Gender mainstreaming: 
Productive tensions in theory and practice

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Introduction
Gender mainstreaming is a contested concept and practice. It is the re-invention, restructuring, and re-branding of a key part of feminism in the contemporary era. It is both a new form of gendered political and policy practice and it is a new gendered strategy for theory development. As a practice, gender mainstreaming is intended as a way of improving the effectivity of mainline policies by making visible the gendered nature of assumptions, processes and outcomes. As a form of theory, gender mainstreaming is a process of revision of key concepts in order to grasp more adequately a world that is gendered, rather than the establishment of a separatist gender theory. Gender mainstreaming encapsulates many of the tensions and dilemmas in feminist theory and practice over the last decade and provides a new focus for debates on how to move them on (Beveridge, Nott and Stephen 2000; Behning and Pascual 2001; Mazey 2000; Verloo 2001; Walby 2001a; Woodward 2003). There has been a significant two-way traffic between feminist theories of gender relations and gender equality practitioners from which both have benefited. This paper explores the potential and limitations of gender mainstreaming as a practical and as an analytic strategy by addressing key underlying theoretical issues as well as comparatively assessing the implications of gender mainstreaming in different settings.

There are at least five major issues in the analysis of gender mainstreaming. First, is how to address the tension between ‘gender equality’ and the ‘mainstream’ and the attempts to re-position these two configurations. Second, is the nature of the model of gender equality invoked by the mainstreaming process, including whether visions of gender equality draw on notions of ‘sameness’, ‘difference’ or ‘transformation’; consideration of the practice and theory of embedding or abstracting ‘women’ and ‘gender’; the inter-relationship between different domains of the gender regime; different conceptions as to what constitutes ‘success’ and ‘impact’; and the relationship between the vision of gender equality and the strategy for its achievement. Third, are the debates as to the relationship of gender mainstreaming with other complex inequalities, especially those associated with ethnicity and class, which draw on the analysis of difference in feminist theory. Fourth, is the analysis of the relationship between ‘expertise’ and ‘democracy’. This addresses the tension between the view that gender mainstreaming is primarily a technical process, to be carried out by ‘normal policy actors’ using an easily provided, neutral ‘tool kit’, and the view that it is primarily a political process of gendered democratisation, in which previously unheard voices representing the political projects and perceived interests of women are newly included in the policy making process. Fifth, are the implications of the trans-national nature of the development of gender mainstreaming. There are discussions as to the influence of international regimes, the development of human rights discourse, and the development of the European Union on gender mainstreaming in both country specific and international settings which require an analysis of processes of policy and political transfer in the context of theories of globalisation and thereby contribute to the analysis of globalisation.

Gender mainstreaming is an international phenomenon, originating in development policies, and adopted by the UN at the 1995 conference on women in Beijing, before being taken up by the European Union (EU) and then its Member States. The analysis
here is situated within this global context, but focuses especially on the role of the European Union as a key actor in developing and pushing forward this agenda and on the variable outcomes found in diverse European countries. Theoretical analysis supported by evidence from comparative studies of primarily countries in the EU drives this account. This paper draws especially on the papers presented to the ESRC seminar series on gender mainstreaming.

‘Gender equality’ and ‘the mainstream’

Gender mainstreaming involves at least two different frames of reference: one emanating from a ‘gender equality’ stance, and the other, the ‘mainstream’. Thus at its heart gender mainstreaming is inevitably and essentially a contested process. Despite this intrinsic conflict there are usually moves within gender mainstreaming to focus on those areas where there might be commonality with the mainstream. The practice within gender mainstreaming is often one of looking for the points of overlap of the agendas of gender equality and of the mainstream, recognising that there are differences in the overall agendas but seeking to prioritise those areas of commonality, as a step in the right direction. In policy practice the duality between gender equality and the mainstream can be sometimes be expressed as the holding of two aims simultaneously: first, the promotion of gender equality and gender justice as an end in its own right; and second, making mainstream policies more effective in their own terms by the inclusion of gender analysis. While the full reconciliation of these two aims is not regarded as a feasible short-term goal, there may already exist some points of overlap between the two agendas. One feature that is often included within definitions of gender mainstreaming is the practice of making visible the way that gender relations are significant in institutional practices where they had previously been seen as marginal or irrelevant, in order to facilitate the implementation of a strategy for both gender equality and for the improvement of the mainline policy.

It is important to note the frequent opposition to gender mainstreaming in order to understand the dualism between gender equality and mainstream agendas. Elgström (2000) suggests that new norms need to ‘fight their way into institutional thinking’ in competition with traditional norms. Other established goals may compete with the prioritisation of gender equality even if they are not directly opposed, such as that of economic growth. This means that the process is contested and often involves ‘negotiation’ and ‘translation’ rather than simple adoption or ‘imitation’ of new policies. Perrons (2003) provides a related account for opposition to gender mainstreaming. She argues that, at least in the UK and perhaps more widely, the goal of the competitiveness of the economy takes precedence over equality considerations, thereby endorsing rather than tackling the low paid work so frequently found among women. The issue is not articulated as opposition to the goal of gender equality, but rather the prioritisation of some other goal. In this instance, the prioritisation of improving the competitiveness of the UK economy is seen to have indirect detrimental consequences for gender equality.

Indeed the reconciliation of the goals of gender mainstreaming and economic prosperity is widely found to be a contested process, despite several accounts which make a strong link, including Walby and Olsen (2002) on gender and productivity analysis, Elson (1998) on the essential role of the domestic sector of the economy for
the provision of labour, Grosser and Moon (2004) on gender and corporate social responsibility, Dex (2004) and Dex, Smith and Winter (2001) on the business case for family friendly policies, and Vinnicombe (2004) on the business case for women directors. In these papers, the contribution of women to economic success is carefully made in diverse ways. Dex (2004) and Dex et al (2001) provide a strong evidential basis for the business case for family friendly policies, using data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey to quantify the benefit to private sector organisations of such policies on their economic performance. Vinnicombe (2004) and Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) demonstrate the links between the appointment of women directors and not only indicators of good corporate governance but also high market capitalisation. They suggest that this correlation is to be explained by the way that women directors act as good role models to women employees and help build companies’ reputations in the market place, thereby attracting future employees.

The conceptualisation of this dualism between gender equality and the mainstream is central to many of the debates about gender mainstreaming. There are a variety of ways in which this mix of contestation and compromise can be analysed and outcomes assessed in multiple registers in several different theoretical vocabularies. These include the ‘frames’ of social movement theory (Ferree 2004; Verloo 2004); the ‘discourses’ of cultural studies/poststructuralism/Foucauldian analysis; the ‘epistemologies’ of Harding (1986); and the paradigms of Kuhn (1979). The postulated end point of the process of mainstreaming can also be described using different theoretical vocabularies. One vision of gender mainstreaming is that it offers ‘transformation’ (Rees 1998), that is, neither the assimilation of women into men’s ways, nor the maintenance of a dualism between women and men, but rather something new, a positive form of melding, in which the outsiders, feminists, changed the mainstream. There are other ways to characterise the outcome. Jahan (1995) contrasts two possible outcomes as either ‘agenda setting’ or ‘integration’, as do also Lombardo (2003) and Squires (2003), while Shaw (2002, 2003) makes a similar contrast between ‘embedded’ as compared with ‘marginalised’. Verloo (2004) and Ferree (2004) refer to possibilities of ‘frame extension’ or ‘frame bridging’. There are further parallel concepts in the field of ethnic politics, where some concepts represent asymmetrical processes, such as, ‘assimilation’, while others imply a more mutual accommodation, such as ‘hybridisation’ (Gilroy 1993). These analogies may be illuminating for the gender context.

