educational achievement.

Country	Programme (year/s)	Targeted beneficiaries of education component	Key instrument of educational component/ scale of transfer	Educational impact <sup>1, 2</sup>
<b>Direct support for education</b>				
Indonesia	<b>Jaring Pengaman Sosial (Social Safety Net) scholarship and grant programme</b> (1998–2005)	Poorest primary and secondary school students, 50% girls	Scholarships of c. US\$10–30 (1998 exchange rate) depending on school level, sufficient to cover full cost of school fees	↓ of 3 p.p. (mid-school year dropout rate at lower secondary in poorest villages)
<b>Transfers conditional on educational behaviour, or with specific educational goals</b>				
Bangladesh	<b>Female Secondary School Assistance Programme</b> , part of Nation Wide Female Stipend Programme (1994–)	Girls aged 11–18 in secondary school (grades 6–10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Biannual transfer of stipend, tuition, book allowance and exam fees, totalling between c. US\$6 and US\$24 (2003)/0.6% of per capita expenditure, depending on school level</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance and achievement</li> </ul>	↑ enrolment by 12 p.p.
Burkina Faso	<b>World Food Programme school lunches and take-home rations</b> (encompassed earlier programmes in 2005–2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School lunches: all children in targeted rural primary schools</li> <li>• Take-home food rations: girls in the last two grades</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lunch for all children in attendance</li> <li>• Monthly take-home ration of 10 kg cereals for girls in last two grades</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ new enrolments by 5–6 p.p. among younger girls</li> <li>• ↓ absenteeism among girls</li> </ul>
Cambodia	<b>Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction pilot project</b> (2002–2005)	Girls grades 7–9 (lower secondary school)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$45 in three instalments/2–3% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment, regular attendance and maintaining a passing grade</li> </ul>	↑ enrolment by 31.3 p.p.; higher among poorest
	<b>Education Sector Support Project – Scholarships for the Poor Programme</b> (2005–)	Children who have completed grade 6 likely to drop out due to poverty, gender, ethnic minority status, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$45 or US\$60 in three instalments/2–3% of median household income, depending on estimated 'probability of dropout'</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment, regular attendance and on-time promotion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ enrolment by 21.4 p.p.</li> <li>• ↑ attendance by 25 p.p.</li> </ul>
Chile	<b>Chile Solidario</b> (2002–)	Very poor households	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreasing monthly benefits for the first 24 months, from US\$21 to US\$8 (2006)/7% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance</li> </ul>	↑ enrolment by 7.5 p.p. among children aged 6–15
Colombia	<b>Familias en Acción</b> (2001/2–)	Extremely poor families with children enrolled in school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About US\$8–33 per child per month/17% of per capita expenditure, depending on school level</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ages 8–13: ↑ enrolment by 2.1 p.p.</li> <li>• Ages 14–17: ↑ enrolment by 5.6 p.p.</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<b>Bono de Desarrollo Humano<sup>3</sup></b> (1998–; relaunched as BDH in 2004)	Families in the poorest two quintiles with children aged 16 or under	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash transfer of US\$15/month/&lt;10% of per capita monthly income</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment and attendance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ enrolment by 10.3 p.p., esp. for poorest quintile, in transition grades</li> <li>• ↑ cognitive development (esp. long-term memory) for poorest decile</li> <li>• No effect on test scores</li> </ul>
Honduras	<b>Programa de Asignación Familiar</b> (1990–; relaunched as PRAFI in 2000)	Poor households with children aged 6–12 who have not completed grade 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$60 per household per year/9% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment and attendance</li> </ul>	↑ enrolment by 2.1 p.p.
Jamaica	<b>Programme of Advancement through Health and Education</b> (2002–)	Children aged 19 or under (or until they graduate from secondary school)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About US\$7–13 per student per month/10% of per capita expenditure; as of 2008, transfer depends on gender (boys receive more) and school level</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance</li> </ul>	Over 20-day period, ↑ attendance by 2.5 p.p. (0.5 days)

