

# Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa



United Nations Educational,  
Scientific and Cultural Organization



# Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa

Proceedings of the UNESCO–ISS Expert  
Meeting held in Pretoria, South Africa

*23–24 July 2001*

Edited by Ms Moufida Goucha and Mr Jakkie Cilliers



United Nations Educational,  
Scientific and Cultural Organization



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Published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)  
Pretoria, South Africa

ISBN: 1-919913-06-8

© ISS 2001

Printed in South Africa

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# Foreword

*Ms Moufida Goucha and Mr Jakkie Cilliers*

**Human security is indivisible.** A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates the overall need for human security, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The world's future depends upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals.

*(From the Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace)*

As the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States unfolds throughout the world, we are again called upon to renew our efforts both to better understand the nature of the rapidly evolving large-scale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and to strengthen mobilization of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today.

In Africa, the number of conflicts is still overwhelming, as are the consequences for civilian populations. In his address to the 37th Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Lusaka (Zambia) in July 2001, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan, warned that 'we are confronted with persistent conflicts and crises of governance and security that threaten to derail our hopes for an African Union of peace and prosperity'.

But it is also clear that the number of African actors involved in conflict resolution and prevention has increased considerably, as has their effectiveness, in particular in the framework of subregional initiatives. One of the major issues is to explore the ways and means of enhancing that effectiveness at both regional and subregional levels. Indeed, lessons can

already be drawn from the past and ongoing processes of negotiation and mediation with a view to reinforcing conflict-prevention mechanisms, including the discussions on the nature and purposes of an African peace-keeping force.

But the main challenge is to link conflict prevention to the promotion of human security, on the basis of the common priorities already identified and on the widely shared concern for meeting the needs of the most vulnerable populations.

This concern can be expressed through four questions:

- How can we ensure that major dimensions of human security will be taken into account in regional, subregional and national policies as we move from the resolution of conflicts to the building of democratic and stable societies, respectful of all human rights?
- Have we adequately identified all the priorities that require long-term action, or are we limiting ourselves to dealing only with the most urgent matters?
- Which capacities have to be built in order to move forward in the promotion of human security, in particular through education and training?
- Which strategies can contribute to the mobilization of the most vulnerable populations, which must emerge as stakeholders in the democratic process, through participation and dialogue?

With a view to answering these questions and building on the Agenda for Action and the Final Recommendations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions held at UNESCO's initiative in November 2000, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa and UNESCO hosted on 23 and 24 July 2001 in Pretoria a high-level expert meeting on *peace, human security and conflict prevention in Africa*, with the participation of regional and continental organizations and selected representatives of civil society.

This volume contains the proceedings of this expert meeting, the first of a series of regional meetings held under the auspices of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace.

Indeed, Africa is one of UNESCO's key priority areas and action in its favour is being structured around four complementary objectives, all of which are essential for advancing human security:

- promoting human capacity-building in the Member States of the region;
- helping African countries to establish a strategy for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other contagious diseases;
- mobilizing and acting as a catalyst for international cooperation in support of initiatives by African Member States; and

- promoting the active participation of communities and representatives of civil society in the planning and implementation of development programmes.

Particular attention should be drawn to the key proposals for action made at the Pretoria meeting on the basis of a series of in-depth analysis papers, also reproduced here. These key proposals aim at reinforcing many dimensions of the human security paradigm, such as *the relation between human security and the culture of peace, the need for further research on human security indicators, the functions of early-warning systems, the capacity-building of African parliamentarians, common legislative agendas on issues such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, environment, and human rights*. At the same time, the participants stressed the importance of reaffirming the overarching principles of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) as complementary to the concept of human security.

UNESCO and ISS wish to profoundly thank all the participants at the meeting for having formulated these key proposals based on their evidence, research and a wide-ranging exchange of ideas. Indeed, the proposals will be most useful in strengthening the joint action of both institutions in promoting human security but, more importantly, in ensuring that all the actors concerned will be able to engage in a renewed effort in favour of African societies, in particular to ensure security for the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, this is the priority of priorities if the indivisibility of human security is to be achieved.

*Paris/Pretoria, November 2001*



# A Theoretical Conceptualization of Human Security

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One of the primary roles of the state is to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside.<sup>1</sup>

## **Introduction**

A major source of military conflict that provided focus for the Western world's perception of the threat to human security was removed when the Cold War came to an end. Another more local source of insecurity was eradicated in Southern Africa with the abolition of apartheid. However, the threat of military force is not the only security challenge faced by states in the new millennium.

This paper offers an appraisal of recent literature on threats to human security that do not derive from military confrontation.

In fact, as early as the 1970s, the United States expanded its definition of national security to include international economics, when it became 'clear that the US economy was no longer the independent force it had once been, but affected by economic policies in a dozen other countries'.<sup>2</sup> But 'a fully fledged debate about the meaning and reconceptualization of security did not begin until the early 1980s'.<sup>3</sup>

## **Theoretical frameworks behind the new security discourse**

Various attempts have been made to provide an adequate conceptualization of

human security. There are two main contemporary theories of international relations. At one end of the continuum is an approach based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, which maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualization of (human) security. Some call this approach the 'new security thinking'.<sup>4</sup> A postmodernist or 'critical human security' approach that is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics represents the other end in this security discourse. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that essentially attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, while placing greater emphasis on the interdependency and transnationalization of non-state actors.

The neo-realist approach to human security has been advocated by 'structural' or neo-realists such as Barry Buzan in his seminal work *People, States and Fear*.<sup>5</sup> Buzan argued that the 'straitjacket' militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War was 'simple-minded' and led to the underdevelopment of the concept.<sup>6</sup> He subsequently broadened it to include political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are militaristic.<sup>7</sup> Although Buzan examines security from the three perspectives of the international system, the state, and the individual, he concludes that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign state. His analysis provides the most extensive contemporary examination available of human security from a state-combined perspective (as originally proposed in a similar form by Clausewitz).

The 'critical' or postmodernist approach to human security, reflected in the work of Ken Booth, also advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats.<sup>8</sup> But advocates of the postmodernist approach stress quite explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of (human) security, and encompass instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and just about all humankind. In expanding the concept of security horizontally and vertically, Booth argues that human security is ultimately more important than state security.<sup>9</sup> Put differently, the postmodernist conceptualization of security does not equate state security with human security.

In Booth's view, states and implicitly governments must no longer be the primary referents of security because governments which are supposed to be 'the guardians of "their peoples' security", have instead become the primary source of insecurity for the many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country'.<sup>10</sup> This approach challenges the idea of a state as an effective and adequate provider of security to its people.

## Evaluation of the two approaches

Both approaches attempt to address the non-military threats to human security. Their fundamental difference lies in the way these analyses point to action. The broadening of security to conceive of more than just military threats raises the contentious question: 'What is it that is to be made secure?'<sup>11</sup> As a result, the ongoing (security) debate centres on the identification of a primary referent or unit of security has been central to an ongoing (security) debate.

Arguments for the state to remain the primary referent of security should not mean maintaining the state as the sole or unitary referent of security. But rather it means that the security of the state, in particular a state that is weak, should continue to remain primary, since the 'main aim is to build the capacity of the state to provide and maintain security for its citizens'.<sup>12</sup> In other words, although the conceptualization of security must make the security of people and human beings its end, the state, as the means, cannot be dislodged as the primary referent. After all if the state is to provide and maintain security, it has to be secure itself or to use Buzan's words, 'it has to be or become a strong state'.<sup>13</sup>

This explanation, of course, needs clarification. What constitutes a state? Using the conventional interpretation, a state is made up of a government, people and territory. In other words the whole (that is the state), comprising all its constituent parts, has a reciprocal relationship with the individual parts. The state cannot be secure if its constituent parts are insecure or unstable. At the same time, if the state as the institution representing its constituent parts is weak or insecure in relation to other states, its elements will also be affected by such weakness or insecurity.

Booth has argued that state security was used by 'governments that posed as guardians of their peoples' security, to cloak reality and hide what essentially was the security of their regime and its supporters and should therefore be dislodged as a primary referent of security'.<sup>14</sup> This argument need not mean the termination of the state per se as a referent of security, but rather that the type of state that has been unable to deliver security to its people should be questioned. It is such governments that do not allow the state to fulfil their functions of statehood that need to be eradicated and 'dislodged'.

The neo-realist approach to security places human security 'alongside state security as a twin referent in the theory and practice of security'.<sup>15</sup> In equating state and human security, Buzan makes reference to 'the fate of human collectivities' as being the primary object or referent of security.<sup>16</sup> 'Human collectivities' are the citizens of a state. The state becomes the referent of security as the representative institution of human collectivities.

In discussing the state as a source of both threats to, and security for, individuals, Buzan maintains that citizens ultimately have to decide on the lesser of two evils, that is either to accept the threats that come from the state, or accept the threats that arise in the absence of the state.<sup>17</sup> The assumption that whatever threats emanate from the state are likely to be of a lower magnitude than those arising in its absence, 'grows as society develops around the state, becoming increasingly dependent on it as a linchpin for social and economic structures of security. In seeking human security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed. Its bottom line is about survival'.<sup>18</sup>

### Critique of the two approaches

Buzan's state-centric approach within a broadened framework of security is useful in so far as it argues that the state is a vital vehicle for the security of its citizens. However, he introduces the concepts of 'strong' and 'weak' states to show that 'the creation of strong states is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for improved individual and national security'.<sup>19</sup> In other words, the existence of strong states would not, by itself, guarantee security, but weakness in states would certainly encourage and sustain insecurity for their citizens. In this regard, Buzan draws a distinction between weak and strong states on one hand, and weak and strong powers on the other.<sup>20</sup> He explains that the strength of a *state* is determined by the degree of its socio-political cohesion, while the strength of its *powers* refers to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their comparative military and economic capabilities. This distinction sits very awkwardly in argument championing the state as the case of human security, since the attainment of human security requires both a strong state and a strong power. To avoid any confusion as to the unit or referent of security, it is preferable to lump together attributes (i.e. socio-political cohesion and military and economic capability) and the characteristic distinction between weak and strong states.<sup>21</sup>

Buzan acknowledges that almost all weak states are found in the South or developing world, where they find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state.

What Buzan does not make clear is how weak powers and states can become strong. Instead he argues that integration into an 'increasingly interdependent international market economy would contribute to a mature anarchy with its promise of greater international security'.<sup>22</sup> This would be problematic for

peripheral states such as those in Africa, which are not only trapped by historical patterns of underdevelopment, but more crucially, are weak rendering their economic security vulnerable to market forces in an integrated or globalized world economy.

According to Richard Falk, while the new threats to security which defy boundaries cannot be solved by one state alone, the uneven development fostered by a hierarchical international system of states and a global capitalist economy has contributed to an intolerable situation. The security of the rich seems to be increasingly diminishing the security of the poor.<sup>23</sup> Accepting Falk's argument, it is clear that Buzan assumes that an integrated world economy would offer mutual gains for weak and strong states and powers alike.

Robert Gilpin argues that the placement of a state in the international division of labour, defined by the Modern World-System theory as lying between core, semi-periphery and periphery, determines whether a state is 'hard' or 'soft'.<sup>24</sup> Whereas a hard state is able to resist the potential negative effects of external market forces, channelling them to its own advantage and managing its economy effectively, a soft state is pliable, at the mercy of external market forces and unable to control its own economic affairs.<sup>25</sup> States in the developing South and in Africa in particular, being soft and peripheral, in terms of Gilpin's definition, would not find an integrated world economy beneficial to either their economic development or their security. In other words, uneven development within the world's capitalist economy sets structural constraints on the achievement of economic security for the poorest states and their inhabitants. In this sense, African states are likely to experience great difficulty in becoming strong or 'hard', to form part of what Buzan calls a 'mature' anarchy. Nevertheless, Buzan has moved beyond the traditional realist fixation on security associated with military power.

The problem with the postmodernist approach is that it regards as proven the assumptions made by the pluralist theoretical framework of international relations. It accordingly asserts that national sovereignty is unravelling, and that states are proving less and less capable of performing their traditional tasks. For example, Xavier Carim argues that global factors increasingly impinge on government decisions and undermine their capacity to control either external or domestic politics. He concludes that 'if state sovereignty has not actually ended, it is under severe challenge'.<sup>26</sup> For Booth, the logical alternative to the modern state as the unit of analysis is the diffusion of power from states to local or regional communities so as to cater for cultural diversity. For example, the wider problems of economics could be dealt with effectively at the regional level.<sup>27</sup>

There can be no denying that regional integration or cooperation, as a

current trend within the international system, aims not only to address the political and economic interests of member states, but also the security needs of their people. A critical concern is whether regional security structures necessitate a redefinition of state sovereignty. Threats to human security that compel a review of the traditional conceptualization of state sovereignty are especially noticeable at a regional level. For example, the insecurity that arises from illegal immigration has complex causes and effects, all of them relating to humanitarian issues, for example people fleeing from poverty, civil war, drought or economic decline, that must be addressed by regional mechanisms or structures. After all, 'when people face famine or war, no fence, army or government policy, will keep them from seeking even marginally better conditions'.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, regional mechanisms that are created to address such threats are ultimately the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security.<sup>29</sup>

Postmodernists have very often stressed the power of non-state actors such as MNCs, crime syndicates and NGOs to operate beyond the control of the state. This however, should not be taken to be generally applicable to all states; nor should it be construed as meaning an end to state sovereignty. Clearly, non-state actors can more easily overpower weak states than strong states. But throughout history non-state actors have coexisted with states. At times the power of non-state actors has been predominant while at other times the power of the state has been superior. The existence of powerful non-state actors does not mean the death of a state.

It has, likewise, been argued that MNCs have no state attachment and operate beyond the control of any state, including their home country. But, as Howard Perlmutter argues, 'the degree of multinationality of an enterprise is positively related to the firm's long-term viability'.<sup>30</sup> In other words, an MNC will retain its home-country identity because of its need to be protected from outside interference. For example, an MNC would rely on its home country or state to impose trade or other sanctions on another country, if the latter endangers its operations. The example comes to mind of the United States suspending the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status of China in 1997 because of violation of copyrights and patents. Similarly, the United Kingdom was protecting the interests of Royal Dutch Shell when its government failed to impose sanctions on the Nigerian military junta for the execution of the Ogoniland activists.

The assumption that MNCs increasingly operate beyond the control of national governments and the state also ignores the process of liberalization in the world economy, and the new rules that govern world trade and the integration of states into the world economy. The addition of new rules such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment will grant MNCs access to any

economic sector of the host country, ensure the removal of any discriminatory legislation against foreign firms, and guarantee full profit repatriation by the MNCs.<sup>31</sup> The power and mobility of MNCs are not only derived from advances in technology, but, of an economic liberalization process that is driven by states. Martin Wolf argues that the revolutionary advance in technology 'makes globalization feasible, but it is liberalization that makes it happen'.<sup>32</sup> As a result, the MNCs of the advanced industrialized countries are able to operate beyond the control of soft, dependent and weak peripheral states, precisely because of the rules advanced by the former to guarantee uninhibited access to the latter's economies.