The distinction between approaches to gender mainstreaming that are either ‘agenda setting’ or ‘integrationist’ made by Jahan (1995) is used by several writers (Lombardo 2003; Squires 2003), and a similar one by Shaw (2002, 2003). Agenda setting implies the transformation and reorientation of existing policy paradigms, changing decision making processes, prioritising gender equality objectives and re-thinking policy ends. In this approach it is the mainstream that changes. Integrationist approaches are those that introduce a gender perspective without challenging the existing policy paradigm, instead ‘selling’ gender mainstreaming as a way of more effectively achieving existing policy goals. While this approach means that gender mainstreaming is less likely to be rejected, its impact is likely to be less substantial. Lombardo (2003) applies this distinction to events in the European Convention aimed at developing a European Constitution. While most of the feminists who sought to adopt a gender mainstreaming strategy preferred to be ‘agenda setting’, there was drift towards one that was merely ‘integrationist’. The strategic framing of gender mainstreaming is an
ongoing dilemma. In a similar vein, Shaw (2002, 2003) addresses the relationship of gender equality and the mainstream in relation to the proposed new EU Constitution asking whether gender mainstreaming is ‘constitutionally embedded’ or ‘comprehensively marginalised’. She finds that while gender concerns are embedded in the Treaty framework, especially the Treaty of Amsterdam, they are less prominent in the politics of the Convention that was established to develop the Constitution (for example there were few women present in senior positions) and its ensuing white paper.

Frame theory is drawn on by both Verloo (2004) and Ferree (2004) to capture variations in the relationship between gender equality projects and the mainstream. Originating in the work of Goffman, and influentially articulated by Snow et al (1986), frame theory has become a key influence in the theorisation of social movements in general (della Porta and Diani 1999; Diani 1996); and gender mainstreaming in particular (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). Frame theory provides a fluid vocabulary to engage with the contestations over and shifts in meaning that are key to the understanding of social movements and related civil society activities. Two terms in particular have been much used, those of ‘frame extension’ and ‘frame bridging’, which capture some of the ways in which social movements either modify and extend the dominant frame so as to include their own projects or find a way to link or bridge their project to the dominant frame. Ferree (2004) and Verloo (2004) are critical of some features of frame theory, in particular, that it does not carefully enough distinguish among the available discursive structures and resources, the actors’ strategic choices in this context, and the outcomes attained. As they develop it in their work, they include national structures of opportunity as well as the voices and activities of a range of actors as they re-work frames in complex ways. Further, Ferree (2004) links frame theory with comparative institutional histories so as to provide greater depth to the account of the resources on which feminist social movements draw.

A further issue in assessing the outcome of gender mainstreaming lies in how ‘success’ is to be defined. Gamson (1975) and the RNGS methodology (Mazur 2002; Stetson and Mazur 1995) suggest that it is important to differentiate between the inclusion of the policy goals and the inclusion of the actors. In most of the analysis here, however, the interest lies in the policy goals, rather than what happens to the specific actors (this distinction is most tenable if ‘gender equality’ as a policy goal can be separated from ‘women’ as actors in a supposedly representative democracy). The outcome, then, depends on the specific understanding of the goal, in particular on the particular model of gender equality held by those seeking to mainstream gender, of which there are several possibilities.

This is further complicated by the possible change in the nature of the goal during the process of negotiation (Elgström 2000), since these are ongoing socially constructions in a changing context of what is perceived as possible. In such a context, both ‘gender equality’ and ‘the mainstream’ are likely to be changing simultaneously, both in response to each other and to other changes. It is important to be able to capture the continuously evolving nature of the interaction between feminist and mainstream conceptions. The conceptualisation developed by complexity theorists, of such processes being ones between ‘complex adaptive systems’ that are ‘co-evolving’ within ‘changing fitness landscapes’ captures these dynamics more adequately than
simple one-way conceptions of ‘impact’ (Kauffman 1995; Mittleton-Kelly 2001; Walby 2004b). This complexity theory informed approach goes beyond the more static concepts of agenda setting and integration, which tend to imply more stability in the alternative projects of gender equality and the mainstream than might be warranted.

**Contested visions of and routes to gender equality**

There are several different ways of understanding the variety of definitions of gender mainstreaming. Underlying these are three types of question. The first question is whether there can be identified a fundamental set of principles of gender mainstreaming, or whether it is more appropriate to conceive of it as always socially constructed. Second, is the question of whether the models of sameness (equal opportunities or equal treatment), difference (special programmes) and transformation are to be understood as alternative and mutually inconsistent visions of the end point of gender mainstreaming or as complementary political strategies. The third question concerns the implicit theory of the gender regime, in particular, the extent to which the different policy domains are seen as closely interconnected or as relatively independent, since this affects the extent to which ‘sameness’ may be held as a standard in one domain simultaneously with ‘difference’ in another.

The variety of definitions and practices of gender mainstreaming may be understood either as a result of confusion that can be resolved by attending to the difficult task of the development of an appropriate definition, or it may be understood as the result of essentially contested processes that inevitably produce varying outcomes in different contexts. One analytic strategy is to seek out underlying principles in an effort to abstract the essential characteristics of the phenomenon. For example, Rees (2004) identifies three underlying principles: regarding the individual as a whole person; democracy and participation; and justice, fairness and equity. Further she suggests that there are sets of tools that can be identified with each of these principles, including work/life balance, gender disaggregated statistics and gender budgeting. This is perhaps parallel to Nussbaum’s (2000) neo-Aristotelian approach to gendered well-being, which is grounded in notions of human needs and capacities and invokes a universalistic perspective.

In a contrasting analytic strategy, gender mainstreaming is seen as an ‘empty signifier’ (Council of Europe 1998), which can be filled by an almost limitless variety of content, as a result of the social construction (Bacchi 1996) of this phenomenon. For example, Verloo (2004) focuses on the processes by which gender mainstreaming is socially constructed, which vary according to national political context. However, the contrast in approach is largely theoretical rather than substantive in that both approaches recognise that there is a diversity of approaches to conceptualisation of gender mainstreaming, and, in practice, both produce working definitions.

Although all accounts of gender mainstreaming imply significant changes to gendered institutions, a range of different visions or models of gender equality have been invoked. Three models of gender equality have often been identified as key (Rees 1998). The first model is one in which equality based on sameness is fostered, especially where women enter previously male domains, and the existing male norm remains the standard. The second is one in which there is a move towards the equal
valuation of existing and different contributions of women and men in a gender segregated society. The third is one where there is a new standard for both men and women, that is, the transformation of gender relations. Rees (1998) describes the first, as ‘tinkering’ with gender inequality; the second as ‘tailoring’ situations to fit the needs of women; the third is ‘transformation’, in which there are new standards for everyone replacing the segregated institutions and standards associated with masculinity and femininity.

