


Chapter 3

Education and armed conflict – the deadly spirals



© Lana Slezacek/Panos



Girls play in a wrecked building in Kabul that is home to 105 refugee families



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Violent conflict is destroying educational opportunities for millions of children. This chapter identifies the mechanisms of destruction – including attacks on schools, human rights violations and diversion of resources to military spending – and examines the shortcomings of the international aid response. It also explains how the wrong sort of education can help fuel conflict by fostering intolerance, prejudice and injustice.

Introduction

War has been described as ‘development in reverse’.¹ Even short episodes of armed conflict can halt progress or reverse gains built up over generations, undermining economic growth and advances in health, nutrition and employment. The impact is most severe and protracted in countries and among people whose resilience and capacity for recovery are weakened by mass poverty.

Education seldom figures in assessments of the damage inflicted by conflict. International attention and media reporting invariably focus on the most immediate images of humanitarian suffering, not on the hidden costs and lasting legacies of violence. Yet nowhere are those costs and legacies more evident than in education. Across many of the world’s poorest countries, armed conflict is destroying not just school infrastructure, but also the hopes and ambitions of a whole generation of children.

Part of the impact of conflict on education can be measured in hard statistics. The fact that conflict-affected countries figure so prominently at the bottom of international league tables for progress in education suggests that violent conflict merits a more prominent place on the Education for All agenda. But not all the effects of conflict are readily captured in data. The wider effects of loss, injury, insecurity, psychological trauma, dislocation of family and community life, and displacement are less easily measured. But they are depriving children, youth and adults of opportunities for education that could transform their lives. They also hold back the human development progress of whole nations, leaving countries trapped in self-reinforcing cycles of violence, poverty and educational disadvantage. Breaking these cycles is one of the greatest development challenges of the early twenty-first century.

This chapter is divided into three sections. It starts by documenting the impact of violent conflict on education. Conflict-affected countries are heavily concentrated at the wrong end of the global scale measuring education performance. The poorest among them account for a disproportionately large share of the world’s out-of-school children. Indicators for nutrition, literacy and gender equality in conflict-affected countries are also among the lowest in the world. These outcomes are closely related to the patterns of violence evident in many

conflict-affected countries. State and non-state actors alike are increasingly blurring the line between combatants and civilians, and in many cases deliberately targeting children, teachers and school infrastructure. Widespread and systematic rape and sexual violence and mass displacement are particularly shocking illustrations of the face of violence.

Beyond the human costs and the physical destruction of school infrastructure, armed conflict is draining some of the world’s poorest countries of financial resources. Instead of directing their budgets towards productive investment in human capital through education, many countries are wasting money on unproductive military expenditure. As the chapter underlines, it is not just poor countries that need to reset their priorities: aid donors are also spending too much on military hardware, and too little on development assistance for education.

If the devastating impact of armed conflict on education is underestimated and under-reported, the same is true of the reverse part of the cycle examined in the second section of this chapter: namely, the damaging impact that education can have on prospects for peace. Education systems do not cause wars. But under certain conditions they can exacerbate the wider grievances, social tensions and inequalities that drive societies in the direction of violent conflict. Education systems that fail to equip young people with the skills they need to achieve a sustainable livelihood help to provide a pool of potential recruits for armed groups. When governments deliver education in ways that are seen to violate basic principles of fairness and equal opportunity, the ensuing resentment can inflame wider tensions. And when classrooms are used not to nurture young minds by teaching children to think critically in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding, but to poison those minds with prejudice, intolerance and a distorted view of history, they can become a breeding ground for violence.

The final section of the chapter examines problems with aid to conflict-affected countries. These countries receive less development assistance than their circumstances merit – and some receive far less than others. While development assistance flows to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan have increased, those to several countries in sub-Saharan Africa have either risen slowly or stagnated. There is a strong case to be made for

Violent conflict is destroying not just school infrastructure, but also the hopes and ambitions of a whole generation of children

1. See Collier, 2007.

More than 28 million children of primary school age are out of school in conflict-affected countries

increasing aid to a large group of conflict-affected states. By the same token, several major donors need to consider far more carefully the interaction between development assistance as a poverty reduction tool on the one hand, and as an element in wider foreign policy and defence agendas on the other. Moves towards the 'securitization' of aid threaten to undermine aid effectiveness and contribute to insecurity.

There are no quick fixes for the problems identified in this chapter. The hidden crisis in education has suffered not just from neglect and indifference, but from institutionalized failures in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. The message to policy-makers from this chapter can be summarized under three headings:

- *The impact of armed conflict has been underestimated.* Conflict is destroying opportunities for education on a global scale. The starting point for an effective response to the crisis is recognition by the international community of the extent of the crisis – and of what is at stake. Failure to break the destructive cycle of armed conflict, and stalled progress in education, is not only a violation of human rights but is also reinforcing inequalities and, ultimately, threatening peace and stability.
- *Education is part of the vicious circle.* National governments and the international community have to recognize that education can reinforce the grievances that fuel armed conflict. Acknowledging this is a first step towards putting education at the centre of a credible peacebuilding agenda.
- *Aid programmes need to prioritize poverty reduction – not national security goals.* Development assistance has the potential to act as a powerful force for peace and reconstruction, and to support the recovery of education systems. Realizing that potential will require a far stronger focus on 'forgotten conflicts' and a clearer demarcation line between the national security goals of donors and the poverty reduction imperative that should define aid programmes.

Armed conflict as a barrier to Education for All

When governments adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in 2000, they identified conflict as 'a major barrier towards attaining Education for All' (UNESCO, 2000, p. 19). With the 2015 target date for reaching the Education for All goals approaching, violent conflict is still one of the greatest obstacles to accelerated progress in education.

Conflict-affected countries are falling behind

Identifying conflict-affected countries is not a straightforward exercise. This Report uses established international reporting practices to identify a group of thirty-five countries that experienced armed conflict during 1999–2008 (Box 3.1). The group includes thirty low income and lower middle income countries that are home to 116 million children. Taken collectively, these thirty countries have some of the world's worst education indicators – far worse than for countries at comparable income levels that are not affected by conflict (Figure 3.1):


- They have more than 28 million children of primary school age out of school, or 42% of the world total. Within the group of poorer developing countries, they account for around one-quarter of the primary school age population but nearly half of the out-of-school population.²
- Children in conflict-affected countries are not only less likely to be in primary school, but also more likely to drop out. Survival to the last grade in poorer conflict-affected countries is 65%, whereas it is 86% in other poor countries.
- Gross enrolment ratios in secondary school are nearly 30% lower in conflict-affected countries (48%) than in others (67%), and are far lower for girls.
- The legacy of conflict is evident in literacy levels. Only 79% of young people and 69% of adults are literate in conflict-affected countries, compared with 93% and 85% in other countries.

2. Because localized conflicts in large-population countries can skew figures, this exercise makes an adjustment by including only conflict-affected areas for India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan.


Figure 3.1: Conflict-affected countries are lagging behind in education

Selected education indicators for low income and lower middle income countries, by conflict status, 2008


Children are less likely to be in school.




Child mortality rates are higher.




Children are more likely to be malnourished.



Youth and adults are less likely to be literate.



Girls are left furthest behind.



■ Conflict-affected low and lower middle income countries ■ Other low and lower middle income countries

Note: All averages are weighted.

Sources: Annex, Statistical Tables 2–5; Strand and Dahl (2010).

- Problems start before children reach school age. In conflict-affected countries, the average mortality rate for children under 5 is more than double the rate in other countries: on average twelve children out of a hundred die before their fifth birthday, compared with six out of a hundred.

This global snapshot reveals the heavy burden of violent conflict on education – a pattern confirmed by country studies (Justino, 2010; UIS, 2010).³

3. A review of the empirical literature on the impact of conflict on education finds a clear negative legacy. From the small number of such studies that are available, three general patterns emerge that support the evidence presented here. First, even relatively minor shocks can have a long-lasting detrimental impact on schooling. Second, girls tend to be more affected, in part because of sexual violence. Third, the effects are greatest for secondary schooling (Justino, 2010).

The experience of Iraq provides a stark example of how conflict can reverse achievements in education. Until the 1990s, the country was a regional leader in education (UNESCO, 2003). It had achieved near-universal primary education, high levels of secondary enrolment and established universities that enjoyed an international reputation. As a result of the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the imposition of sanctions, followed by eight years of violence since 2003, the country has slipped down the education league table. Though national data are unreliable, one survey put the attendance rate for 6- to 14-year-olds in 2008 at 71%. The reported net enrolment ratio is below the level in Zambia, and half a million primary school age children are out of

Twelve children out of a hundred die before their fifth birthday in conflict-affected countries

school. Much of the school infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed. Many teachers have fled. The university system has collapsed amid sectarian violence, assassinations and the departure of academics (Harb, 2008; OCHA, 2010e). With the slow pace of recovery, prospects for at least two generations of primary school age children have been irreparably damaged.

Violence reinforces inequalities

Within countries, the impact of conflict varies geographically and between groups. While data constraints make it difficult to establish clear patterns, there is convincing evidence that conflict strongly reinforces the disadvantages associated with poverty and gender. The upshot is that armed conflict both holds back overall progress in education and reinforces national inequalities. Since education disparities can play a role in fuelling conflict, the result is a self-reinforcing cycle of violence and rising inequality.

The more localized effects of armed conflict can be captured by the Deprivation and Marginalization in Education (DME) data set (UNESCO et al., 2010), which makes it possible to compare levels of educational disadvantage in conflict-affected areas with those in other parts of a country. The DME measures the share of the population aged 7 to 16 with no education and the proportion of those aged 17 to 22 living in 'extreme education poverty' (with less than two years of schooling). The data set also makes it possible to look at associations between education indicators and wealth and gender disparities.

The results confirm that conflict-affected areas are often sites of extreme disadvantage in education (Figure 3.2). Within these areas, the poor typically fare far worse than others, and poor girls worst of all. In comparison with the national average, adolescents and young adults living in North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, are twice as likely to have less than two years in school – three times as likely for poor females. In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines, the incidence of extreme education poverty is twice as high for women aged 17 to 22 from poor households as for their average national counterparts.

In Myanmar, levels of extreme education poverty are seven times higher in the conflict-affected Eastern Shan state, where military operations have displaced 100,000 people from ethnic minority

groups (IDMC, 2010e). The poorest in the region face particularly acute deprivation. The proportion of young adults aged 17 to 22 with less than two years of education reaches nearly 90%. One stark example of the wealth and gender effects of conflict comes from northern Uganda. In this case, violent conflict appears to have had little impact on the educational opportunities of boys from the wealthiest one-fifth of households, while it nearly doubles the risk of extreme education poverty for girls from the poorest households.

What are the more immediate effects of armed conflict on schooling? Current school attendance patterns provide an insight into the impact of violent conflict on the younger generation. In Myanmar, half of those aged 7 to 16 in Eastern Shan report non-attendance at school, compared with less than 10% nationally. In the Philippines, the non-attendance rate in ARMM is more than four times the national average.

Intra-country comparisons of this type have to be treated with caution. It cannot automatically be assumed that conflict is the main source of the disparities identified by the DME. Inequality associated with wider social, economic and political factors operating in conflict zones also influences opportunities for education. Nevertheless, the strong associations evident in Figure 3.2 identify conflict as a potential source of inequality interacting with wealth and gender effects. For the poorest households, conflict often means a loss of assets and income, and with few resources to fall back on, there may be no choice but to take children out of school. In the case of gender, poverty effects interact with parental security fears over sexual violence to keep girls out of school.

A lesson from history – conflict can interrupt progress in education


Historical evidence confirms that episodes of armed conflict can disrupt or reverse education gains made over many years. Research carried out for this Report by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) provides a unique insight into the scale of the losses sustained by some countries. Using data on years of education, the research looks at the degree to which episodes of conflict interrupt pre-conflict trends.

The UIS study charts trends in education attainment for children aged 11 to 15. It compares pre-conflict trends with those of the conflict period.

Armed conflict both holds back overall progress in education and reinforces national inequalities

Figure 3.2: Violent conflicts increase inequalities in education

Share of 7- to 16-year-olds with no education and of 17- to 22-year-olds with less than two years of education in selected conflict-affected regions and other regions, latest available year



Notes: '% with no education' applies to the population aged 7 to 16. 'Extreme education poverty' is the share of the population aged 17 to 22 with less than two years of education. For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, data for the second poorest and second richest quintiles were used.

Source: UNESCO et al. (2010).

This makes it possible to establish whether a specific episode of violent conflict has been associated with an interruption of the trend, leading to fewer years in school than might otherwise have been the case.

Table 3.1: War leads to lost years in education

Years of schooling lost in association with trend interruption during selected conflict episodes, selected countries

	Average years of education at start of conflict	Growth rate for years in school ¹		Years of schooling lost
		Pre-conflict (%)	During conflict (%)	
Afghanistan (1978–2001)	1.8	5.9	0.4	5.5
Burundi ² (1994–2006)	2.9	6.6	-0.3	3.4
Cambodia (1967–1978)	3.3	4.0	-1.1	2.3
Iraq (1990–1996)	6.2	2.2	-1.0	1.4
Mozambique (1977–1992)	2.7	7.2	0.7	5.3
Rwanda (1990–1994)	4.9	4.7	0.1	1.2
Somalia (1986–1996)	2.9	4.5	-2.5	2.3

Notes: The dates in brackets refer to the conflict period under review.
 1. All growth rates are compound growth rates. The pre-conflict rate is calculated using the 10-year period preceding the conflict. The growth rate during the conflict is calculated over the entire conflict period identified. The number of years of schooling lost is calculated using forward projections of the compound growth rate before the conflict (best-case scenario).
 2. Burundi: data from 1994–2005.
Sources: Kreutz (2010); UIS (2010).


For some countries, the interruption translates into significant losses (final column, Table 3.1). For example, the two decades of conflict in Afghanistan up to 2001 resulted in a loss of 5.5 years of schooling as progress in education stalled. Mozambique’s civil war also cost the country over five years of schooling. Even relatively short episodes of violence can be associated with large setbacks, as the example of Rwanda shows. Once again, it should be emphasized that association does not imply direct causation. Conflict is seldom the only factor influencing trends. Even so, the strength of the relationship in these cases suggests that conflict is a significant contributing factor.

The impact of losses on the scale recorded in the UIS research should not be underestimated. Setbacks in education have lifelong consequences not just for the individuals concerned, but also for their countries. Fewer years in school translates into slower economic growth, diminished prospects for poverty reduction and more limited gains in public health.

The UIS data also underline the impact of conflict on inequality in education. When Guatemala’s civil war started in 1965, indigenous people averaged three years fewer in school than non-indigenous people (Figure 3.3). Between the beginning of the war and the start of peace talks in 1991, indigenous people in areas not affected by conflict gained 3.1 years in education, albeit from a very low base; at the end of the civil war they averaged around the same years in school as non-indigenous people in the mid-1960s. For indigenous people in conflict-affected areas, however, the civil war marked the start of a decade of stagnation followed by a decade of interrupted progress (1979–1988) and a far slower rate of catch-up. The education gap between indigenous people in conflict-affected areas and the rest of the indigenous population increased from 0.4 years to 1.7 years over the conflict period.

Figure 3.3: Indigenous people in conflict zones lost out in education during Guatemala’s war

Average number of years of schooling among 11- to 15-year-olds, by indigenous status and location, 1964–1991



Source: Kreutz (2010); UIS (2010).


The changing face of armed conflict

Measured in terms of the number of armed conflicts, the world is less violent than it was when governments met in Jomtien, Thailand, at the World Conference on Education for All in 1990 (Figure 3.4). At that time, there were fifty-four armed conflicts taking place, many of them a legacy of Cold War rivalries.⁴ By the time the Dakar Framework for

4. Countries included had at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a given year. More than one conflict can take place within an individual country (UCDP, 2010).

Figure 3.4: Most wars are fought within states, not across borders

Number of armed conflicts in the world since 1946, by type



Note: Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its territory. For details on definitions of conflict types, see Harbom (2010).
Source: Harbom and Wallensteen (2010).

Action was adopted in 2000, the Cold War was history. Although ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda made the 1990s a decade of brutal war crimes and other crimes against humanity, peace settlements brought many long-running conflicts to an end, and the world seemed poised to reap the benefits. In recent years, however, the downward trend in the number of conflicts and battle-related deaths has reversed.

In 2009, there were thirty-six armed conflicts involving contested claims over government or territory, or both. The vast majority were internal rather than interstate conflicts. Today's wars are overwhelmingly fought within borders. However, there has been a marked rise in the number of internal conflicts involving military intervention by other states, as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Official data may underestimate the scale of such conflict. In countries including the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, neighbouring states have provided financial, political and logistic support to non-state groups involved in armed conflicts, with violence spilling across national borders (Box 3.1).

Most violence is directed against civilians

The streets of Mogadishu are completely deserted, the few people who are left there are too scared to leave their houses. All you see in the streets are the bodies of people killed by bullets or mortars.

– Aisho Warsame, Somalia (UNHCR, 2010d)

Antonovs bombed schools and villages indiscriminately. When they saw buildings they bombed them, when they saw people gathering in areas like market places, they bombed them.

– James, 22, Southern Sudan
(Save the Children, 2007)

All armed conflicts pose threats to the lives and security of civilians. Those threats can be limited when combatants observe international norms on the protection of non-combatants. Unfortunately, the rise in intra-state conflict has been associated with flagrant disregard for such norms. Non-state groups as well as many government forces perpetrate egregious violations of human rights, indiscriminate acts of terror, targeting of civilians, forcible uprooting of communities and destruction of livelihoods. These patterns of violence are a source of widespread insecurity and poverty. And they have a devastating impact on children and education systems.

In 2009, there were thirty-six armed conflicts and the vast majority were internal rather than interstate

Box 3.1: Identifying conflict-affected states – an inexact science

Defining conflict is not an exact science. This Report draws on international reporting systems to construct a list of conflict-affected countries, though any classification involves grey areas, uncertainties and selection problems.

Table 3.2: Conflict-affected countries, 1999–2008

Low income 16 countries
Afghanistan*
Burundi*
C. A. R.*
Chad*
D. R. Congo*
Eritrea
Ethiopia*
Guinea
Liberia
Myanmar
Nepal*
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somalia*
Uganda*
Yemen*
Lower middle income 14 countries
Angola
Côte d'Ivoire
Georgia*
India*
Indonesia
Iraq*
Nigeria*
Pakistan*
O. Palestinian T.*
Philippines*
Sri Lanka*
Sudan*
Thailand*
Timor-Leste*
Upper middle income 5 countries
Algeria*
Colombia*
Russian Fed.*
Serbia
Turkey*
Total 35 countries

* Indicates a current or recent conflict (with at least one year reaching 200 battle-related deaths between 2006 and 2008).

Source: Strand and Dahl (2010).

The two primary institutes collecting and analysing data on conflict-affected countries are the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Their data sets use established criteria for identifying conflict-affected states. For reporting purposes, armed conflict has to entail 'contested incompatibility' over government and/or territory where the use of armed force is involved, and where one of the parties to the conflict is the state. This definition is an attempt to differentiate between organized, politically motivated violence and generalized violence linked to criminal activity. The selection criteria also include a threshold for battle-related deaths.**

The list prepared by PRIO researchers for this Report identifies thirty-five countries that were affected by armed conflict from 1999 to 2008. Thirty of these countries were low income and

lower middle income developing countries (Table 3.2). Some states experienced more than one episode of armed conflict: forty-eight episodes were reported for the reference period, forty-three of which were in low income or lower middle income countries. Twenty-five of the thirty-five countries experienced conflict during 2006–2008. The other ten are 'post-conflict' but have been at peace for less than ten years and can be considered at risk of a relapse into violence.

One striking feature to emerge from the profile of armed conflict is the duration of violence. On average, the twenty conflict episodes registered in low income countries from 1999 to 2008 lasted twelve years and those in lower middle income countries averaged twenty-two years (Table 3.3).

While it is useful to differentiate between conflict-affected countries and other countries in assessing progress towards international goals in education and other areas, the limitations of any list have to be recognized. Conflict-affected countries differ in the intensity, duration and geographic spread of the associated violence. For example, India, Iraq and the Sudan all appear on the PRIO list, but the patterns of violence in each are very different.

There are also difficulties associated with the distinction between forms of violence. Armed conflict involving state and non-state actors is different in principle from generalized violence associated with widespread criminal activity. In practice, though, the dividing lines are often blurred. For example, the reliance of armed non-state parties on the exploitation of economic resources has eroded boundaries between political and criminal violence. Control over valuable minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, piracy in Somalia and narcotics in Afghanistan and Colombia link armed groups in conflict with the state to criminal trafficking networks.