For the postmodernists, the apparent lack of order in the international system should no longer dominate security policies, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. East-West confrontation was diminished but the world is far from stable. Advances in military technology have profoundly transformed the dynamics of the world security landscape with the beginning the new millennium. 'A new round of military expansion is in progress among major powers, notably the US with its Missile Defense System, thereby aggravating imbalances in the world military strategic configuration. This undoubtedly poses new challenges to world peace and development'.<sup>33</sup>

## **Conclusion**

An adequate conceptualization of human security for African states would 'link human security with human development'.<sup>34</sup> Economic development will have to be at the top of the institutional agenda, since development and security are 'two sides of the same coin'.<sup>35</sup> Non-state actors do not have the power to bring about large-scale development or to resolve the new security threats alone, without any state assistance. Surely, 'it is only academic to conceive of rudimentary security and development without strong, legitimate states'.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, in the context of Africa's soft states, strengthening the state is a necessary precondition for the institutionalization of peace and security. African states will have to remain interventionist to build the institutional capacity to manage the non-traditional security threats that affect the people of the continent.

## Notes

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- <sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 5.
- <sup>11</sup> Buzan, op. cit., p. 435.
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# The New Africa Initiative: A View from the Economic Commission for Africa

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## **Impetus for a new development initiative**

The New Africa Initiative (NAI) recognizes past continent-wide development programmes which, for a variety of reasons both internal and external, have not been successful. Today a new set of circumstances that lend themselves to integrated practical implementation has come into being. Although Africa's development during the past decades has been a long saga of achievements and failures, Africa's destiny during this new millennium should be defined and shaped by the realities on the ground and the way in which these impact on its future.

## **Role of ECA**

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has been mandated by the United Nations to support the economic and social development of African states, foster regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. Established in 1958 and based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ECA is one of five regional economic commissions under the administrative direction of the UN. It reports directly to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through the Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Economic and Social Development and Planning.

For forty years, the commission has contributed to African development through various programmes. It still has a role to play in the new set of circumstances in which Africa finds itself. The commission helped to set up the African Development Bank (ADB) and a number of subregional organizations

such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), for Eastern and Southern Africa, now the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). ECA also supports technical institutions that lay a firm base for the socio-economic development that African citizens need. The commission has had a hand in many well-recognized economic strategies, such as the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (LPA) and the Cairo Agenda for Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development.

ECA supports initiatives enhancing human security and preventing conflict, and thus welcomes the new set of initiatives which aim to correct the mistakes of the past while setting a clear path for future development.

African countries cannot turn a blind eye to developments at international and regional levels, because a number of these have serious implications for Africa, not only with respect to its relevance in the global economy but for its own economic survival. Clearly these developments could have grave consequences for African people.

At the international level, the emerging economic order, with its emphasis on globalization and liberalization, poses enormous challenges with both threats and opportunities. These forces are redefining the global economic landscape and favouring the deregulation of markets (free-market economy) and free trade, bringing the promise of increased growth and development. Unfortunately, many African countries have not been major beneficiaries of these developments.

The benefits of globalization and liberalization have not been evenly distributed, and to some extent have contributed to the widening development gap between Africa and the rest of the world. The reversal of this trend can only be achieved through a major renewal process, including the transformation of African economies and the adoption of a more proactive and visionary stance. In the light of these considerations, African countries have stepped back and taken a serious look at the future of the continent within the global village in order to define how to position Africa more favourably in the new economic environment.

At the regional level, the continent has to face up to many important policy challenges. To begin with, despite the gains of the 1990s, it has to face the prevailing poor economic situation. Overall economic performance can be considered as fragile at best. Major reforms are needed to consolidate economic gains. If African countries do not improve their economic performance, they will be further marginalized in the world economy.

Another important development is the move from individualized national economies to regional economic integration, political transitions with an emphasis on good governance and democratization, and social transformation

with a strong commitment to addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic and alleviating poverty. Regional integration will assist Africa to benefit from the globalization process, especially in exploiting economies of scale and overcoming the limitations of market size.

African countries must show greater commitment to a gradual integration of the continent. The adoption of the African Union (AU) at the Lusaka meeting in July 2001 is the first step in this direction. Furthermore, African countries cannot ignore or wish away the socio-political reforms called for by the transition to a market economy. Our leaders are also beginning to recognize the need for fundamental changes in their orientation towards better governance and democratization processes, in which the pursuit of national development goals takes precedence over individual interest in political survival.

African leaders must understand that the growing uneasiness and frustration of their peoples is a result of the failure of their leadership, which unfortunately in some instances includes taking up arms. Finally, African countries are also aware of the need to adopt measures that emphasize domestic resource financing. Most importantly, African countries now know that they cannot integrate fully into the global economy through aid, which is becoming scarce and has so far not served Africa well.

### **Africa's new development initiative**

The above are a few of the development issues which provide compelling reasons for formulating new initiatives. Africa is in a 'must-win' state, as any failure to address the deteriorating situation could lead to irreparable damage to the continent's economic development and to its place in the international community. There must be renewed commitment to taking the necessary action to accelerate development growth in Africa, to improve the quality of life of its people and to get Africa out of its present economic quagmire.

It is against this backdrop that the leaders of Africa are proposing a new development initiative for accelerating the region's growth. This New Africa Initiative is based on a common vision of the challenges ahead, and centres on African ownership and management. It aims to bring about economic renewal in order to eradicate poverty at the local level and enhance the continent's participation in markets at the global level. The agenda, which provides an integrated perspective, is a merger of the Millennium Africa Recovery Program (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan with the Compact for African Recovery, which provides the operational and technical orientation. The proposed agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development

plans are to be addressed through participative processes involving the general public. The Initiative, which is intended to achieve accelerated growth and development, focuses on selected key priority areas:

- improving economic governance;
- developing human resources, including education and health;
- developing infrastructure, with particular attention paid to information and communications technologies (ICT);
- improving market access and trade;
- encouraging diversification of African economies, covering issues of competitiveness and enabling conditions;
- improving financial flows and managing debt; and
- developing agriculture and protecting and sustaining the environment.

Other important features of NAI are its emphasis on:

- the need for imaginative leadership that is committed to improving the livelihood of a nation's people;
- mobilization and better management of Africa's development resources;
- the need for African ownership of Africa's development destiny;
- the need to create an environment conducive to improved collaboration among various local development agents and stakeholders (representatives of government, private sector and civil society); and
- the creation of a new global partnership based on strategic and mutual interest.

These features are targeted at achieving the following objectives:

- restoring peace, stability and security on the continent, and promoting democratic systems of government;
- promoting development, reducing poverty and attaining international development targets for health, education and gender equality; and
- raising investment capital from domestic and foreign sources by lowering the risks associated with investing and doing business in Africa.

Given the importance attached to NAI, African leaders have also outlined a comprehensive programme of action for which they will take joint responsibility for implementing. The programme of action covers the following critical elements:

- Leaders will strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the regional and continental levels, and ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace.
- Leaders will promote and protect democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of

accountability, transparency and participative governance at the national and subnational levels.

- Leaders will restore and maintain macroeconomic stability, especially by developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards.
- Leaders will institute transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and the auditing of public sector departments and private companies.
- Leaders will revitalize and extend the provision of education, technical training and health services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases.
- Leaders will promote the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by the development of revenue-generating activities through facilitating access to credit; and by ensuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries.
- Leaders will build the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as well as maintain law and order.
- Leaders will promote the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets.

## **Transformation and renewal process**

Initiative after initiative, whether regionally or internationally driven, has underscored the importance of peace, human security and conflict prevention as necessary conditions for Africa's economic growth and sustainable development. A long list of development programmes has been launched over the years, beginning with the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in 1980. As far back as the 1980s, Africans were aware of the importance of peace and security to the region's economic progress. The Lagos Plan was a blueprint for transforming the African economy based on the assumption that peace and human security were given. Even with this assumption, the centrepiece of the Lagos Plan was its focus on the human dimension of development, that its success should be measured only by improvement in the well-being of the people. This included their living in a secure and stable environment. Successive programmes after the LPA echoed this point.

The United Nations Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986 and 1990 recognized the importance of genuine peace and

security to African economic development. It noted the plight of 5 million refugees and returnees, but also recorded the adverse effects of refugees: first, the burden they impose on the frail economies of host countries, and second, the depletion of the productive capacity of their countries of origin.

The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s also emphasized the relevance of peace and security, noting that 'Peace is an indispensable prerequisite for development. Peace initiatives by African countries should be encouraged and pursued in order to bring an end to war, destabilization and internal conflicts so as to facilitate the creation of optimal conditions for development. The international community as a whole should endeavour to co-operate with and support the efforts of African countries for a rapid restoration of peace, normalization of life for uprooted populations and national socio-economic reconstruction'.<sup>1</sup>

The UN system-wide Special Initiatives on Africa and peace-building, conflict resolution and national reconciliation were among efforts to provide the minimum conditions for economic development.

The Cairo Agenda for Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development recognized that democracy, good governance, peace, security, stability and justice are among the critical factors necessary to create socio-economic development. Without democracy and peace, development is not possible; and without development, peace is not durable. In this respect, member countries committed themselves to undertake programmes aimed at promoting a culture of tolerance, free and fair elections, and respect for the freedom of the press, of speech, of association and of conscience.

The new agenda and the operational blueprint of the Compact for African Recovery have resoundingly reiterated the need to pay particular attention to peace-building, security and conflict prevention. The other preconditions outlined in the new agenda: democracy and improved political, economic and corporate governance, with a focus on public finance management, are also seen as important contributors to peace and stability.

It is obvious, therefore, that the expectations of the agenda reflect the mood of our leaders and the urgent desire to address the imperatives of a new milieu – the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights and sound economic management, which is based on lessons learnt from previous experience. African leaders envisaged a critical role for the state in creating the above conditions for development. Within this context, the agenda strives to strengthen the capacity of the state in the critical aspect of creating conditions for development, by placing value on:

- respect for the rule of law;
- respect for human rights; and
- readiness to participate in effective power-sharing processes.

The agenda, while placing a high priority on capacity-building, has targeted the following areas for action:

- promoting long-term conditions for development and security;
- building the capacity of African institutions for early warning of potential conflict as well as enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict; and
- institutionalizing commitment to the core values of NAI through its leaders.

Efforts to build Africa's capacity to manage all aspects of conflict focus on the means necessary to strengthen existing continental and regional institutions, especially in four key areas:

- prevention, management and resolution of conflict;
- peace-making, peace-keeping and peace enforcement;
- post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and
- combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

## **View from ECA**

### *Timing of NAI*

The New Africa Initiative is timely: it is no coincidence to find three independent efforts have been made to articulate a new development agenda for Africa's economic transformation and development. As the process of articulating the Compact and the related consultations evolved, it emerged that Presidents Bouteflika of Algeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Obasanjo of Nigeria were also developing the MAP initiative mentioned above. Around the same time, President Wade of Senegal announced his Omega Plan for Africa.

These initiatives reflect a renewed sense of urgency in responding to the challenges dictated by events on the international and regional front.

The Millennium Declaration adopted at the UN Millennium Summit acknowledged the special situation of Africa and the need to pay special attention and renewed commitment to supporting an African-owned development agenda. With many positive developments occurring in Africa, including economic and political reforms that emphasize market-oriented economic development, good governance and democratization, renewed commitment to pan-African solutions, and with the growing interest shown by the international community in providing assistance, African countries must seize the moment and sustain the momentum.

NAI is timely in that it reinvigorates Africa's resolve to change the present

status quo from a continent at a disadvantage to one that can compete and has a voice in the international community. It is also necessary for taking action to remove barriers, including structural constraints and productivity issues, which impact on African development. Only then will African countries assume their rightful place in the community of nations.

### *Relevance of issues to development challenges*

All these initiatives have now been merged under a new name: The New Africa Initiative: Merger of the MAP and the Omega Plan. The path towards entering the new world economic order is by no means easy. The challenge is to accelerate socio-economic development and introduce progressive changes to the African economic and political development landscape. Coping with a reduction in resources and creating space for participation of the private sector and civil society are only two of the critical issues that the region has to confront. Developments on the international scene and Africa's own experiences of the past suggest the need for an increased spirit of competitiveness and effort towards efficiency.

Another important element in the changing landscape is the move towards political liberalization which, although currently at a nascent stage, is opening up scope for broader public participation in the governance process. Political reforms are being expressed in many forms: legalized political opposition, the holding of elections, the relaxation of some government controls on political activities and increased press freedom

Increased attention is being given to structural and institutional reforms. For example, more and more African countries are paying greater attention to issues such as poverty, human development, education and training, and infrastructure institutional development, as well as building capacity in various critical areas.

These needs dictate the areas and issues that any initiative to further Africa's development must cover. Responding to them is a daunting task, and projects must be as comprehensive and integrated as possible. Africa's efforts should aim at consolidating these initiatives through the systematic pursuit of critical areas defined in the agenda, which among other conditions place heavy stress on peace, security and good governance as critical for achieving growth and development.

The Compact, which was drawn up in response to a resolution of the ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance on the challenge of financing development in Africa, has been revised towards NAI through extensive consultation with partners outside Africa, the UN family, and a great many African governments

who are to provide technical support for its operation. While NAI provides a development vision for Africa's future growth and poverty reduction, and the Compact emphasizes 'how to' achieve growth and development, they converge on many issues, including the preconditions for successful implementation. Both aim at accelerating Africa's development.

The emphasis on peace, security and political governance as necessary preconditions for Africa's development is now a widely accepted position. The strength of this initiative is that it recognizes the need for greater sensitivity to good political governance as a foundation for peace and security. Building durable peace in Africa requires both good governance and sustainable development, involving a response to the broader political, economic and social conditions needed to prevent future conflict. The importance of these preconditions can be better appreciated from the following facts:

- The cost of the more than half a million guns accounted for through disarmament programmes could free resources that could be directed towards development.
- The more than one million children caught in Africa's civil conflicts, either as conscripts or war victims, represent wasted human resources that could have contributed to the region's productivity.
- Over ten ongoing conflicts – inter-state or internal civil disputes – have robbed the countries and the region of major development resources and economic development and entailed the destruction of property and lives.
- In the Mano River Union countries (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone) alone, more than 300,000 persons have been killed and about one million displaced or left destitute and deprived of human dignity.

This picture will remain the firm reality in Africa if the situation is not addressed on all fronts: conflict prevention, peace-building, peace-making, conflict resolution, national reconciliation, anything that will change the present situation.