There is question here as to whether the first two models actually constitute gender mainstreaming, because they retain the gender standards of the status quo. For Rees (1998), only the third strategy constitutes gender mainstreaming and has the potential to deliver gender justice because this is the only strategy that involves the transformation of the institutions and the standards necessary for effective equality, while Booth and Bennett (2002) argue that all three are gender mainstreaming approaches.

While the elimination of gender inequality is the goal of the gender mainstreaming strategy, the extent to which this can mean accepting and valuing existing gendered differences is a key source of disagreement within gender mainstreaming theory and practice. This has been a debate within gender theory more generally. While all the definitions of gender equality include equality within each social domain, they vary as to whether a change in the balance of the domains, and the equalisation of any differential representation of women and men in each domain, constitute legitimate areas for intervention or not.

The most frequently cited definition of gender mainstreaming in the European literature is that devised by Mieke Verloo as Chair of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Gender Mainstreaming:

> Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy making (Council of Europe, 1998: 15).

In contrast to Rees (1998), the Council of Europe definition of gender equality implies that differences between women and men are not an essential obstacle to equality:

> Gender equality means an equal visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life. . . .Gender equality is not synonymous with sameness, with establishing men, their life style and conditions as the norm. . . .Gender equality means accepting and valuing equally the differences between women and men and the diverse roles they play in society (Council of Europe, 1998: 7-8).

These discussions contain important aspects of the ‘sameness/difference’ debate that has taken place within feminist theory. This key analytic distinction, indeed often dichotomy, has been subject to much debate within feminist theory (Felski 1997; Folbre 2001; Fraser, 1997; Holli 1997; Lorber 2000; Nussbaum 2000; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Scott 1988; Tronto 1994). This is a multi-faceted debate, which is simultaneously normative, philosophical, theoretical, substantive, empirical and
policy-relevant. Thus within an analysis of gender mainstreaming are the classical arguments within feminist theory about difference, universalism and particularism. Gender can be an example of difference, which has become a major issue in social theory (Calhoun, 1995; Felski, 1997). In particular, there are dilemmas in how to recognise difference, while avoiding the trap of essentialism (Ferree and Gamson 2003, Fraser 1997), and taking account of the global horizon (Benhabib, 2000). Postmodern ambivalence and the prioritisation of situatedness and fluidity (Braidotti, 1994) may be contrasted with a new assertion of universal standards (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999). Included within this is the question of whose standards and from or for which constituency (Squires, 1999)?

It has often been argued that traditional equal opportunities policies are inherently limited because they mean that women can only gain equality with men if they are able to perform to the standards set by men (Guerrina 2002; Rossilli 1997). Can there be an effective route to gender justice in which existing separate gender norms/standards are retained and become equally valued, or is it never really possible to be ‘different but equal’ because the differences are too entwined with power and resources? Some standards, such as equal pay for women and men, may already constitute standards that are already held by women as well as by men. Some policy interventions, such as legislation on equal pay and government policy to improve child care, may be better conceived as contributions to gender mainstreaming rather than as mere equal treatment or special programmes, since they have the potential to transform the association of women with domesticated care. Is gender mainstreaming introducing new hybrid standards of gender justice for human beings, replacing the ostensibly more male oriented standard of the old equal opportunities policies, for instance, by beginning to transform the workplace so that it is organised around standards suitable for those who combine care-work and paid work?

The Council of Europe (1998) specifies the need for the ‘equal participation of women and men in political and public life’ and the need for ‘the individual’s economic independence’, and that ‘education is a key target for gender equality.’ This defines equal participation in political and public life, in education and the achievement of economic independence, as universal goals while other spheres (notably the family and care-work) remain sites of difference. An underlying question here is that of the assumed degree of connection among the gender practices in different domains. If they are coupled tightly, it may not be possible to have equality through sameness in one domain and equality with difference in another. If the links are looser, this may be theoretically and practically possible. This debate depends on an implied theory of gender relations that needs to be made explicit in order to understand the nature and degree of the postulated connections between different gendered domains and the implications of changes in one of them for the others (Walby 2004a).

There is a further question as to whether this three-fold distinction captures a trajectory of development from more minor strategies to larger strategies of gender equality, as is argued by Rees (1998) or whether these three models are in practice complementary, as is argued by Booth (2003) and Booth and Bennett (2002). Underlying this disagreement is the issue of whether this threefold typology reflects different visions of gender equality, or instead a set of policy and political tactics. If it
is the former, then they are more likely to be alternative approaches, if the latter then they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Booth (2003) and Booth and Bennett (2002) argue that each of these three approaches is actually essential for the successful conduct of the others; that they are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. They challenge the compartmentalisation of different types of equality strategies, arguing that the ‘equal treatment perspective’, the ‘women’s perspective’ and the ‘gender perspective’ are better conceptualised as components of a ‘three-legged stool’. They are interconnected and each needs the other. If any of the three elements is weak, then the whole is weakened. They argue that the tendency to associate the gender mainstreaming approach only with the third perspective, the gender perspective, is mistaken, leading to limiting of the strategy’s transformative potential.

An examination of documents from the European Commission and Council about gender equality finds that the European Commission recommends the use of all three gender equality strategies simultaneously. The European Commission (2000: 5) in its ‘Community strategy on gender equality’ states first, that the ‘principle of equal treatment for women and men’ is a fundamental principle of Community law. Second, it notes that action should be continued ‘combining integration of the gender dimension with specific action’. This approach, which appears to combine equal treatment, gender-specific actions and a wider gender dimension, is developed in the European Employment Strategy, the guidelines for the employment policies of member states put forward by the European Commission and Council (2003). The European Employment Strategy notes two routes for gender equality, both ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘specific policy actions’, while the formulation of the policy implies a single standard for equality for women and men. The Council announces that

Member States will, through an integrated approach combining gender mainstreaming and specific policy actions, encourage female labour market participation and achieve a substantial reduction in gender gaps in employment rates, unemployment rates, and pay by 2010 (European Council 2003).

Thus in practice, the European Commission and Council, recommend all three strategies for gender equality. First, they posit a single standard of equality for women and men in employment that is based on minimizing gaps, that is achieving the same level of participation in employment, the same level of unemployment, and the same level of pay. This would appear to have significant similarities to the ‘sameness’ approach to gender equality. Second, there is reference to ‘specific policy actions’ and the naming of policy domains that are focused on women’s activities, which emphasises difference. These include targets for increased childcare, agreed at the Barcelona European Council, so that this is available by 2010 to at least 90% of children between 3 years and at least 33% of children less than 3 years of age. Third, this is combined with a vision of transformed relations between care and employment:

particular attention will be given to reconciling work and family life, notably through the provision of care services for children and other dependants, encouraging the sharing of family and professional responsibilities and facilitating return to work after a period of leave (European Council 2003).
The goal of the reconciliation of work and family life has the potential to constitute a transformation of gender relations. However, the implementation of the policy is open to varying interpretations. Indeed, Stratigaki (2004) argues that this policy has become less about sharing family responsibilities between women and men, and more about encouraging flexible forms of employment.