Some countries not on the list are also sites of intensive violence. To take one example, there were around 28,000 reported deaths in Mexico linked to narcotic-related violence from 2006 to 2010. That is more than all battle-related deaths reported from Afghanistan in 1999–2008. Yet Mexico does not figure as a conflict-affected state.

** The criteria used for compiling the list of conflict-affected countries presented in this Report are: any country with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths over 1999–2008, plus any country with more than 200 battle-related deaths in any one year between 2006 and 2008. Battle-related deaths include fatalities among civilians and military actors. See Strand and Dahl (2010) for further details on the compilation of the list.

Sources: BBC News (2010); Chauvet and Collier (2007); Collier (2007); Geneva Declaration (2008); Lacina and Gleditsch (2005); Stepanova (2010); Strand and Dahl (2010).

Table 3.3: Number and average length of conflict episodes, 1999–2008, by region and income group

	Number of conflict episodes	Average length
	1999–2008	(years)
By region		
Arab States	6	19
Central and Eastern Europe	3	14
Central Asia	1	17
East Asia and the Pacific	6	31
Latin America and the Caribbean	1	45
South and West Asia	11	24
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	9
By income group		
Low income	20	12
Lower middle income	23	22
Upper middle income	5	21
Total	48	17

Note: Calculations can include several conflicts on the same territory.

Source: Kreutz (2010).

Formal definitions of armed conflict focus on battle-related deaths and the participation of state forces. In all the conflict-affected countries included on the list shown in Table 3.2, engagement between government security forces and insurgent groups is an important aspect of the violence – but it is often just one aspect. While armed conflict in the first decade of the 21st century has taken many forms and produced varying casualty profiles, indiscriminate use of force and one-sided violence

against civilians were two recurrent themes (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Stepanova, 2009) (Box 3.2).

Failure to discriminate between civilians and combatants, and to protect the former, has been a feature of episodes of violence from Afghanistan to Gaza, Iraq, Sri Lanka and the Sudan, to name a few cases. The destruction of schools and killing of schoolchildren during Israel's military incursion into Gaza in 2008–2009 is one case of indiscriminate

Box 3.2: Civilians under attack

As the number of wars between countries has declined and intra-state conflict has increased, patterns of violence have changed. Conflicts have become immeasurably more dangerous for vulnerable non-combatants, and more detrimental to social cohesion, basic services and efforts to reduce poverty. The following cases provide a general picture of patterns of violence against civilians.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has gone through many phases, involving Congolese armed forces, a Tutsi rebel group (National Congress for the Defence of the People) said to have been backed for a time by Rwanda, a predominantly Hutu group (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and a bewildering array of local militia known as Mai Mai. The Lord's Resistance Army is also active in the east, where it has perpetrated several massacres and conducted campaigns of systematic rape. It is estimated that from 1998 to 2007, more than 5 million lives were lost as a result of conflict-related disease and malnutrition. In 2010, there were 1.3 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in North and South Kivu provinces. Military operations between January and September 2009 resulted in reports of more than 1,400 civilian deaths and 7,500 rapes. The United Nations has accused state and non-state parties of widespread, systematic violation of human rights.

Iraq. This conflict illustrates the role that indiscriminate and one-sided violence can play in promoting mass displacement, as well as the thin line between forms of violence. When central government authority collapsed, rival groups asserted political and territorial claims. Following the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006, radical Shia and Sunni militias, many of them with links to army and police units, embarked on a campaign of violence – principally assassination and indiscriminate bombing – to expel people from mixed areas. More than 1.5 million were uprooted and left as IDPs, while 2 million fled the country.

Myanmar. In one of the world's most protracted, most violent and least-known conflicts, the government has responded to interlinked ethnic insurgencies in the north and east with harsh counterinsurgency tactics. At least 470,000 people are displaced in eastern Myanmar. Renewed violence in 2009 led to mass displacements in Karen and Shan states. Insurgent forces are highly fragmented. The United Nations Secretary-General has cited three Karen militias for violating the rights of children in armed conflict. Conflicts between militias, and between militias and government forces over territory and timber resources, have led to attacks on villages, crops and basic service facilities.

The Sudan. Since the conflict in Darfur began in 2003, aerial bombardment of villages in rebel-held areas has claimed many civilian casualties, as have brutal attacks by the government-supported Janjaweed militia. Large-scale massacres, widespread rape, abduction, property destruction and scorched-earth campaigns have been extensively documented. In 2009, about 2.7 million of Darfur's 6 million people were displaced. Women are under threat of rape and other gender-based violence. Government soldiers and allied militias targeted civilians when fighting intensified despite a peace agreement between the government and a rebel group, Human Rights Watch has reported. The accord with the Justice and Equality Movement began unravelling not long after it was reached in February 2010. The clashes in rebel-held areas, including Jebel Mun and Jebel Mara, along with government aerial bombing and internal fighting among rebels, had killed, wounded and displaced civilians and destroyed civilian property. It said such fighting was largely undocumented because the United Nations and humanitarian agencies lacked access to the areas.

Sources: Democratic Republic of the Congo: Coghlan et al. (2008); Human Rights Watch (2009e, 2010b); IDMC (2010b); OCHA (2010h); Prunier (2008). Iraq: al-Khalidi and Tanner (2006). Myanmar: Amnesty International (2008); IDMC (2010e); United Nations (2010b). The Sudan: Cohen and Deng (2009); Human Rights Watch (2010e); IDMC (2010g).

Conflicts have become immeasurably more dangerous for civilians

In the D. R. Congo, for every fatality of a militia member, 3 civilians were killed and 23 women and girls were raped

violence. Other examples include the aerial bombardment of civilian areas in Darfur, the Sudan, and use of roadside bombs by insurgents in Afghanistan.

One-sided violence differs from indiscriminate violence in the intent of the perpetrators. It involves deliberate targeting of civilian populations. The practice is particularly widespread in countries such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, and it is central to the inter-group violence in Iraq. One stark illustration

of one-sided violence occurred in December 2008 and January 2009, when the Lord's Resistance Army responded to a military attack by massacring more than 865 civilians in a border area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2009a).


The dividing lines between indiscriminate use of force and one-sided violence are not well defined, but both are clear breaches of international human rights law.⁵ Their effect is to expose people and civilian infrastructure to what Graça Machel described fifteen years ago as 'unregulated terror and violence' (Machel, 1996).

Casualty figures confirm the erosion of the line separating combatants and civilians. Media attention on Afghanistan and Iraq has tended to focus primarily on fatalities among Western troops. Yet in both countries, civilians have borne the brunt (Figure 3.5). Belonging to an armed group in the conflict zones of the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has some risk attached. But being a civilian – especially a female civilian – is far more dangerous. Military operations by government forces and their allies against one of the main militias in January 2009 produced a grim casualty arithmetic that powerfully highlights the distribution of risks. For every reported fatality of a militia member, three civilians were killed, twenty-three women and girls were raped, and twenty homes were burned (Human Rights Watch, 2009b).

Every armed conflict has its own underlying dynamic and pattern of violence. But indiscriminate and one-sided violence produces three distinctive practices that can be observed in many current conflicts. The first is recourse by armed parties to regular, routine, low-level violence against civilians. While state actors are seldom the main perpetrators, they are often implicated either through connections to local militias or through a failure to protect civilians. The second theme is the devolution and fragmentation of violence as armed groups exploit local power vacuums created by the absence of government. Typically using poorly trained, ill-disciplined combatants reliant on light arms, such groups often combine an explicit political agenda with criminality. The third theme is the use of violence to inflict terror, disrupt social and economic life, destroy public infrastructure and displace civilian

Figure 3.5: Civilians dominate casualty figures in Afghanistan and Iraq

Fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq, by status



Note: Fatalities for Afghanistan are those directly due to the conflict. Iraq fatalities include all deaths due to violence.
Sources: iCasualties (2010); Iraq Body Count (2010); Rogers (2010).

5. The Geneva Conventions (under Article 51 of Additional Protocol 1) prohibit not only the intentional targeting of civilians, but also indiscriminate attacks on military targets that can be expected to cause excessive loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects (Geneva Conventions, 1977).

populations. In many cases, armed forces have made explicit their objective to forcibly expel populations identified as 'the enemy' on the basis of their beliefs, identity or language (Cohen and Deng, 2009; Kaldor, 2006). As this section will show, these patterns of violence have very direct consequences for education, with school infrastructure and education systems being systematically targeted.


Beyond the battlefield – counting the human costs

Statistics on immediate death and injury caused by violent conflict capture just the tip of the iceberg. With armed groups increasingly targeting the lives and livelihoods of civilians, many fatalities caused by conflict occur away from the battlefield. Diseases, not bullets, are the biggest killers. When conflicts are played out in communities where poverty, malnutrition and vulnerability are widespread, forcible displacement, destruction of assets and infrastructure, and disruption of markets have fatal consequences.

Capturing those consequences in data is intrinsically difficult, though measurement problems should not allow the extent of hidden death and injury to be overlooked. One approach to measuring mortality beyond the battlefield is to estimate the 'excess death' associated with armed conflict. This entails comparing levels of child mortality and recorded fatalities from poor nutrition and disease with what might be expected in the absence of conflict (Geneva Declaration, 2008).⁶ Even acknowledging wide margins of error, the evidence points clearly towards hunger and disease playing a far more lethal role than munitions (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Guha-Sapir, 2005). In several recent or current conflicts, these twin scourges have accounted for over 90% of conflict-related fatalities (Figure 3.6). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the excess death toll from 1998 to 2007 has been put at 5.4 million. Children under 5 account for almost half of the total, although they make up only one-fifth of the population (Coghlan et al., 2008).

These are figures that should have propelled the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the top of the international agenda. The loss of life is unparalleled by any conflict since the Second World War. Yet the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo receives scant attention in the foreign policies of developed-country governments, and even less from the international media. Patterns of mortality often vary with time. In Darfur, battle-related deaths accounted for a large share of fatalities

Figure 3.6: Most fatalities happen away from the battlefield
Indirect mortality as a share of total conflict-related deaths, selected conflicts



Notes: Indirect mortality is caused by the worsening of social, economic and health conditions in conflict-affected areas. For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, missing years have been interpolated.

Sources: Coghlan et al. (2008); Geneva Declaration (2008).

during periods of intensive activity by the Janjaweed in 2004, but diarrhoea was the biggest killer from 2004 to 2007 (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010; Depoortere et al., 2004).

Excess death calculations provide an insight into the lethal impact of armed conflict in societies marked by high levels of poverty. The effects of violence do not operate in isolation. Increasingly, armed conflict is one element of complex emergencies linked to drought, floods and food crises. In the Central African Republic and Chad, armed conflicts are being fought against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity. About half the under-5 population in conflict-affected regions suffers from stunting (Central African Republic Institute of Statistics, 2009; Chad National Institute of Statistics and ORC Macro, 2005). Similarly, the protracted conflict in Somalia is taking place amid a severe drought that has devastated rural livelihoods already weakened by conflict. In some cases, as in Southern Sudan, environmental stress linked to climate change may have exacerbated the underlying cause of conflict. But whatever the context, when conflict is superimposed on the lives of people living on the margins of existence, it is a prescription for disaster.

Excess mortality data highlight an issue that should be of central concern on the Education for All

Many fatalities caused by conflict occur away from the battlefield: diseases, not bullets, are the biggest killers

6. For a discussion of the methodology involved, see Geneva Declaration (2008); Human Security Report (2009).

agenda but has been conspicuously absent. While the level of death among children in many countries is shocking in its own right, it is only part of the problem. For every fatality, many more children are left with debilitating illnesses and impairments that compromise their prospects for access to education and learning. That is another reason why conflict resolution and prevention should be seen as central to any international strategy for achieving the Education for All goals.

On the front line – children, teachers and schools

Armed conflict has placed children directly in harm's way. It is estimated that over 2 million children were killed in conflicts and 6 million disabled in the decade to 2008. Around 300,000 children are being exploited as soldiers, placed on the front line by warring parties. And 20 million children have had to flee their homes as refugees or IDPs (UNICEF, 2010a).

As these facts suggest, children have not been spared from the patterns of violence outlined in the previous section. They have often been either deliberately targeted or insufficiently protected – or both. The resulting human rights violations have very direct consequences for education. Children subject to the trauma, insecurity and displacement that come with armed conflict are unlikely to achieve their potential for learning. Moreover, education systems are increasingly under direct attack. All too often, armed groups see the destruction of schools and the targeting of schoolchildren and teachers as a legitimate military strategy. The problem is not just that schools – and schoolchildren – are getting caught in the crossfire, but that the very places that should provide a safe haven for learning are viewed as prime targets (O'Malley, 2010a).

The United Nations Secretary-General reports annually to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on six 'grave violations' of the rights of children: killing or maiming, recruitment into armed forces, attacks on schools and hospitals, rape and other sexual violence, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access (Kolieb, 2009). The reports provide only a partial and fragmented account of the scale of violations (see Chapter 4). Even so, they offer an insight into the shocking levels of violence directed against children.

Recent reports confirm the scale and persistence of human rights abuse suffered by children in conflict areas. In 2010, the Secretary-General reported on twenty-two countries investigated for recruitment of child soldiers, killing or maiming of children, and rape and other forms of sexual violence. He cited fifty-one parties for grave violations in one or more of these areas. While most were non-state parties, some state forces were identified – including the national armies of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan – along with pro-government militias (United Nations, 2010b). If the criteria for being cited included state failure to protect children, many more governments would have been listed. The overall result is widespread and growing disregard for the human rights of children and the sanctity of schools, with direct implications for international efforts to achieve the Education for All goals. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict has put it: 'The consequence is a growing fear among children to attend school, among teachers to give classes, and among parents to send their children to school' (United Nations, 2010h, p. 6). Even a brief overview of the violations documented provides an insight into the experiences that generate such fear.

Attacks on children and teachers

We were on the way to school when two men on motorbikes stopped next to us. One of them threw acid on my sister's face. I tried to help her, and then they threw acid on me, too.

– Latefa, 16, Afghanistan (CNN, 2008)

Children figure prominently among casualties of indiscriminate and one-sided violence. In 2009, more than 1,000 children were injured or killed in conflict-related violence in Afghanistan, most by improvised explosive devices intended for government or Western forces, by rocket attacks or by air strikes. In Iraq, bomb attacks by insurgents in public areas such as markets and outside mosques injured or killed 223 children from April to December 2009 (United Nations, 2010b). Israel's Operation Cast Lead in late 2008 and early 2009 left 350 children dead and 1,815 injured in Gaza (United Nations, 2010b). In the Sudan, aerial bombardment by government forces, attacks by pro-government militias, intercommunal violence and factional fighting between armed groups have killed thousands of children (United Nations, 2009a). An upsurge in intercommunal violence in Jonglei state, Southern Sudan, in 2009 claimed at least 2,500 victims, mostly women and children (United

Over 2 million children were killed in conflicts and 6 million disabled in the decade to 2008

Nations, 2010b). High levels of child fatality and injury have also been reported from armed conflicts in Somalia and Sri Lanka (United Nations, 2010b).

Such casualty figures highlight the level of risk children face in many conflicts, but they do not adequately capture the impact of the associated violence, psychological trauma and loss of parents, siblings and friends (UNESCO, 2010a). One survey of Iraqi refugee children in Jordan found that 39% reported having lost someone close to them, and 43% witnessing violence (Clements, 2007). Evidence from a range of conflict-affected environments, including Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gaza, and Sierra Leone, points to conflict-related post-traumatic stress disorder as a frequent source of impaired learning and poor achievement in school (Betancourt et al., 2008b; Elbert et al., 2009; Tamashiro, 2010).

In several long-running conflicts, armed groups have used attacks on schoolchildren and teachers to 'punish' participation in state institutions. Groups opposed to gender equity in education have targeted girls in particular. Among recent examples:

- In Afghanistan, some insurgent groups have actively sought to undermine access to education. In the first half of 2010, seventy-four children were killed as a result of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices, sometimes deliberately placed on routes used by female students to walk to school (UNAMA, 2010). Other incidents included bomb attacks on a secondary school in Khost province and the poisoning of water supplies at girls' schools in Kunduz province (O'Malley, 2010b).
- Insurgent groups in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have targeted girls' primary and secondary schools. In one attack, ninety-five girls were injured as they left school (O'Malley, 2010b).
- In Thailand's three southernmost provinces, many teachers and children have been killed and schools burned over the past five years. In 2008 and 2009, sixty-three students and twenty-four teachers and education personnel were killed or injured (United Nations, 2010b).

Attacks on school infrastructure

Parents were scared to send their children to school – my parents sometimes forbid me from going to school, saying it might be bombed.

– James, 22, Southern Sudan
(Save the Children, 2007)

Deliberate destruction of education facilities is a long-standing practice in armed conflicts. Most of Sierra Leone's education infrastructure was destroyed in its civil war and, three years after the end of the war, 60% of primary schools still required rehabilitation (World Bank, 2007).

Motives for attacking education infrastructure vary. Schools may be seen as embodying state authority and therefore as a legitimate target, especially when insurgent groups oppose the type of education promoted by governments. This has been a motivation for attacks on schools in Afghanistan. That motivation may have been strengthened in areas where school construction programmes have been overtly used as part of a wider 'hearts and minds' campaign (see last section of this Chapter). In other contexts, the use of schools by armed forces can lead to their being targeted by anti-state groups and abandoned by communities, as recently documented in India, Somalia and Yemen. More generally, destruction of schools is sometimes an element in a wider strategy aimed at destabilizing areas and disrupting communities. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, schools and other basic service facilities are routinely destroyed during attacks on villages. In addition, schools often suffer collateral damage when armed forces fail to provide adequate protection. Estimates of the number of schools damaged and destroyed in conflict vary widely, but it is clear that schools are often targets. Among the recent examples of damage to schools:

- Education infrastructure in Gaza was severely damaged during Israeli military attacks in 2008 and 2009. Some 280 schools were reported damaged, of which 18 were destroyed. Restrictions on movements of building materials as a result of a military blockade have hampered reconstruction (O'Malley, 2010b). The lack of materials for reconstruction and rehabilitation, along with shortages of supplies, has forced thousands of students to learn in overcrowded and unsafe environments (United Nations, 2010b). This is a stark example of an education system subject to indiscriminate use of force and inadequate protection.

In Gaza, in 2008 and 2009, some 280 schools were reported damaged, of which eighteen were destroyed

Sexual violence leaves psychological trauma that inevitably impairs the potential for learning

- Insurgent groups have routinely targeted schools in Afghanistan, and the intensity of attacks is increasing. Most of the attacks are planned and deliberate rather than a consequence of indiscriminate violence. In 2009, at least 613 incidents were recorded, up from 347 in 2008. Reports indicate that damage to schools and security fears have resulted in the closure of more than 70% of schools in Helmand and more than 80% in Zabul – provinces with some of the world’s lowest levels of attendance. Attacks have also spread into northern provinces previously considered safe (United Nations, 2010b). In early 2010, 450 schools remained closed as a result of insurgency and security fears. The use of schools as polling stations for the August 2009 elections led to a surge in attacks: 249 incidents were reported that month, up from 48 in July 2009 (United Nations, 2010e). One study on behalf of the World Bank and the Afghanistan Ministry of Education found that girls’ schools were targeted more often than boys’ schools, and that schools identified with the government were also attacked frequently (Glad, 2009).
- In 2009, some sixty schools were closed in Mogadishu, Somalia, while at least ten were occupied by armed forces. Many schools have been damaged or destroyed during exchanges of fire between forces of the Transitional Federal Government and anti-government groups (United Nations, 2010b). Since mid-2007, 144 schools in five districts of Mogadishu have been closed either temporarily or permanently as a result of armed conflict (United Nations, 2009a). The Transitional Federal Government and the Al-Shabaab militia have been cited by the Secretary-General for violence directed at schools.
- Attacks on education infrastructure have been a feature of armed conflict in Pakistan. Some of the most intensive have taken place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the neighbouring Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Reports from Swat district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa indicate that 172 schools were destroyed or damaged by insurgents between 2007 and 2009 (O’Malley, 2010a).
- In India, Naxalite insurgent groups have systematically attacked schools to damage government infrastructure and instil fear in communities in Chhattisgarh state (Human Rights Watch, 2009c). In some cases, security forces have also been implicated in using school

buildings. The National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights has identified the use of schools by security forces as contributing to their abandonment, and a high court ruling has called for the withdrawal of armed forces from schools (United Nations, 2010b).