*Response to issues related to preconditions: peace, security, political, economic and corporate governance*

For many, including the Economic Commission for Africa, the task now is to translate these ideas into concrete programmes. The goal of individual and collective efforts on issues concerning peace, security and political governance should be to provide technical support through a mix of activities that assist the successful implementation of the agenda. Africa has come a long way in placing peace, security and conflict prevention at the centre of development.

Ensuring peace and security and providing effective conflict prevention is a complex, multifaceted and long-term challenge. Long-term solutions that are integrated and address both the causes and effects of conflict are required to solve the problem. African countries can contribute in the following areas:

- Good governance practices should be promoted, including building the capacity of the institutions of governance within the state, civil society and the private sector to contribute to peace, social stability and democratic pluralism. The state's role in maintaining stable, effective and fair legal-regulatory frameworks for ensuring stability and equity in the political process and market place should be strengthened.
- Information on the destructive impact of conflict should be disseminated and public sensitivity to the issue should be raised, focusing on the role of the media and other information groups. This entails:
  - increased and more accurate documentation of war atrocities and of their impact;
  - capacity-building in society, including the empowerment of networks of women, religious and community groups;
  - strengthening of civil society's role in peace and security matters, especially by organizing more powerful groups to influence public policies and to provide checks and balances;
  - promoting a culture of peace, including the introduction of peace education in school curricula and other activities; and
  - targeting of peace and security activities towards youth and women, the two groups most vulnerable to conflict and most useful in peace-building and close-up conflict prevention.

All these initiatives call for the adoption of practical measures, such as:

- research, to document and provide cogent arguments;
- capacity-building, including empowerment to provide the force and networking needed to make a difference;
- lobbying and advocacy to sensitize all stakeholders to the effects of conflict; and
- a special focus on women, including empowerment to take more active roles in the peace process.

## Conclusion

The discussions on human security taking place in cities around Africa are important for 'the future of Africa' and need to be translated into concrete programmes. The roles of certain stakeholders in the New Africa Initiative

need to be finalized. ECA, as well as other bodies such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), needs to work with regional, subregional and other institutions to carry out consultative meetings and workshops on this topic in various parts of the continent. ECA welcomes plans to organize activities that would further promote NAI, particularly in civil society. It is envisioned that the newly established African Centre for Civil Society (ACCS), which is working to promote and strengthen the capacity of the African civil society community, will be the focal point for such activity.

Finally, ECA, in the true spirit of the Initiative and in line with its own modalities, seeks to work closely with other partners to strengthen cooperation in order to better respond to the needs of the governments and people of Africa.

## Note

- <sup>1</sup> Annual Report 1990, UN Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development, New York.



# A Common Subregional Agenda for Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention: A View from SADC

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## **Introduction**

This paper attempts to assess the agenda of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on peace, human security and conflict prevention, in order to establish whether there is a link between the idea of conflict prevention and the promotion of human security. It also debates whether SADC takes into consideration the principal dimensions of human security, at both regional and national levels. Strategies that have been put into place to deal with the major challenges of conflict prevention and the building of peace and human security are examined.

Before attempting to define SADC's common agenda on peace, human security and conflict prevention, one needs to have an understanding of the strategic context. This will give a clear picture of both the background and the future prospects for SADC as a regional body to champion the agenda on peace, human security and conflict prevention. The problems facing SADC in its search for a common regional security are also discussed.

## **SADC: institutional developments in the regional security arrangement**

### *Origins*

SADC evolved from the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), formed in 1980. Its main aim was to reduce the region's economic dependence on apartheid South Africa and to coordinate investment

and trade. Initially, SADC membership comprised only nine states: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but Member States have now grown to fourteen with the addition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa. During the SADCC era, its security functions were the responsibility of the separate Front Line States (FLS) grouping, which was established in the 1970s by the United Republic of Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia specifically to assist in the struggle for the liberation of the White-ruled states of Southern Africa. The FLS grew out of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa,<sup>1</sup> to which most of the members belonged. It had a security coordinating structure, known as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which discussed security issues. At Summit level, the FLS included representatives from various liberation movements in its meetings. As other countries in the region gained independence from colonial rule, they joined the FLS. Thus, Angola joined in 1976, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994.

The end of apartheid in South Africa had an impact on the original mandate of the FLS with regard to security issues and to the objectives of the organization as a whole. The fact that the political climate in the region had changed from that of aggressive confrontation and White-dominated rule to that of regional cooperation and integration, meant that the FLS mandate extended to cover the political, military and security realms. These changes eroded the original objective of the FLS and meant that it required restructuring in order to retain its relevance and ability to address the new regional challenges.

These developments prompted the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992 at the Windhoek Summit. At this Summit the heads of state and government published a treaty that emphasizes human as well as state security, committing members to upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and setting out objectives which include economic integration and the promotion of peace and security. The treaty also called for the establishment of a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.<sup>2</sup>

In 1993, the SADC Programme of Action proposed the adoption of a 'new approach to security', which emphasized the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security; the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; reductions in force levels and military expenditure; the introduction of confidence- and security-building measures and non-offensive defence doctrines; and the ratification of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations.<sup>3</sup>

In July 1994, SADC convened a ministerial workshop in Windhoek on democracy, peace and security which marked a major step on the road to a common political and security regime. It recommended the formation of a Human Rights Commission headed by judges and eminent persons; a Conflict Resolution Forum comprising the foreign ministers of Member States; a Security and Defence Forum composed of ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence; a SADC Sector on Security and Defence; and an autonomous institute for strategic studies.<sup>4</sup>

The SADC Windhoek Summit of August 1994, attended by heads of state, approved the creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security which was to operate according to certain terms of reference, protocols and guiding principles. The Windhoek initiative was strengthened by the decision of the FLS to dissolve and 'become the political and security wing of SADC'. This notion began to take shape at the SADC Foreign Ministers' meeting on defence and security, held in Gaborone in January 1996. The ministers agreed to recommend to their heads of state that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security be created, which would allow greater flexibility and more rapid responses at the highest level to sensitive and potentially explosive situations. The assumption was that this agreement would allow for a permanent SADC mechanism, while maintaining the flexible approach of the old FLS grouping.<sup>5</sup>

In 1996, at the Gaborone Summit, SADC finally agreed to the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which incorporated the ISDSC. Its mandate included a long list of principles and methods to be employed by the SADC Organ on the prevention, management and resolution of conflict by peaceful means. The list included provisions concerning preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, negotiations, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication by an international tribunal, and the development of various protocols. The heads of state and government signed the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation at Blantyre, Malawi, in August 2001. At the same Summit, the Council of Ministers considered and approved the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, which would be ready for signing by heads of state at the next Summit.

The objectives of the SADC Protocol range from safeguarding the development of the region to developing common approaches to foreign policy. It includes (Article 2h) consideration of the development of a Mutual Defence Pact which would regulate a form of collective security in the region. Such wide-ranging goals need a powerful structure if they are to be attained. The Organ is given considerable authority but the text makes it clear that the Organ cannot act independently and will have to report to the SADC Summit. The Organ chairperson will serve for only one year and can only table matters

for discussion by the SADC Summit through the Summit chairperson. Article 6 of the Protocol outlines the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) which, in a region where diplomacy is often overshadowed by military force, has the rather unenviable task of performing ‘such functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy’. The ISPDC comprises ministers of foreign affairs and allows the Organ to pursue a diplomatic track independent of the ISDSC, which is more likely to be involved in military issues.

The Malawi Summit also confirmed the jurisdiction of the Organ, which is likely to be an important issue of debate. It may involve itself in intra-state and inter-state conflict in the region under many circumstances including conflict over territorial boundaries, a military coup, a condition of insurgency and large-scale violence such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. The Protocol recognizes ‘State Parties’ and ‘non-State’ parties and goes on to list procedures for dealing with each.

Article 11 (4d) states that the Organ will respond to requests by State Parties and will only use diplomatic means where this is not forthcoming. This makes it unlikely that enforcement action will be taken although this is allowed for. The Organ Chairperson, acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend enforcement action to the Summit, though only as a last resort.

The main objective of the Mutual Defence Pact is to operationalize the mechanisms of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters. These include conflict resolution, military preparedness, consultation, collective defence, non-interference, identification of destabilizing factors and defence cooperation. Once they are up and running, these initiatives by SADC Member States should go a long way towards ensuring the achievement of peace, stability, human security. They might even create an environment within the subregion that would allow SADC to concentrate its attention on resources, energy and creative policy formulations that could lead to economic growth and sustainable development.

## **Strategic context**

The end of the Cold War and the imminent demise of apartheid as a government policy in South Africa created great opportunities and challenges for the SADC countries. These opportunities were demonstrated by a dramatic change in the political and strategic environment of the region. Most of the major historical conflicts had either been resolved or were in the process of being settled. This period witnessed the independence of Namibia, the

withdrawal of the Cuban and South African troops from Angola, the commitment to a ceasefire between FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique and, for the first time, democratic elections in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and South Africa. The advent of democracy in South Africa removed the dominant source of regional instability.

The rivalry between the two superpowers, Russia and the United States, to influence events on the subcontinent, the United Nation's role in regional and national conflict resolution and the ideological politics that had acted as a source of tension within and between the SADC countries, all came to an end at this time. The absence of these influences created an opportunity for peace among Member States. These were hopes of a transition towards stability in Zaire, when Kabila's forces forced President Mobutu to step down in 1997. Kabila's new government was thought at the time to offer a more democratic dispensation in what he renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the transition to democracy was fraught with uncertainty and danger. In Angola, the ceasefire agreement and subsequent elections in 1992 were thrown into disarray, when UNITA rejected the election results. Since then the country has remained locked in civil war. In Lesotho, the newly-elected government became subject to a coup in 1994, while the 1998 election dispute resulted in a military intervention by SADC. Lesotho's democracy remains very fragile. In the DRC, hopes of Kabila's government were destroyed by a new civil conflict, which threatened future prospects for peace in the region. The negotiated settlements in Mozambique and South Africa were threatened by ongoing political and criminal violence. In Zimbabwe, the long-standing unresolved land problem and mismanagement of resources began to threaten the democratic process. The Namibia and Botswana border dispute threatened to divide the Member States. These problems provide the new challenges to SADC's prospects for peace and security in the region.

Furthermore, SADC is wracked by a range of formidable problems for which no immediate remedies are in sight. These include an absence of effective governance; internal, political and ethnic conflicts; unstable civil military relations; a proliferation of small arms in private hands; chronic underdevelopment and the attendant consequences of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced people; a debt crisis and net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation. These are compounded by natural disasters like drought, poor planning and prioritization of programmes, corruption and mismanagement. All these problems are exacerbated by the growing political and economic marginalization of sub-Saharan Africa; all are a great threat to human security.

The question is: What opportunities or options are available for SADC to create a common security agenda to address these critical human needs?

### **Opportunities to create a common security agenda**

SADC is characterized by the following strategic features, which provide a good argument for the creation of a common security agenda.

- First, almost all the major threats to the security of people and states derive from internal rather than external factors. The fact that the threats are not external is an added advantage in the sense that states should be able to control and deal with threats of their own making. Nevertheless, the domestic crises in some states are so severe that they undermine stability in neighbouring countries, and often provoke cross-border hostilities. All the same, this is a good reason for other states to assist. They should act as mediators to resolve the crisis, because their own security may be threatened.
- Second, the most serious security problems are political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in origin and character. Although they may give rise to violence, leading to the deployment of the police and possibly even the armed forces, their solutions lie in socio-economic development and the consolidation of democracy.
- Third, certain critical issues such as refugees, environmental destruction, the depletion of natural resources and the proliferation of small arms are common to many countries and transcend national borders. Addressing them will therefore require a high level of collaboration not only among member states but in the wider world community.
- Fourth, in the absence of external military threats to individual states or the region as a whole, SADC could engage in a process of substantial disarmament.
- Fifth, there is the prospect of improving existing institutions and of creating structures to maintain peace, promote economic and social advancement and ensure a future that offers the children of the SADC countries better prospects than before.
- Finally, there is the opportunity to assert the common core values around which the region's ancestors united. The cultures and languages of the South African region are interconnected, and the common historical experiences, of the region's peoples, their common problems and aspirations, remain a firm and enduring foundation for common actions to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in equity and partnership.<sup>6</sup>

All these opportunities can be turned into strategies upon which SADC can create a common agenda for peace, human security and conflict prevention in the region.

### **Approach to a common security agenda**

SADC's conceptual framework on peace and security recognizes the new approach to security, which emphasizes the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security. The model also acknowledges that the security of states does not necessarily have the same meaning as the security of people. The philosophy of the SADC framework is based on the principle that security is a holistic phenomenon that is not restricted to military matters, but incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues. Its objects are not confined to states, but extend in widening circles to include a people, the inhabitants of a geographic region and the global community. Threats to security are not limited to military challenges, to state sovereignty and territorial integrity; they include abuse of human rights, economic deprivation, social injustice and destruction of the environment.

The objectives of security policy go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and protection of the environment. The use of military force is a legitimate means of defence against external aggression, but it is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and settling disputes. The framework also recognizes that states can mitigate the security dilemma and promote regional stability by adopting a defensive rather than an offensive military doctrine and posture.

The conceptual framework adopted by SADC also emphasizes that domestic security policy should pay greater attention to social sources of instability such as the problem of violence against women and children. Rape, wife battering, child abuse and diverse types of harassment have a traumatic impact on the physical and psychological security of over half the population, but are largely ignored by state agencies.

This concept of security sets a broad agenda. Defining problems such as poverty, oppression, social injustice, the need for good governance, the uneven distribution of income, wealth and power, ethnic tensions, poor health facilities, unemployment, AIDS, drug trafficking, and the need for land restitution, as security issues raises their political profile. SADC as a community has considered these factors as the greatest threats to domestic stability and economic development. Therefore these are what governments and societies have to address on a continuing basis. All SADC's protocols and

terms of reference on a common regional security approach are based on these practical principles of the new approach to human security. They recognize the need to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security.<sup>7</sup> The common security regime will provide: early warning of potential crisis; the building of military confidence and stability through disarmament and transparency in defence matters; engagement in joint problem-solving and the development of collaborative programmes on security issues; the negotiation of multilateral security agreements; and the management of conflict through peaceful means. The protocols are based on the recognition that war and insecurity are the enemies of economic progress and social welfare. Good political relations among the countries of the region, together with peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration.

### **Methods and strategies on peace and security**

SADC adopted the strategies of disarmament, the peaceful resolution of conflict and institutional development as the foundations on which peace, human security and conflict prevention should be built. SADC also adopted a policy of 'freeing resources from military to productive development activities'.<sup>8</sup> The rationale was that an arms build-up was dangerous for the region because it heightened political instability, the risk of armed hostilities and the human and economic costs of warfare. Further, it diverted resources from more productive ends and caused a major net outflow of capital, in this way contributing to underdevelopment in many countries and contribute.<sup>9</sup>

However, the disarmament policy has its own problems:

- It is not easy to integrate former combatants into civilian society and to find employment for them. In the case of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, most of the demobilized soldiers remained unemployed and resorted to banditry.<sup>10</sup>
- Defence budget cuts often lead to lower wages and deteriorating conditions in the armed forces, which in turn create a crisis of morale, which could result in an attempted coup, as in Lesotho.