At least in the programmes of the EU, the three approaches to gender equality co-exist. What are the implications of three approaches to gender equality, that is, equal treatment, special programmes and gender mainstreaming, being adopted simultaneously by the European Union’s governing bodies? Does it mean that the EU is incoherent on gender issues and has inconsistent policies that are in tension with each other (Perrons 1999)? Or, does it mean, as Booth (2003) argues, that they are inherently complementary rather than mutually inconsistent? I believe instead that it is important to distinguish the use of these approaches as visions of the end point of gender equality from their use as policy and political tactics and strategy. If this distinction is made, then both the arguments by Rees and Booth can be sustained, since they are addressing different phenomena.

While some of the above accounts have considered the whole range of social domains as if they were similar in regard to gender mainstreaming, others have suggested that different policy areas may have divergent practices with different visions and routes to gender equality. Underlying this issue is the question as to whether the domains of a gender regime are closely coupled, or quite autonomous? How systematically interconnected are the different domains of the gender regime? This issue can be explored both empirically and theoretically.

The varied practices in regard to gender equality between different areas is implicit in the Council of Europe (1998) text, since it assumes that there can be a model of gender equality based on sameness in some domains, while equal valuation of different activities in other domains. Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2000) find differences in the implementation of gender mainstreaming between five issue areas of the European Union: Structural Funds, employment, development, competition, and science research and development. They explain these differences in terms of three factors: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and networks, and variations in strategic framing by advocates of gender mainstreaming.

Employment is perhaps the field where the development of similar standards, such as equal pay, is the most developed, while other areas, such as the care of children, are more likely to contain at least some elements that value differences between average men and women. Employment is the arena that has been most fully addressed by the EU, because of the centrality of economic development to its core remit (Mósesdóttir 2004; Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir 2004). It is in the domain of employment that the argument that the mainstream would benefit from attention to gender is perhaps most fully articulated. Here, the mainstream is understood as ‘business’ as in Dex (2004), on the business case for family friendly policies because of its contribution to productivity, and in Vinnicombe (2004), on the business case for women directors in terms of the benefits of diversity in the Boardroom for competitiveness and productivity. The mainstream can also be interpreted as the ‘whole economy’ as in
Walby and Olsen (2002), on the implications of gender relations in employment for the productivity of the UK economy.

Grosser and Moon (2004) extend this approach in their argument that the mainstreaming of gender benefits the corporate social responsibility agenda which is simultaneously good for both business and the wider society. They argue that the value of a company can be affected by its treatment of a wider range of stakeholders than is usually included. This is work that goes beyond the domains of the economy to that of governance, understood broadly especially in the work of Grosser and Moon (2004) and Vinnicombe (2004). In this way, employment is not neatly compartmentalised from politics and governance. Further, a significant amount of the work on the EU and employment concerns the importance of the development of legally based regulations (Hoskyns 1996; Pillinger 1992; Walby 1999), and of softer yet still politically-led changes through the development of the open method of policy co-ordination (Behning and Pascual 2001).

In the area of violence against women, there is a double move, involving not only mainstreaming gender into crime policy, but also the mainstreaming of the violence against women agenda across the breadth of policy arenas (Kelly 2004). This is a field which developed later than employment policy and which has not drawn so strongly upon the powers of the EU, not least because the competence of the EU in this area is more limited (Hanmer 1996; Walby 2004a). Yet this does not mean that policy development is confined to individual countries. There has been much policy transfer as a result of global feminist networks and the development of the discourse of universal human rights (Kelly 2004; Peters and Wolper 1995).

Rather than generalising across all gendered domains within a country, it is important to consider the specificities of each domain, and the nature of its links to other domains in order to understand to development of gender mainstreaming. Each domain is likely to have its own institutional history and have been subject to different types of gender equality policy and politics. It is important both to distinguish between different domains and also to examine the nature of the connections between them so as to be able to understand whether changes in one domain are likely, ultimately, to have implications for other domains.

**Diverse inequalities**

Gender equality and gender mainstreaming do not take place in isolation from other forms of inequality. The category ‘woman’ is internally divided by many other forms of difference and inequality. There has been increasing attention paid to the nature of the relationships between these diverse forms of inequality and their implication for the theory and practice of gender mainstreaming (Ferree 2004; Squires 2003; Woodward 2004b, 2004c). On the one hand, attention to other inequalities may dilute the effort spent on gender mainstreaming if resources are allocated elsewhere, if there is loss of focus, if there is loss of appreciation of the specific structural causes of inequality, or if there is competition over the priority accorded to different forms of inequalities (Woodward 2004b). On the other hand, the outcome of gender mainstreaming may be strengthened if there were concerted actions of previously separate communities and initiatives on agreed priorities for intervention and if it
were to lead to a strengthening of procedures for deliberative democracy (DTI 2004; Squires 2003).

One result of the Treaty of Amsterdam is increasing legal recognition of diverse inequalities. When all the new regulations required by Article 13 of the Treaty come fully into effect by 2006, not only will gender, ethnicity and disability be legally recognised grounds on which to file complaints of discrimination, but religion, sexual orientation and age also will be. The implications for gender mainstreaming appear complex. Are the equality tools needed by diverse disadvantaged groups sufficiently similar that they can share institutional spaces rather than each needing their own?

Underlying the practical issues raised by the practical interconnection of gender mainstreaming with other forms of equality and diversity policies and politics is the question of the theorisation of difference and complex inequalities. Much debate in social theory has concerned these issues (Braidotti 1994; Calhoun 1995; Felski 1997; Kymlicka 1995; Nussbaum 2000; Scott 1988; Spellman 1988; Walby 2001a). To some extent, they overlap with the debates on sameness/difference discussed above (Ferree et al 2002; Young 1990). While early concerns focused on the cross-cutting of gender inequalities by ethnicity and class, the inequalities and differences now considered are more numerous, extending at least to include sexuality, disability, religion, nationality and age. Indeed class is now more often treated implicitly, embedded within concepts of ‘poverty’ (Kabeer 2003), ‘social exclusion’ and ‘pay’, than as a focus of theoretical debate.

There are at least two major analytic strategies to address the concept of gender within debates on difference (Holmwood 2000; Sayer 2000). The first has been to disperse gender as a category, so that is understood always together with other complex inequalities rather than a category in its own right. Gender is always embedded within other social forms (Holmwood 2000). Intersectionality with other complex inequalities is always present. In this approach the utilisation of the category of woman is criticised as problematically essentialising and homogenising. The second approach is to retain the concept of gender, while always noting that this is an abstraction since any practical category is always socially constructed. This approach has been supported by the revitalisation of realism as an approach in social theory, an approach that argues for greater depth in ontology, which can be better achieved by abstraction of specific categories that by their dispersal (Sayer 2000).

A range of strengths and weaknesses has been identified with the re-positioning of gender equality projects within a diversity framing (Barmes and Ashtiany 2003; Squires 2003; Woodward 2003, 2004). On the one hand, this potentially can strengthen and improve alliances to take forward particular issues; on the other hand, it can dilute the link of policy with a mobilized civil society grouping and distort the analysis of particular social structural causes of specific inequalities.