- In Yemen, all 725 schools in the northern governorate of Saada were closed during five months of fighting in 2009 and 2010 between government forces and Houthi rebels, and 220 schools were destroyed, damaged or looted (O’Malley, 2010b).

Rape and other sexual violence

I was just coming back from the river to fetch water. ... Two soldiers came up to me and told me that if I refuse to sleep with them, they will kill me. They beat me and ripped my clothes. One of the soldiers raped me. ... My parents spoke to a commander and he said that his soldiers do not rape, and that I am lying. I recognized the two soldiers, and I know that one of them is called Edouard.

– Minova, 15, South Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Human Rights Watch, 2009d)

Sexual violence has accompanied armed conflicts throughout history. Mass rape was a feature of Bangladesh’s war of independence, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the genocide in Rwanda, where it is estimated that 250,000 to 500,000 women were subjected to sexual attacks (IRIN, 2010b; Kivlahan and Ewigman, 2010). The international courts set up in the wake of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda have firmly established rape and other sexual violence as war crimes, yet these acts remain widely deployed weapons of war. They are used to inflict terror, destroy family and community ties, humiliate ethnic, religious or racial groups defined as ‘the enemy’ and to undermine the rule of law (Goetz and Jenkins, 2010). While the majority of victims are girls and women, boys and men are also at risk in many countries.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the devastating effects on education. For those directly affected, sexual violence leaves psychological trauma that inevitably impairs the potential for learning. Fear of such violence, exacerbated when perpetrators go unpunished, constrains women’s mobility and often results in girls staying home rather than attending school. The family breakdown that often accompanies sexual violence undermines

prospects of children being brought up in a nurturing environment. Of all the grave human rights violations monitored by the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, rape and sexual violence is the most under-reported. Cultural taboos, limited access to legal processes, unresponsive institutions and a culture of impunity are at the heart of the under-reporting problem. However, the United Nations reporting system also contributes [see Chapter 4]. The following accounts provide an insight into the scale of the problem:

- The Kivu provinces of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have been described as ‘the rape capital of the world’ (Kristof and WuDunn, 2009). Reported cases of rape in North and South Kivu stood at 9,000 in 2009, and reporting captures only a fraction of the crimes (UN News Centre, 2010). One survey found that 40% of women had reported an experience of sexual violence, and it also documented a high level of sexual violence against men and boys (Johnson et al., 2010). Children have figured prominently among the victims: the Secretary-General documented 2,360 reported cases in Oriental Province and the Kivus in 2009 (United Nations, 2010*b*). Alarming, national army and police units have been heavily implicated, along with a wide range of militias. Despite a strong national law on sexual violence, only twenty-seven soldiers were convicted of offences in North and South Kivu in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2009*d*). Recent military operations against militias have been accompanied by a sharp increase in rape levels. In September 2010, around 287 women and girls were raped in four days in what the United Nations described as a carefully planned attack (MONUSCO and OHCHR, 2010).
- In eastern Chad, women and girls face the threat of rape and other forms of sexual violence by local militias, Janjaweed groups from the Sudan and members of the national army. Most reported cases concern attacks on and rapes of girls carrying out household activities outside camps for IDPs (United Nations, 2008*a*). Access to essential services such as health care are often lacking for victims of such violence (Perez, 2010).
- In Afghanistan, widespread sexual violence against girls and boys has been reported. The poor rule of law in many areas has hindered

reporting to authorities. Perpetrators are often linked to local power brokers, including government and elected officials, military commanders and members of armed groups (UNAMA and OHCHR, 2009).

- Sexual violence remains a major concern in Darfur. In 2004, Amnesty International documented systematic rape by Janjaweed militia and Sudanese armed forces (Amnesty International, 2004). Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court indicate that senior political figures may be implicated. The warrants issued for President Omar al-Bashir, a former state minister and a Janjaweed militia leader cite evidence of government collusion in perpetuating or facilitating crimes against humanity, including the subjection of thousands of women to rape (International Criminal Court, 2010*a*).

Recruitment into armed forces and abduction

The forced recruitment of children into armed forces, often through abduction, is widespread. It remains an immense barrier to education, not just because child soldiers are not in school, but also because the threat of abduction, the trauma involved, and problems of reintegration have far wider effects.

While data on numbers of child soldiers are inevitably limited, the problem is widespread and widely under-reported. One survey covering 2004–2007 identified armed groups that recruited children in twenty-four countries, in every region of the world (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Moreover, the number of governments deploying children in combat and other front line duties did not significantly decrease during this period. More recent reports from the United Nations have documented the continued use of child soldiers by government forces, or government-supported militias, in the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Somalia and the Sudan. In all, the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council, covering fifteen countries, identifies fifty-seven groups recruiting children as soldiers (United Nations, 2010*b*).

Children have often been abducted from classrooms, creating security fears for children, teachers and parents. In 2007, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that hundreds of children were serving on

Children have often been abducted from classrooms, creating security fears for children, teachers and parents

**Around
98.5 million
undernourished
children live in
conflict-affected
countries**

the front line in North Kivu province. Many were forcibly recruited from classrooms, leading to the schools' closure in some cases (IDMC, 2009*b*). While child soldiers are invariably depicted as boys, girls are often involved as well. Since the armed conflicts in Angola and Mozambique in the 1990s, 'girl soldiers have been present in virtually every non-international conflict' (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p. 28). In some conflicts, abduction of girls for sexual exploitation and forced marriage has also been common (Geneva Declaration, 2008; WCRWC, 2006).

Evidence from Colombia has drawn attention to the association between displacement and abduction. Armed groups such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and others routinely recruit children as soldiers and workers in the illegal narcotics trade, and schools are often the sites of this forced recruitment. One study found that the average age of recruitment was just under 13. Fear of forced recruitment has been identified as a major cause of displacement in at least five departments (United Nations, 2009*d*). Recruitment of children from refugee camps has also been reported in several African and Asian countries, including in Chad by Chadian and Sudanese armed groups, and in Thailand by Karen rebels against Myanmar's government (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008).

Reinforcing poverty and diverting finance

As well as destroying lives, war weakens livelihoods, exacerbates health risks, undermines economic growth and diverts scarce public resources into armaments. Efforts to accelerate progress towards the Education for All goals suffer twice over, as violent conflict increases poverty – with attendant consequences for child labour and household spending on education – and robs school systems of desperately needed investment.

Armed conflict directly and indirectly undermines the health and psychological well-being of children entering school systems. One study using World Health Organization data found that civil war significantly increased the incidence of death and disability from many infectious diseases, including AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases (Ghobarah et al., 2003). The higher levels of malnutrition in conflict zones help explain the elevated risk, especially for children. UNICEF estimates that 98.5 million undernourished

children under 5 – two-thirds of the global total – live in conflict-affected countries (UNICEF, 2009*b*). Conflict also has a contagion effect. People displaced by war often face elevated risks of infection as a result of poor nutrition or exposure to unsafe water and poor sanitation. They also have limited access to health services. As displaced populations move, the infectious diseases they pick up are often transferred to host populations. This explains the higher levels of diseases such as malaria observed in some countries that receive refugees (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007).

Disease eradication efforts are frequently compromised by conflict. In Southern Sudan, civil war has undermined efforts to control many debilitating tropical diseases – including Guinea worm, trachoma, schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminths – that impair child health and learning potential (Tamashiro, 2010).

Poor households bear the brunt

There are many indirect channels through which violent conflict damages education systems. Apart from increasing poverty, prolonged armed conflicts can harm economic growth, undermine government revenue and divert spending on education (Gupta et al., 2002). One study estimates that a civil war tends to reduce economic growth by 2.3% a year, which itself has implications for poverty and public spending (Collier, 2007). Beyond these broad economic effects, conflicts also have a direct impact on the circumstances of individual households. The upshot is that armed conflict damages education from above (through the national budget) and below (through household budgets).

For marginalized and vulnerable households, armed conflict can block the path to more secure and prosperous livelihoods. Homes are destroyed, crops and livestock stolen, and access to markets disrupted. The overall effect is to wipe out assets and undermine incentives for poor households to invest in raising productivity, reinforcing a vicious circle of low productivity and poverty. One symptom of that circle is an increase in child labour. In Angola, household survey research found higher levels of child labour and lower levels of school attendance in conflict-affected provinces. In Senegal, children displaced by conflict were much more likely to be working and to drop out of school (Offenloch, 2010).

Diversion of resources is one of the most destructive pathways of influence from armed

conflict to disadvantage in education. Loss of revenue means not just that governments spend less on education than might otherwise be the case, but that households have to spend more. In effect, armed conflict shifts responsibility for education financing from governments to households. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, households pay fees not only for schools but also for the administration and management of the whole system. On one estimate, 5 million to 7 million children are out of school partly as a result of an inability to afford schooling (European Commission, 2009b). Standard fees of US\$4 to US\$5 per term in conflict-affected areas have been identified as a major barrier to increased enrolment and a source of school dropout (Davies and Ngendakuriyo, 2008; Karafuli et al., 2008).

From ploughshares to swords – conflict diverts resources from education

Direct attacks on children and schools, deteriorating public health and household poverty all have immediate consequences for education. Less visible, but no less insidious in its effect, is the diversion of financial resources away from public investment in education and into armed conflict. Military spending linked to conflict and insecurity is a massive drain on the resources of many countries. Instead of financing productive investment in education, some of the world's poorest countries waste a large share of their limited budgets on the purchase of unproductive weapon systems – a point made by Oscar Arias Sánchez (see Special contribution). In rich countries, too, the international aid effort is often swamped by military spending, calling their priorities into question.

Many of the poorest countries spend significantly more on arms than on basic education. Drawing on data for thirty-nine countries, this Report identifies twenty-one states in which military spending outstrips spending on primary education – in some cases by a large margin (Figure 3.7). The military budget is double the primary education budget in Ethiopia, four times higher in Chad and seven times in Pakistan. While every country has to determine its own budget priorities, governments also have to consider the trade-offs between military spending and spending on basic education. One case in point is Chad, which has some of the world's worst education indicators but one of the highest ratios of military spending to education spending (Box 3.3). In some cases, even modest reductions in spending on military hardware could finance significant increases in education spending. If the twelve

Special contribution:

Swords into ploughshares – bombs into books

When I was President of Costa Rica I was often asked whether the absence of a military budget might undermine our people's security. It struck me then as a curious question – and it still does. The insecurity, destruction, and vast waste of human potential that come with high levels of spending on armaments make their own case for converting swords into ploughshares. Nowhere is that case more evident than in education.

Consider first the basic financial arithmetic for universal primary education. Getting all of the world's children into school would require another US\$16 billion in aid annually. That figure represents but a fraction of the military spending by the OECD countries.

I am convinced that the increased hope, economic growth and shared prosperity that would come with universal education would act as a much more powerful force for peace and stability than the weapons that would be purchased with those funds.

Of course, it's not only rich countries that have to reassess their priorities. Many of the world's poorest countries are spending as much – or more – on armaments as they spend on basic education. I struggle to name a less productive use of public finance. An investment today in the education of a child is a source of economic growth, improved public health, and greater social mobility in the future. By contrast, an investment in imported military hardware is a source of regional friction and lost opportunity.

Every government has to make an assessment of national security challenges. But political leaders also need to remember that poverty is a formidable source of national insecurity – and that war, military budgets and the arms trade are causes of poverty. That is why my Foundation for Peace and Progress will continue to argue for more stringent controls over the export of weapons. And it's why I endorse UNESCO's call for governments around the world to invest less in bombs and bullets, and more in books, teachers, and schools.


Ethics and economics dictate that we act now. The billions of dollars that each year are spent on arms and other military expenditure are depriving the poorest people of the world of the possibility of satisfying their basic needs and their fundamental human rights. The real question is not whether we can afford universal primary education. It's whether we can afford to continue with misplaced priorities and to delay converting bombs into books.

Oscar Arias Sánchez
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 1987

countries in sub-Saharan Africa spending more on the military than on primary schooling were to cut military spending by just 10%, they could put 2.7 million more children in school – over one-quarter of their out-of-school population. If all twenty-one countries spending more on arms than basic education were to follow that example, they could put an additional 9.5 million children in school. That would represent around 40% of their combined out-of-school population.

Figure 3.7: Spending on arms often outstrips spending on schools

Ratio of military to primary education expenditure in poor countries, circa 2007



* Data from UIS database.
Sources: EPDC and UNESCO (2009); SIPRI (2010b).

Box 3.3: In Chad, education is losing out in the arms race

The real cost of military spending has to be measured partly in lost opportunities for spending in other areas, including education. The case of Chad illustrates the trade-off between military spending and investment in education.

Chad has some of the world's worst education and wider human development indicators. More than 20% of children die before age 5 as a result of infectious diseases linked to poverty, malnutrition and limited access to basic health services. Around one-third of the primary school age population is out of school. Gender disparities are very wide. Education quality is poor.

Despite substantial oil revenue, expenditure on key services is limited. In 2007, the country spent four times as much on defence as on primary education (see Figure 3.7).

Can Chad afford to spend so much more on its armed forces than on its primary schoolchildren? Not if it wishes to accelerate progress towards the Education for All goals. Estimates by the EFA Global Monitoring Report team suggest that Chad faces an annual

of national security concerns. Yet increased investment in education, with attendant benefits for employment and social inclusion, would do a great deal to enhance Pakistan's long-term national security (see last section of this chapter).

It is not only government budgets that get diverted by military spending. Many conflict-affected countries are rich in natural wealth but poor in education provision. The two conditions are not unrelated. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, high-value minerals such as coltan and cassiterite (tin ore), used in mobile phones, provide the armed militias responsible for human rights violations with a lucrative source of revenue (Global Witness, 2009; Wallström, 2010). This money, provided by developed-country consumers, could finance the recovery of the education system. Like the 'blood diamonds' used to pay for the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the export of mineral wealth from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of timber from Myanmar to finance armed conflict is a waste of national wealth. More than that, some economists maintain that mineral wealth is part of a 'resource trap' that keeps countries locked in cycles of violence (Collier, 2007). While that

Just one-fifth of Pakistan's military budget would be sufficient to finance universal primary education

For some countries, the policy choices are particularly stark. Consider the case of Pakistan. With one of the world's largest out-of-school populations (7.3 million in 2008), some of its highest levels of gender inequality and a public education system widely viewed as being in a state of crisis, the country is far off track to meet the Education for All goals. Yet it spends a small share of national income on education, and military spending dwarfs spending on basic education. The discrepancy is so large that just one-fifth of Pakistan's military budget would be sufficient to finance universal primary education. Of course, Pakistan's military budget reflects political decisions taken in the light

financing gap of US\$148 million to 2015 for universal primary education. Redirecting around one-third of the military budget to primary education would enable the country to close the gap and create school places for all of its out-of-school children, whose numbers are estimated at over half a million.

Changing the balance between military and education spending requires policy action in several areas. First and foremost, Chad's political leaders need to urgently review national spending priorities. There is also a need for dialogue with the Sudan to end what has become a regional arms race between the two countries. While primary responsibility for arms imports rests with Chad, its arms suppliers may also need to reconsider their policies. It is estimated that arms imports by Chad increased sixfold from 2001 to 2008. Expenditure on these imports – supplied by countries such as Belgium, France, Switzerland and Ukraine – diverts resources from education priorities that arms suppliers claim to be promoting, supported through international aid.

Sources: Holtom et al. (2010); SIPRI (2010a); UNICEF (2009c); United Nations (2008b, 2009a); Wezeman (2009).

Like governments in developing countries, donor governments have to consider trade-offs between international aid and military spending. One useful reference point for assessing that trade-off is the Education for All financing gap. The 2010 *EFA Global Monitoring Report* estimated the annual external financing gap for achieving some of the key Dakar goals for basic education at US\$16 billion. Stated in absolute terms, that appears a large figure. However, it would take just six days' worth of military spending by donor governments belonging to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to close the global financing gap in education (Figure 3.8).

International military spending dwarfs the development assistance effort for education. The 4% increase in military spending registered from 2007 to 2008 amounted to an additional US\$62 billion. To put that figure into context, it is around thirty times the total spent on aid for basic education in low income countries in 2008. Rich countries currently spend more than nine times as much on military expenditure as they do on international aid. Put differently, less than one month's worth of DAC members' 2008 military budgets would cover the total Education for All aid financing gap for the five years to 2015.


Less than one month's worth of OECD-DAC members' 2008 military spending would cover the total Education for All aid financing gap

interpretation is open to question, there is no doubt that peace and good governance can rapidly convert resource revenues into lasting human development investment. In Botswana, wealth generated by the export of diamonds was invested in expansion of the education system, recruitment of teachers and the removal of user fees. The country went from a 50% enrolment rate in the mid-1960s to universal primary education by the late 1970s, creating in the process a skills base for future growth (Duncan et al., 2000).

Balancing military spending and other priorities is not just a challenge for developing countries. The wider international community needs to consider the balance between investment in education and spending on military hardware. Total global military expenditure has increased by 49% in real terms since 2000, reaching US\$1.5 trillion in 2009 (Perlo-Freedman et al., 2010). Hopes that the end of the Cold War would deliver a 'peace dividend' in the form of smaller military budgets have receded in the face of responses to real and perceived security threats, the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and increased arms spending by many developing countries (Stepanova, 2010).

Figure 3.8: A fraction of global military spending could close the annual EFA financing gap

Total military expenditure and official development assistance disbursements by DAC countries, US dollars, 2008



Sources: OECD-DAC (2010c); SIPRI (2010b).

Military Block

Military Spending vs the Education for All financing gap




\$16 bn
Education
for All finance
gap

6

Number of days of military spending needed to close the Education for All finance gap

War Games

Twenty-one developing countries spend more on the military than on primary education...



Converting swords into ploughshares has the potential to extend educational opportunities for millions of children

Developed-country governments face very real national and international security concerns. By the same token, they have to weigh the consequences of budget choices. The six days' worth of military spending that would be required to put all children in school and achieve wider education goals would clearly have benefits for social stability, security and economic growth in many conflict-affected states and other countries. These benefits would in turn help mitigate the threats and security risks that drive up military spending. Here, too, it could be argued that investment in education might be expected to yield a higher return for peace and security than the equivalent military spending.

Of course, military budgets cannot be evaluated in isolation. Governments have to make decisions in the light of national security assessments and fiscal circumstances. However, there is a good case for viewing aid to education as a more effective investment in long-term peace and security than investment in military hardware. This is especially true of aid invested in countries undergoing conflict or embarking on post-conflict reconstruction, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. In other words, converting swords into ploughshares has the potential not just to extend educational opportunities for millions of children, but to underpin models of development that are less prone to violent conflict and more conducive to shared prosperity and international security.

Mass displacement – a barrier to education

Mass displacement is one consequence of attacks against civilians – and in many cases it is a central objective of the perpetrators. Displacement has far-reaching implications for individuals, for society and for education. That is true both for refugees, who flee across borders, and for IDPs, who remain in their own country. Displacement deprives those most immediately affected of shelter, food, basic services and productive resources, and can lead to marginalization, abject poverty and a loss of independence. The wider consequences of displacement can be equally damaging. Countries or areas to which the displaced flee may face growing demands on already overstretched social and economic infrastructure. Meanwhile, the areas from which the displaced have fled are likely to suffer through depopulation and underinvestment.

Separated from their communities, their income and their property, and having witnessed or

experienced traumatic events, people displaced by conflict face hazardous and uncertain futures. Education is a critical part of the rebuilding process. Children and youth often make up a majority of those displaced. Recent estimates suggest about 45% of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers, or around 19.5 million people, are under 18 (UNHCR, 2010a). In Chad, two-thirds of internally displaced people and 61% of Sudanese refugees are under 18 (UNHCR, 2010b). Access to school can offer displaced children and youth a sense of normality and a safe space. All too often, however, displacement is a prelude to severe educational disadvantage.

Refugees and internally displaced people

Global patterns of displacement have changed over time, though there are strong elements of continuity. Reported refugee numbers have been declining, albeit on a fluctuating trend that reflects the ebb and flow of armed conflict. As has long been the case, the vast majority of refugees live in developing countries. The share of displaced people made up by IDPs has risen. In 2010, there were almost twice as many IDPs as refugees (Figure 3.9).

Headline figures on displacement have to be treated with caution. The most widely used global figure is the population reported as being of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). At the end of 2009, UNHCR data showed 43.3 million people displaced globally – more than double the level in 2000 (UNHCR, 2010a). The statistics almost certainly under-represent the problem. Reporting systems on internal displacement are extremely restricted. And there are no reliable data on the share of people fleeing countries as a result of armed conflict who are not able to register as refugees. Stringent eligibility requirements, inconsistent application of rules, and restrictive laws result in many refugees being undocumented, in some cases because they are forced underground.