### *Peaceful resolution of conflict*

The Cold War perspective on the use of military force as instrument of foreign policy has not been completely abandoned by the SADC states. An example is

the reinstatement of Lesotho's government following the coup in 1994, in which SADC's diplomatic efforts were 'reinforced' by the threat of a military blockade against the land-locked mountain kingdom.<sup>11</sup> A further example is the 1993 SADC Programme of Action, which states, 'there is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign policy.'<sup>12</sup> SADC would need to agree on conditions under which the use of armed force will be acceptable, and also consider conditions under which military intervention another member state might be permissible. This shows little appreciation by SADC of the most fundamental rule of international law, that the use or threat of force in international relations is only justified in the case of self-defence against an armed attack or, in the absence of an attack, with the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council. SADC's commitment to peaceful conflict resolution needs to be grounded in a formal endorsement of the law on armed conflict.<sup>13</sup>

### *Institutional development*

The SADC Programme of Action of 1993 proposed the following strategies for advancing the regional security agenda:

- adoption of a people-centred security approach, which promotes the non-military dimensions of security;
- creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration;
- reduction in force levels and military expenditure;
- introduction of confidence- and security-building measures and non-offensive defence doctrines; and
- ratification of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations.

Most of these ideas need to be developed into concrete strategies, with established fixed procedures and mechanisms for their implementation.

### **Strategies on security and defence**

The strategies on security and defence cooperation can be drawn from the objectives of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

- *Military threat*: The strategy is to develop a collective security capacity and Mutual Defence Pact for response to external and internal threats.
- *Peace-making, peace-keeping and peace enforcement*: The strategy is to develop a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies, for internal or external use.

- *Conflict prevention, management and resolution:* The strategies are to use preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal; to establish an early-warning system in order to facilitate prompt action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict; to mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts; to develop conflict-prevention management and resolution capacity; and to have full regional cooperation in conflict management.
- *Crime prevention:* The strategy is to work in close cooperation in dealing with cross-border crime, and to promote a community-based approach to local crime.
- *Foreign policy:* The strategy is to develop a common foreign policy that promotes cooperation and common political value systems, so that SADC can lobby as a region.
- *Human rights:* The strategy is to develop democratic institutions and practices that observe and monitor international human rights conventions and treaties.

### **Progress on collective peace and security**

In past decades, SADC heads of state have supported measures that promoted collective security in the region. On the political front, these measures included the formation of the FLS in 1970, SADCC in 1980 and SADC in 1992. Through these bodies, SADC has successfully established a political solidarity that has sustained and deepened the desire for regional integration. SADC has also created common political values, systems and institutions in order to build a firm foundation for democratic governance. This is illustrated by the fact that a majority of Member States has abandoned mono-party one-person rule and military authoritarianism since the 1990s, and embraced political pluralism and regular multi-party elections. This process of nurturing and consolidating democratic governance in Southern Africa is crucial, not only for the broadening of political participation but also to ensure the relative stability of political systems and the legitimacy of governments. SADC has also made progress towards political integration by establishing the SADC Parliamentary Forum outside the formal structures. This is a consultative body which lacks sufficient legislative powers to have real impact on SADC. SADC has also established a SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, which is again a consultative body, and also lacks executive authority to make any real impact on the electoral process in SADC. Although much progress has been made in the holding of regular elections, the observance of human rights, the strengthening of local government, the active participation of civil society

actors and the increased participation of women in the political process, much remains to be done to institutionalize democracy and translate the constitutional provisions of fundamental freedoms and rights into the political culture and practice of societies in the region.

The Malawi Summit in August 2001 agreed on a consolidated text of the SADC treaty which includes some important amendments. The changes have made the SADC bureaucracy bigger in some ways, but also clearer. There is now an Integrated Committee of Ministers which reports to the Council after reaching agreement by consensus. It will oversee core integration areas and be empowered to act without a formal Council meeting which has delayed matters in the past. The part of the treaty concerning the Organ (Article 10a) is made clearer (as discussed above) and the rules of reporting and decision-making are spelled out. The Council will meet four times each year and will be supported by the secretariat. The secretariat, which already has a long list of functions is now also responsible for, amongst others 'gender mainstreaming', 'devising appropriate strategies for self-financing' and 'undertaking research on community building'.

### **Progress on military and state security**

A number of bilateral defence agreements have been set up. Among the more practical measures were the creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 1996, and the establishment of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee, the Regional Peace-keeping Training Centre and the Southern Africa Police Chiefs' Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO). Most of these arrangements are currently operating, although in conflict situations there are still problems of overlap and divergent perceptions of what should be done, by whom, and how. These problems should be solved in the near future, since the heads of state signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation at the Blantyre Summit of August 2001 and the Council of Ministers approved the Mutual Defence Pact Protocol, which has to be forwarded to heads of state for signature at the next SADC Summit. The Pact is important because it is the legal instrument empowering the operational mechanism of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters.

Some recent achievements of SADC in the realm of military security are:

- Through the ISDSC, SADC has successfully contained the intermittent political unrest in Lesotho. It also managed to restrain Angola from invading Zambia, accused of complicity in the rearmament of UNITA.
- The ISDSC has adopted six important regional policy documents concerning

disaster management, satellite communications, action against coup makers, peace-keeping training, peace-keeping doctrine, and standard operating procedures for peace-keeping operations. The satellite communications network, which links regional leaders and key officials on a 24-hour all-weather basis, has already been installed.

- The ISDSC has been instrumental in efforts to establish a SADC peace-keeping brigade, which have been under way since early 1998.
- The two regional peace-keeping field-training exercises, Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane, were hosted in Zimbabwe and South Africa in 1997 and 1999 respectively, under the auspices of the ISDSC.
- The Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare has already trained over two hundred SADC students.

## Conclusion

The following action could be taken for the peaceful and constructive settlement of conflicts.

- Creating a culture of democracy and tolerance would entail the creation of organs of civil society to carry out mass education on the concept and practice of democracy and tolerance. The establishment of forums and mediums would allow government to interact with the various sectors of the population, particularly in the design and implementation of public policies.
- Creating a human rights culture is the pillar upon which a democratic society is built. It is essential to establish and strengthen institutions that are specifically geared to informing and educating people about their rights. These bodies could also serve as watchdogs, preventing government excesses.
- Creating a culture of constructive conflict resolution is essential. Proper techniques and strategies for alternative conflict management and resolution methods need to be developed. It is imperative that indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution be explored, as they could be applied to current types of conflicts. A wide level of educational training in the skills of conflict management and resolution would need to be employed.
- Promoting women's full access to, and control over, productive resources to reduce the level of poverty among women is another urgent task to bring about an improvement in social conditions.
- Strengthening SADC structures, such as the Parliamentary Forum and the Electoral Commissions Forum, would entail organizing workshops in order to equip functionaries with the necessary skills.
- Improving the management of the education system, apart from devising

cost-effective ways of delivering education services such as cost sharing, joint procurement of school materials and mounting joint training programmes is an urgent priority for SADC countries.

- Helping to increase the capacity for HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, for planning and for research, is an essential activity to help address the AIDS epidemic.
- Instituting an operational legal mechanism to make the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security binding on all Member States is another important priority. This would also help to give direction in some areas where the Protocol articles are unclear.
- Establishing an early-warning system, with well-qualified personnel and a conflict management team to help deal with disputes and also to advise the Member States. Would assist SADC in defusing potentially destabilizing situations.

The role suggested above for civil society assumes that government and the private sector cooperate and participate in the process. Government can create the enabling environment in which civil society can be effective. Likewise, the private sector can assist by providing the necessary resources to carry out such activity.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> See Jakkie Cilliers, *Building Security in Southern Africa*; ISS Monograph Series, No. 43, November 1999, p.3. The FLS was constituted as an informal forum for the discussion of mainly political and, to a lesser extent, military problems common among the liberation movements, and the problems faced by the newly independent governments in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.
- <sup>2</sup> *Towards the Southern Africa Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of States or Government of Southern African States*, 1992, Windhoek, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>3</sup> *Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*, Harare, Southern African Development Community, 1993, pp. 24-6.
- <sup>4</sup> See *Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security: Report of the Officials and Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security: Workshop Resolutions*, Windhoek, Southern African Development Community, July 1994.
- <sup>5</sup> For information see the proceedings of the Gaborone meeting of 18 January 1996. See also J. Cilliers, 'The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa', *African Security Review*, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1995.

- <sup>6</sup> *Towards the Southern Africa Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of States or Government of Southern African States*, 1992, Windhoek, p.1.
- <sup>7</sup> *SADC Declaration*, op cit., pp. 9-10.
- <sup>8</sup> *Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*, Harare, Southern African Development Community, 1993, p. 25.
- <sup>9</sup> *SADC Declaration*, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
- <sup>10</sup> See R. Preston (ed.), *The integration of returned exiles, former combatant and other war-affected Namibians*, report of the Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Namibia, 1993. See also L. Cock, 'The social integration of demobilised soldiers in contemporary South Africa', unpublished report of Military Research Group, Johannesburg, 1993.
- <sup>11</sup> See *Southern African Report*, 2 September 1994, and *South Scan*, Vol. 9, No. 32, 2 September 1994.
- <sup>12</sup> *Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*, Harare, Southern African Development Community, 1993, p. 26.
- <sup>13</sup> See B. Weimer, 'The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference: Past and Future'; *Africa Insight*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1991, pp.78-89.

# Developing a Common Agenda for Subregional Organizations for Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa: A View from ECOWAS

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## **Introduction**

This paper gives details of some of the experiences that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has had in the area of conflict management over the years, and subsequently proposes strategies that might assist in the quest for a commonality of approach in addressing security matters.

ECOWAS as an organization was established by treaty in 1975 in order to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity among its Member States. Its purpose was to raise the living standards of the people of West Africa, fostering closer relations among them and ultimately contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

Because of distressing events in several of its Member States, ECOWAS soon realized that the cause of economic development and progress can only be pursued in an environment of relative peace and stability. It found that it had to involve itself in conflicts in Member States to ensure that an environment conducive to the implementation of its economic programmes was maintained.

At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau from 1989 to 2000, ECOWAS already had certain legal instruments that enjoined Member States to respect each other's territorial integrity, exist alongside each other in peace and harmony, and unite to ward off both any external attack, armed threat or aggression directed against a Member State and internal armed conflict engineered from outside. These

instruments were the Protocol on Non-Aggression of 1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence of 1981.

However, these Protocols lacked in-depth provisions for effective prevention, military intervention and management or resolution strategies that might be employed to end conflict. As a result, ECOWAS had to resort to ad hoc mechanisms such as repeated mediation initiatives by high-powered committees, usually made up of foreign affairs ministers of Member States or their defence chiefs. These committees were expected to create a forum where representatives of Member States could discuss the causes of the conflict and debate ways to resolve the differences between warring factions within the states.

At the height of the hostilities in each of the conflict-torn states, ECOWAS sent a multinational West African military force made up of troops volunteered by West African states with the sole purpose of restoring peace within the given state. This was the beginning of the ECOWAS force, commonly known as ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group), widely recognized and accepted as the first peace-keeping force of African origin to have successfully discharged its mandate of peace-keeping and peace enforcement. West Africa thus became the only subregion in Africa to have successfully mounted a full peace-keeping operation.

After seven years of ECOMOG operations, successful elections were held in Liberia, bringing a democratically elected government to power.

In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG managed the conflict effectively, leading to the return to power of the civilian head of state in 1998. This peace-keeping force continued to monitor events in Sierra Leone until April 2000, when ECOMOG withdrew as a result of financial constraints (troop-contributing Member States could no longer afford to maintain their forces in Sierra Leone).

Guinea-Bissau, following the outbreak of violence there in 1998, also benefited from the intervention of ECOMOG. The result was the organization and holding of general and presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau and the restoration of peace and stability in that country.

### **The revised ECOWAS Treaty**

The revision of the ECOWAS enabling instrument in 1993 into its present form was an important event in the history of the organization. The revised Treaty not only strengthens the capacity of ECOWAS to forge a strong economic and monetary union to meet the challenges of globalization, but reinforces within its provisions a political union between Member States. This combination allows the organization to deal with issues pertaining to security, in recognition of the link between stability and economic development.

The initial experiences of ECOWAS in peace-keeping and peace enforcement, occasioned by incessant conflict, brought about the realization by heads of state and government of the need to develop an appropriate mechanism for the organization. This would not only formalize and lay out criteria for military intervention by a multinational force but, more importantly, would provide strategies that could be employed to prevent conflict or the outbreak of hostilities in Member States. If potential causes of such conflicts could be detected, it might be possible to start initiatives that could deal with these causes. The general idea was that it would certainly be cheaper in the long run to prevent conflict and resolve disputes than to manage conflicts after they had broken out, bearing in mind the dire consequences of wars and their effect on life and property.

On 10 December 1999, the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was adopted by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. This mechanism provides the organization with the capacity to operate effectively in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution, peace-keeping, humanitarian support, peace-building and subregional security. It also deals with the very important issue of security in terms of cooperation in the control of all kinds of criminal activity within the Member States and across their borders.

The ECOWAS Mechanism, as it is usually called, establishes several institutions, organs and strategies, all with defined responsibilities and aims that address the peace and security situation in the subregion. These include:

- The Mediation and Security Council, which operates at the level of heads of state and government, ministers and ambassadors, taking decisions that impact on peace and security, including deployment of military missions.
- The Defence and Security Commission, which is made up of defence chiefs and security technocrats who work out the technicalities of a military intervention.
- ECOMOG, which is now formally established as a multi-purpose standby force ready for immediate deployment. ECOMOG is described as multi-purpose in the sense that it can assume one of several functions of observation, monitoring and peace-keeping. It can be deployed for humanitarian intervention or the enforcement of sanctions. It can also undertake policing activities in order to control fraud and organized crime.
- An early-warning system, in the form of a regional observation network, has also been created. Established within the Executive Secretariat and also in specific areas within the community are observation centres or bureaux, where data on states ranging across the economic, political, security and social sectors are collected and analysed in order to detect warning signals

that may signify potential conflict. This is considered an important tool in the early detection of conflict that should then inform conflict-prevention strategies.

- A Council of Elders is proposed in accordance with African traditional practice to assume the roles of mediation, conciliation and negotiation in a situation where there are indicators of potential conflict. ECOWAS has a Council of Elders made up of thirty-two eminent persons drawn from within and outside the subregion. Its mandate is essentially that of preventive diplomacy. The Council of Elders will be constituted annually by the Executive Secretary from an approved list stored in a data bank in the Secretariat.