Squires (2003) suggests that in constructively addressing the diversity agenda, groups that are currently isolated from each other should be brought into dialogue. Such dialogue could help to resolve the tension between individual egalitarianism and the politics of group recognition that hold back the development of gender mainstreaming. Such dialogue could be understood to be a form of deliberative democracy that could develop new political projects that transcend old barriers.
Woodward (2004b) contrasts the approaches to the relationship of gender equality and other complex inequalities in the US with those in the EU. In the US, early policies that named women and then gender as key categories have been replaced by policies focused on a new category of ‘diversity’. Woodward explores the ambivalence about making women visible as a component of gender equality strategies. On the one hand this is essential if the specific social structural causes of gender equality are to be analysed and the effects of such policies are to be monitored and evaluated. On the other hand she recognises the tendency to then embed and entrench these categories as a consequence of the very policies that were intended to remove the inequalities. Woodward (2004c) reports on the ambivalence reported by women in civil society that reflects these concerns, and the fear of the loss of affirmative action that some think may be entailed by gender mainstreaming. She concludes that the introduction of the concept of diversity into the equality policies of the EU could have detrimental consequences for the goal of gender equality, especially through the loss of the specific recognition of women as a category for policy.

Ferree (2004) addresses the inter-relationship of gender, race and class politics within the context of frame theory and comparative national institutional developments. The institutional history of each country sets the conditions shaping the development of different kinds of discursive construction of equality politics. In the US the history of struggles around race means that it is available as a metaphor for other kinds of equality politics. Further, in the US, race politics are positioned within a framing that is both liberal and democratic, but in which exclusion on the basis of ‘natural’ differences sets the terms of the debate. Hence rights based arguments constitute a master frame for US social movements. By contrast in Germany, class struggle is the dominant motif of equality struggles, with a dominating continuum between Left and Right and a presumption of collective rather than individual articulation of claims. These different contexts provide different opportunities and obstacles for the development of gender equality projects, which are, accordingly, shaped by these conditions. In this analysis the co-existence of diverse equality projects is taken for granted, and the focus is on the way in which they influence each other in the context of the legacy of patterns of historic development. The meaning and potential of different gender equality projects is then specific to its context, and there can be no easy generalisation as to what is likely to be successful outside of this context.

The development of EU equality policy is currently shaped by the process of implementation of Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provides a legal basis for the removal of discrimination on at least six grounds: gender, ethnicity and race, disability, religion and belief, sexual orientation and age. This potentially repositions gender mainstreaming within a wider mix of equality and diversity issues. For example, there is a question as to whether these regulations will entails the creation of more equality commissions, one for each of the strands, or whether existing equalities bodies are to be merged into a new body that addresses them all. Would the integration of the relevant governmental agencies entail the dispersal of expertise, loss of contact with the specific constituencies, and a diluted approach, or can it be an opportunity for levelling up to the best legislation for any one of the groups, more efficient deployment of resources, and a stronger approach?
The UK White Paper about the new Equality Commission for Equality and Human Rights (DTI 2004) proposes that all equalities issues together with human rights issues be addressed by a single body. This would replace the three existing Commissions for gender (Equal Opportunities Commission), race and ethnicity (Commission for Racial Equality) and disability (Disability Rights Commission) and additionally address the inequalities associated with religion and belief, sexual orientation and age and human rights issues. However, despite disparate legislation for each of these issues, there is no proposal for a single integrative act, merely modifications to existing acts, leaving different legal standards for complaints and interventions. There is a renewed commitment to the implementation of a duty on public bodies to promote gender equality, in a manner comparable to the existing duty in relation to race and the promise of one for disability. The implications of these proposed changes have yet to be seen.

The relationship between gender inequality and other complex inequalities is an important but unresolved debate in both gender mainstreaming practice and in feminist theory. The dilemma of either abstracting and naming disadvantaged categories or of integrating with consequent loss of visibility and focus is common to both arenas. There is a two-way street in the exchange of ideas and analysis that makes this a fertile area for both theory and practice.

‘Expertise’ or ‘democratisation’?

Expertise and democracy are often treated as rival forms of governance. Democracy is usually contrasted favourably with expertise, which is regarded as associated with and contaminated by the dominant order. However, a different kind of contrast draws on the connotation that expertise is scientific and thereby politically neutral and above mere sectional interest. Gender mainstreaming sits in the middle of such debates. Sometimes it is represented as if it were primarily a technical process and at others as primarily a political process. On the one hand, it has been understood as a process of developing a more inclusive democracy, by improving gendered democratic practices. On the other hand, the process is represented as one of efficiency and expertise carried out by the normal policy actors with a specially developed toolkit. This issue raises larger questions about the changing nature of democracy in a gender unequal context and about the positioning of ‘expertise’ in debates on democracy. There is a question as to whether it is appropriate to polarise ‘expertise’ and ‘democracy’ as alternative models or interpretations of gender mainstreaming at all.

Beveridge et al (2000) make a distinction between the ‘expert-bureaucratic’ model, involving primarily experts and specialists, and the ‘participatory-democratic’ model involving a range of individuals and organizations. They suggest that these constitute real differences in the ways in which gender mainstreaming is implemented, not just perceptions of such processes. They consider that only the participatory democratic process can accomplish gender mainstreaming as agenda setting rather than integration (cf. Jahan 1995).

Rai (2003, 2004) conceptualises gender mainstreaming as a process of gender democratisation, of including women and their own perceptions of their political interests and political projects into policy making processes. A range of different processes and practices are identified as involved, with a particular focus on the national gender machineries in the state and their relationship with civil society.
women’s groups. The accountability of the national machineries to a wider context that includes NGOs and women’s groups is seen as essential to their effective operation. Gender mainstreaming is seen as a process by which various actors, previously outside the privileged policy arenas, get to have voice within them. This view appears to runs counter to the view that gender mainstreaming is done by the ‘normal policy actors’ (e.g. Council of Europe 1998).

In the Council of Europe (1998) text, the definition of gender mainstreaming incorporates the notion that it is implemented ‘by the actors normally involved in policy making’. This might be understood to imply that, once the political goal of mainstreaming gender equality has been set, the process can be effectively implemented by technocrats and bureaucrats within the policy and state machinery. This approach is further exemplified by that part of the discourse that prioritises the use of ‘tools’, such as those of gender disaggregated statistics, gender budgeting and gender impact assessments (Rees 2004). Here the issue under discussion is focused on how, not whether, to mainstream gender equality. The focus then becomes the resources, such as expertise, that the technical experts have to do their jobs.

The relative significance of expertise or democracy may be an issue of context or one of interpretation. This issue resonates in the papers by Verloo (2001) and Woodward (2003). Woodward (2003) argues for the importance of contextual factors in determining the success or otherwise of gender mainstreaming initiatives. In particular, the level of sophistication of the gender equality awareness within the political environment affects whether state functionaries can effectively implement gender mainstreaming. Where this is high, as in the case of the Netherlands, where some of Verloo’s examples are based, then the normal policy actors may be effective in implementing gender mainstreaming. Where this is low, as is the case in Flanders in Belgium, then the normal policy actors are unlikely to carry out this process effectively. Woodward also draws attention to significance of experts who are outside of government. Further, Verloo (2001, 2003) makes clear that the political context, that is, whether there are political opportunities, strong mobilising networks within and outside the bureaucracy, and appropriate ‘frames’ available, should be expected to make a difference to the process and outcome of gender mainstreaming.