Despite all these caveats, it is clear that refugees account for a declining share of reported displacement. There were around 15 million in 2009, with the largest concentrations in the Arab States. Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic host long-standing Palestinian refugee populations and 1.6 million Iraqi refugees. In sub-Saharan Africa, refugee movements are dominated by people who have fled armed conflict in Somalia (with Kenya and Yemen the main host countries) and the Sudan (seeking refuge in Chad). The war in Afghanistan


has generated the largest surge in refugees of the 21st century, with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan absorbing most of the displaced. People fleeing to Bangladesh and Thailand from violent conflict and human rights abuse in Myanmar constitute another long-standing refugee population.

Two aspects of continuity in the profile of refugee situations have particularly important implications for education planning. The first is duration. Many refugees are displaced for very long periods. At the end of 2009, more than half had been refugees for over five years (UNHCR, 2010a, 2010f).⁷ This implies that, for a large proportion of refugees, planning for education has to go beyond short-term emergency provision and operate over a time horizon of several years. The second element of continuity concerns location. While public debates in rich countries often reflect concern over refugee surges, such countries host just 15% of refugees. Three-quarters of the total flee to neighbouring developing countries (Gomez and Christensen, 2010). Many of these host countries have weak education systems and limited capacity to support new populations. Moreover, refugees are often concentrated in the most educationally deprived regions of host countries. Afghans in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Iraqis in poor areas of Jordan, and the Sudanese living in eastern Chad are examples. The implication is that host governments and refugee agencies have to provide education in areas where the national population itself is poorly served.

IDP populations have been growing over time. At the end of 2009, an estimated 27 million IDPs were living in fifty-three countries. About 11.6 million IDPs were in Africa, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and the Sudan accounting for 72% of the total (IDMC, 2010d). After the Sudan, which has 5.3 million displaced people, the world’s largest displaced population is in Colombia, with more than 3 million people (out of a population of 42 million) (IDMC, 2010c). In both countries, the IDP population greatly exceeds the number of refugees. In Colombia, only around one in ten of the displaced have left the country as refugees (IDMC, 2010d; UNHCR, 2010a). While IDP situations are often characterized by considerable fluidity and flux, many of those affected face long-term displacement. In several countries, including Colombia, Georgia, Sri Lanka and Uganda, displacement often lasts for many years (Ferris and Winthrop, 2010).

Figure 3.9: There are millions more internally displaced people than refugees in the world today

Numbers of refugees and IDPs by country of origin, 2009



Notes: In addition to refugees and IDPs, there are 0.9 million asylum seekers, making a total of 43.3 million displaced people. The number of IDPs in Colombia is estimated to be between 3.3 million and 4.9 million. The figure shows the mid-point of these estimates. *Sources:* IDMC (2010c); UNHCR (2010a); UNRWA (2010).

Distinctions between refugees and IDPs are rooted in international law. Refugees are covered by a legal framework for protection and assistance under the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The framework includes internationally accepted norms, rights and entitlements, and an international agency – UNHCR – mandated to enforce them and protect refugee

⁷ Including the 4.8 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency would increase the share to 68%.

Almost half of refugee camps report primary school participation rates below 70%

interests. The right to basic education is part of this framework and mandate. By contrast, there is no legally binding instrument upholding the rights of IDPs. Instead, there is a set of broad principles that reflect established human rights provisions (Ferris and Winthrop, 2010). Responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs lies with national authorities, which is problematic in countries where governments are implicated in displacement and wider human rights violations.

Distinctions between refugees and IDPs can be overdrawn. Many of the people displaced by conflict in Darfur are both: they migrate between eastern Chad and the Sudan depending on the level of security threat. In Afghanistan, squatter areas around Kabul include people who have returned from refugee camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan but have become IDPs, not yet able to go back to their home area. With returning refugees placing more pressure on already overstretched infrastructure, access to basic services such as health, water and education is often limited. One survey of returnees found that over one-third of parents reported being unable to send girls to school, often citing the absence of a safely accessible school building as the main reason (Koser and Schmeidl, 2009).

Refugee education – limited and uneven provision

Under international law, refugees enjoy a wide range of rights to protection and service provision. There is often a large difference, however, between formal rights and actual provision (Betts, 2010). This is particularly apparent in education. While data remain limited for many refugee situations, recent work by UNHCR has started to fill some of the information gaps, especially on provision levels in refugee camps. Data collected in 127 camps in 2008 documented wide variations in education indicators. Among the key findings (Figure 3.10):

- The primary school participation rate of refugee children is 69%. The participation rate at secondary level is much lower, just 30%.⁸
- High levels of gender disparity are a feature of many refugee camps. On average, there are around eight girls in school for every ten boys at the primary level, and even fewer at the secondary level. Gender disparities are particularly wide in camps in South and West Asia, especially in Pakistan, where four girls are enrolled for every ten boys at the primary level.

- In sub-Saharan Africa, nine girls are enrolled for every ten boys at the primary level. The gender gap widens significantly at the secondary level, where around six girls are enrolled for every ten boys.
- Pupil/teacher ratios are very high in many cases. In nearly one-third of camps the ratios exceed 50:1. At least half the teaching force is untrained in about one-quarter of camps.

This global snapshot obscures significant differences among camps. Almost half the camps in the sample reported primary school participation rates below 70%. More striking still is the variation in enrolment (Figure 3.10). UNHCR data point to enrolment rates averaging 80% for camps in eastern Chad but declining to 50% for camps in southern Chad primarily serving people displaced by violence in the Central African Republic (UNHCR, 2010*a*).


The UNHCR data provide a useful insight into the varied state of education across camps. Yet they also highlight the scale of information gaps surrounding refugee education. Collecting data on enrolment rates of refugees is far from easy. People move in and out of some refugee camps and settlements very rapidly, making it extremely difficult to keep accurate track of numbers. Moreover, UNHCR sometimes opens its schools to host populations, making it harder to differentiate between refugees and non-refugees in the reported data (UNHCR, 2009*b*). Another problem in some environments is uncertainty over the accuracy of data on the age of refugee children. For all these reasons, the results of the UNHCR survey have to be treated with caution. Yet they do raise questions over the very wide variations in education coverage reported across different camps.

What are the forces behind the picture that emerges from the evidence on education provision in refugee camps? Several factors can be identified. Populations that arrive in refugee camps with higher levels of education may be more likely to seek schooling for their children. Problems of insecurity in some camps deter many parents from sending children to school, especially girls. Levels of financing and the quality of education may also affect attendance. At the secondary level, few camps offer more than very limited schooling. An important factor in this context is the 'temporary' status accorded to refugees which may deter investment beyond the primary level.

8. The primary school participation rate is the primary gross enrolment ratio for the population aged 6 to 11 in the 127 camps, using the UNHCR Standards and Indicators data set. The secondary school participation rate refers to the population aged 12 to 17 in these camps (UNHCR, 2008).

Figure 3.10: Education conditions vary across refugee camps and regions

Education indicators in refugee camps, 2008



* Data at the secondary level for South and West Asia are excluded due to lack of data for Pakistan.
Source: UNHCR (2008).

Shortages of qualified teachers proficient in an appropriate language represent another limiting factor in education provision. In many refugee camps, teachers are recruited from among the camp population. Given that many refugees were themselves educated in camps and did not go beyond the primary level, this limits the available skills pool. In the camps in Kenya, less than one-third of teachers have been trained (Figure 3.10). Official validation and certification of learning is an important yet widely ignored requirement for effective education of refugee children. Failure to develop systems that provide a form of recognition of learning that is transferable to national education systems can result in wasted years of schooling. Children who have completed, say, grade 4 in a refugee camp might be sent back to start at grade 1 if they return to their home country (Kirk, 2009).

The UNHCR snapshot of provision in camps offers a very partial picture. The standard Western media image of sprawling refugee camps does not reflect the daily realities facing most refugees. Only around one refugee in three lives in a camp, though the figure rises to 60% for sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR, 2010a). Most live in an urban setting. For example, it is estimated that 200,000 urban refugees live in Kenya alone (UNHCR, 2009a). Very little is known about the education status of refugee children living in urban environments, though there are typically high concentrations of refugees in informal

settlements characterized by high levels of deprivation. One assessment in Nairobi found that, although primary schooling is meant to be free to all, some schools request an ‘admission fee’ before enrolling refugee children, limiting their access to education (Pavanello et al., 2010).

Approaches to refugee governance have a major bearing on the degree to which refugee rights and entitlements are protected. This issue goes beyond whether states are signatories to the 1951 convention. Comparisons between countries are instructive. Jordan has not signed the convention, but allows Iraqi children to access public schools (see Chapter 4). By contrast, Malaysian law does not distinguish refugees from undocumented migrants. Refugees are subject to arrest and arbitrary deportation, and their ‘lack of official status means that refugees have no access to sustainable livelihoods or formal education’ (UNHCR, 2010f, p. 244). Given that an estimated 1 million illegal migrants live in Malaysia, many of them children, it appears likely that there is a high level of education deprivation that goes unreported because potential refugees are driven underground (UNHCR, 2010f). In Thailand, refugees from Myanmar have been confined to camps for more than two decades, with limited freedom of movement, access to formal employment or entitlement to attend public schools outside of camps. While provision within camps has improved, and recent reforms have extended access to

In refugee camps in Kenya, less than one-third of teachers have been trained

In East Jerusalem, schools attended by Palestinian refugees are overcrowded and under-resourced

vocational training outside the camps, educational opportunities remain limited (Box 3.4).

Every refugee situation has its own characteristics. The world's largest group of refugees is Palestinian, displaced over successive phases of a conflict that stretches back to 1948. There are almost 5 million Palestinians registered under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), spread across several countries, including Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the occupied Palestinian territory (United Nations, 2009c). School-age refugees in this population face many difficulties. In 2009/2010, UNRWA provided education to around half of all Palestinian children,

with almost half a million in its primary and lower secondary schools. While most of these schools perform as well as, or better than, host country schools (Altinok, 2010), UNRWA providers have problems in some areas. Early childhood provision is limited (except at schools in Lebanon), and most UNRWA schools operate only up to grade 9. While students have an entitlement to join the secondary school systems of their host countries, many have trouble making the transition. Palestinian students outside the UNRWA system also face difficulties. In East Jerusalem, schools attended by Palestinian refugees are overcrowded and under-resourced, forcing many students into private sector provision (Box 3.5).

Box 3.4: Sanctuary, but problems in education – Karen refugees in Thailand

Conflict has driven large numbers of Myanmar's people into neighbouring states, including Bangladesh, China and Thailand. Nine camps on the Thai border house the largest population of these refugees. Predominantly from the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, the 140,000 registered residents represent a small fraction of the displaced civilians entering the country. Although Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, since 1984 the authorities have tolerated refugee camps on the understanding that they are temporary and that their inhabitants will return to Myanmar once the situation permits.


Over the years the camps have developed an extensive education system, including pre-school, primary, secondary, vocational and adult learning opportunities. The seven Karen camps have a network of 70 schools serving 34,000 students. Education in the camps is sanctioned by the Thai authorities but provided by community-based organizations and financed by international non-government organizations (NGOs), charities and parents.

Education in the Karen camps reflects an extraordinary commitment and community effort, but there are serious problems. Enrolment at the secondary level is particularly low (Figure 3.11). Inadequate and uncertain financing is reflected in the poor state of some schools and low teacher salaries. One estimate put total spending per student at US\$44 a year in 2008 – less than 3% of the level for Thai primary students. ZOA Refugee Care Thailand, the main source of funding for the camps, is scaling down its operations, so the level of future financing remains uncertain.

Some of the education problems in the camps can be traced to wider governance concerns. Refugees have

Figure 3.11: Education stops at primary school for many Myanmar refugees in Thailand

Primary and secondary gross enrolment ratios in seven refugee camps, 2009



Source: Oh (2010).

limited freedom of movement and are not allowed to take jobs outside the camps. Because the camps are treated as temporary, no permanent school buildings can be constructed (though recent amendments allow semi-permanent construction). Teachers are recruited within the camps and often lack the necessary skills.

Recent reforms have started to address some of these concerns. Under a Framework of Cooperation with the Thai Ministry of Education, there has been progress towards the certification of vocational learning, with 11 courses and 108 trainers certified to date. UNHCR has called for expansion of vocational education and sources of employment as a way of reducing the dependence of camp populations on external support.

Sources: Lang (2003); Oh (2010); UNHCR (2010f).

Box 3.5: Equal rights but unequal education for Palestinian children in East Jerusalem

Education should offer the prospect of an escape from poverty. Yet for many Palestinian children in East Jerusalem, the education system is part of a poverty trap that restricts opportunity, reinforces divisions and ultimately fuels violent conflict.

After Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli municipalities became responsible for public schooling. Yet many of the 90,000 school-age Palestinians in East Jerusalem are denied access to free public education, even though they are entitled to it under Israel's Compulsory Education Law. The barrier they face is not legal discrimination but inadequately financed and poor-quality education. Neglect of Palestinian schooling in East Jerusalem is reflected in:

Classroom shortages: According to a report by the State Comptroller for East Jerusalem, there was a shortage of about 1,000 classrooms in 2007/2008. While construction efforts have been stepped up, they fall far short of the rate required to accommodate new students and replace existing classrooms. Municipal authorities have been constructing new classrooms more slowly than requested under a 2001 High Court of Justice Ruling, which would itself have provided for less than half the new classrooms required by 2011. There are only two municipal pre-schools in East Jerusalem and the high cost of private provision leaves around 90% of 3- and 4-year-olds not enrolled at all.

School quality. Many children in municipal schools are taught in dilapidated buildings and schools. More than half of classrooms are categorized as being in an 'unsuitable condition' or otherwise substandard. Part of the problem is that many school buildings are rented rather than custom-built. Twenty schools have been identified as being in unsafe condition.

Restrictions on movement. Parents and children cite military checkpoints as a constant concern. It is estimated that over 2,000 students and more than 250 teachers face delays at checkpoints or as a result of permit checks on the way to school.

Reports of harassment are widespread. Parents have identified arbitrary closure of crossing points as a major security concern, especially during periods of heightened tension. One UNESCO survey found that 69% of Palestinian children do not feel safe on their way to and from school.

Because of the scarcity of classrooms and concerns over quality, fewer than half of school-age Palestinian children attend municipal public schools. Most of the remainder attend private schools, which charge fees. Classroom shortages mean that over 30,000 Palestinian children pay to attend private or unofficial schools with relatively high fees, creating a financial burden on a community marked by high levels of poverty. Other education providers include UNRWA and Islamic Waqf schools. UNRWA schools provide education only up to grade 9, however, limiting students' prospects of transferring to municipal schools.

Several initiatives have been mounted to try to lower the barriers facing these children. These include the Madrasati Palestine initiative launched by Queen Rania of Jordan in 2010 to renovate schools operating under the supervision of the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. The project supports school renovation and teacher training, promotes safe and healthy schools, and engages communities in after-school activities.

Such initiatives can deliver important results. However, wider measures are needed. If East Jerusalem's Palestinian children are to enjoy their legal right to free education of good quality, municipal authorities need to embark on a large-scale classroom construction programme, while covering the costs faced by parents forced to send their children to private schools as an interim arrangement.

Sources: al-Sha'ar (2009); Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Ir Amim (2009, 2010); Bronner (2010); Global Education Cluster (2010b); Khan (2001).

Most host countries severely restrict refugees' right to employment

Whatever their legal status, many refugees face institutional barriers that have direct and indirect effects on the prospects of their children receiving an education. Most host countries severely restrict refugees' right to employment, resulting in exclusion from labour markets or illegal entry into low-paid, informal work. Apart from reinforcing household poverty, labour market restrictions reduce incentives for refugee children to seek secondary education. In some countries, UNHCR

has documented arbitrary detention and deportation of refugee populations, a practice that prevents registration. In 2010, for example, UNHCR noted the arrest and deportation in Thailand of refugees from Myanmar's northern Rakhine state and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (UNHCR, 2010f).

Several developed countries have also adopted practices that affect the right to education. UNHCR

has complained to Australia over its stringent screening procedures and a decision in 2010 to suspend asylum claims for people from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Other governments, including those of Denmark and the United Kingdom, have been challenged over practices relating to deportation of refugees who are from parts of Iraq still affected by armed violence (UNHCR, 2010e). Meanwhile, asylum procedures can themselves disrupt education provision. In the United Kingdom, applying for asylum can result in long waits for decisions on applications and appeals, causing considerable delay in enrolling children in school (Bourgonje and Tromp, 2009).

IDPs are less visible and more marginalized

It is difficult to study there. We live in tents. The floor is uneven. I can't study or do homework there. My old school was much better.

– Robeka, 13, living in a camp in Sri Lanka
(Save the Children, 2009a)

Reliable data on education for IDPs are even more limited than for refugees, but the available evidence indicates that displacement severely disrupts education. Groups that were already marginalized in non-conflict settings, such as the poor, girls and indigenous people, are often the worst affected by further losses in opportunities for schooling:

- Conflict and displacement had grave consequences for education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, two of the country's most disadvantaged areas. Some 600,000 children in three districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were reported to have missed one year or more of school (Ferris and Winthrop, 2010).
- In Colombia, there are significant gaps at the secondary school level between displaced children and the rest of the population. Just 51% of IDP youth attend secondary school, compared with 63% of non-IDP youth. The proportion of displaced youth that is still in primary school at ages 12 to 15 is nearly twice the share for the non-displaced, pointing to delayed entry and more repetition and dropout (Ferris and Winthrop, 2010). Because Afro-Colombians and indigenous people are disproportionately affected by displacement, this magnifies national education disparities.

- Levels of education provision for displaced people in Darfur, in the Sudan, are highly variable. One survey of IDP communities in North and West Darfur in 2008 found that only half of primary schools provided instruction in all eight grades. Pupil/teacher ratios of 50:1 or more were common, and on average 44% of students were girls (Lloyd et al., 2010).
- In Iraq, analysis of data from the governorates of Baghdad, Basra and Ninewa found that IDP families were far less likely to send their children to school than families in the local population. Significant gender gaps were observed for children of IDPs in all three governorates (Bigio and Scott, 2009).
- In Yemen, access to education for up to 55,000 internally displaced children is very limited. Many children have missed up to two years of school (IDMC, 2010h).
- In rural parts of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are about 600,000 IDPs and only 34% of children have access to basic education, compared with 52% nationally. Many parents report that their children's education was interrupted indefinitely by displacement (IDMC, 2009b).

Displacement effects linked to violence are compounded by poverty, excluding many displaced children from education. Surveys of displaced people in many conflict zones consistently point to household deprivation, often linked to child labour, as a barrier to education. In Yemen, many internally displaced children complement family income by begging, smuggling or collecting refuse, and there are concerns that child labour is increasing (IDMC, 2010h). Internally displaced households in Afghanistan cite child labour as the primary reason for young boys being out of school (Koser and Schmeidl, 2009). Costs associated with education can have particularly damaging consequences for displaced populations. The need to pay fees is a major barrier to education for displaced children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Foaleng and Olsen, 2008). Similar evidence emerges from other conflict-affected areas. It follows that policy interventions aimed at strengthening livelihoods, providing social protection and cutting education costs have a vital role to play in protecting access to education.

In Yemen, access to education for up to 55,000 internally displaced children is very limited

Many countries with large internally displaced populations have failed to develop rules and practices to protect education. Internally displaced children who have migrated to urban areas are often denied access to schools on quasi-legal grounds. One example comes from the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, where approximately 1 million IDPs make up around 20% of the population. Whatever their legal status, a lack of identification documents often limits their access to public services such as education, and they are forcibly relocated more frequently than other groups (Jacobsen and IDMC, 2008).

Education problems facing IDPs are not restricted to episodes of violent conflict. When displaced people return to their homes after a conflict, they often face disadvantages linked to poverty, the loss of their homes and other assets, and limited provision of schooling. Several countries of the former Soviet Union are grappling with the consequences of displacement caused by disputes over territory (Box 3.6).