The Executive Secretariat also has a central role to play in the implementation of the mechanism, including the power to initiate actions for conflict prevention and management, which may include fact-finding missions, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. The Executive Secretary also has the responsibility of deploying the Council of Elders, depending on his or her assessment of a given situation. Within the Secretariat is a newly established Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security, headed by a Deputy Executive Secretary. In addition to having the responsibility for policy formulation and implementation in all military peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, the department controls the observation and monitoring centre in the secretariat and its counterpart centres in the four designated zones within the subregion, where the collation and analysis of day-to-day data gathered from Member States are carried out.

The ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security goes beyond prescriptions for preventing and managing conflicts as a means of achieving security. It approaches the issue of subregional security in a more holistic manner, making strong recommendations for promoting human security in such areas as the control of trans-border crime. It gives ECOWAS the task of promoting closer cooperation among the security services of Member States. It also advocates the establishment of specialized departments within the justice, defence and security ministries of Member States for coordination and centralization of cooperation in criminal matters and in extradition requests. The Protocol also enjoins Member States to harmonize their domestic laws in this area and to adopt a common convention regarding standardized punishment for the most commonly committed crimes within the subregion. It advocates joint measures for combating trans-border crimes such as money-laundering, corruption and arms trafficking.

The Protocol covers institutional capacity-building in the community in

order to provide humanitarian assistance in conflict or disaster areas. More importantly, it also provides a framework for action by the community in the area of peace-building.

The provisions of the ECOWAS Mechanism recommend the adoption of a graduated strategy, which must be implemented as a continuum, before, during and after conflicts. These measures include:

- involvement in the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in Member States as a means of monitoring and actively supporting the development of democratic institutions as the basis of good governance;
- assistance to Member States emerging from conflict, to help to increase their capacity for national, social, economic and cultural reconstruction (in particular the role of ECOWAS financial institutions which have the responsibility for developing policies to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction programmes); and
- support for all other processes that will assist the restoration of political authority, the rule of law and the judiciary, and help to develop respect for human rights.

Some of the provisions of the ECOWAS mechanism may provide the necessary framework in the task of developing a common agenda for subregional organizations in the area of peace, security and conflict prevention.

### **Recommendations for achieving a common agenda**

Logically, the common agenda for peace and security in subregional organizations on our continent should be centred on the attainment of a harmonious, safe and stable environment to make possible the evolution and implementation of development programmes that will provide economic prosperity for our peoples. Open debate on achieving these aims is truly indispensable, as it provides members of different subregional groups with the opportunity of exchanging ideas on how to achieve a common agenda and crystallize their vision of a prosperous Africa. To this end, all subregional organizations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), should aim to achieve a unified concept of human security. This would expedite agreement on the following issues:

- *Governance*: Having determined that problems of governance are a major cause of conflict in Africa, delegates must be able to work out and agree on fundamental principles that should govern intra-state and inter-state relations. For example, certain standards of behaviour and principles should be recognized and held sacred, like those governing devolution of powers or

power-sharing; the status of the opposition in any government; the issue of what constitutes good governance; the role of the military in governance; civil/military relations; the need for effective separation of powers between the three arms of government; the need to have an independent judiciary for the impartial dispensation of justice; a de-emphasis on ethnic and tribal differences, and the equitable sharing of national resources.

- *The Protocol cooperation with regional and continental organizations:* The ECOWAS Mechanism makes specific provisions on the need for ECOWAS cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the OAU, and all other international, national, regional and non-governmental organizations and religious groups. The OAU or the UN may also request assistance on security issues from ECOWAS for national, regional and international agencies. This relationship should be maintained with all those addressing peace and security in Africa.
- *Collaboration in conflict prevention:* In searching for a commonality of approach, African subregional organizations may consider collaboration on particular conflict-prevention strategies such as an early-warning system. Linkages could be established for the exchange of information, while fact-finding and mediation missions such as the ECOWAS Council of Elders need not restrict their work within a particular region, but may carry out their functions on behalf of other organizations.
- *Creation of a joint inter-African Criminal Intelligence Bureau:* This would make for more effective coordination of criminal investigations, with the aim of improving human security and controlling cross-border crimes.
- *Formulation of treaties regarding mutual assistance:* Such agreements, on civil, criminal and extradition matters, would improve due process on a regional basis and thus enhance security.
- *Creation of a network of non-governmental organizations:* The establishment of a network of African NGOs in the area of peace and security could ensure both global participation and the involvement of civil society. It could also help to develop a relationship between the efforts of NGOs and those of governments.
- *Development of an integrated approach to peace-building:* This would involve joint efforts, particularly in the service of humanitarian interests, at all stages of a conflict. It would also provide support for development programmes for reconstruction and rehabilitation purposes. This might be assisted by organizations such as the African Red Cross. A United Nations Concept Paper, developed for consideration at the 4th United Nations Regional Organization High-Level Meeting, lists other possible areas of cooperation. These include security stabilization; restoring law and order; helping to re-equip and restructure the local security forces; implementing

successively the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes; restoring political order, good governance and democratization; promoting human rights requirements; providing humanitarian relief; and emphasizing sustainable development. These are all post-conflict peace-building strategies.

- *Creation of an international financial recovery facility or standing trust fund for peace-building:* This is a useful mechanism and one to which all organizations can contribute or even solicit contributions for. ECOWAS has found it necessary to establish trust funds, particularly in the case of Liberia, to cope with financial demands such as the elections in Liberia. The modus operandi for establishing such a fund and its accessibility criteria would need to be worked out.
- *Designation of liaison offices:* The subregional organizations can designate liaison officers within their secretariats to act as links for collaboration. All possible channels of communication between the different organizations should be opened and maintained.

These recommendations are but the tip of the iceberg in the building of 'multidimensional security' in the African continent.

It is the view of ECOWAS that although prioritizing the challenges that confronted the organization was not an easy task, recent experiences in West Africa have underscored the need to pursue the security agenda just as much as the developmental one: the two are inextricably linked. ECOWAS is willing to learn from the experiences of sister organizations, which all share the same ideals and objectives. These ideals are achievable so long as there is a sincere commitment to collaboration.



# Human Stability and Conflict in the Horn of Africa

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## Introduction

The issues addressed in this paper relate to human security or, as we would prefer to call it, human stability, at the regional, national and subregional levels in the Horn of Africa. Specific attention is paid, first, to steps taken at the level of the African continent towards promoting increased human stability and the prevention of conflict in the region; second, to the development of a conflict-prevention agenda at the subregional level; and last, to steps that must be taken in order to realize these objectives.

Social scientists often feel the need to open discussions by defining key terms, because they find it difficult to communicate successfully even among themselves, let alone with people representing other disciplines. Thus we would like to explain why we prefer to use the term 'stability' rather than 'security'. One could define security as 'the guarantee of safety' as has often been done. One might further define the guarantee of safety as 'the political arrangements that make war less likely, which provide for negotiations rather than belligerence and which aim to preserve peace as the normal condition among states'.

The term 'security' has sometimes assumed sinister overtone in the sense of 'national security'. National security can refer to safety, the likelihood of the absence of war, and the likelihood of negotiations rather than belligerence, but it can also refer to the preservation of peace as the normal condition for some people within society but not for others belonging to the same nation. National security as a term has also come to denote all purposes of defence,

including preparations for belligerence, pre-emptive strikes and even any presumed 'vital' interest. As a result, policies of national security may precipitate insecurity rather than security by being the exclusive tools of those in power. Moreover, when measured against the reality of instability and insurrection, especially in the less economically developed countries today, speaking of 'guarantees' or 'near guarantees' of peace and stability appears to be unrealistic. Because such terms may be ideologically loaded in favour of the ruling classes, a more neutral term such as 'human stability' may take some of the heat out of the debate and add more light to it, hence our preference for the terms 'stability' and 'destabilization'.

The political climate in the Horn of Africa today is influenced by local political and social conflict not only in terms of specific histories and effects, but also in terms of their interaction with forces operating at a global level. The history of the countries of the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan) since the end of colonialism has largely been one of violent repression on the one hand and insurgency on the other. No matter how governments in the region came to power, in practically every case force has been the means of dislodging them. Succession by peaceful election has been the exception. Independent civil society organizations have proved to be ineffective counters to the power of the chiefs of state and their circles of intimates. The organizations have been banned outright, forced to go underground or carefully monitored to ensure that they are apolitical. In spite of these difficulties, civil society could have a profound influence on governments and military regimes in the Horn. Groups could organize by affinity (for example by age, kinship, gender, work and religion), and could include Church groups, associations of elders, youth groups and trade unions. On the other hand, governments may set constraints on their gathering in public places to pursue common ends.

The level of independence or autonomy of civil society is often regarded as a significant indicator of the degree of democracy in a country. Nation-states attempting to eliminate or control civil society often use authoritarian practices and policies to do so. They often try to create the illusion of a thriving civil society by creating their own official organizations, with a view to mobilizing the population in public support of goals already formulated by the regime. The so-called GONGO (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization) is a related phenomenon. Its specific task is to express public solidarity with the regime at international meetings, while claiming to represent civil society. In these circumstances, the intent of the state may be not to depoliticize civil society but to subjugate or disempower it.

This paper looks at the internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of the balance of power between civil society and the state.

## Conflict in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is located in a part of the African continent where struggles over economic and political power often take the form of ethnic conflict. This portion of the continent is underdeveloped. The socio-economic systems of the countries in it are often rooted in exploitative relations. Ethnic identities in this region, although they can be 'beneficial' to those ethnic groups that are in power, tend to be used to consolidate and serve the interests of the dominant at the expense of the less powerful groups. The contemporary destruction of the legitimacy and accountability of many of the states in the region results in part from the arbitrariness of their territorial boundaries, originally brought about by colonial partition and then 'transferred' to the local elite at independence. In these circumstances, overlapping ethnic identities between states, especially when used in the pursuit of power, often become a source of conflict rather than of unity. In the past two decades, hundreds of thousands of people have fallen victim to violent conflict and the vagaries of the dictators in the region. In their alienation from the state, many people have fled their countries and become refugees.

The states of the Horn of Africa are also undermined by acute environmental degradation. An ecological system made viable by cyclical drought has been further damaged by armed conflicts. Pastoralists and other hinterland populations have been among the primary victims. Desertification, drought, environmental degradation and a scarcity of resources have displaced large numbers of people, driving them across national borders as migrants or as environmental refugees. Apart from putting pressure on state boundaries, their arrival sometimes creates feelings of insecurity and intolerance in the local population, which now has to compete for scarce resources. This of course can engender xenophobia and conflict of various kinds in the populations of the receiving countries.

Internal social tensions and external pressure are combining to push people in the region towards cooperative 'groupings' which are better able to respond to the demands of the global economy. Technological innovations, although they have helped nation-states, are now helping to undermine national borders as capital and information flows show scant respect for boundaries. One of the main effects is that, no matter what the origin of social conflicts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to contain them using current state frameworks. The state crisis in Somalia, for example, indicates that a monopoly of power by one group with foreign sponsors may lead to government failure and civil war. Furthermore, in some African countries the distinction between crime and war is becoming blurred.

Many poverty-stricken followers of African warlords find membership of

their rag-tag armies preferable to living conditions as civilians in their own countries. Facing such armed bandits, Africa's professional armies are often found wanting. Their budgets are often smaller, their equipment more out of date, their salaries late or unpaid. Morale is sinking. The advantage of war over mere delinquency is that it legitimizes in the name of 'justice' or 'revolution' the use of arms and violence to gain control over the resources of the state. Thus the regular armies of increasing numbers of African states have been defeated and replaced with striking ease by insurgent guerrilla forces whose members are drawn from their own citizens. A major problem for the new regimes thereafter is that even as they start building up new armies, they need to disarm and demobilize various other ethnically-based bands of guerrillas. The situation is further complicated by the need to recruit, train and organize new armies from among people who often remain ethnically polarized. Moreover, the colonial practice of recruiting for the army and promoting members of the 'smaller', less politically powerful ethnic groups has created one of the major sources of the instability plaguing army/state relations in post-colonial Africa. In effect, these relations have become unhinged to the extent that the geo-ethnic make-up of the group that wields military power need not coincide with the position of the group whose members claim the mandate to rule. In such a situation, old prejudices are susceptible to manipulation by elites.

These processes have created post-colonial instability in the region, and open the possibility that state boundaries as recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and now the African Union (AU), may be altered in future. There is an inexorable growth in the list of provinces that have already detached themselves from central authority, with federalism and secession remaining viable options. Although secession as such has thus far been the exception, Eritrea is probably the most relevant example of a successful breakaway. More generally, communities that have suffered at the hands of dominant groups holding military and/or political power claim that their rights as groups should be recognized and that measures should be taken to satisfy their demands.

Having established some of the basic parameters of the often intransigent problems that face governments both in Africa and in general, we now turn to the Horn of Africa itself. People who live in this region have faced pervasive crisis for a very long time. Its dynamics originate at both the local and global levels. The people suffer from the impact of colonialism and authoritarianism, and the rule of those who try to manipulate the state in their own narrow interests. The crisis manifests in many different forms: civil wars, the violation of human rights, the suppression of civil liberties, abject poverty, famine, epidemics, debt problems, population displacement, ecological disaster and

disenfranchisement. Marginalized social groups, including women, children, the elderly, the economically destitute and ethnic minorities, bear the brunt.

No end is in site to the crisis in the Horn. Attempts by groups both inside and outside the region to manipulate and control their states generate intense armed conflict among different social groups. These conflicts result in further depletion of resources already distributed unequally, they engender more violence, disruption of economic production and increased demographic displacement.

Eventually, the perennial disorder will destroy the social fabric by promoting militarization, tyranny and mutual animosity; over time it will produce a 'culture of warfare'. The region's bondage to world markets also contributes to the crisis: regional economies are disrupted by unequal exchange and exploitative relations with the West, and the formation of alliances between global capital and the region's economically privileged and ruling political elites.

Another relevant feature of the disorder in the region is the formation and disintegration of centralized states. On the one hand, the centralizing states are negatively affected by the crisis, which can lead to their fragmentation and failure. On the other hand, the states themselves contribute to the escalation of instability. Attempts to centralize the states in the Horn of Africa have often been the cause of crisis because many of the political and armed conflicts in the region have been aimed at control of state power, which is a central conduit to power and resources.

The ruling political groups are seldom interested in power-sharing, while formally presenting themselves as promoting representative democracy. These rulers have become clientelist and sectarian, leaving no political space for disenfranchised and marginalized social groups, who often have no choice but to resort to resistance. Consequently, in the Horn of Africa the states themselves have become central elements of the crisis, largely through their incessant quest to centralize and concentrate power.