An alternative to polarising ‘expertise’ and ‘democracy’ is to see them as complexly entwined in contemporary practice. An example of this may be seen in the practice of gender budgeting. This is conventionally represented as a process invoking ‘expertise’ rather than one of ‘gendering democracy’ (Budlender et al 2002; Sharp 2003), but in practice the process usually involves both. Gender budgeting requires a specialised toolkit including gender disaggregated statistics, equality indicators and gender impact assessments. The use of statistics and economic data utilises an authoritative technical and abstracted mode of expressing the expertise. It is often presented as the efficient, neutral application of techniques to an already agreed agenda and set of policy goals. However, gender budgeting is often more complex that this (Sharp and Broomhill 2002; Women’s Budget Group 2004a, 2004b). First, it can include explicit statements about the importance of improving women’s lives, that is, it can be situated within a wider framework that is not politically neutral. Second, the representation of the intervention as one that is based on expertise may itself be a political strategy. For example, the UK Women’s Budget Group holds meetings with elected politicians (both Ministerial and backbench MPs), civil servants (both within
and outside the specialised gender machinery of government), and wider civil society (both other Non-Governmental Organisations and individuals), and knowingly positions itself as expert and technical, even as it also simultaneously uses democratic accountability to create pressure for change. There is a duality of expertise and participatory democratic working in this gender mainstreaming that is complementary rather than in contradiction.

These issues insistently raise the issue of the nature of democracy, in particular the inclusiveness of formal elected representation as well as the processes by which political projects are developed and support mustered. The traditional view of liberal democracy has centred on the formal election of representatives to national parliaments, so the narrow conventional definition of democracy focuses on free elections and free political parties in the context of a free civil society (Potter et al 1997). However, recent debates highlight the nature and meaning of representation as well as the relevance of participation in deliberation about political projects (Held 1996). Conventional liberal practices of electoral representation have not delivered equal numbers of women and men in elected positions, nor proportionate members of minority communities. There has been much discussion of the role of different kinds of political mechanisms (e.g. quotas, different voting systems) in explaining variations in the representation of women (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). These discussions have given rise to a deeper consideration of what is meant by the ‘representation’ of women in both Parliament and other political arenas (Squires 1999). Is the presence of women (their substantive representation) essential to their democratic representation (Phillips 1995)? Do women have collective political interests that might be represented electorally or are these either too individual or too diverse for this to be appropriate (Young 1990)? Does ‘identity’ politics essentialise and stabilise the group at stake and underestimate the significance of differences within that ‘group’ in a politically problematic way? Does the concept of women’s interests too readily assume that political interests can be read off from social structural location?

The investigations of associations between political preferences and location with the gender regime have found positive correlations, although these do not constitute a complete explanation of differences in political preferences (Huber and Stephens 2000; Manza and Brooks 1998). The development of feminist theories of the state and democratic representation drew attention to the plurality of arenas that are relevant to the representation of voices and political projects associated with perceived women’s or gendered interests (O’Connor et al 1999; Hobson 2000). These include not only the traditional focus on the elected representatives in parliaments and similar institutions, but also included consideration of the development of gender machinery and women’s bureaus within the state and also the articulation of political projects by social movements and other civil society actors (Stetson and Mazur 1995; Mazur 2002). The relationship between these three – gendered constituencies, elected representatives, women’s units and civil society – has been shown to be important in explaining variations in the impact of feminist projects (Halsaa 1998; Vargas and Wieringa 1998).

Woodward (2004a) demonstrates the importance of the ‘velvet triangle’ linking feminist bureaucrats, trusted academics and organized voices in the women’s movement for the development of gender mainstreaming in the EU. The trio of
relevant female players is slightly from those of Vargas and Wieringa (1998), but the conception of alliances between differently positioned individuals and groups is common to both. In Woodward’s trio of allies there are academics, rather than elected representatives, suggesting the importance of expertise as a key component of these EU gender networks. The development of the analysis of gendered democracy has led to the consideration of the significance of alliances between those in different political arenas but engaged in complementary projects. The analysis of gender mainstreaming includes expertise, in the form of academics, as a key element.

The importance of expertise in the context of the gender machinery, elected politicians and academics for gender mainstreaming is addressed by Veitch (2004) in relation to the UK. The absence of information, knowledge and resources holds back gender mainstreaming by government officials. The acquisition and utilisation of expertise is situated within the processes linking different parts of the gender machinery, other government departments, Ministers, MPs, academic researchers and the legal framework. In a related way, Zippel (2004) shows how governing bodies may have an interest in developing such expertise and working with such non-electoral networks, (using the development of sexual harassment policy in the EU as her example.

‘Accountability’ is a concept within the repertoire of democratic practices, but is slightly off-centre. It has been used in several ways in relation to gender mainstreaming. Rai (2003) argues that national gender machineries should be accountable to civil society NGOs and women’s groups. Grosser and Moon (2004) contend corporations need to be accountable to a wider range of stakeholders than shareholders if they are to deliver value. Accountability implies flows of information into the public domain and a willingness to engage in dialogue with those outside the organisation’s boundary. Transformative gender mainstreaming often requires information be made public and input from actors external to the organisation because it is a practice that intrinsically goes beyond existing neatly bounded responsibilities.

Within democratic theory, an alternative focus to that on substantive representation is that of deliberative democracy, often drawing on the work of Habermas and his theories of communicative action (Habermas 1987, 1991), which is seen to offer the potential to address the resolution of initially conflicting priorities of diverse social groups and communities. Squires (2003) argues that it is essential in order to address gender mainstreaming in the context of diversity. She argues that the debates on gender mainstreaming demand a resolution of the tension between liberal individual egalitarianism and the politics of group recognition. It is only when diverse groups bring to the public agenda their respective views and experiences and engage in democratic deliberation that gender mainstreaming can move forward. One of the limitations of deliberative democracy, she notes, is that it depends on the institutional design of debate to ensure the inclusion of all groups, and how this will happen tends to be under-specified in the theoretical literature. Thus she concludes that the debates on gender mainstreaming and deliberative democracy have much to learn from each other.

Deliberative democratic theory has also produced new interest in the significance of expertise and argumentation (Risse 1999). A conceptual vocabulary has developed that entwines expertise and democratic impulse. Those who have actively used
expertise in pushing forward political projects have been variously conceptualised as ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) and as ‘advocacy networks’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). An epistemic community is defined by Haas (1992: 3) as ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. . .they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs . . . (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain . . . (3) shared notions of validity . . . (4) a common policy enterprise.’ Here specific combinations of expertise and value commitment fuel new kinds of political interventions.