Conclusion

The impact of armed conflict on education has been consistently and systematically underestimated. Education systems cannot be fully insulated from the effects of violence. However, current patterns of violence, with armed parties actively targeting children and schools, are destroying opportunities for education on what may be an unprecedented scale. Peace and post-conflict reconstruction are the only viable foundations for achieving accelerated progress towards universal primary education and wider goals in conflict-affected countries. But the most immediate challenge facing the international community is to strengthen protection and maintain access to education for those on the front line and for those displaced from their homes. □

Peace and post-conflict reconstruction are the only viable foundations for achieving universal primary education

Box 3.6: Short wars with lasting consequences in the former Soviet Union

Conflicts in countries of the former Soviet Union have been marked by episodes of intense violence over competing claims to territory and government. Many of the conflicts have caused large-scale displacement, social upheaval and physical damage – and losses in opportunities for education for some vulnerable populations.

Tensions between **Georgia** and the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to fighting in the early 1990s and large-scale displacement. Some 300,000 Georgians fled, mostly from Abkhazia. Renewed fighting between the Russian Federation and Georgia over South Ossetia led to another wave of displacement in 2008. Today, ethnic Georgians who have returned to their homes in Abkhazia report difficulties in many aspects of their lives, including education. The quality of education is often poor. Problems include a lack of qualified teachers, dilapidated buildings, and the cost of textbooks and transport. Around 4,000 internally displaced children in Georgia proper continue to attend separate schools. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has documented problems facing Georgian parents in getting children in Abkhazia educated in their mother tongue.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have yet to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, almost fifteen years

after signing a ceasefire agreement. Some 570,000 people remain displaced, and many children face acute difficulties in access to good-quality education. In Azerbaijan, the government has made extensive efforts to address the problems of displaced children from Nagorno-Karabakh. Internally displaced students are supposed to receive free uniforms, books and access to higher education. Nevertheless, many displaced parents report having to pay for these items, and a survey in 2005 found that 58% reported being unable to send their children to school. The quality of education is also a problem, linked in some cases to the limited training available to teachers.

In **Chechnya**, the education system bears the scars of two wars that displaced over 800,000 people. In 2009, the government was still repairing 142 out of 437 schools. UNICEF has reported education quality problems linked to shortages of teaching materials, inadequate training opportunities for teachers and large class sizes. While most children of primary school age are in school, many have experienced displacement, and mental health problems are widespread. About 80% of children emerged from the period of conflict needing psychological support, and while thirty-one psychosocial centres have been established, there are shortages of trained counsellors.

Sources: IDMC (2008, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f).

Fanning the flames – education failures can fuel armed conflict

When countries descend into conflict, antagonists invariably have well-rehearsed arguments for resorting to violence. Irreconcilable claims over governance, territory and resources all figure prominently. Education is seldom, if ever, cited as the primary cause of conflict. Yet it is often an underlying element in the political dynamic pushing countries towards armed conflict.

Making education a force for peace demands an informed assessment of how, under the wrong conditions, it can push societies towards war. The previous section of this chapter examined the ways in which violent conflict hurts education. This section looks at the reverse link. It identifies the mechanisms through which education, interacting with wider social, political and economic processes, can undermine peace and fuel violence.

The role of education in contributing to the conditions for armed conflict has received little systematic attention on the part of governments and aid donors (Bird, 2009; Østby and Urdal, 2010). That oversight is worrying on at least two counts. First, there is no shortage of evidence that grievances over education have, in many countries, reinforced wider social, economic and political grievances. In some cases, education has been a flashpoint for armed conflict. The second reason for concern is that this is an area in which policy choices have immediate consequences. There are many spheres of public policy in which government choices have little impact in the short run, but education is not one of them. What is taught in school, how it is taught and how education is financed and delivered are all policy areas in which government decisions have both an early and lasting impact, for better or for worse.

This section identifies three broad channels through which education can make societies more prone to armed conflict:

- *Too little education.* Poverty and high levels of youth unemployment are both associated with increased risk of conflict, and insufficient education contributes to the risk. Problems arise not only when there is not enough education, but also when schooling fails to

provide young people with relevant skills. The links between education and armed conflict are not clear cut. There is no shortage of countries with high levels of education that have experienced violent conflict. But in conflict-prone societies, the restricted opportunities facing people with limited access to education may lead to a weaker stake in peace.

- *Unequal access to education.* The idea of equal opportunity is deeply ingrained in most societies, and a fair chance in education is widely seen as one of the foundations of equal opportunity. But in conflict-affected societies, education has a special role to play. If education policy is seen by disadvantaged groups as a source of diminished life chances for their children, it is likely to generate a deep sense of injustice that can call into question the legitimacy of the state itself. As Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission recognized in its assessment of the causes of the country's civil war, limiting educational opportunities through political and social systems based on privilege, patronage and politicization was a potent source of violence (TRC Liberia, 2009). That assessment has a far wider application.
- *The wrong type of education.* Schools play a critical role not just in equipping children with knowledge and skills, but also in transmitting values and creating a sense of identity. They can foster attitudes based on mutual respect, shared interests and common values, helping to underpin social cohesion in culturally diverse societies, or they can promote ideas and practices that weaken cohesion. For example, schools that are unresponsive to the social, cultural and linguistic concerns of indigenous people or ethnic minorities are likely to be seen not as centres of expanded opportunity, but as vehicles for domination. Similarly, when curriculum or textbook content explicitly or implicitly disparages some social groups, schools can inculcate intolerance and reinforce social divisions. And while schools can provide a peaceful environment in which children learn and interact with each other, they can also play a role in normalizing violence, and in undermining attitudes conducive to peaceful conflict resolution.

Making education a force for peace demands an informed assessment of how, under the wrong conditions, it can push societies towards war

Tracking the causes of conflict – and the links to education

What makes a country prone to violent conflict? Even a cursory review of current and recent conflicts reveals how difficult it is to answer that question. Being poor is one risk factor. Having recently experienced a civil war is another. Over the past forty years, about half of all civil wars have been due to post-conflict relapses: an estimated 40% of conflicts that ended started again within ten years (Chauvet and Collier, 2007). Recurrent episodes of violence demonstrate that armed conflicts often create a vicious circle in which dispute resolution through violence becomes the political norm. Institutional failure is another feature of conflict-affected countries. Armed conflict is more likely to occur and persist where the state is weak and where state institutions are unable, or unwilling, to respond to grievances or mediate in disputes. Fragility in these areas is often associated with low per capita income levels, with poverty, conflict and institutional failure creating self-reinforcing cycles (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

The changing profile of armed conflict documented in the first section of this chapter reinforces the case for a better understanding of the interaction between education and armed conflict. When UNESCO's constitution was drafted at the end of the Second World War, its architects were addressing one overwhelming concern: the prejudice that had fuelled wars between states. If they were framing a new constitution for the early 21st century, they would focus far more on the prejudice driving violence *within* states. The rise of intra-state armed conflict has shifted not just the locus of violence, but also the pattern of motivation. Whereas conflicts between states typically revolve around competing claims to territory, those within states are often associated with competing identities and aspirations. While territorial claims often figure in intra-state conflicts as well, they invariably intersect with grievances linked to factors such as ethnicity, language, faith or regional inequalities. According to one data set, the proportion of conflicts around the world broadly falling into the category of 'ethnic' increased from 15% in the early 1950s to nearly 60% in 2004 (Marshall 2006, as analysed in Stewart, 2008a). As an institution that occupies a central role in framing identities, the education system has considerable potential to act as a force for either peace or conflict.

While the underlying causes of armed conflict are political, mobilization along group lines occurs only when people identify strongly with 'their group' and view 'others' as being different, hostile and a source of socio-economic disadvantage. Education can influence the potential for violent group-based mobilization in a number of ways. One is economic. To the extent that the education system creates opportunities for employment, it can diminish the incentive for young people to join armed groups. Conversely, when education fails and high youth unemployment follows, the risk of violence can increase. That risk is likely to be even greater if education is experienced or perceived as a source of inequality between socio-economic groups or regions, especially when schools themselves reinforce mutually hostile identities. This section looks at the mechanisms through which education systems can fuel violence. In identifying these mechanisms, it is useful to start by considering a broader question: what are the wider forces, risks and problems that propel some societies towards armed conflict?

Economic motivations, state fragility and grievance

There is an extensive body of literature that seeks to identify the underlying causes of violent conflict. It broadly divides into four approaches, each of which offers insights that are useful for understanding how education fits into the armed conflict equation. Briefly summarized, the approaches are as follows:

- *Economic motivation as a driver of violence.* According to one influential approach, individuals weigh the costs and benefits of participating in rebellion, taking into account other opportunities for generating income (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In this account, the likelihood of people joining an armed group is inversely related to their employment and income-generating prospects, with low income creating an incentive to join groups engaged in armed conflict. What is true for individuals also holds for societies. Economic calculation linked to poverty, so the argument runs, is part of a wider conflict trap that locks countries into cycles of violence. Because civil war slows growth, and slower growth translates into diminished opportunities for remunerative employment, armed militia leaders can call on a large reservoir of potential combatants (Collier, 2007).

Conflicts within states invariably intersect with grievances linked to factors such as ethnicity, language, faith or regional inequalities

Education can dramatically reduce the economic incentives that may propel young people into violence

- *State fragility and resource traps.* A related perspective sees violent conflict as a result of the state's weak administrative capacity and lack of control over territory and resources, linked in turn to limited financing capacity. Several commentators have emphasized the role of high-value minerals in creating conditions for violent conflict. Because the state is weak, rebels can gain control over these 'lootable' resources, which finance war while providing a powerful economic motivation for engaging in rebellion. Here, too, the cycle of conflict is self-perpetuating: states that cannot mobilize resources are unable to meet the needs of their citizens, undermining their legitimacy and making conflict more likely. To take one widely cited example, exploitation of diamonds during Liberia's civil war not only created opportunities for personal gain – Charles Taylor is estimated to have made more than US\$400 million per year off the war from 1992 to 1996 (USAID, 2004) – but also weakened the state's legitimacy and capacity for action.
- *Ethnic composition.* Some commentators have drawn a link between the extent of ethnic diversity in a country and violent conflict. The rise of intra-state violence based on appeals to ethnic identity, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Iraq, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, gives such approaches an intuitive appeal. However, this is an area in which opinions diverge – and where the data are inconclusive. Cross-country data analysis provides little support for the contention that the degree of ethnic diversity is positively associated with violent conflict – a finding that some view as evidence that economic factors are more important. At the same time, however, there is evidence that societies characterized by high levels of social and economic polarization between ethnic groups (as distinct from ethnic diversity or fragmentation) are more prone to conflict. One study covering thirty-six developing countries from 1986 to 2004 found that the probability of conflict breaking out in any given year more than doubled in countries with extreme inequality between culturally defined groups (Østby, 2008a).⁹
- *Grievance and injustice.* Several commentators have identified grievances associated with political, social and cultural inequality as a primary motivating force for political violence. Evidence from conflict analysis across many countries provides support for this school of

thought. No two conflicts are alike, but many follow the fault lines of social, ethnic, religious and regional disparities. These 'horizontal inequalities' between groups are widely cited by those involved in armed conflict as a reason for their participation.¹⁰ Consistently high correlations between measures of inequality and social exclusion on the one hand, and violent conflict on the other, have been documented in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (Gurr, 2000; Stewart, 2010; Wimmer et al., 2009). Proponents of what is sometimes called the grievance perspective do not argue that economic motivations are unimportant, but they focus on the critical role that perceived and real injustices play in creating conditions for violence. Several studies within this framework suggest that political violence is most likely to occur when there is a combination of political exclusion (which motivates leaders of disadvantaged groups) and social marginalization caused by state interventions perceived as unfair (which motivates followers) (Brown, 2010; Gurr, 2000; Stewart, 2008b).

Debates over the causes of armed conflict have a tendency towards polarization. That tendency is unhelpful because each of the perspectives outlined above offers useful insights – and because there are significant areas of overlap, as well as differences.¹¹ This Report draws more heavily on the grievance and injustice approach, because it offers a broader analytical framework for understanding the interface between identity and conflict. Yet whatever their distinctive starting points and conclusions, all four approaches serve to illustrate the central role of education as a factor influencing armed conflict. For example, education can dramatically reduce the economic incentives that may propel young people into violence. Similarly, what happens in education can widen or narrow horizontal inequality, and it can influence how social groups perceive each other and the state.

The following subsections explore the mechanisms through which education can exacerbate the risk

9. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) are among those unable to find a significant relationship between civil wars and ethnic fractionalization – i.e. the number of ethnic groups. Using a measure of ethnic polarization (measured by the distance between groups), rather than the ethnic fractionalization that most cross-country studies adopt, others find ethnicity to be an important part of explaining the incidence of civil war (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Østby, 2008b).

10. 'Horizontal inequalities' are inequalities between groups, typically determined by ethnicity or religion. This is contrasted with 'vertical inequalities' between individuals or households, which are found to be less likely to lead to conflict (Stewart, 2008b).

11. Commentary on the debate over the causes of conflict often presents the complex issues involved as a simple choice between a 'greed' approach, which emphasizes economic incentives, and a 'grievance' approach that highlights horizontal inequalities. The real boundaries in the debate are more blurred.

of armed conflict. Drawing on evidence from a range of conflict-affected countries, they focus on three key connections:¹²

- Too little education and poor education quality can lead to unemployment and poverty.
- Unequal access to education can generate grievances and a sense of injustice.
- The wrong type of education can reinforce social divisions, foster hostility between groups and normalize violence.

Restricted education opportunities – a source of poverty and insecurity

If we can't get a secondary education and can't get a job, where will we go? Al-Shabaab has people recruiting here. They are offering money. Some boys who haven't been able to continue their education have already left the camp to go back to Mogadishu and fight.

– Young male refugee, Dadaab, Kenya
(UNESCO, 2010c)

People join armed groups for many reasons. While economic considerations do not operate in isolation, poverty, unemployment and a lack of alternatives are potentially forceful recruitment sergeants for armed groups. They can turn Somali children in Kenyan refugee camps into armed combatants in Mogadishu, and push children in Afghanistan, Colombia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the ranks of militias that, whatever their cause, provide income, food and shelter, and an outlet for resentment and hostility.

High levels of poverty and unemployment do not automatically tip countries or people into armed conflict: if they did, there would be many more conflicts around the world. Yet they are risk factors. Education can help mitigate the risk by creating opportunities to develop skills, obtain employment and increase income. On average, an additional year of education adds about 10% to a person's pay in a low income country (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). To the extent that economic cost-benefit considerations inform individual choice regarding whether to join an armed cause, returns to education can create powerful disincentives to engage in armed conflict. That may explain why some studies document a strong association between education levels and violent conflict (Hegre et al., 2009; Østby and Urdal, 2010; Thyne, 2006).¹³ One analysis finds that an increase in primary school enrolment from 77% to universal provision

is associated with a near halving of the likelihood of civil war (Thyne, 2006). The reported effects of secondary schooling are even greater: increasing male enrolment from 30% to 81%, for example, is estimated to reduce the probability of civil war by almost two-thirds (Thyne, 2006). Higher male secondary school rates may also reduce the duration of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

While these findings are instructive in identifying risk factors associated with armed conflict, they have to be treated with caution. However sophisticated the statistical exercises appear, it is all but impossible to control for the complex factors that cause conflict, or to isolate the specific contribution of education. Moreover, any average effect that education may have on reducing conflict will inevitably obscure variations. For example, while higher levels of secondary education may on average be associated with a reduced likelihood of participation in armed conflict, in some cases it may increase the likelihood of conflict. In Pakistan, the occupied Palestinian territory and Sri Lanka, highly educated youth have been drawn into violence (Berrebi, 2007; Brown, 2010; Fair, 2008; Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Such cases call into question the resort to economic or educational determinism in attempting to identify universal risk factors. Economic calculations may be a motivating force behind young people's participation in armed conflict in some contexts, but other considerations also weigh heavily, including a perception of historical injustice, social grievance and political ideology. Moreover, whatever the income levels and economic incentives, the vast majority of young people in conflict-affected countries do not join armed groups – an observation that underlines the importance of understanding the motivations of those who do.

Recruiting the poor

Evidence from recent armed conflicts suggests a strong association between recruitment into armed groups and social disadvantage. In some cases, the impact of conflict on education has played a part.

The experience of Sierra Leone is instructive. During the civil war, both insurgency and counterinsurgency movements attracted people from the poorest and least educated parts of society (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2007). One survey of former combatants and non-combatant militia members found that almost 80% had left school before joining a rebel group, in many cases because their schools had been closed due to damaged and

Increasing male enrolment from 30% to 81% in secondary schools is estimated to reduce the probability of civil war by almost two-thirds

12. Background papers prepared for this Report (Brown, 2010; Østby and Urdal, 2010) provide detailed evidence in support of these connections, and are drawn on in the sections that follow.

13. Interpreting the quantitative evidence for this finding can be difficult, as education levels are highly correlated with levels of GDP per capita. However, Thyne (2006) and Barakat and Urdal (2009) demonstrate that education indeed has a pacifying effect even after controlling for income level.

In Sierra Leone, poverty and low levels of education increased children's susceptibility to recruitment

destroyed infrastructure. Poverty and low levels of education increased their susceptibility to recruitment (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008).

The 'unemployment and despair' of uneducated Sierra Leonean youth, which the country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission identified as providing an easy route to recruitment into the Revolutionary United Front in the late 1980s, remains a latent threat to Sierra Leone's peace and stability (TRC Sierra Leone, 2004, vol. 1, p. 15). Despite recent government actions, including adopting a Youth Commission Act, concerns have been raised at the United Nations Security Council that many of the country's young people remain frustrated by what they perceive as their social marginalization (United Nations, 2010).

Sierra Leone's experience represents a microcosm of a far wider concern. While there is no automatic link from low income or unemployment to violence, in countries with a recent or current history of armed conflict that link can swiftly emerge.

Much of the debate on poverty-driven recruitment into armed groups tends to focus on young men. But young women are also affected. While women typically represent a small share of armed combatants, they have accounted for up to one-third of some insurgent groups (Bouta et al., 2005). Lack of education and job opportunities was reported as one consideration informing the decision of young women to join armed groups in Mozambique, for example (McKay and Mazurana, 2004). Women may also provide less visible non-military support (whether voluntarily or otherwise) through domestic labour and 'encouraging' their children to go to war (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009). Other gender-based factors contribute to female recruitment. In some countries, young girls and women are more prone to abduction by armed militias, whose leaders exploit female recruits for military, sexual and labour purposes. The fact that women often have significantly lower educational opportunities may also be significant. One survey in Liberia found that young women who had been combatants had had little access to education or work, making them more vulnerable to exploitation (Specht, 2006).

The evidence base for exploring the link between poverty, low levels of education and recruitment is often circumstantial and anecdotal. Armed militias and national forces are seldom in the business of providing information on recruitment strategies,

or on the socio-economic characteristics of their troops. Yet there is little question that, in many conflicts, the pool of recruits for state and non-state groups draws heavily on young people with relatively low levels of education and limited employment opportunities.

The youth bulge

Demographic trends and employment patterns are evolving in ways that could create elevated risks of future conflict. With youth populations rising in many low income countries, employment opportunities are expanding more slowly than the flow of new entrants to labour markets. This is a potential source of social dislocation and conflict – and it is an area in which education can make a difference.

The association between demography and the risk of armed conflict is not straightforward. The same is true for employment. Even a cursory review of armed conflicts in recent decades would reveal that countries with varied population and employment profiles have gone to war. Yet in societies that are prone to armed conflict, the combination of a large and growing youth population and a static or shrinking employment market poses considerable risks. As more young people leave school to find labour markets in stagnation or decline, there is a danger that unemployment and poverty will rise, breeding despair and hopelessness. Moreover, in many conflict-affected countries, a 'youth bulge' is bringing more people into labour markets. In countries including Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, over 60% of the population is under 25, compared with less than one-quarter in many OECD countries (Figure 3.12).

Rural-urban migration adds another dangerous twist to the unfolding trends, as large numbers of young people move to cities in the vain hope of finding work (Ruble et al., 2003). By 2030, it has been predicted, 60% of those living in urban areas of developing countries will be under 18 (UN-Habitat, 2009). High concentrations of marginalized youth in urban environments can pose threats to peace and stability in any country, but especially in those that have recently emerged from violent conflict.

Failures in education exacerbate the risks associated with the youth bulge and unemployment. Too many children leave school in conflict-affected countries lacking the skills and knowledge they need to succeed in labour markets, making them

vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, often with tragic consequences. In Rwanda, unemployed, undereducated rural male youth figured prominently among the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. One reason was that young men who were out of education, unable to inherit land and lacking the skills even to find low-paid, temporary jobs were drawn into the Interahamwe militia through a combination of coercion and monetary reward (Sommers, 2006).