These states then produce and reproduce façades, seemingly so inextricably caught up in their own political practices that they cannot extricate themselves from the centralizing forces that they created. The only solution then is periodic disintegration of the states.

## **Strategic importance of the Horn of Africa**

The region is of considerable strategic importance, even to nations far beyond its borders. There are three main reasons why it has attracted international attention for many centuries. First, it is strategically located: four countries in

the Horn of Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudan – border two crucial sea routes, on the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are currently regaining importance in international maritime trade now that a number of Middle Eastern and Asian countries and the Russian Federation are trying to open new markets in Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Moreover, Africa is emerging as a potentially lucrative market for Asian electronic technology, oil has been discovered, and globalization has boosted international trade. These factors have combined to make the Horn of Africa an important region in the international economic arena of the twenty-first century. The Sudan has potential as an oil producer, while the country has significant water reserves and an agricultural capacity that could make it a meaningful contributor to regional development once it attains internal stability. Ethiopia, with its huge water reserves and human resources, can also be considered a possible contributor to regional prosperity, should its internal problems be resolved.

The region also has the most diverse religious and ethnic grouping in Africa. In view of the tendency for ethnic and tribal wars to erupt throughout the region, this situation requires careful management. Most of the residents of the Horn of Africa espouse Sunni Islam as ‘their religion’ and most of them can trace their origins to the Middle East.

With its radical religious politics, the region is likely to witness the rise of Islamic radicals trying to impose their version of Islam on others, as has already been the case in the Sudan and some parts of Somalia. The emerging rivalry between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam on the east coast of Africa might well pose a threat in some countries of the region.

Finally, the Horn of Africa has significant agricultural potential. The source of over 80% of the waters of the River Nile and its tributaries, the region could achieve economic prosperity should its leaders assign top priority to making peace. However, representative political participation and economic stability are two major prerequisites before the region can become part of an integrated African economy, even more so now that African decision-makers are putting in place the economically strategic New Africa Initiative.

From the short description given above, it can be deduced that discussing war, peace and development in the Horn of Africa is a daunting task that requires a separate critical analysis of the situation in each country. There is no scope in this paper for such an analysis. Instead, we examine the major source of instability in African countries (the inappropriateness of the Western notion of a centralized state), and address instability, conflict management, prevention and resolution. Identification of the mechanisms available to individuals handling peace and war in this volatile region are often the crucial issues at stake in such analyses.

## Western statist theory as a source of instability in Africa

At present, the economic sovereignty of many of the states in the Horn of Africa is being undermined by emerging patterns of globalization. At the same time, banditry and informal cross-border trading networks are growing. A further threat to state autonomy stems from the growing militarization of conflicts. As states become more unstable, low-level warfare, famine, deprivation and political crisis overlap. Those nominally in control of the state are unable to provide security for their citizens, cannot provide the basis for economic improvement, do not fully control their territory and are unable either to co-opt or defeat their opponents. Economic pauperization and an ideological vacuum, arising in part from the erosion of human rights and the uglier side of nationalism, are giving rise to a proliferation of religious cults and extremism. This is forcing a redefinition of social cohesion and civil space.

Many of Africa's social problems arise from a misconception among Western analysts regarding the construction of centrally organized states. It has been claimed that the centralizing state is universally applicable 'regardless of differences' in social structure and culture of countries. Moreover, the idea of the state as an embodiment of order has been contrasted with its absence, namely an undesirable state of disorder. The Hobbesian conception of the 'state of nature' as a state of anarchy has informed this contemporary political theory of the state. However, many statist scholars (and subsequently state elites) have failed to come to terms with the construction of the centrist state in Africa. According to statist theory, centralized states, together with global forces, emphasize similarity rather than heterogeneity as part of the human condition. Under this rubric, it is claimed that rationality will pull in those people who were traditionally excluded, leading eventually to an identity of interest between all members of society. However, this theory does not address the need of groups to maintain ethnic and religious identity.

The notion of creating a rational order implies the construction of homogeneous nation-states, national identities, centralized bureaucracies, unified legal systems with a set of formal laws and the institutionalization of market capitalism as the only rational economic system. These, it is claimed, represent 'civilized society'. The state's task is to centrally enforce all these features under a 'rule of law'. One of the primary functions of the state is therefore to maintain law and order. The rule of law comes to represent value-free, neutral, institutionalized power relationships. Interpreted in this manner, the rule of law is elevated and becomes a universal benchmark identifying deviance in all societies, regardless of specific traditional polities.

The concept of the rule of law does not explain changes in the law or its differential application. Consequently, the relationship between alterations in

state structures and legal rules remains blurred, as the sanctity of the rule of law is invoked in both appropriate and inappropriate instances. The rule of law fails to explain how concepts of legal equality have changed, for example in the granting of legal status based on gender, ethnicity, race and age. It does not even address discretion in law enforcement or punishment. The statist approach is universalist and imperialist, but has major self-negations embedded in it. In spite of these, it has been imposing its monolithic conceptual scheme in every part of the world. This includes employing naked force or technologically enforced violence, up to and including genocide. However, the statist approach may also impose itself through diffusion of ideas and training, as well as by indirect rule through co-opting indigenous modern elites.

The ultimate design of Western statist theory is to establish 'universal order' through the central state, an assumed potential order the state itself inherently lacks. This lack is borne out by the catastrophic conflicts taking place among the various alternative state systems. The indices referred to, based on Western constructions of the concept of 'disorder' rather than 'diversity', are now employed by the New World Order as justifications for extermination under the façade of progress.

## **Conflict prevention**

It is clear that the countries of the Horn of Africa remain, even today, full of conflict and the potential for conflict. What can be done to help? The remainder of this analysis is devoted to answering this question. One of the main consequences of conflict is coerced population movement, creating the need to protect displaced persons at the local, national, regional and international levels. A comprehensive conflict-maintenance system has three functional objectives. The first is the political aim of averting conflict, or at least defusing it in its initial stages through trust-building, coalition-building and negotiated settlements. No conflict-prevention mechanism can be maintained without a viable early-warning and risk-assessment system. Protection for displaced persons should be ensured.

Most African states and regional actors do not have systems in place either to warn them of conflict or to undertake risk assessment. African regional actors such as the OAU are, however, attempting to develop systematic conflict-prevention capacities. One problem is their inability to adequately predict and respond to conflict. This has, in contravention of the spirit of the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969, inhibited their ability to provide protection to displaced persons and prevent population displacement. Subregional organizations such

as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) exhibit the same inability to prevent conflict because they too lack early-warning and risk-assessment capabilities.

Unless host states and humanitarian actors are supplied with sound information about the location, direction, number and immediate needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, the principal function of the OAU Refugee Convention – to establish a firm legal standard for refugees and ensure their safety and security, thereby decreasing the likelihood of future mass population displacement – cannot be met.

### **Conflict management**

The conflict-management objective is, by virtue of being most integral to the physical and legal protection of displaced people, the most important. In this context, it works towards preventing the escalation of refugee flows and the protection of internally displaced people. The political objective of conflict management is to promote trust and confidence and ensure peace, security and stability with respect to displaced persons. The aim should also be to minimize the escalation of conflict and to provide humanitarian assistance and case-specific solutions.

A great shortcoming of the OAU has been its inability to manage conflict. Greater emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures and concerted peace-making and peace-building can, however, lessen the need to resort to complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations. Of late, the OAU and IGAD have become more concerned with developing and enhancing their conflict-prevention capabilities, with both being in the process of establishing early-warning and risk-assessment capabilities.

As an interesting aside, perhaps UNESCO might facilitate a project aimed at providing risk assessment and an early-warning system for Africa, starting with the Southern African region and later expanding its activities further north.

### **Conflict resolution**

The political objective of conflict resolution is to maintain and sustain peace by building or rebuilding civil society and state institutions to allow for transparency and accountability. At this level, the aim should be to negotiate agreements on the return of displaced persons to their home states and/or places of habitual residence.

The international community, and the United Nations in particular, has a poor record of safeguarding the rights of forcibly displaced people in Africa. African states themselves have a far better record in this respect. Africans appear to be the most committed and best suited to safeguard the rights of Africans, but they lack the financial and logistical resources to provide adequate protection.

The OAU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD have all engaged in conflict resolution, with varying degrees of success. The OAU and ECOWAS appear to be the most active in this respect. Although, owing to the technological and military assets at its disposal, SADC appears to have the greatest capability to engage in long-term conflict resolution, all four organizations remain hamstrung by limited resources.

There is as yet no African mechanism that permits individual refugees to bring claims against host state governments or combatants for violating their human rights. Until such structures are instituted, the international community would be well advised to question the authenticity of attempts by African governments and regional actors to tackle problems associated with the plight of displaced persons.

## Conclusion

Where does all this leave the Horn of Africa, with its pronounced propensity for conflict and displacement of people? It is clear that Africa has few resources available to help the region. It is also clear that authoritarian statism has been the rule rather than the exception in the Horn of Africa during the past four decades, and that this has been fostered by international capitalist interests.

There is much speculation about what the future holds for the region. It is still characterized by early mortality, poverty and illiteracy. The short-term solutions most often proffered are greater state influence in the region, more law and order practices based on the Western model, and an increased military presence to quash insurgency and rebellion. However, these solutions come at the expense of the development of civil society, the search for consensus and a respect for diversity. They tend to exacerbate strife and conflict, despite their apparent concessions to the rule of law, order and security.

The Western response to internal conflict (sometimes termed 'lawlessness') has been to promote and encourage the development of law and order institutions, which often take the form of a strong central military apparatus, larger and more secure prisons, technology to improve surveillance and monitoring, and practices such as 'swift and certain' sentencing, more aggressive policing, curfews and austerity measures. Such law and order antidotes to African

'lawlessness' have the effect of strengthening the officially recognized state regime in each country at the expense of dissenting political views, minority groups and civil society. Indeed, in essence the externally imposed Western model has promoted authoritarian statism in the Horn of Africa despite its putative commitment to democracy, equality and individual rights.

Accordingly, the West cannot delude itself into thinking that it is capable of taking the lead in building or rebuilding civil society in any of the countries of the Horn of Africa. The situation in Somalia bears witness to the disastrous effects of such a strategy. While the international media now point to the \$30 billion spent on the 'humanitarian' mission of the early 1990s and the atrocities committed against Somali civilians by American, Belgian, Canadian and Italian military contingents during the mission, these disasters are only a small proportion of the devastating losses.

This analysis has suggested a number of principles that should be applied when trying to formulate any lasting solution to the conflict in the Horn of Africa:

- Greater democratization needs to be established in the area, especially in the sense of avoiding all forms of authoritarian/hegemonic rule both within and between states.
- A regional cooperation plan, based on present functional contributions to the region rather than on historic conflicts, should be established for the whole of the Horn of Africa.
- The history of conflict in the region as a whole, as well as smaller parts of it, should be used as the guiding principle in formulating any plan for regional cooperation.
- In any plan for regional cooperation, there should be firm and clear sanctions against any form of power dominance, whether by individuals or groups. Instead, the principles of minimum government intervention and equal representation of all in central institutions should apply.
- A looser form of federal cooperation between states and within governments, with no single state being dominant and no government having the opportunity to assume hegemony over other parties or groupings within its own state, is worth considering for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa.
- There should be no assumption of cohesion between the regions or within the states of the Horn of Africa in formulating a plan for cooperation between and within states in the region.
- Closely allied to the previous principle, the inclusion of all identifiable interest groups (at least cultural, religious, economic, social and political groups) needs to become a prerequisite in any plan to establish regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa.

- Because Western nations have achieved minimal success in allaying conflict in the Horn of Africa, and have in fact exacerbated the situation, through colonial rule, African nations need to take the initiative in formulating and applying any cooperation plan for the region.
- All Western attempts to interpret internal conflict in the Horn of Africa as 'lawlessness' should be vigorously resisted when formulating a cooperation plan for the region, because perceptions of the conflict as the product of disorder rather than diversity undermines the legitimacy of the struggles fought in the region over centuries.

In view of what has been discussed regarding the future of the Horn of Africa, internal solutions should be sought. The promotion of civil society organizations, kinship structures, social safety nets such as hospices and mutual aid, the independent resolution of disputes and sharing of common resources, may all help to steer the countries of the Horn of Africa in a new direction. This direction would be informed by the lessons learnt from the region's pre-colonial past. Perhaps then the Horn of Africa may become a model for drawing positive results out of the complex historical dialectic of external order and internal conflict. On the other hand it should be recognized that, in the short to medium term, no modern state can afford to ignore the demands of global capitalism. These demands can take many forms, but require the meeting of relatively uniform economic requirements in order for any country or region to become part of the system and share in its benefits. In the Horn of Africa, regional affiliations (of whatever nature, but including close economic cooperation) appear to be an option worth investigating.

It is true that many of the nations in the Horn are characterized by internal social formations and cultural groupings that foster conflict and violent struggles. At the same time it should be recognized that centralized state power, although it has become an essential survival mechanism in the region, has also become its greatest weakness, fostering old rivalries between social, cultural and religious groupings.

Whether stronger or weaker affiliations are needed should be investigated for each country individually, and also for different regions within each country, before any firm steps are taken. A possible solution to conflict is that of a regional union, with the rights of each participant clearly spelled out and enforced by a regional organization of greater size, possibly the AU. In this envisaged union, one of the crucial principles that should apply is that of scrupulous inclusivity, which should be enforced and adhered to by each prospective participant. In this manner, the Horn of Africa may be able, by exploiting its strategic position, diverse culture and resources, to make a meaningful contribution to the global economic system.

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# The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa Framework and the Role of the Regional Institutions

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## **Introduction**

In the 1980s, which are sometimes referred to as Africa's lost decade, it appeared that the continent needed to undertake a series of initiatives in order to deal with its problems. These initiatives were to be based on an African agenda, managed and designed by Africans but with the active involvement of the international community, especially those states variously denoted as 'friends of Africa'. Perhaps the most significant initiative that emerged was the Kampala Document, which contains the proposals for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).

The end of the Cold War in 1990 exposed the leadership and administrative inadequacies of African states. African citizens and leaders felt a discernible loss of confidence in the various institutions of governance, and questioned both the fundamental nature of their states and the rationale for their existence. During this period of uncertainty there occurred numerous crises, orgies of violence, genocide, state disintegration and combinations of these. The obvious lesson to be drawn is that African interests are excluded from the current socio-political and economic paradigms applied in the rest of the world.

For Africa, a continent that has remained volatile and vulnerable to external factors and factions, there is a need to develop and implement paradigms,

concepts and new attitudes to increase institutional capacity and make progress toward the goals of stability and prosperity. An African agenda on issues of stability, integration, human security, socio-economic development and democratization must evolve within the overall framework of collective African solidarity.