In sum, while expertise and democracy have sometimes been seen as rival sources of legitimacy in governance, the case of gender mainstreaming suggests a strong inter-relationship. This may be conceptualised either as an alliance between individuals and groups or as a new integrated form of community or network in its own right. These alliances, communities and networks often involve academics as well as more conventional political actors, such as elected politicians, civil servants and social movements. The analysis of gender mainstreaming thus involves a reconsideration of the nature of democracy, to consider not only the gender of the elected representatives, the institutionalisation of gendered interests in the gender machinery of the state and an active gendered civil society, but also the incorporation of expertise, especially from academics.

**International regimes, human rights and gender mainstreaming?**

Gender mainstreaming raises important questions about the relationship between global, trans-national politics and national levels of policy making. Gender mainstreaming is a global initiative but is not evenly developed globally. The EU is a lead agency in the current phase of its development, but was not the original source. The implementation of gender mainstreaming is uneven, even when led by a common trans-national political entity, such as among the Member States of the EU. Thus, the understanding of gender mainstreaming raises complex questions as to the relationship between global, regional and national levels of governance. Unlike some more conventional forms of politics and policy, gender mainstreaming is not primarily situated within a national or country frame-work, but rather has been transnational from the start. This poses particular challenges to the understanding of the processes of policy development, since they include issues of international regimes (Ruggie 1998), globalisation (Castells 1997), trans-national polities (Leibfried and Pierson 1995) and practices of political and policy transfer from one location to another (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002).

In the analysis of globalisation there is a question as to how exactly politics and policies are transferred from one location to another. While some traditions of analysis argue that capital is the lead element, (Robinson 2001), the world-society thesis suggests that cultural values are (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al 1997). Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) sees the information revolution leading to new forms of globally networked society. As Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) note, many contributors to this field are more interested in the political, economic and cultural implications of global developments, than in the empirical processes by which trans-national transfers of political practices develop. The focus here is on the way in
which political processes are involved in globalisation. It is has been suggested new ideas and social movements usually develop first in the West, especially the US, then are transferred to the rest of the world (Rogers 2003), though this one-directional transfer has been criticised and other directions of movement suggested (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Snyder 2003).

So, what is the relationship between developing countries, the US, the EU, the global and the national, as sites in the development of different types of gender equality policies? Which polities are takers and which are makers of gender mainstreaming policy and why is this (Behning and Pascual 2001; Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir 2004)? Do the policies remain the same or are they hybridised as they interact with different local conditions (Barry 2004; Laas 2004; Ferreira 2004)? How important are developing institutions of global governance and the political spaces that are associated with them, for example those of the UN and UNIFEM (Elson 2004; Meyer and Prügl 1999; Pietilä 1996; Rai 2003)? How important is the developing discourse on universal human rights (Kelly 2003; Peters and Wolper 1995) and is this a Western, globally hybridised, or locally varied tradition (Ferree 2004; Woodiwiss 1998)?

The principle of gender mainstreaming was initially developed by feminist development practitioners in the 1970s and launched at the UN conference on women Beijing in 1995 (Meyer and Prügl 1999). Its origins lie especially in the context of feminist work within development, where different ways of including gender equity within development processes and goals had long been explored (Kabeer 2003; Jahan 1995; Moser 1993). Since the UN conference, gender mainstreaming has been adopted by the European Union as the basis of its gender policy, which has been deepening and become more wide-ranging since the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thus gender mainstreaming is a further example of a policy development that is not a simple process of diffusion from core countries to the periphery (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), but rather one in which there is complex hybridisation and the development of variations in its forms in different locations.

The process of policy and politics transfer has sometimes been described as a process of diffusion. However, the concept of diffusion has connotations that limit the range of ways in which this transfer can take place. In particular, some processes involve unequal power so that changes may involve degrees of coercion or compulsion. The process of gender mainstreaming is associated with a range of processes. These include: advocacy by civil society groups and movements within a country; transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Zippel 2004), epistemic communities and expert networks (Hoskyns 1996), perhaps drawing on the legitimation of universal human rights (Kelly 2003; Peters and Wolper 1995); isomorphic development within the European organisational field (Wobbe 2003); legal compulsion from a trans-national polity such as the EU (Pillinger 1992); legal necessity following other political decisions, such as joining the EU (Barry 2004); a mix of forms of soft law and targets, as in the EU open method of policy coordination (Behning and Pascual 2001; Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir 2004; Rubery 2003; Rubery et al 2001). The process may involve a mix of processes, for example, pressure from national civil society groups in dialogue with transnational experts (Pillinger 2004).
The development of globalisation has been associated with the development of a discourse of universal human rights (Berkovitch 1999; Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). The rise of a legitimating principle of human rights has been associated with globalisation, and the development of international forums and political spaces, such as the UN conferences on women (Meyer and Prügl 1999; Walby 2001a). The human rights approach has over the past decade been extended to violence against women in that the UN declarations on human rights, since 1993, extend to women’s rights not to suffer violence (Peters and Wolper 1995). Kelly (2003) addresses the development of a human rights discourse and its implications for the mainstreaming of concerns with violence against women into social and crime policy. This has been a global development, utilising political spaces opened up by the UN and global communications. This was ‘not the good will or political acumen of the UN that resulted in the declaration on violence against women and human rights in 1993, but a global coalition of women from every continent who created a new understanding of human rights and lobbied at each and every opportunity (Kelly 2001: 7).’ In this way it contrasts with the development of gender mainstreaming in employment and related economic domains, which, in European countries at least, have been far more dependent upon developments within the EU than at the global level.

However, it is important to distinguish between different kinds of rights traditions, in particular, between human rights, civil rights, and equal rights, since they make different kinds of claims with differing levels of legitimacy in different domains (Ferree 2004). The human rights discourse might appear to allow for the expression of many of the equality concerns across a range of forms of structured social inequality simultaneously, while yet claiming the possibility of universally relevant standards. Yet, historically the human rights approach has been more concerned with minimum standards than with full equality. So, it is to be expected that there will be considerable variation in the implications of ‘rights’ discourse, according to the form of this discourse and the domain and location of its application.

The EU has become a lead actor in the development of gender mainstreaming in the contemporary period, despite its origins in development. The EU has used a range of instruments to pursue its gender equality agenda, from the hard law of legally binding Directives (Hoskyns 1996; Pillinger 1992) to the softer process of the open method of policy co-ordination (Behning and Pascual 2001; Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir 2004; Rubery 2003; Rubery et al 2001). These powers rest in the Treaties that constitute the legal basis of the powers of the EU, starting from Article 119 on equal pay in the 1957 Treaty of Rome and developed most especially in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Whether or not they become further deepened in a European Constitution is not yet known (Lombardo 2003; Shaw 2002, 2003).

Gender mainstreaming has been especially associated with the open method of policy co-ordination in which member state draw up national action plans for presentation to the European Commission on the European Employment Strategy (EES). The EES is a wide ranging strategy that has undergone several rounds of revision and now includes issues of social inclusion. In the earliest version equal opportunities for women and men was one of four pillars. Currently gender equality is one of ten guidelines and includes both gender mainstreaming and specific equality measures (European Commission 2003). The open method of policy co-ordination involves Member States submitting plans as to how they will reach common agreed targets
concerning, for example, the closing of gender gaps in employment and the raising of the provision of child care. It is intended that Member States reach these targets in a way consistent with their national contexts. There is considerable discussion as to whether the open method of policy coordination is effective (Behning and Pascual 2001; Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir 2004; Rubery 2003; Rubery et al 2001; Zeitlin and Trubeck 2003).