Education but no jobs


More education is not an automatic panacea for the threat posed by the combination of a youth bulge and mass unemployment. When education levels rise but labour markets are stagnant, the result can be a rapid increase in the number of better-educated unemployed young people resentful over their lack of prospects. As one young man in the Congo who joined an armed militia in adolescence put it: 'Education does not lead to employment, so why bother? You have a Ph.D. and you are a taxi man! ... The shortest route, the easiest job in Congo is the army: they are always hiring; above all they are paid' (Brett and Specht, 2004, pp. 21, 22). His experience draws attention to a wider concern. To the extent that education creates opportunities for gaining employment and escaping from poverty, it can dampen the social tensions that push vulnerable youth into armed conflict. When higher levels of education are not matched by expanded opportunities, however, the resulting frustration can have the opposite effect.

There are many armed conflicts in which educated young people have provided a steady flow of recruits for armed militias. In Sri Lanka, both Sinhala and Tamil militia movements drew recruits from the ranks of the educated unemployed (Amarasuriya et al., 2009; Brown, 2010; Peiris, 2001). Among Tamil youth, frustration linked to unemployment was reinforced by wider grievances, including discrimination in university admission processes. This frustration was among the main factors behind the development of militant Tamil youth movements in the 1970s (UNDP, 2006).

Unemployed educated youth also figure prominently in some of Africa's armed conflicts. In north-east Nigeria, the Islamist movement Boko Haram – meaning 'Western education is forbidden' – began a campaign of violence in July 2009. It aimed to impose Sharia law nationwide. Many young people who joined the uprising were unemployed secondary school dropouts and

Figure 3.12: Many conflict-affected countries have a youth bulge

Estimated proportion of the population under age 25, selected countries, 2010



Source: United Nations (2009).

university graduates. Underlining the link between the economic situation and wider grievances, young people in the movement blamed their circumstances on a failure of government to manage its resources to the benefit of all (Danjibo, 2009).

In many countries and regions, notably the Middle East and North Africa, the problem is not so much the amount of schooling but the weak alignment between what children learn in school, job availability and the skills demanded by employers. In 2008, 23% of the youth labour force in the Arab States was unemployed (ILO, 2010b). In several countries in the region, those with at least a secondary school diploma – the majority of young entrants to the labour market – tend to have higher rates and durations of unemployment (Dhillon and Yousef, 2009). This makes transition from school to work increasingly difficult, with the prospects of long-term unemployment leaving many young people open to radical political or religious mobilization.

Unequal education – a force for grievance and injustice

Leaders of insurgent movements and armed militias are typically drawn into conflict by political and ideological factors. Their followers and supporters, however, are often motivated by a more direct experience of social and economic injustice (Stewart et al., 2007). People may resort to violence, or support it, out of a conviction that unfair government policies and practices are diminishing their life chances. Public spending patterns, political representation, the distribution of

In Sri Lanka, militia movements drew recruits from the ranks of the educated unemployed

opportunities for public sector employment, and approaches to issues central to identity, such as language, ethnicity and culture, are all factors that can push people into violence.

Perceptions of unfairness related to education can be a potent source of grievance. For parents who see education as a route out of poverty and into employment, any sense that their children are denied an equal opportunity because of ethnicity, language, religion or location is likely to exacerbate group-based grievance. When restricted access to education and discrimination in employment leave some groups facing high levels of youth poverty and unemployment, it adds to the social tensions that can give rise to violent conflict. In Nepal, poverty and exclusion, particularly among marginalized castes and ethnic groups in rural areas, were key factors driving the decade-long insurgency. Recruitment of schoolchildren was particularly prominent in areas where socio-economic or ethnic exclusion was most apparent (Eck, 2010). Similarly, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) rebels in Peru exploited high levels of poverty and unemployment among indigenous youth with low levels of education (Barakat et al., 2008).

As in other areas, it is difficult to establish the importance of education relative to other factors that fuel group-based violence. Even so, there is strong evidence from national conflicts and cross-country analysis that education matters – and that it matters more than is widely recognized. Analysing data from sixty-seven developing countries, one study found that educational inequalities significantly heightened the risk of conflict. Patterns of education inequality also influenced the level of risk: ethnic disparities emerged as more significant than religious or regional disparities. This was especially true for sub-Saharan Africa (Østby and Strand, 2010). The results of any cross-country analysis have to be treated with caution. The association of armed conflict with social disparities should not be confused with evidence of causation. Even so, the findings strongly suggest that educational inequalities merit serious consideration as a factor in armed conflict.

Resentment over unequal educational opportunities feeds into violent conflict in ways that are shaped by national and local circumstances. Low levels of access to education can be a significant factor in their own right. However, the catalyst is usually a sense of deprivation relative to another group, often allied with a related conviction that the government

is behaving unfairly. In Indonesia's Aceh province, a violent separatist struggle was fuelled by perceived injustices over the sharing of benefits from a booming gas and oil industry. When the province's wealth began to grow, the jobs created tended to go to more educated Javanese migrants rather than to the Acehnese. Unemployment rates in the 1990s were twice as high for urban Acehnese as for Javanese. Meanwhile, most revenue gains went to the central government. The Free Aceh Movement, which sought secession from Indonesia, appealed directly to grievances related to Javanese migrants and to losses of revenue from oil and gas exports. Education was one of the grievances. In a 1976 statement, the Free Aceh Movement declared that the central government and Javanese migrants had 'robbed us from our livelihood [and] abused the education of our children' (Brown, 2008, p. 267).

Demands for a greater share of resource wealth to be invested in education figure prominently in many group-based conflicts. Striking contrasts between the wealth generated by exploitation of minerals and the dilapidated state of classrooms, low levels of education and high levels of poverty can generate a strong sense of grievance. Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region provides an example. The region has 90% of the country's oil reserves but also its highest poverty levels. Unemployment is high as well, while access to good education and other basic services is limited. One survey of around 1,340 young men in the region found that more than half had not completed primary school, and over a quarter were neither in education nor employment (Oyefusi, 2007). Young adults with little or no education were most willing to join in violent protest or armed struggle. Statistically, a person with primary schooling in the region was found to be 44% less likely to be involved in armed struggle than a person with no education (Oyefusi, 2007, 2008).

Transmission mechanisms between education and armed conflict operate in both directions. Perceived injustices over education feed into underlying causes of violence, and the violence then affects education. In Liberia, skewed distribution of education resources before the conflict fuelled wider inequalities by perpetuating differences in access to learning opportunities. The resulting social divisions in turn fuelled grievances that exploded into a civil war, which destroyed much of the country's education infrastructure (Williams and Bentrovato, 2010). In Côte d'Ivoire, rebel groups in the north identified highly visible inequalities in education as symptomatic of deeper injustices

In Nepal, recruitment of schoolchildren was particularly prominent in areas where socio-economic or ethnic exclusion was most apparent

[Barakat et al., 2008]. The closure of schools during the conflict exacerbated a sense that the government was targeting education as part of its counterinsurgency strategy (Box 3.7). Whatever the reality behind the claims and counterclaims, Côte d'Ivoire's experience demonstrates the ways in which perceived injustices linked to education can inflame violence.

Schools as a vehicle for social division

Values inculcated in school can make children less susceptible to the kind of prejudice, bigotry, extreme nationalism, racism and lack of tolerance that can lead to violent conflict. When the discrimination and power relationships that maintain social, political and economic exclusion

find expression in the classroom, however, education can have the opposite effect. Schools can act as conduits for transmitting attitudes, ideas and beliefs that make societies more prone to violence.

There are many channels through which the wrong type of education can fuel armed conflict. If government policies result in the use of a 'national' language of instruction viewed as inappropriate by minority groups, the school may be seen as a vehicle for cultural domination. Curricula and textbooks may carry messages that stigmatize some groups and assert claims to superiority on the part of others. The resulting attitudes carried from school into adult life may make people more receptive to the appeals of extreme groups

In Côte d'Ivoire, rebel groups in the north identified highly visible inequalities in education as symptomatic of deeper injustices

Box 3.7: Côte d'Ivoire – denial of education as a divisive force

The renewed wave of violence that followed the elections of 2010 in Côte d'Ivoire provided a reminder of the fragility of peace in the country. Civil war from 2002 to 2004 was caused by the breakdown of an inclusive political settlement, with education contributing to wider grievances.

The immediate catalyst for war was the abandonment of a policy of ethnic balancing. During his autocratic rule from 1960 to 1993, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny had maintained a careful balance within state institutions between regions and ethnic groups. While suffering from many of the familiar failings of highly centralized education systems, schools were seen as a vehicle for promoting a shared national identity, with French adopted as the sole, unifying medium of instruction.

After Houphouët-Boigny's death in 1993, successive governments sought to strengthen the idea of 'national identity' by adopting the concept of 'Ivoirité', though about a quarter of the population was either immigrant or descended from immigrants from neighbouring countries. The majority of those deemed 'non-Ivoirian' lived in the north of the country. In many cases, their land rights were revoked. 'Foreigners' were banned from participating in elections. One of them, Alassane Ouattara, was a presidential candidate in the disputed 2010 election, where the national identity issue resurfaced.


This politicization of identity fragmented the country and tipped it into a civil war in 2002 pitching rebels in the north against the government in the south, with United Nations peacekeeping forces securing a 'zone of confidence' between the two.

Education figured prominently in the political mobilization surrounding the conflict. Rebel groups in northern areas cited long-standing disparities in schooling as evidence of discrimination by the state. Widening education disparities between north and south, and the everyday experience of a poorly performing school system in the north, lent weight to their claims. Events during the conflict itself reinforced perceptions of injustice linked to education. When the government closed schools due to security concerns, rebel leaders presented the decision as part of a wider strategy of 'cultural genocide'. Whatever the intent behind the closures, the forcefulness of the response demonstrated that education had become central to the conflict.

The Ouagadougou Political Accords in 2007 paved the way for a transition to peace, although the situation remains fragile. Divisions in education remain. By 2006, fewer than one-third of children in the north and north-west were attending school – around half the level in most of the south (Figure 3.13). Recent education programmes risk reinforcing the north-south divide, with

Figure 3.13: Côte d'Ivoire – education in the north vs the south

Primary net attendance rate by region, 2006



Source: Côte d'Ivoire National Institute of Statistics and UNICEF (2007).

a school subsidy initiated as a pilot project in 2002 continuing to reach only schools in the south.

Sources: Boak (2009); Côte d'Ivoire Government (2009); Djité (2000); Langer (2005); Sany (2010); Save the Children (2010); World Bank (2009b).

or more resistant to a government seen as hostile. Similarly, when education systems allow for rigid separation of children on the basis of their group identity, it may reinforce negative attitudes to other groups. And schools themselves may expose children to violence, making it more likely that they will come to see recourse to violence as normal.

Language barriers

In multi-ethnic societies, the imposition of a dominant language through the school system has been a frequent source of grievance linked to wider issues of social and cultural inequality. Language policy in education is just part of broader state approaches to managing diversity, but language is often an essential element in ethnic and cultural identity, so it has particular symbolic importance in terms of group identity. One of the most powerful demonstrations of the critical place of language in politics took place in South Africa in 1976, when thousands of Soweto schoolchildren protested against being taught in Afrikaans, seen as the language of oppression. Nelson Mandela identified their march as a symbol of resistance to apartheid (Mandela, 1994).

By one estimate, over half the countries affected by armed conflict are highly diverse linguistically, making decisions over the language of instruction a potentially divisive political issue (Pinnock, 2009). This is particularly true where the fault lines of conflict follow the contours of group-based inequality. For example, disputes about using Kurdish in schools have been an integral part of the conflict in eastern Turkey (Graham-Brown, 1994; UNESCO, 2010a). In Nepal, the imposition of Nepali as the language of instruction fed into the broader set of grievances among non-Nepali-speaking castes and ethnic minorities that drove the civil war (Gates and Murshed, 2005). Guatemala's imposition of Spanish in schools was seen by indigenous people as part of a broader pattern of social discrimination (Marques and Bannon, 2003). Armed groups representing indigenous people included the demand for bilingual and intercultural education in their conditions for a political settlement, and the country's peace agreement included a constitutional commitment to that end (see Chapter 5).

Language is at the heart of several ongoing armed conflicts. In Thailand's three predominantly Muslim southernmost provinces, language and education have been at the centre of a wider political conflict

in which some insurgent groups are seeking secession and others greater autonomy. The conflict has resulted in grave violations of human rights as a result of attacks by insurgents against schoolchildren, teachers and schools (United Nations, 2010a). Public school teachers remain a prime target for insurgents, who see them as agents of a system hostile to Malay culture. While public support for armed militias is limited, many Malay Muslims appear to view the use of Thai as the sole language of instruction in school as a threat to their cultural identity (Human Rights Watch, 2010d; Melvin, 2007). Whatever the underlying complexities and political dynamics, the case highlights the way in which language policy in education can emerge as a focal point for violent conflict.

Disputes over language often reflect long histories of domination, subordination and, in some cases, decolonization. In Algeria, the replacement of French by Arabic in primary and secondary schools after independence was intended to build the new government's legitimacy. In practice, it both marginalized the non-Arabic-speaking Berber minority and created grievances among those excluded from high-status private-sector employment by a French-speaking elite (Brown, 2010). Here, too, language has long remained a source of grievance between groups.

Other cases from history illustrate the interplay between language and politics. In Pakistan, the post-independence government adopted Urdu as the national language and the language of instruction in schools. This became a source of alienation in a country that was home to six major linguistic groups and fifty-eight smaller ones (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The failure to recognize Bengali, spoken by the vast majority of the population in East Pakistan, was 'one of the first sources of conflict within the new country, leading to student riots' (Winthrop and Graff, 2010, p. 30). The riots gave birth to the Bengali Language Movement, a precursor to the movement that fought for the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of a new country, Bangladesh. Both countries have continued to face language-related political challenges. In Bangladesh, where Bengali is the national language, non-Bengali tribal groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts have cited a perceived injustice over language as a factor justifying secessionist demands (Mohsin, 2003). In Pakistan, the continued use of Urdu as the language of instruction in government schools, even though it is

Language policy in education can emerge as a focal point for violent conflict

spoken at home by less than 8% of the population, has also contributed to political tensions (Ayres, 2003; Rahman, 1997; Winthrop and Graff, 2010).

Breeding intolerance through curricula and textbooks

Intolerance and prejudice can appear in schools in many guises. What is taught, especially in history classes, and how it is taught can strongly influence the ways students view their identity and the relationship of their 'group' to others. Textbooks often carry enormous authority and are a means for governments to introduce students directly to ideology. Schools thus are often viewed by extreme nationalists and by exponents of ethnic, faith or regional politics as a political battleground.

From Nazi Germany to apartheid South Africa, history is replete with examples of schools being used to foster prejudice (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). In pre-genocide Rwanda, Hutu-dominated governments used schools to spread a version of history designed to generate prejudice against Tutsis, portrayed as outsiders who had conquered the country, imposed feudal rule and oppressed the Hutu peasantry (Eltringham, 2004; McLean Hilker, 2010; Rutembesa, 2002). This historical narrative featured heavily in the genocidal propaganda of the early 1990s. Some commentators argue that it played a role in creating conditions for genocide by instilling an ideology of ethnic division and fear among the Hutu population (Chrétien et al., 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Uvin, 1997). In the past, Sri Lanka's education system also actively fostered enmity between groups. Textbooks used by Sinhalese students celebrated 'heroes' who had vanquished Tamils, and presented Sinhalese Buddhists as the only true Sri Lankans. Neither Sinhalese nor Tamil textbooks portrayed the other group positively (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Heyneman, 2003).

Disputes over curriculum have in some cases directly spilled over into violent conflict. In 2000, overtly Sunni textbooks were introduced in Pakistan's Federally Administered Northern Areas (known since 2009 as Gilgit-Baltistan). The ensuing protests led to violence between Shia and Sunni communities that reached a peak in 2004 and 2005, with the resulting curfews closing schools for almost an entire academic year (Ali, 2008; Stöber, 2007). In the Sudan, the imposition from 1990 of a national education system that stressed one ethnicity (Arab) and one religion (Islam) aimed, in President Omar al-Bashir's words, 'to strengthen

faith and religious orientation and conviction in youngsters so that they may become free, Allah-devoted and responsible persons' (al-Bashir 2004, p. 44 in Breidlid, 2010). While the conflict in Southern Sudan has a long and complex history, the imposition of a different culture has clearly contributed to the violence and strengthened the appeal of armed groups seeking secessionist solutions (Breidlid, 2010).

Reinforcing a culture of violence

If schools are to contribute to the development of peaceful societies, they have to offer children a peaceful environment. Schools and teachers can help pupils learn to resolve conflicts through dialogue and to see violence as unacceptable. Unfortunately, schools are themselves often marked by high levels of violence and frequently socialize young people into violent behaviour.

Throughout the world, students are routinely exposed to many forms of violence. Corporal punishment is one of those forms. Teachers are legally entitled to physically punish children in at least eighty-six countries (Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2010b). In many societies, wider patterns of violence involving criminal gangs or politically motivated groups also enter the school environment. The wider 'culture of violence' encompasses physical, psychological and sexual harassment, bullying, abuse and assault (Jones et al., 2008; Plan, 2008).

Violence against children in schools has many physical, psychological and social effects, and a significant impact on educational participation and attainment. It can also increase the risk of children themselves behaving aggressively and engaging in criminal activity and other risk-taking behaviour (Pinheiro, 2006). While direct links are often difficult to identify, evidence from several countries shows that violence in schools can become part of a cycle of conflict. One such country is Colombia (Box 3.8).

Segregated education reinforcing separate identities

Schools are where children develop one of the most vital of all skills – the ability to see themselves as part of a wider community. The process of learning to appreciate and respect the diversity of that community, and to develop a sense of one's place within it, is a crucial source of social cohesion and peaceful conflict resolution. It is in school that children can come to appreciate the fact that nationality, language, skin colour, faith and ethnic

Schools are often viewed by extreme nationalists and by exponents of ethnic, faith or regional politics as a political battleground

Box 3.8: Violence spills over into Colombian schools

Schools have not been immune to the high level of violence in Colombian society. Students witnessing or participating in violence in their communities bring the resulting behavioural traits to school, and children experiencing violence in school carry the effects back to their communities.

Children and adolescents living in municipalities and neighbourhoods with high levels of violent conflict and homicides demonstrate higher levels of aggression and school-based bullying. Surveys in Bogotá schools in 2006 and 2007 suggested that this had negative effects on interpersonal relationships, with rivalry and violence common, and with power disputes and competition for popularity associated with the possession of money, drugs and weapons. Discussing concerns over very high levels of theft, firearms and bullying in Bogotá schools, a town councillor identified 'defending oneself from violence by means of violence' as 'the principle of paramilitarism' and noted that the pervasive nature of violence made it impossible to isolate students from it. Recognizing that schools can help create a culture of peace, the Colombian government has introduced initiatives to address school-based violence, with some positive effects (see Chapter 5).

Sources: Chaux et al. (2009); Martínez (2008); Villar-Márquez (2010).

In Kosovo, education segregation continues to hamper dialogue and social cohesion

background are all part of a person's makeup. As Amartya Sen has written: 'the importance of one identity need not obliterate the importance of others' (Sen, 2006, p. 19).

Children who define their identity in broad terms are less likely to be susceptible to hostile political mobilization along group lines as adults. It follows that when schools divide or categorize children on the basis of narrow identity groups, this may make them more susceptible to such mobilization. That does not mean societies with schools allowing group-based selection based on religion or other criteria are automatically more prone to violence. If that were the case, the Netherlands and Belgium would be among the world's most violent societies. In some circumstances, however, segregated schools can reinforce mistrust between groups. Survey evidence from Lebanon, Malaysia and Northern Ireland supports this view, finding that those educated in segregated schools have, on average, more negative perceptions of groups other than their own than do those educated in integrated schools (Brown, forthcoming; Frayha, 2003; Kerr, forthcoming).

The Northern Ireland experience is instructive. Schools almost entirely segregated along religious lines were part of a wider system of social inequalities between identity-based groups.

Catholic children left school with lower qualifications and fewer job opportunities, on average, partly because Catholic schools received less funding from the state. As well as reinforcing social divisions, segregation of schools encouraged children to think of themselves as different – a lesson reinforced through differing approaches to aspects of the curriculum, such as the teaching of Irish, religious education and history (Smith, 2010a).