African political leaders responded to these needs and emerging trends by proposing a variety of initiatives in regional institutions. In the first place, there appeared to be a consensus that the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Africa's primary political continent-wide framework, had recorded demonstrable successes in pursuit of the objectives of Article 2(d) in the OAU Charter: 'to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa'. These achievements paved the way for a recommitment to unity and solidarity, the defence of territorial integrity and the independence of all states. To this end, individual efforts to achieve a better life for African people were to be coordinated and intensified. In a similar vein, the OAU achieved varying degrees of success in pursuit of the principles articulated in Article 3 of its Charter, particularly in the areas of diplomatic and political cooperation, but also in other spheres such as the economy, transport, communication, health, science, technology, and defence and security cooperation.

Yet African leaders and the OAU could not deal decisively with challenges to peace and security, and the continent was inundated by a wave of conflict. Indeed, the importance of social and political stability grew as the changing international political framework began to marginalize the African continent and its concerns. There was also a growing awareness that the continent had not recorded enough progress in the sphere of economic development, and that poor economic performance was a contributory cause of the rising wave of domestic conflict.

### **Responding to the challenges**

Accordingly, in designing a new strategy for confronting the critical challenges presented by the new international milieu, the need was felt to link the requirements of economic development and the demands for peace and security. In fact, any effective method for tackling the challenge of the new era had to be one that integrated both areas. This realization informed the landmark Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, adopted by heads of state and government in 1990.<sup>1</sup> That Declaration not only presented an objective analysis of the state of affairs within the continent, but also contained a range of suggestions on methods or procedures for changing the situation by

tackling some of the apparently intractable challenges that confront the continent. In the Declaration the leaders stated:

We are fully aware that in order to facilitate this process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it is necessary to promote the popular participation of our peoples in the processes of governance and development... We therefore assert that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing.

This new thinking was also captured, in part, by the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, signed by heads of state in Arusha in February 1990. The Arusha Charter moved a step further by pointedly maintaining that:

We realize at the same time that responsibilities of achieving these objectives we have set will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in our continent. We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts in the continent.

Coming from an organization often labelled (wrongly or rightly) a conservative club of the African political oppressors, the Declaration broke fresh ground. It was the first frank and honest assessment of African reality since the earliest wave of independence in Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s.

### **CSSDCA: An African agenda for peace and prosperity<sup>2</sup>**

In response to the enormity of the political, strategic, economic and social upheavals resulting from the end of the Cold War and the consequent changes in the configuration of global power, the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF), in collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), convened a high-level expert meeting in Paris, France, in 1990, on the theme 'Developments in Eastern Europe: Strategic Implications for Africa'.

At the Paris meeting it was observed (quite correctly) that, with the end of the Cold War, resources previously directed at Africa by the West and the Soviet Union would be redirected elsewhere, and that this was likely to lead to the marginalization of the continent. The immediate puzzle to be resolved was: How will Africa be affected by the end of the Cold War polarization? Will the industrialized countries, which had previously channelled considerable resources of development assistance to Africa, now turn their backs on the continent and divert official development assistance towards the states of Eastern Europe, for reasons of geographical contiguity and affinity?

The 1990 Paris meeting recognized the need for Africa to rise to the

challenge; to tackle the interrelated problems of security, stability, development and cooperation through its own means, and to engage the rest of the world within a holistic and composite framework designed, owned and driven by Africans. Inspired by the experience of Europe and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), a scenario emerged in subsequent discussions: Africa should identify a process capable of providing a holistic and comprehensive approach to its myriad developmental challenges.

The ALF accepted the challenge of driving this process forward. In November 1990, it convened a meeting of prominent Africans drawn from government, business, and academic, international and non-governmental organizations, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On this occasion, the ALF was acting in collaboration with the secretariats of the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The stated aim was to consider concrete strategies to cope with the world's new realities. Recognizing the need to develop a framework for Africa along the lines of the CSCE, the Addis Ababa meeting set up a steering committee. In early 1991, the ALF and the German Foundation for International Development (DSE) joined forces to examine what relevance the European (Helsinki/CSCE) process held for Africa. The meeting brought Africans together with Europeans who had been involved in the CSCE process. Subsequently, a series of other technical and consultative meetings were held to refine the concept and agree on possible modalities for moving the process forward. These meetings culminated in the Kampala Forum, held in May 1991.

The Kampala Forum attracted over five hundred people from all walks of life. Trade union leaders, representatives of the private sector, peasants and presidents, students and professors, leaders from international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, ministers and other political leaders, participated in the meeting. The host, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, was joined by, among others, Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Dr Quett Masire of Botswana and General Hassan Omar El-Bashir of the Sudan. Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere also attended, as did the former President of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira, and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. The African National Congress sent Alfred Nzo (soon to be Foreign Affairs Minister) as its representative.

This historic meeting adopted the Kampala Document, which contained proposals for the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, grouping the four cardinal issues into 'calabashes'.

Subsequently, in June 1991, the Kampala Document was introduced at the OAU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. The ALF's immediate expectation was that the OAU Summit would accept the CSSDCA proposals and launch the process.

During the course of the Summit there were promising signs that this might happen. The Zambian President at the time, Kenneth Kaunda, pointed out during his address that the CSSDCA provided the political side of the African Economic Community Treaty that was about to be signed in Abuja, and enjoined his colleagues to accept the CSSDCA proposals. President Museveni of Uganda spoke in a more or less similar tone, and the OAU Summit noted these mentions of the CSSDCA. Contrary to the ALF's initial expectations, however, the Summit stopped short of accepting the CSSDCA proposal, but it reaffirmed and recognized the strong linkage between peace, security and development. Having noted the contents of the document, the Summit recommended it to the OAU Council of Ministers for further consideration.

The decision by the OAU Summit not to adopt the CSSDCA process was a direct consequence of the fears of a few vulnerable African governments, though within the OAU itself there was no concerted opposition. The two main states that expressed opposition to the CSSDCA process did so on matters of national policy.

Over the years, the CSSDCA proposals – often described as Africa's Magna Carta – won the support of numerous African states, non-governmental organizations and influential individual and opinion leaders, but failed to garner full acceptance by the OAU. The Kampala Document remained a widely used resource base for policy formulation in some states, and also in some regional and subregional organizations.

Though the ALF never lost hope, the period of activism was long and sometimes frustrating. Nevertheless, the ALF stood by its original mission and vision. The liberating breakthrough eventually occurred in 1999, with Nigeria's return to democracy and the subsequent election of Olusegun Obasanjo as President. This brought about a return of the CSSDCA proposals to the mainstream of policy-making in Africa. At the Algiers and Sirte OAU Summits, President Obasanjo obtained the support of his fellow African leaders for the resumption of the consideration of the CSSDCA, based on the Kampala Document. The ALF was thereafter invited to become closely associated with the intergovernmental OAU-led process that was to consider the CSSDCA.

The recommendations of the Algiers Summit meeting precipitated a series of events that eventually culminated in the adoption in 2000 of the 'Solemn Declaration' by heads of state at the 36th OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo.

### **The CSSDCA Declaration**

The full Declaration is divided into five parts. The introductory part is

followed by a list of general principles; thereafter the specific principles and plan of action and an implementation mechanism are described. The general and specific principles are divided into the four calabashes of security, stability, development and cooperation.

The general principles are:<sup>3</sup>

- The sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States must be respected.
- The security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked to that of other African countries. Instability in one country affects the stability of neighbouring countries and has serious implications for continental unity, peace and development.
- The interdependence of Member States and the link between their security, stability and development make it imperative to develop a common African agenda. Such an agenda must be based on a unity of purpose and a collective political consensus, derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress without finding lasting solutions to the problem of peace and security.
- Disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, with the emphasis on seeking African solutions to African problems.
- The prevention, management and resolution of conflicts provide the enabling environment for peace, security, stability and development to flourish.
- The responsibility for the security, stability and socio-economic development of the continent lies primarily with African states.
- While recognizing that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the United Nations Security Council, the OAU, now the African Union (AU), in close cooperation with the United Nations and the Regional Economic Communities, has the responsibility for promoting security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa.
- Democracy, good governance, respect for human and peoples' rights and the rule of law are prerequisites for the security, stability and development of the continent.
- Africa's resources should be used more effectively to meet the needs of African peoples and to improve their well-being.
- The fulfilment of the objectives of the CSSDCA requires the strengthening of Africa's solidarity and partnership with other regions of the world, in order to meet the challenges of globalization and avoid further marginalization.
- HIV/AIDS and other pandemics on the continent constitute a threat to human security as well as to short- and long-term sustainable growth in Africa.

- Member States should adhere in good faith to all CSSDCA principles and ensure their implementation.

The Declaration stipulates that peace, security and stability are the preconditions and the basis for development and cooperation in Africa. It also emphasizes that the security, stability and development of African states are inseparably interlinked. The erosion of security and stability is thus one of the major causes of the crises that continue to plague African states, and one of the principal impediments to economic growth and human development on the continent.

The CSSDCA Declaration also noted that peace constitutes the basis of all wholesome human interactions and that with peace should go security. Lack of democracy, denial of personal liberty and abuse of human rights are causes of insecurity. The concept of security transcends military considerations and includes conflict prevention, containment and resolution, all of which relate to the aim of collective continental security. Security also embraces all aspects of society, including the economic, political and social dimensions of the individual, family and community, to take in national and regional stability. The Declaration posits that the security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen, not only to live in peace but also to have access to the basic necessities of life, to participate freely in the affairs of society and to enjoy fundamental human rights.

The promotion of political and social stability in individual African countries is another key component of the CSSDCA process. Under the stability calabash, all African states are to be guided by strict adherence to the rule of law, popular participation in governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Political organizations should not be based on religious, ethnic, regional or racial affiliations. There should be transparency in public policy-making, and an absence of fundamentalism in religious practice.

The CSSDCA Declaration also provides a framework for collective action and for cooperation at various levels: continental, regional and international. It provides for cooperation between African states, between South and South and between North and South; for the economic integration of African states in the African Economic Community; for the joint development of common natural resources; for interdependence based on beneficial cooperative relations with other developing and industrialized nations; and for supra-nationality based on the need to devolve certain key responsibilities to continental institutions. The CSSDCA Declaration has thus charted a framework for Africa's development based on self-reliance, effective and responsive governance, regional integration and international cooperation.

The March 2001 OAU Summit meeting in Sirte was briefed on progress

made with the implementation of the CSSDCA. Ironically, while the newly formed AU itself does not provide for the Conflict Management Unit, the Summit agreed on a CSSDCA implementation mechanism as a unit to be situated in the AU Secretariat. This mechanism also envisages negotiations at expert level on all issues to be incorporated in the calabashes (security, stability, development and cooperation). These negotiations will be followed by a review at ministerial level, which must take place before the OAU Summit in South Africa. The latter will be the first Summit to review progress on the implementation of the CSSDCA agenda.

The adoption of the AU has revitalized the long-stalled project to revise the OAU Charter. However, the process is sure to be slow if the preceding efforts are any indication.

A crucial aspect of the CSSDCA is that it entails a biannual standing conference. Members are expected to adhere 'in good faith to all CSSDCA principles and ensure their implementation'. This particular provision is important because the standing biannual conference will involve the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs). In furtherance of the provisions of the Lomé Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA, the OAU secretariat or the AU will convene a number of expanded discussions on the four calabashes of the CSSDCA with the following possible objectives: to agree on specific principles and actions to give practical meaning to the home Declaration, and to codify them in a binding agreement.

The CSSDCA framework facilitates a constant engagement of African leaders and strengthens the capacity to hold them to their commitments, to which they have freely subscribed within their own organizations.

What then might be the role of CSOs in such an endeavour? The CSSDCA is principally designed to assist in the search for a common set of values, to which all of Africa might subscribe. That in itself defines in clearer terms the challenge for CSOs, be they regional or national in scope and orientation. The overriding challenge to CSOs remains that of helping to identify the parameters of a just order, and then preparing society to think in terms of those parameters. The task will involve the continuous expansion and defence of the liberal political space. This was a major concern of the ALF when it proposed a standing conference on security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa. The CSSDCA process aims to create a new political dispensation in the many and various societies in Africa. That political culture is premised on centrality. Without peace, no development can take place. Without development, Africans are doomed to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water. The development process in Africa, if it is to be sustainable, must be premised first and foremost on justice, which is the only way to accommodate the continent's desire to build a culture of peace.

Every society aspires towards a better-organized social structure, better service delivery from its political leaders and better governance. In particular it wishes for a government that will take overall development of the society as its priority. Given the current state of knowledge, democracy, with all its defects, remains the best form of governance known to humanity. Democracy is the liberal ground upon which freedom, the rule of law, justice and fairness to all in Africa can grow. As an ideology, democracy develops; it improves itself by the day; each new experience, each new compromise, each new conflict that challenges its claims and its postures adds to its strength. Democracy grows with the people, over time. For all these reasons, democracy is the ideological ground upon which the African structure of nation-state should be constructed.

When we speak of democracy, what do we have in mind? What are the tenets of democracy? The most universal of its elements is justice. Justice here rises above court rulings in judicial controversies; it also includes being just, considerate, law-abiding, fair, accommodating, tolerant and so on. As a tenet of democracy, justice is all-embracing; it captures all our various claims to 'democracy dividends' – the delivery of electoral promises, the openness to critique and fairness in political action. It is a manifestation of the dictum: *do unto others as you would have others do unto you*. This could be converted into the injunction that every citizen should seek a just society, where the rule of law and the supremacy of the governed over those in government is held dear. In such a society, the importance of the collective interest is greater than narrow, selfish aims.

If justice, as described above, is so significant to democracy and democratic claims, how do Africans arrive at that frame of mind? Is it an inborn quality or a way of thinking that can be learnt? If the former is the case, then there is nothing we can do! Our society is doomed to fail. But if it is the latter, if it is the case that we can train ourselves to have respect for others, Africans can modify and influence the sort of society they want, starting with the school system and young people, the future custodians of society,

Justice makes it possible for a society to be governed in a level-headed and equitable manner. It enhances the basic principle that law in the land is supreme and above all personal interests. It ensures that elected politicians have respect for the system and maintain a state of order, transparency, accountability, social justice and the freedom of the people. This includes respect for variance in opinion and religious orientation. Justice promotes cultural differences because it recognizes and accommodates plurality. Most significantly, justice also ensures that the spending and planning of the present generation is mindful of the interests of the generations yet unborn.

It is only within the context of a just society that we can talk of peace. A

complementary aim is the continuous improvement in the living conditions and prosperity of the majority of African people. In the absence of both democracy and prosperity, any attempt at building or creating a culture of peace cannot succeed. This is the message that the CSSDCA seeks to promote.

The stability calabash of the CSSDCA outlines the imperative interaction between state and civil society as a means of achieving enduring political stability. Under the stability guidelines, all African states are to be guided by strict adherence to the rule of law, popular participation in governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, while public policy-making and execution should be both accountable and transparent; political organizations should not be based on religious, ethnic, regional or racial considerations, and violent and destructive fundamentalism in religious practice should be discouraged.