There is considerable variation in the impact of gender mainstreaming. This varies by policy domain and also by country. For example, Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2000) find that gender mainstreaming is implemented quite differently in different policy areas within the EU. Mósesdóttir (2004) and Mósesdóttir and Thorbergsdóttir (2004) in their analysis of the policies within the Member States of the EU towards gender equality and towards the Knowledge Based Society note the there are several social models rather than one European model. They detail the nature of the revised EES and its implications for gender equality. They clarify the distinction between the hard legally binding Directives and the soft nature of the EES based on textual arguments data and persuasion. They conclude (21): ‘The drafting of the NAPs has in most cases been a mere formal exercise of translating the EES into previous employment measures and results.’

Behning and Pascual (2001a) present a series of comparative case studies of gender mainstreaming in the European Employment Strategy. In their conclusion, Behning and Pascual (2001b) argue that the implementation of gender mainstreaming is significantly shaped by the nature of the pre-existing gender regime in different countries, showing identifiable continuity with national paths of development of gender inequalities. Barry (2004) describes the enormous impact of the EU on Ireland following its membership of the EU in 1973. This was not least because of the nature of the regulation of gender relations in employment in Ireland was so far from the established EU model. For example, Ireland had to remove its marriage bar that banned married women from working in the civil service and other areas of employment, in order to comply with EU equal treatment laws. Ireland was also a major recipient of Structural Funds, which accounted for 40% of NDP expenditure, and in order to receive these, those receiving the funds had to comply with EU policy on gender equality (Barry 2004). By contrast, countries that also received substantial Structural Funds but where women’s employment was already high enough to meet EU targets, such as Portugal, were not subject to such pressures to change their gendered employment regulations for this reason (Ferreira 2004).

This is likely to be the case also for most of the ten countries that joined the EU in May 2004, since many had established high rates of female employment prior to 1989 (Laas 2004). The different levels of civil society activity are also likely to make a difference, as Ferriera (2004) argues in the case of Portugal. The EU provides much of the specific legal impetus behind developments in gender mainstreaming in the UK (Rees 1998; Walby 2001b). The UK government adopted gender mainstreaming as the basis of its gender policy in 1998 (Cabinet Office 1998) and since then has been developing a series of policy instruments to implement this policy (Veitch 2003), although with somewhat uneven impact (Beveridge et al 2000).

The trans-national level has been a component of the development of gender mainstreaming in almost all places and domains. There is little policy development
that has remained at a national level. Currently the EU is a trans-national actor that is very important in the development of gender mainstreaming, but the origins of the initiative are to be found in development practices and in niches in the emerging institutions of global governance where feminist civil society actors had acquired a place. The US is noteworthy for the absence of gender mainstreaming among its gender equality policies. The transfer of the policy is thus not simply from the most powerful countries to weaker ones, but takes a more horizontal form that hybridises according to local conditions.

Conclusions

Gender mainstreaming is a powerful new development in feminist theory and practice. While most frequently understood as a specialised tool of the policy world, it is also a feminist strategy that draws on and can inform feminist theory. It is subject to two-way development as a result of both theoretical analysis and policy practice which interact in this arena. Gender mainstreaming is essentially contested since it is constituted in the tension between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘gender equality’. There are many different forms of gender mainstreaming, not least because of the different visions of and theories of gender equality and of the social and political processes that might constitute routes towards such a goal. These theoretical issues include but are not confined to that of whether gender equality is conceptualised through sameness, equal valuation of different gendered practices or transformation. The articulation of gender mainstreaming within the debates on sameness/difference and transformation sometimes stumble on the insufficient theorisation of the relationship between the different domains of the gender regime. Yet a key question is whether there can be sustained a treatment of equality through sameness in some domains and equal valuation of difference in other domains, and new hybrid standards in others (cf. the debate on the Council of Europe 1998 text). An issue here is whether these are relatively independent domains that can sustain different values, or whether, over time, there is a tendency to coherence. While many feminist scholars have hesitated at the implications of treating gender as a social system, in the context of the criticism of grand narratives and grand theory, there is increasing social scientific evidence of the interconnections between domains. So there remains a question about the underlying theorisation of the relations between different gendered domains within the gender regime, that is, the extent to which these are tightly or loosely coupled domains.

Gender mainstreaming is always situated in the context of other diverse and intersecting inequalities. The theorisation of these and the practical recognition of such intersectionality is a current major concern. Mainstreaming concerns processes of hybridisation of gender equality and mainline agendas, but the extent to which this should be achieved by embedding and thus dispersing gender, or by abstracting and analytically separating out gender so that it is clearly visible remains an issue at both policy and theoretical levels. Both gender theory and gender equality practitioners have gone beyond the analysis of stable categories of women and men to more subtle and complex accounts of fluid gender inflected discourses. For both it goes beyond the practice of adding women on as a separate topic, to the integration of gender into the heart of the practice or concept.
Implicit within much of this analysis of gender mainstreaming is a theory of the state, of the political and of democracy. There has sometimes been perceived a continuum in gendered theories of the state between a conceptualisation of the gendered state as a coherent body that is the instrument of male interests over female interests and a conceptualisation of gendered political interests as highly varied along with a view of the state as so contradictory and dispersed that it barely exists as a coherent force. The debates on gender mainstreaming demonstrate that the state is a contested arena, with a mix of coherence and contradiction among a set of core institutions and complex linkages to other political and non-political domains. Gendered interests are socially constructed in complex ways rather than essentially related to simple conceptions of social structural location, even though differences in resources associated with social position remain a key contribution to the environment within which political projects are constructed. The project of gender mainstreaming is itself partially constitutive of the terrain of struggle around the state as well as operating within this terrain. The range of relevant forms of power relevant include not only the representation of gendered interests through processes of formal democratic elections, but also through the constitution of specialised state gender machinery, and the constitution and articulation of gendered interests in civil society, both within NGOs and the grass roots. Gender mainstreaming is constructed, articulated and transformed through discourse that is clustered within frames that are extended and linked through struggle and argumentation. Expertise is a form of power, often neglected in conventional analysis, which is increasingly deployed by those representing gendered interests in and against the state, often articulated within epistemic communities that combine values, expertise and politics to become advocacy networks, which are increasingly international. Gender mainstreaming is situated within the development of trans-national global politics, of multi-lateral forms of governance such as the UN and the trans-national polity of the European Union, as well as the development of diverse global discourses of human rights that transcend country boundaries, each of which have disparate outcomes when in articulation with country differences.

While these debates on gender mainstreaming have often acted to challenge and deconstruct existing categories of analysis, they have not led to fragmentation. Instead concepts have been re-built and expanded rather than rejected, so that they can better incorporate gender. These gender mainstreaming debates position inequality and difference at the heart of social and political theory of the state and democracy, not as a separate field of study.

This paper has drawn heavily on the papers presented at the ESRC gender mainstreaming seminar, and it is in these that alternative resolutions of these questions can be found.
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