Another example of divided education reinforcing group-based divisions comes from Kosovo.¹⁴ From 1989, Serbian was the sole official language of instruction, and schools that taught in Albanian were closed. The curriculum was standardized along Serbian lines. In response, Kosovo Albanians established an extensive system of parallel schools, often in private homes, providing Albanian-language instruction. From 1992, these schools operated under the auspices of a Kosovo government in exile deemed illegal by Serb authorities. The parallel education system became a centrepiece of Kosovo Albanian resistance in the lead-up to armed conflict (Nelles, 2005; Sommers and Buckland, 2004). Segregation continues to hamper dialogue and social cohesion, with Kosovo Albanian students attending schools run by the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and Kosovo Serb students attending schools run by the Serbian Ministry of Education (OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2009).

If peace settlements are based on educational separatism, school systems can perpetuate the attitudes that make societies prone to armed conflict unless there are countervailing efforts to rebuild contacts, develop a peacebuilding curriculum and ensure that schools do not act as a conduit for prejudice. Peace settlements that devolve authority run similar risks, as they can fragment education. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement of 1995 sought to create a basis for nation-building through high levels of decentralization. The resulting fragmentation of education authority has made it more difficult to forge a multi-ethnic national identity (Box 3.9).

The experience of education reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates a wider problem in framing identities that are conducive to peace. More than in most countries, the security of future generations hinges critically on the development of a school system that is a source of tolerance and understanding. Such a system has yet to emerge. Even before the Dayton Agreement, a great deal

14. All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.

of progress had been made in reconstructing school infrastructure. Yet social reconstruction has lagged far behind. In 2001, the Office of the High Representative acknowledged that schools 'are still being used to spread ethnic hatred, intolerance and division' (Office of the High Representative, 2001). While efforts are being made to change this picture, the danger remains that fragmented governance and segregated schools will reinforce narrow ethnic and nationalist identities.

If there is one country that symbolizes the potential for education to reinforce social division, it is Rwanda. After independence, Hutu political leaders aimed to overturn what they saw as unfair education advantages inherited by Tutsis from the colonial era. An ethnic quota policy known as *iringaniza* (roughly, 'social justice') was introduced, limiting Tutsi presence in schools and other institutions to a level consistent with their 'official' share in the overall population – around 9%. Part of the rationale was to increase Hutu participation in schools with high learning achievement. However, the quota policy was also used to enforce discriminatory practices, including a mass purge of Tutsis from universities, the church and public posts (McLean Hilker, 2010; Prunier, 1995). More tragically, the use of schools to ethnically 'label' children and enforce rigid group identity rules enabled the Interahamwe militia responsible for the genocide to identify Tutsi children from school registers (Prunier, 1995).

Conclusion

Education is seldom, if ever, the primary motivation for armed conflict. However bad the perceived injustice, groups rarely resort to violence just because of school governance systems, approaches to the curriculum or language policy. Perhaps that is why the role of education in contributing to violent conflict has been so widely neglected. That neglect has played no small part in exposing countries to elevated risk of armed conflict. The lesson from history, and the message of this section, is that governments ignore the very real links between education and violence at their peril. Failure to recognize that approaches to education can fuel wider grievances is dangerous, because policy choices can propel countries further along the path to violent conflict. It is also wasteful, because it results in a loss of opportunities to exploit the potential for education to act as a force for peace. □

Box 3.9: Fragmented governance, fragmented education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

If the voters of tomorrow are educated according to the norms of nationalist division and exclusionary ethnic principles, [Bosnia and Herzegovina] will remain at constant risk of further fragmentation or dissolution.

– (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010)

Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which aimed to allow separate 'national identities' to coexist within a single border, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged with a governance structure highly decentralized along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. The danger is that the education system may reinforce social divisions, with adverse consequences for peacebuilding.

The Dayton Agreement has had far-reaching consequences for education, including the absence of an effective central education authority. Today, there are effectively thirteen separate ministries of education: one for each of the ten cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina plus an overarching Federal Ministry of Education and Science, one for the Republika Srpska, and one for the District of Brčko.* A state-level Education Agency was established in 2008, but is not yet fully operational.

Most schools are segregated by ethnicity, religion and language. In some areas, this is a result of geographic segregation caused by ethnic cleansing and displacement. Even in areas with greater ethnic mixing, parents are wary about the security of their children in schools dominated by another community. Rather than enrol children in the nearest school, many parents seek to place children in schools associated with their 'national identity', often some distance away. A small number of schools – less than 3% – operate a 'two schools under one roof' policy, but children from different groups have separate teachers, learn at different times and have different curricula.

Such fragmentation creates several concerns for education governance. The absence of a strong federal ministry hampers the development of national planning systems, undermining efforts to address problems in education quality and curriculum reform. The lack of a centralized system for allocating funds also contributes to wide geographic variations in student performance, undermining prospects for greater equity. Perhaps most important of all, rigid separation of schools and pupils does not help children develop the sense of multigroup identity upon which lasting peace and security will ultimately depend.

* Brčko is a neutral, self-governing administrative unit, under national sovereignty and international supervision. It is formally part of both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sources: Magill (2010); OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007b, 2007c, 2008b); Smith (2010a); World Bank (2006a).

Aid to conflict-affected countries – distorted by the security agenda

Development assistance has a vital role to play in conflict-affected countries. It has the potential not just to maintain basic services during episodes of violence, but also to support strategies for post-conflict reconstruction. Unfortunately, the international aid system is failing conflict-affected states. It is delivering too little development assistance, and does so on irregular and unpredictable terms. Moreover, the use of aid to advance the national security and wider foreign policy goals of major donors threatens to compromise the effectiveness of development assistance.

Development assistance to education in conflict-affected countries is inevitably affected by the broader aid environment. Low levels of unpredictable aid result in school systems being starved of the financing required for reconstruction, while undermining capacity for national planning. The blurring of lines between development and security is a special concern in education, not least because school systems are already on the front line of many violent conflicts. Any perception that aid to education is geared towards winning hearts and minds, rather than combating illiteracy and disadvantage, runs the risk of embroiling schools and schoolchildren even more directly in conflicts from which they should be protected.

Increased and more effective aid for education in conflict-affected countries is a condition for more rapid progress towards the goals set in the Dakar Framework for Action. Humanitarian aid can help to maintain education during emergencies, and long-term development assistance has a key role to play in supporting the efforts of post-conflict governments to reconstruct education systems – a vital condition for building confidence in peace settlements. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed analysis of what is going wrong in the aid system. This chapter briefly looks at the level and distribution of aid to conflict-affected countries and the policy environment in which it operates.

There are compelling grounds for reviewing the shortcomings of the current aid system. Development assistance for conflict-affected countries is above all an ethical imperative and

a condition for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. But it is also an investment in global security. In an interdependent world, the instability caused by armed conflict crosses national borders and affects international peace and security. While the most immediate effects are felt in developing countries, rich countries are not immune to these spill-over effects. The case for reviewing current aid priorities can be summarized under three broad headings:

- *Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.* Conflict-affected countries represent the biggest test in meeting global development targets. They account for a large share of out-of-school children, and they have some of the world's worst indicators for child survival, nutrition and access to basic education (see first section of this chapter). Low levels of human development are both a cause and an effect of armed conflict: armed conflict pushes people into destitution, which in turn can perpetuate a cycle of violence. Aid can help to break the cycle.
- *Global and regional security.* While residents of conflict-affected countries bear the brunt of armed conflict, spillover effects – from conflict, disease, political instability, international crime, terrorism and economic collapse – put neighbouring states and the wider international community at risk. Instability in Somalia has harmed bordering states and created a base for piracy, which threatens regional shipping lanes. In Afghanistan and Colombia, armed groups are part of a wider system of international narcotics trading: it has been estimated that 90% of the world's illicit opium originates in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010a). Conflict-affected countries unable to provide strong health systems can become reservoirs of communicable disease, regionally and globally. They can also provide a haven for terrorism (Weinstein et al., 2004), which poses security threats for rich countries and weakens prospects for peace in conflict-affected states.
- *Conflict prevention is better – and cheaper – than cure.* Most conflict-affected countries are trapped in cycles of violence, with brief windows of peace often giving way to more violence. For the people and countries concerned, these cycles are a formidable barrier to reducing poverty. For donors, they place demands on already overstretched humanitarian aid budgets, diverting resources from long-term

Conflict prevention is better and cheaper than cure

Aid to conflict-affected countries – distorted by the security agenda

development aid in the process. Investing in conflict prevention through effective long-term development assistance saves lives, and is far cheaper than dealing with the repeat emergencies generated by cycles of violence. One study estimates that US\$1 spent on conflict prevention could generate savings of over US\$4 for aid donors (Chalmers, 2004).

The first part of this section looks at overall levels of aid for low income and lower middle income countries affected by armed conflict. The second part explores problems with development assistance, highlighting tensions between development goals in education and strategic goals of rich countries.

Conflict-affected countries poorly and unequally served


Levels of aid to countries in armed conflict have increased markedly in recent years. That aid is vital for maintaining and rebuilding education systems. However, global aid data mask a highly skewed pattern of distribution across countries. They also obscure wider problems in the governance of aid.

How much aid flows to conflict-affected states? To address that question, this subsection looks at data for twenty-seven low income and lower middle income countries on the list of conflict-affected states.¹⁵ Collectively, these countries received US\$36 billion in 2007–2008,¹⁶ or 29% of total official development assistance (ODA).

Global figures such as these obscure differences in aid to individual countries. ODA to conflict-affected states is highly concentrated. In 2007–2008, Iraq received over one-quarter of all aid to conflict-affected countries, and together with Afghanistan accounted for 38% of the aid received by the twenty-seven poorer developing countries. As these figures imply, there are marked disparities in the aid received by different groups of countries (Figure 3.14). Afghanistan received more aid than the combined total disbursed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and the Sudan; Iraq received almost as much aid as the combined total for conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 3.14: Some conflict-affected countries receive far more aid than others

ODA to low income and lower middle income conflict-affected countries, 2007–2008 average



Source: OECD-DAC (2010c).

The very poorest conflict-affected countries have benefited from an overall increase in aid. In 2007–2008, the sixteen low income countries in the group of twenty-seven received US\$16.4 billion, compared with US\$11.7 billion in 2002–2003. One reason aid for these countries is so important is that it represents a large share of government revenue. In total, development assistance is equivalent to domestic revenue (Figure 3.15), rising to over six times the amount in countries such as Afghanistan and Liberia.

The sixteen poorest conflict-affected countries have seen their share of overall aid rise along with their share of aid to education (Figure 3.16). Aid to education in these countries has increased faster than overall aid and faster than the increase in global aid to education. The upshot is that between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008, low income conflict-affected states saw their share of total development assistance rise, along with their share of aid to basic education – from 13% to 18% of the total, in


One study estimates that US\$1 spent on conflict prevention could generate savings of over US\$4 for aid donors

15. India, Indonesia and Nigeria are excluded here because armed conflict affects only parts of these large countries, while their high overall aid levels are associated with programmes in other areas.

16. Figures are averaged over two years to smooth out aid disbursement volatility.

Figure 3.15: Aid is an important source of revenue in the poorest conflict-affected countries

Sources of revenue in conflict-affected low income countries, 2007–2008 average




Notes: The figure covers financial flows in thirteen of the sixteen low income countries classified as conflict-affected in this Report (Chad, Somalia and Yemen are not included). Some figures for remittances and domestic revenue are estimates.

Sources: EFA Global Monitoring Report team calculations; IMF (2010d, 2010e); OECD-DAC (2010c); World Bank (2010f).

Figure 3.16: Conflict-affected low income countries receive a growing share of aid

Share of total ODA to conflict-affected low income countries, 2002–2003 and 2007–2008



Source: OECD-DAC (2010c).

Development assistance flows to basic education rose more than fivefold in Afghanistan and almost tripled in Pakistan between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008 (Figure 3.17). While aid to basic education in the Sudan also increased, it did so on a far more modest scale. Meanwhile, aid to basic education in Chad stagnated at very low levels, and in Côte d'Ivoire it fell dramatically since the start of the 2002–2004 civil war.¹⁸ Between them, Afghanistan and Pakistan received over one-quarter of aid for basic education in the group of conflict-affected low income and lower middle income countries. In itself, this does not point to a mismatch between needs and allocation, and both countries face very large financing gaps in education. However, so does the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which received less than one-quarter of the aid provided to Pakistan, and the Sudan, which received less than half as much aid as Iraq.

Another way to assess the alignment of needs and aid is to examine estimates of national financing gaps for achieving the Education for All goals (EPDC and UNESCO, 2009). Given the large number of out-of-school children, low levels of literacy, and costs associated with classroom construction and teacher recruitment, low income conflict-affected countries face far higher costs than other low income countries. On average, their estimated per-pupil financing gap is around US\$69, compared with US\$55 for all low income

The Sudan received less than half as much aid to basic education as Iraq

the latter case (Figure 3.16).¹⁷ However, this change has done little to narrow the large financing gap in education, partly because of the way aid is distributed among countries.

Disparities in aid for education

How closely is international aid for education to conflict-affected states aligned with need? There is no simple formula for addressing that question. However, the skewed pattern of overall aid is reflected in a skewed distribution of development assistance for basic education. The marked increase in support to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan stands in stark contrast to the experience of many other countries.

Comparisons between these three 'front line' states and conflict-affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa graphically illustrate the disparities.

17. The group of low income conflict-affected countries differs from that covered in the 2010 *EFA Global Monitoring Report*, in part because some previously low income countries are now classified as lower middle income countries by the World Bank. Aid to basic education for the twenty countries included in the 2010 group showed a similar trend, however, increasing from 18% in 2002–2003 to 24% in 2007–2008.

18. From 2002 to 2003, total development aid to basic education to Côte d'Ivoire dropped from US\$46 million to US\$10 million, with large reductions in contributions from France and the World Bank. When UNICEF appealed for humanitarian aid for education, its requests were largely unmet.

countries. Yet low income conflict-affected countries receive US\$16 per pupil in aid to basic education, compared with the US\$22 average for other low income countries. There are very large variations around the global average. Some countries, such as Rwanda, have received levels of aid that are pushing the country towards the required per-pupil financing level. However, this is the exception to the rule. Even with increases in aid, the vast majority of conflict-affected low income countries continue to face very large financing gaps. Countries including the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia face particularly large financing gaps but receive very low levels of per-pupil aid – less than US\$10 per pupil per year (Figure 3.18).

Aid volatility undermines stable planning


This snapshot raises questions about whether the very poorest countries are receiving a level of aid commensurate with their human development challenges in basic education. The volatility and unpredictability of aid are further cause for concern. With their weak planning capacity and large financing gaps, low income countries need predictable sources of finance. But overall aid flows to fragile and conflict-affected states are twice as volatile as those to other countries (OECD et al., 2010). The level of volatility can be charted by reference to five conflict-affected countries (Figure 3.19). Countries including Chad and the Central African Republic have experienced two-year cycles in which aid to education doubled and then dropped by 50%.

Volatility is an especially serious problem for education, which needs long-term resources to enable effective planning. Erratic flows of aid can translate into unpredictable spending on core education needs and on reconstruction. Large changes from year to year can mean that teachers are not paid and classrooms are not built.

Why is aid to conflict-affected countries so volatile? In some cases, violent conflict may make it impossible to disburse aid that has been committed. In others, a combination of donor reporting requirements and governance problems in recipient countries can disrupt flows. Governments in recipient countries may be unable to meet minimum standards for transparency, and corruption is often a serious and legitimate concern for donors.

Figure 3.17: Aid to basic education has increased more in some conflict-affected countries than others

Total aid to basic education in selected conflict-affected countries, 2002–2003 and 2007–2008 averages



Source: OECD-DAC (2010c).

Innovative approaches can circumvent some of these difficulties, however. Donors can pool risk by operating through multilateral mechanisms. They can also invest in capacity-building and reporting systems that improve accountability – for people in developing countries as well as for donors – and they can work through NGOs to reach vulnerable populations. In addition, donors can tailor reporting requirements to the realities in which they have to operate. This may imply taking risks – but risk aversion can also block aid and make a return to violence more likely. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 5.

The 'securitization of aid'


In their policy statements, donors emphasize a range of reasons for working in conflict-affected countries. The imperative to help countries that are falling behind on the Millennium Development Goals, including in education, figures prominently (Bermingham, 2010; Lopes Cardozo and Novelli, 2010). Broadly defined security concerns are another recurrent theme.

Many donor governments see poverty and state fragility in conflict-affected countries as a source of global insecurity and a national security threat linked to terrorism, weapons proliferation and international crime (OECD-DAC, 2006). Development aid is firmly established as part of the response to

The Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia face particularly large financing gaps but receive less than US\$10 per-pupil aid per year

Figure 3.18: The gap between external financial needs for education and aid received remains large in conflict-affected countries


Change in aid to basic education per primary school aged child between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008 and average annual financing gap per child, selected conflict-affected countries



Note: Côte d'Ivoire, Pakistan and Nigeria were classified as lower middle income countries in 2008 and therefore are not included in the averages to the right of the figure. Sources: EPDC and UNESCO (2009); OECD-DAC (2010c).

Figure 3.19: Aid to basic education in conflict-affected countries is highly volatile

Annual change in aid to basic education in five conflict-affected countries, 2003–2008



Source: OECD-DAC (2010c).

these threats, especially where donor countries are directly engaged in the conflict. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point. In assessing the underlying causes of these attacks, strategic security reviews in the United States concluded that poverty in developing countries, linked to state fragility, represented a national security threat to be countered through development. To take one example, the 9/11 Commission identified low income, youth unemployment and poor education in Pakistan as potential sources of recruits for future terrorist attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2005), and a National Defence Strategy adopted in 2005 called for a renewed effort to strengthen weak states as part of a wider approach to combating terrorism and

organized crime (US Department of Defense, 2005). That call was reiterated in the country’s 2010 National Security Strategy (White House, 2010c).

The linking of security and development agendas, reinforced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is not limited to the United States. Governments in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and elsewhere have also integrated aid into wider strategies that span security and development (Birmingham, 2010; Lopes Cardozo and Novelli, 2010; Mundy, 2009; Patrick and Brown, 2007a). Today, donor governments widely view development assistance as a critical part of what is known in the jargon of the aid industry as the 3D approach, alongside diplomacy and defence.

Integrated approaches to security, foreign policy and development make sense. Ultimately, prospects for preventing conflict and reconstructing education after conflict depend on several strands of policy coming together. In the Great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, donor countries need a planning framework that extends across foreign policy (to secure effective United Nations interventions and resolve conflicts between neighbouring states), security (to rebuild effective police and army forces and the rule of law) and development (through long-term investment in the infrastructure and education of regions such as Southern Sudan and the northern Democratic Republic of the Congo) to create the conditions for a sustainable peace. Failure in any one area will undermine progress on all fronts. One reason the large amount of assistance provided over the years to the Great Lakes region has produced such modest outcomes is that developed-country governments have not made the region a foreign policy priority. There has been little investment in diplomatic activity for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. ‘Whole of government’ approaches hold out the prospect of greater policy coherence (OECD-DAC, 2006).

Yet the dangers inherent in the 3D approach have to be recognized. One obvious concern is that national security considerations will override other priorities. If development is subordinated to military and foreign policy goals, poverty reduction will inevitably slip down the agenda. Moreover, the use of aid to pursue what are perceived by actors in conflict-affected countries, rightly or wrongly, as strategic objectives for donor countries can fuel violence.

Shifting priorities to ‘front line’ countries

It is not just in policy statements that donors have linked development and security. As highlighted earlier, some have substantially increased aid to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan – countries viewed as being on the front line in the ‘war on terror’ (Figure 3.20). From 2002 to 2008, aid to Afghanistan more than tripled. Although Iraq received negligible aid before the 2003 invasion, by 2005 it had become a major recipient. Aid to Pakistan has grown more slowly but is on a rising trend.


In Afghanistan, increased aid has gone hand in hand with an expanded military presence on the part of many donors. Forty-one countries have a military contingent under NATO or coalition forces (Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, 2009); meanwhile, all DAC donors and eight multilateral aid agencies have a development aid presence, and sixteen of these donors supported education in 2007-2008 (OECD-DAC, 2010c).

In 2008, the three ‘front line’ countries accounted for over 20% of US aid, more than double the share in 2002. With the United States having announced a tripling of economic assistance for Pakistan, to around US\$1.2 billion in 2010, the share is likely to rise over time (Center for Global Development,

If development is subordinated to military and foreign policy goals, poverty reduction will inevitably slip down the agenda

Figure 3.20: Several donors have increased the share of aid going to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan

Share of total ODA to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan from selected donors, 2002 and 2008



Note: The 2002 figure for aid to Pakistan from the United States is from 2003.
Source: OECD-DAC (2010c).