Country	Programme (year/s)	Targeted beneficiaries of education component	Key instrument of educational component/ scale of transfer	Educational impact <sup>1, 2</sup>
Kenya	<b>Cash Transfers – Orphans and Vulnerable Children</b> (2005–)	Ultra-poor households fostering orphan or vulnerable child aged 17 or under not receiving any cash transfer; child cared for by chronically ill adult	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash transfers based on the food poverty gap every two months, c. US\$20/month, for 4 years</li> <li>• Conditional on attendance</li> </ul>	Final evaluation not yet available, but improvements in attendance and retention noted. Four-year pilot now being funded to scale up as regular programme
Mexico	<b>Oportunidades</b> (1997–)	Extremely poor households with children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfers for stipends and material vary by school level and, from secondary, by gender, c. US\$35–103 per child per month/20% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Plus US\$336 in a savings account upon completion of secondary school</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment, attendance and completion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grades 0–5: insignificant impact</li> <li>• Grade 6: ↑ enrolment 8.7 p.p.</li> <li>• Grades 7–9: insignificant impact</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<b>Atención a Crisis</b> (2005–2006)	Poor households living in drought-affected region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$90 per household per year + US\$25 per child per year (for supplies) + US\$13 per child per year to school/18% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment and attendance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Among children aged 7–15 in grades 1–6: ↑ enrolment by 6.6 p.p.</li> <li>• ↑ cognitive development (esp. language and personal behaviour)</li> </ul>
	<b>Red de Protección Social</b> (2000–2005/6)	Extremely poor households with children aged 7–13 in grades 1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$17 per household every two months + US\$20 per child per year (for supplies)/27% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment, attendance and promotion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ enrolment by 12.8 p.p. (25 p.p. for the poorest)</li> <li>• ↑ proportion advancing 2 grades in 2 years by 7 p.p.</li> </ul>
Pakistan	<b>Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme</b> (2003–)	Girls aged 10–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About US\$3 per student per month/3% of per capita expenditure</li> <li>• Conditional on enrolment and attendance</li> </ul>	↑ enrolment by 11.1 p.p.
Paraguay	<b>Tekoporã</b> (2005–)	Households in the poorest districts with low quality of life score and children aged 15 or under	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash transfer of c. US\$18–36/month</li> <li>• Conditional on school attendance and matriculation</li> </ul>	↑ attendance by 5–8 p.p., esp. among boys and older children
Turkey	<b>Social Risk Mitigation Project</b> (2002–)	Primary and secondary school students	6% of per capita expenditure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary students: ↓ enrolment by 3 p.p.</li> <li>• Secondary students: no significant increase in enrolment</li> </ul>
<b>Other transfers, without specific educational goals or conditions</b>				
Bangladesh	<b>Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra Poor (BRAC)</b> (2002–)	Ultra-poor households, identified in terms of living in a poor area, labour constraints, lack of assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most generous model provides productive assets (e.g. livestock, sheds worth on average c. US\$90) and support inputs; weekly stipends (c. US\$1); income generation training; and other forms of technical, health and social support</li> <li>• Unconditional</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ enrolment by 6.5 p.p. among young boys</li> <li>• No overall effect on enrolment rates</li> <li>• ↑ maximum educational level among 6- to 20-year-olds in household</li> </ul>
Ethiopia	<b>Productive Safety Net Programme</b> (2005)	Food-insecure, asset-poor households in selected districts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash or food transfers (c. US\$0.61/day, 2005 prices)/maximum transfer of c. US\$18 per member per year</li> <li>• Conditional on work on labour-intensive projects designed to build community assets. Labour-constrained households receive unconditional transfers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ attendance among boys by 19–23 p.p.</li> <li>• ↑ enrolment among c. 33% of households</li> <li>• ↑ months in school among c. 50% of households</li> <li>• ↑ time studying at home</li> </ul>
<b>Integrated programmes</b>				
Burkina Faso	<b>BRIGHT (Burkinabe Response to Improve Girls' cHances To succeed)</b> (2005–)	Children, especially girls, in districts where girls' enrolment is lowest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Daily meals for all; take-home rations (8 kg cereal/month) for girls; school kits and textbooks for all students</li> <li>• Conditional on strong attendance</li> <li>• Other: Construction of rural schools, latrines and teacher housing; mobilization campaign for girls' education; adult literacy training and literacy mentoring for girls; local partner capacity-building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ↑ enrolment by 20 p.p.</li> <li>• ↑ attendance by 16 p.p.</li> <li>• ↑ math/French test scores of 0.4 s.d. (equivalent of moving from 50th to 80th percentile)</li> </ul>

**Notes:**

1. 'p.p.' = percentage points; 's.d.' = standard deviation.

2. As different methodologies were used to determine the educational impacts of the different programmes, and as target groups and length of intervention vary markedly, these results are not strictly comparable but provide an indication of the range and magnitude of effects.

3. Note that while the Bono de Desarrollo Humano was initially intended to be a cash transfer conditional on education and health behaviour, the education conditions were never monitored or enforced. Nevertheless because of the early information campaign, around one-quarter of households believed sending children to school was a programme requirement (Fiszbein et al., 2009).

Sources: Table adapted from Fiszbein et al. (2009). Additional material from Acharaya and Luitel (2006); Ahmed et al. (2009); Alviar et al. (2009); Barr et al. (2007); Barrientos et al. (2008); Cameron (2009); Devereux et al. (2006); Edmonds and Schady (2008); Filmer and Schady (2009); Grosh et al. (2008); Hoddinott (2008); Hoddinott et al. (2009); Kazianga et al. (2009); Levy et al. (2009); Moore (2008); Sharp et al. (2006); Slater et al. (2006); Soares et al. (2008); Sulaiman (2009); Villanger (2008); WFP (2005); Woldehanna (2009).