2010). The UK has registered a threefold increase in aid to the three 'front line' states, while Canadian aid has more than doubled.

Winning hearts and minds?

Warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations.

– Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System Handbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009)

'Hearts and minds' approaches could make schools, schoolchildren and development workers more vulnerable to attack

As the Commander's Guide underlines, the 'whole of government' model can be subject to a variety of interpretations. For some military strategists, aid is a potentially valuable resource for combating insurgency and winning over 'hearts and minds'.¹⁹ The education sector is a natural focal point for 'hearts and minds' activity. Schools offer local populations obvious and highly visible benefits. Yet the type of perspective captured in the Commander's Guide also comes with risks, not least because schools also provide a highly visible symbol of government authority – and an equally visible target for groups challenging that authority. The danger is that 'hearts and minds' approaches to development aid will further blur the distinction between civilians and combatants, in the process making schools, schoolchildren and development workers more vulnerable to attack.

Much of the debate on the role of the military in development has focused on the United States. This is partly because a rising share of the country's aid finance is channelled through the defence and diplomacy wings of the country's '3D' agencies. From 1998 to 2006, the US Department of Defense share of total US aid increased from 3.5% to almost 22%, while that of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) fell (Brown and Tirnauer, 2009). Some see the shifting balance as evidence of the Pentagon and State Department exercising growing influence over the direction of aid strategy (Brigety II, 2008; Moss, 2010; Patrick and Brown, 2007b).²⁰

Approaches to aid delivery have lent weight to this view. Under the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), one vehicle for providing development assistance in insecure

areas, American field commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have access to aid funds 'to respond with a non-lethal weapon' directed towards small-scale humanitarian and reconstruction projects in areas covered by military operations (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009). Assistance to local populations provided under CERP is explicitly identified as an element in counterinsurgency strategies. The emphasis has been on identifying 'quick impact' projects to win local support for external military forces and weaken the hold of insurgents (Patrick and Brown, 2007b; Wilder, 2009; Wilder and Gordon, 2009).

Education projects, most involving school reconstruction and repair, have figured prominently in the CERP portfolio. There have been more projects supporting education than any other sector under CERP in Afghanistan, and school projects have been the single largest recipient of funds in Iraq (SIGAR, 2009a; SIGIR, 2009). Operating through CERP, the United States has emerged as a major actor in aid for education in insecure areas. In Afghanistan, almost two-thirds of overall US education aid spending went through CERP in 2008 (OECD-DAC, 2010c). In Iraq, the entire US aid budget for education, US\$111 million, was delivered through CERP; and this amounted to 86% of aid spending on education by all donors. These funds largely bypass government agencies responsible for coordinating and managing foreign aid (Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, 2009). Disbursement is typically rapid, partly because CERP's operating rules do not incorporate the more stringent guidelines on project design, evaluation and performance required by USAID (Brigety II, 2008).

Military involvement in aid delivery has been particularly marked in the case of the United States, but other countries have also adapted aid practices to conflict environments. Part of the adaptation can be traced to security imperatives. Aid agencies and NGOs clearly cannot deliver development assistance to militarily contested areas without some form of security guarantee. Working through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries including Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have used armed forces to provide security for aid agencies involved in development, though in some cases troops have also participated directly in building schools and health clinics. While few donors are as explicit as the United States in presenting aid as part of a

19. The 'hearts and minds' approach aims to improve citizens' perceptions of the government (and build its legitimacy), and of external military forces.

20. The recently released US Global Development Policy proposes to 'balance our civilian and military power to address conflict, instability and humanitarian crises' (White House, 2010b).

'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency strategy, PRTs are nonetheless part of an effort to win over local populations and weaken support for insurgents. Similar approaches are also guiding aid policies in other countries and areas seen as possible havens for terrorists, including northern Kenya, Somalia and Yemen (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010).

Donor countries that are militarily involved in armed conflicts face genuine dilemmas. Through their aid programmes, they have an opportunity to address concerns at the heart of poverty and violence. On any interpretation of the evidence, countries such as Afghanistan have immense human development deficits that aid can help to reduce. Yet aid delivered by countries that are parties to conflict is unlikely to be seen as politically neutral by insurgents. And all aid donor countries have to weigh carefully the terms on which they use armed forces to deliver development assistance, and the impact of that assistance, in three areas:

Risks to schools and schoolchildren. Involving the military in school construction can put children directly on the front line. Education is already part of the political battleground in Afghanistan and other countries. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that in 2007–2008 attendance in school declined by 8% for boys and 11% for girls and concluded that this was 'arguably linked to increasing insecurity and in particular to threats and attacks against schools and families who send their children there' (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2008, p. 36). The number of reported attacks on schools almost tripled from 242 in 2007 to 670 in 2008. While the attacks cannot be directly linked with the effects of quick impact aid projects, the risks are readily apparent. One study, carried out in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, found communities to be generally aware of the sources of funding for schools, and suggested that PRT support made schools particularly vulnerable to attack (Glad, 2009). A US government audit of an individual school built with military help in Afghanistan has raised wider questions about safety. War-related debris on the site of one girls' school, including destroyed military vehicles in the schoolyard, caused serious concern (SIGAR, 2009b).

The targeting of aid workers. In recent years, there has been a disturbing increase in attacks on civilian aid workers. Since 2006, aid personnel have

been at greater risk of violence than uniformed peacekeeping troops (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010). More than 200 per year were killed, kidnapped or seriously wounded from 2006 to 2009 (Harmer et al., 2010). Six countries have accounted for nearly three-quarters of such attacks: Afghanistan, Chad, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and the Sudan. The blurring of distinctions between civilian and military operators adds to the risks faced by aid workers, undermining vital humanitarian work and holding back efforts to strengthen livelihoods and basic service provision. In Afghanistan and, increasingly, in Pakistan, armed opposition groups see aid workers as legitimate 'enemy' targets. Even aid agencies that scrupulously avoid working with military or political entities are now identified as military actors (Harmer et al., 2010). NGOs operating in conflict-affected areas have warned that military involvement in aid projects could threaten the delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services to communities affected by armed conflict (Jackson, 2010). Part of the problem for international aid agencies in education is that insurgent groups may be unable to differentiate between their own school construction projects and those involving military support.

The development impact. Comprehensive evaluations of projects involving military engagement in aid projects are sparse. While some projects may generate development benefits, others appear to produce poor results at high cost. One example comes from northern Kenya, where building schools has been a key part of the strategy of the US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa to counter terrorism, mitigate violent extremism, and promote stability and governance. Over half the spending on these projects has been allocated to education. Enrolment has increased in some areas, often benefiting girls in particular. But the overall development impact has been negligible, partly because the costs for administration and classroom construction are far higher than in comparable NGO projects and partly because projects have generally been extremely small in scale (a single classroom or toilet block, for example) (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010). Several NGOs have expressed concern that the 'quick impact' focus on school infrastructure can raise false expectations, with new school buildings remaining empty because of a lack of trained teachers to provide instruction (Jackson, 2010).

It is not just the involvement of military troops in aid programmes that erodes distinctions between

In Afghanistan and, increasingly, in Pakistan, armed opposition groups see aid workers as legitimate 'enemy' targets

Some donors avoid working in conflict-affected countries because they consider it too difficult to maintain political neutrality in such situations

civilians and combatants. The use of private military contractors and security firms can have a similar effect, especially when their remit extends to development.

In one recent case, DynCorp, a major US military contracting firm, acquired an international development contractor that it plans to integrate into its operations in some conflict-affected countries. The firm is involved in activities ranging from training of Afghan police and army personnel to relief work in Pakistan. DynCorp's own company branding highlights the range of its work, and the blurring of the line between international development and security. It is described as 'a global government services provider in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, delivering support solutions for defense, diplomacy, and international development' (DynCorp International, 2010). Having unarmed development project managers, some of whom may be involved in school construction, and heavily armed security operatives under the same company brand could reinforce a perception that aid is part of a wider military strategy. One question that arises is how local communities and NGOs in conflict-affected areas will respond to the presence of companies employed by both USAID and the US military. It would appear unlikely that insurgent groups will differentiate between different actors from firms operating across the security and development divide. This raises in turn questions of how the US government coordinates its work with the security and development wings of private firms.

There are other channels through which the national security perceptions of donor-country governments can cloud development thinking. One striking example with a wider resonance comes from Pakistan. In recent years, the country's madrasa schools have been viewed as a recruiting ground for potential terrorists. There is little credible evidence to support this conclusion (Box 3.10). Most parents send their children to madrasas to receive a Koranic education, or to escape a failing state system. The real challenge for Pakistan is to strengthen the state education system and to build bridges between that system and madrasa schools. Yet the generalized international climate of hostility towards madrasas, fuelled by donors, is not conducive to bridge-building.

Rethinking aid for conflict-affected states

Some donors avoid working in conflict situations that make it difficult to maintain political neutrality. Others may attempt to bypass conflict-related policy concerns by focussing on technical issues.²¹ That is seldom appropriate. In any conflict situation, aid may inadvertently be delivered in ways that benefit some groups while disadvantaging others, re-igniting long-standing tensions. Similarly, donors may be perceived as partisan, which limits their ability to provide support to some areas or groups. Given the politically charged nature of education, donors need to pay close attention to three widespread problems in current approaches and adapt their programmes accordingly:

Turning a blind eye. In societies with a history of group-based violence and social tensions, aid is part of the conflict environment. That basic fact is seldom recognized. In the words of one aid donor working in southern Thailand: 'Conflict is an issue, we're aware of it, but I'd be lying if I said we put serious time into it' (Burke, pending, p. 94). Yet failure to consider how aid intersects with conflict can have disastrous consequences. In Rwanda, donors overlooked the way their support was being used by pre-genocide governments to disadvantage Tutsi people in health, education and employment (Uvin, 1999). The quota system used in education to reinforce ethnic divisions added to resentment (Bird, 2009). However, several donors heavily involved in education chose to ignore the ramifications of the system they were supporting.

Reinforcing patterns of exclusion. When aid supports skewed patterns of public spending within countries, it can reinforce the inequalities that feed conflict. The OECD-DAC Principles for Engagement in Fragile States urge donors to avoid spending patterns that reinforce inequalities. However, recent monitoring of the principles has found wide disparities in donor support between provinces within countries, and between social groups in countries including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti (OECD-DAC, 2010g). In Sri Lanka, Tamil areas received a 'drip feed' of humanitarian aid while the bulk of development assistance went to the Sinhalese south (Goodhand et al., 2005). In Pakistan, aid is skewed to the better-off areas, notably Punjab province, and to areas viewed as a security priority (Development Assistance Database Pakistan, 2010). There are good developmental reasons to focus on insecure regions, since they have poor social indicators. The danger is that

21. This is commonly referred to as working around or in conflict, rather than on conflict. Working around treats conflict as an impediment or negative externality to be avoided; working in conflict recognizes the links between programmes and conflict, and attempts to minimize conflict-related risk so that aid 'does no harm'. Working on conflict is a conscious attempt to design programmes in such a way that they 'do good' (Goodhand, 2001).

Box 3.10: Reassessing security threats in Pakistan's education system

The US report on the 9/11 attacks set the tone for much of the received wisdom in donor countries on Pakistan's madrasa education: 'Millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrasas. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available...but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism' (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2005). Madrasas in several other countries, including Nigeria, have also been identified in developed-country government security assessments as a source of militancy and terrorist indoctrination.

Such conclusions are not grounded in evidence. Some madrasas in some parts of Pakistan – such as Deobandi madrasas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas – have been associated with groups responsible for extremist violence. But they are the exception, not the rule. There is no one-to-one relationship between madrasas and recruitment to armed groups, in Pakistan or any other country. Moreover, it is not the case that 'millions of families' in Pakistan send children to madrasas. One detailed estimate found that only about 1% of children attend these schools full time, though many more attend part time.

Why do parents choose to send children to madrasas? In many cases, because they want them to receive a Koranic education. Another important source of demand for madrasa education is the poor condition of Pakistan's public school system. Attended by two

students out of three, that system is in a state of protracted crisis. Chronic underfinancing, poor quality and corruption have left Pakistan with some of the worst and most unequal education indicators in South and West Asia. The rapid rise of low-fee private schools is symptomatic of the state of public education. For many parents who are too poor to afford these schools, madrasas offer a better alternative.

The crisis in Pakistan's public education system, not madrasas, is the real security threat to the country's future. Pakistan has one of the world's largest youth bulges, with 37% of the population under 15, as well as the second largest out-of-school population at 7.3 million. Some commentators warn that those who are in school are not taught critical thinking or citizenship skills, leaving students vulnerable to radical influences outside the school environment. Fixing the public system and ensuring that children gain the skills they need to find employment form the key to tackling a rise in extremism and setting Pakistan on a path to inclusive development.

The public policy challenge posed by madrasas is very different from the one identified by the 9/11 Commission. As a large number of children attend these schools for part of their education, it is important that government agencies and school authorities work together to ensure that the education provided meets basic standards of quality and that learning outcomes are monitored.

Sources: Bano (2007); UNESCO (2010a); Winthrop and Graff (2010).

political leaders in other regions will conclude that donors are further skewing public spending priorities already viewed as unfair.

Inflicting unintentional harm. An inadequate or inappropriate assessment by donors of ways in which education may reinforce patterns of discrimination can exacerbate the causes of conflict:

- One study found that donors working in Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2006 focused too much on external risks of violence from Indonesia and not enough on internal risks from tension between groups and within the Timorese elite (Scanteam, 2007). One aspect of this focus was that some donors avoided supporting the education sector for fear of getting embroiled in debates over the language of instruction, which was giving rise to tensions internally (Nicolai, 2004).

- In Burundi, rebuilding schools without considering their geographic distribution was found to reinforce ethnic and class inequalities that were a root cause of the civil war. International agencies tended to contribute inadvertently to these inequalities by focusing on the most accessible areas and prioritizing the rebuilding of existing infrastructure (Sommers, 2005).
- A study found that donors were building schools in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo without authorization from local authorities. Officials noted that such external initiatives weakened public institutions, undermining attempts to build state-society links. This in turn could threaten peace (OECD-DAC, 2010a).

An inadequate assessment by donors of ways in which education may reinforce patterns of discrimination can exacerbate the causes of conflict

Effective conflict assessments can help unlock the potential benefits of aid to education as a force for peace

Box 3.11: Increasing aid to conflict-affected states – the UK's aid commitments

The United Kingdom is one of several donors that have committed to increase aid for conflict-affected countries. The government maintains that the shift in priorities is consistent with the poverty reduction mandate of DFID. Some NGOs have expressed concern, however, that the move could mark a step towards the 'securitization of aid', with poverty reduction goals subordinated to national security objectives. Is the concern justified?

It is too early to evaluate the new policy orientation. When this Report went to press, the details of a bilateral aid review setting out plans were still unavailable. However, the debate in the UK has raised questions of wider concern that have a direct bearing on prospects for education financing in conflict-affected countries.

Part of the difficulty with the debate has been a lack of clarity over the government's intent. In 2010, around 20% of overseas aid from the UK was directed towards countries defined as conflict-affected or fragile states. The aim under the new policy is to increase this to 30% by 2014/2015, with a particular focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the UK aid programme set to increase by about £4.2 billion over this period, conflict-affected states will gain an expanding share of a growing budget. Aid to these states will almost double from around £1.9 billion to just under £3.8 billion.

In public statements, ministers have cited two broad grounds for the shift in policy. The prime minister has drawn attention to the potential role of aid in conflict prevention and 'trying to stop upstream things that will cost us even more money downstream'. The secretary of state for international development has similarly

emphasized that the imperative to reduce poverty in conflict-affected states and the UK strategic interest in conflict prevention should be seen as mutually reinforcing.

These are compelling arguments that few of the government's NGO critics would contest. The controversy has been over what the new policy will mean in practice. At the heart of the controversy are questions over how the increased aid will be provided, how it will be distributed across countries, and how it will be evaluated.

It is not difficult to understand why aid delivery has become a source of NGO concern. Consider the case of Afghanistan, where UK aid will increase by 40%. Currently, the bulk of aid is channeled either through the multidonor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to which the UK is one of the largest contributors, or through government programmes and NGOs. While none of this aid is ring-fenced from the conflict, it is delivered in ways that are not directly associated with the UK's military presence. This aid has helped to pay the salaries of 160,000 teachers, build national planning systems and – via NGOs – reached communities in insecure regions.

Another channel for UK funds operates in Helmand province. This is an insecure region with a strong UK military presence. The UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team, which brings together DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, includes both British and Afghan forces. The team is helping rebuild schools and provide other basic services, but the military presence raises concern that local communities, aid workers and even schoolchildren

The risks and opportunities facing donors in conflict-affected countries cannot be identified in advance by reference to policy blueprints. Nor can they be ignored. The starting point for aid policy design has to be a comprehensive conflict assessment through which interventions can be evaluated, both for their intended results and for the potential of unintended consequences linked to perceptions from various social groups. Apart from avoiding harm, effective conflict assessments can help unlock the potential benefits of aid to education as a force for peace.

With several donors planning to scale up aid spending to conflict-affected states, important questions are being raised about the place of development in the wider 3D framework.

One example comes from the United Kingdom, where the Department for International Development (DFID) has established a strong track record over many years in supporting poverty reduction and reconstruction in conflict-affected states (Bermingham, 2010). Recent policy statements point in the direction of marked increases in development assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. While these increases will take place in the context of an expanding overall aid budget, several NGOs have raised questions about the balance to be struck between aid for countries in which the United Kingdom is militarily involved and a wider group of conflict-affected states (Box 3.11). These questions have a relevance that extends beyond the United Kingdom.

will be targeted, with development assistance being viewed by Taliban forces as part of a military 'hearts and minds' campaign. For NGOs, the concern is that any increase in financing delivered with support of military security, or as part of a wider security agenda, could lead to schools and aid workers being targeted.

Country selection for aid raises wider questions. The immense needs of Afghanistan and Pakistan in education and other areas are not open to question. Yet these countries are not the only conflict-affected states with a legitimate claim on UK aid. Part of the concern for NGOs is that an overemphasis on aid for Afghanistan and Pakistan might divert development assistance from other conflict-affected countries where the UK is a significant donor, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and the Sudan, and from countries that have been relatively neglected in UK aid, including the Central African Republic and Chad. While UK aid to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan has been growing, the former received only £700,000 for education and the latter £6 million in 2009-2010, compared with £12 million for Afghanistan.

The new aid policy might also have implications for the UK's emerging whole-of-government approach. In the context of conflict-affected countries, that approach operates through the Stabilisation Unit, a joint unit of DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence that includes staff from all three. In Afghanistan, Iraq and the Sudan, where the Stabilisation Unit has an operational

presence, DFID has been a strong voice in asserting its poverty reduction mandate.

The new government has now set up a National Security Council to coordinate the responses of all government departments to perceived national security risks. One concern expressed by commentators is that DFID's influence may be diluted.

The bilateral aid review and, more important, eventual policy implementation will determine whether the concerns raised over the future direction of UK aid are justified. To avoid the potential problems identified in this chapter, the new policy should:

- establish clear rules and operational guidelines separating development assistance from counterinsurgency actions and proscribing direct military involvement in school construction and other service delivery programmes;
- indicate how any increase in aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan will be delivered and evaluated;
- balance the claims of Afghanistan and Pakistan with those of the larger group of conflict-affected countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa;
- make public the expected costs of achieving specified development goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan relative to those in other countries;
- ensure that the DFID budget remains devoted to poverty reduction priorities, with no cross-departmental financing for defence or wider foreign policy operations.

Sources: ARTF (2010); DFID (2010b, 2010d); HM Treasury (2010); Mitchell (2010); UK Government (2010a, 2010b); UK Parliament (2010); World Bank (2009a).

Conclusion

International aid can be a powerful force for good in conflict-affected countries. It can support the efforts of local communities to maintain access to education, provide the finance needed to underpin peace and reconstruction efforts, and support the development of capacity. These are issues examined in Chapters 4 and 5. There are good reasons for increasing aid to countries trapped in cycles of violent conflict. Yet governments and aid donors need to exercise caution in how they approach development assistance in these countries. The overarching purpose of aid should be to reduce poverty and extend opportunities in areas such as education. Working to that purpose in a conflict-affected environment is inevitably difficult,

though innovative strategies can be developed. By contrast, using development assistance as part of a strategy to win over hearts and minds is a prescription for putting both aid and those it serves at the centre of the conflict. ■

The overarching purpose of aid should be to reduce poverty and extend opportunities in areas such as education