In effect civil society organizations, be they national or regional, must work with these objectives in mind. Africa's regional institutions are opening up and moving in directions that tend to suggest that African leaders are beginning to acknowledge the advantages of the CSSDCA process. In order to assist them, proponents of the plan should not only mobilize popular support but also identify a number of core states favourably predisposed to democracy and justice, so that they can be used as bell-wethers to lead the way.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Ayodele Aderinwale, *Bridging the Gap between the State and the Civil Society: The Role of Regional Institutions in Constitution-making Processes: The CSSDCA Framework*, presentation at the CDD Conference on Constitutionalism in Africa, Cape Town, June 2001.
- <sup>2</sup> Olusegun Obasanjo, *Africa in Search of Common Values*, Ota, ALF Publications, 1993.
- <sup>3</sup> Ayo Aderinwale, *op.cit.*, 2001.

# The Economic Community of Central African States and Human Security

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## Introduction

Granting people the freedom to trade as a means of increasing prosperity is one way of promoting the ‘human security’ that so many Africans seek. Through trade, people form agreements and exchange ideas. Trade is often the impetus for travel, which exposes people to a wider world than their own village or city.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), also known by its French name, *Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale* (CEEAC), was born of the desire to widen the area of trading in Central Africa. Although its efforts have been limited since 1992, a strengthened ECCAS could play a vital part in realizing the concept of increased intra-African contact and trade that is envisaged by the African Renaissance and the African Union.

In December 1981, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) agreed to the principle of a wider economic community of Central African states. ECCAS was established on 18 October 1983 by UDEAC and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL) – consisting of Burundi, Rwanda and the then Zaire as well as São Tomé and Príncipe. ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but has been inactive since 1992 because of financial difficulties (the non-payment of membership fees) and the current conflict in the Great Lakes area (which has proved divisive for ECCAS members, since Rwanda and Angola back opposing sides).

ECCAS currently consists of eleven states covering a surface area of 6

million km<sup>2</sup>, populated by about 100 million inhabitants. It aims to promote harmonious cooperation and balanced and self-maintained development in all fields of economic and social activity, to reinforce close and peaceful relations between Member States, and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.

In this context, the adhesion of ECCAS Member States to the Treaty establishing the African economic community and the African Union's constitutive Act ensures ECCAS's role as one of the builders of the single African market of the future. In 1985, the ECCAS General Secretariat, based in Libreville, Gabon, set out to achieve a wider trade area under rather difficult circumstances. That endeavour lasted until 1992, when the community fell into a state of lethargy because of the socio-political crises that continue to destabilize Central Africa.

Seven states (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda) of the eleven ECCAS members are still confronted with armed conflicts that destroy human lives and damage the flora and fauna of the region, its economic infrastructure and production. Conflict also causes the movement of citizens within and out of their countries.

The other countries in the region, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe, suffer from the indirect effects of these wars. These aggravate a difficult socio-economic situation characterized by poverty, unemployment, degradation of the environment, endemic diseases, the plague of drugs, the high cost of living, and especially the poor economic performance of several of the ECCAS Member States.

Faced with such problems and in order to take into account the new challenges resulting from globalization, the assembly of ECCAS heads of state and government, gathered at Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in June 1999, defined four priority fields of focus to revitalize the community. These priorities are:

- to develop capacities to maintain peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic and social development;
- to develop physical, economic and monetary integration;
- to develop a culture of human integration; and
- to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS.

The heads of state and government of ECCAS signed a pact of non-aggression in 1996. The purpose of the pact is to restore confidence between the various states of the subregion.

In 1998, they established the Central African Council for Peace and Security (COPAX), a forum for political dialogue that meets in the event of serious

threat to peace and security in one or several countries in the subregion. The technical organs of the council are:

- The Central African early-warning system (MARAC), which is a mechanism for the early detection and prevention of crises. Its duty is to collect and analyse data.
- The Defence and Security Commission, which is the meeting of chiefs of staff of national armies and commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different Member States. Its role is to plan, organize and provide advice to the decision-making bodies of the community in order to initiate military operations if needed.
- The Central African multinational force (FOMAC), which is a non-permanent force consisting of military contingents from Member States, whose purpose is to accomplish missions of peace, security and humanitarian relief.

Within the framework of conflict prevention, it is worth mentioning the network of central African parliamentarians and the Human Rights and Democracy Centre. The purpose of the establishment of the network of parliamentarians is to involve MPs in the pursuit of the objectives of ECCAS. The network held its first meeting in Luanda, Angola, in November 2000.

The Human Rights and Democracy Centre aims to promote human rights, democratic practices and good governance, the observance of which may help to prevent conflict. The centre held its first meeting in Libreville, Gabon, at the beginning of September 2001.

Apart from community actions to settle conflicts, there are similar fields of cooperation between Member States, in particular:

- the trilateral agreement on peace and military cooperation between Angola, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
- the bilateral agreement on military cooperation between Cameroon and Chad; and
- border agreements between Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe; Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon; and Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic.

The aim of these agreements is to fix accurately the land and sea borders between the states concerned, to prevent land or sea claims. In other cases, these agreements provide for the control of common borders and simultaneous military operations, to curb both the phenomenon of armed gangsters who terrorize, kill and plunder peaceful travellers and farmers, and to confiscate the innumerable weapons in the hands of civilians and political and military groups.

## **Social values**

The new orientation given to the regional integration programme in Central Africa stresses the need to restore those African social values that foster peace and tolerance, because it is necessary to put an end to conflict. To foster this, all actors and beneficiaries of regional integration - parliamentarians, economic operators, youth, women, teachers, students, researchers and other members of civil society - should take part in the restoration of the communities torn apart by conflict. This may enable Central African people to know one another better and may thus lead to reconciliation. The aim of this orientation is to make the nationals of every country in the community feel at home in any other part of the subregion.

In this context, political and administrative leaders in the community will have to play a central role by creating a common and dynamic vision of regional integration. Likewise, the private sector will be encouraged to play a major role in the physical and economic integration of Central Africa. At the same time, steps will be taken to promote the free movement of people and goods and services.

Immigration ministers from Member States met in Yaounde in November 2000 to look into the modalities for launching ECCAS passports, which will be issued from 2002. National and regional investments will be protected and financial support will be given to developers in the subregion. A Department for Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability was introduced into the ECCAS organization in 1998 to oversee the implementation of such a programme. Its management is entrusted to a deputy secretary-general.

## **Prospects for future funding**

ECCAS is aware of the work that needs to be done to fulfil its integration and security objectives. But for the time being it does not have all the facilities needed, especially financial and technical ones, to attain its goal. That is why the General Secretariat is in touch with a number of international organizations that are ready to help it to carry out programmes on intra-community trade liberalization processes; cooperation in the field of energy; the development of communication and telecommunication facilities; food security; and sustainable management of the environment.

The entry into force of a new method of funding the activities of ECCAS, which is expected in 2003, will strengthen the technical support of partner organizations and improve the implementation of the policies adopted in these sectors.

## **Non-military initiatives**

If Africans are to live in some sort of peace, the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts must be buttressed by groups holding power in African societies. Once ECCAS funding has been strengthened, it will continue to support initiatives to promote free trade, regional integration and cooperation. These can be grouped into four broad categories: political, economic, social and institutional initiatives.

### *Political initiatives*

African governments should promote the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights, transparency in the management of public affairs, social justice and the peaceful, diplomatic resolution of disputes. Political parties as well as regional or ethnic groups will be encouraged to foster and observe these values. African leaders should commit themselves to being honest, competent and law-abiding in order that the continent can develop in peace. African and non-African states should refrain from interfering unnecessarily in the internal affairs of other states, either to destabilize them or to support unpopular regimes.

### *Economic initiatives*

Economic performance has to be improved in Africa by increasing the quantity and quality of production and services. African countries should boost their agriculture industries by building skills, good economic management and competition. Regional economic integration can be an avenue towards better economic results if it reduces the cost of reaching the market, makes companies more efficient and competitive, and enlarges the pool of skilled business people and administrators. The final goal is unemployment reduction, poverty alleviation and better living conditions.

### *Social initiatives*

Action should be taken at national and regional levels to improve housing facilities, educational infrastructure, food security and health conditions. Accordingly, efforts have to be redoubled in order to achieve these aims, while still protecting the environment.

### *Institutional initiatives*

Existing organizations such as the UN, UNESCO and OAU/African Union have to play a major role in promoting human security in all respects. Regional trade organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society should each make their own contributions to this process. The aim is to build institutions that reach beyond national boundaries and are trusted by the citizens of the region. These institutions can only be assured of the support of the citizenry if they are responsive, open and accountable.

### **Conclusion**

Good regional plans need bold leaders who are willing to look beyond the day-to-day politics of their state. ECCAS is there to support those leaders, citizens and NGOs who want to play a positive regional role. The states of Central Africa have been brought together in terrible conflict. The search for conflict resolution must be the start of a regional togetherness that fosters positive linkages and opens a path toward peace and prosperity.

# Subregional Agenda for Peace and Security: The Case of COMESA

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## **Background**

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a regional integration grouping of twenty African sovereign states (Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, the Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). These states have agreed to promote regional integration through trade development, and to develop their natural and human resources for the mutual benefit of all their peoples.

COMESA was established in 1993 and 1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which had been in existence since 1981 within the framework of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. The PTA was established to take advantage of a larger market size, to share the region's common heritage and destiny, and to allow for greater social and economic cooperation, with the ultimate objective being the creation of an economic community.

COMESA (and before it the PTA), supported by its specialized financial institutions – the Trade and Development Bank for East and South Africa (PTA Bank), the COMESA Clearing House and the reinsurance company – has a proven track record. Over the past fourteen years, it has developed a large number of regional programmes, which are assisting Member States in a positive way to attain economic recovery and sustainable economic growth.

COMESA is made up of the following:

- the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the supreme policy organ

- of the common market, which is responsible for general policy, direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the common market and the achievement of its aims and objectives;
- the Council of Ministers, which takes policy decisions on the programmes and activities of COMESA, including the monitoring and review of its financial and administrative management;
  - the Court of Justice, which has been established to ensure the proper interpretation and application of the provisions of the COMESA Treaty and to adjudicate any disputes that may arise among the Member States regarding the interpretation and application of its provisions;
  - the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, which manages the COMESA Clearing House and ensures implementation of the monetary and financial cooperation programmes;
  - the Intergovernmental Committee, which is a multi-disciplinary body composed of permanent secretaries from the Member States responsible for the development and management of programmes and action plans in all sectors of cooperation, with the exception of the finance and monetary sector;
  - the technical committees, which are responsible for the various economic sectors and for administrative and budgetary matters;
  - the Secretariat, which provides technical support and advisory services to the Member States in the implementation of the Treaty; and
  - the Consultative Committee of the Business Community and Other Interest Groups which provides a link and facilitates dialogue between the business community and other interest groups and organs of the common market.

A number of other regional organizations operating within the region are also covered by COMESA, such as the East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). COMESA has established working relations, both formally and informally, with all these regional organizations. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed with EAC, IGAD and IOC.

At the COMESA Summit in Egypt on 22 and 23 May 2000, the COMESA Authority recognized that the Secretariats of SADC and COMESA had been working together closely on a number of projects and programmes, and had reduced the degree of overlap between the institutions. The Authority also endorsed the decisions of its chairman and that of SADC to establish a joint committee to work out ways of rationalizing their activities. Reports of the joint committee, once adopted, will be submitted to the respective organs of the two institutions.

On 31 October 2001, the COMESA heads of state successfully launched a Free Trade Area (FTA). Although the heads of state had decided in 1997 that COMESA should concentrate on economic integration and leave issues of peace and security to the United Nations, OAU and subregional organizations, this was subsequently reversed at the COMESA Summit of 1999 for the following reasons:

- the COMESA FTA, soon to be launched, would be impaired by the conflicts in the subregion;
- the OAU had decided that all subregional organizations should include the issues of peace and security on their agendas;
- the Treaty already contained provisions regarding issues of peace and security;
- the linkage between peace and security and development is strong and, therefore, in the absence of peace and security, development is doomed to fail.

Accordingly, although the principal objective of COMESA is development through economic and social integration, it was realized that the organization needed to play a role in promoting peace and security in the region in order to create a peaceful and secure atmosphere in which its primary objective, enhancing economic integration, could be achieved.

It was argued that a major motivating factor was the failure of some states in the group to benefit from the establishment of the FTA owing to conflicts prevailing in the region.

### **COMESA mandate on peace and security**

The 4th Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, which was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 and 25 May 1999, decided that COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at least once a year to consider modalities for promoting peace and security in the region. It was further decided that they should consider the modalities of promoting peace, security and stability within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and to report to the Authority.

The Summit made the above decision after a lengthy debate on the devastating impact of wars and conflicts on the COMESA integration agenda. The debate arose from a growing concern over the widespread and persistent armed conflicts occurring in more than half of COMESA Member States. One potential member of COMESA, Somalia, has been in turmoil for more than ten years.

The 5th Summit of the COMESA Authority, held in Port Louis, Mauritius, on 17 and 18 May 2000, in reviewing the status of peace and security in the COMESA subregion as presented by its Bureau of the Council of Ministers, further decided that, among other factors, the COMESA Study on Peace and Security should take into account the need to identify human and financial resources; the root causes of the conflicts; the gaps that could be filled by COMESA; the lessons to be learned from other subregional organizations; and how other stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians and the business community could be involved in the development of a policy regarding peace and security.

### **COMESA activities in developing a strategy**

In order to comply with the decisions of the 4th Summit, the COMESA Secretariat proceeded in 1999 to set up a study team on peace and security.

The objective of the study team was to draw up a proposed programme of action outlining the role that COMESA could play in promoting peace and security in the region. Accordingly, the team examined ways in which the organization could foster peace in collaboration with the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The study team was supplemented by the holding of two workshops. The first, on 'The challenges to peace and security in the COMESA subregion', was held in Lusaka, Zambia, on 27 and 29 March 2000.

This workshop, which recalled the decisions of the 4th Summit of the COMESA Authority on the development of a COMESA policy and plan of action on peace and security, laid the foundation upon which the entire study would be based. Apart from an initial survey of the root causes of existing conflicts in the subregion, the workshop, established inter alia a linkage between peace and security and development, and the need for COMESA to play a role in promoting them, although the principal objective of COMESA was that of 'development through economic and social integration'.

The second workshop, on 'The role of the private sector, NGOs and civil society in the promotion of peace and security in the COMESA subregion', was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 19 and 21 February 2001. Its thrust was to implement the decision of the 5th Summit, on peace and security, as mentioned above, to involve other stakeholders such as NGOs, civil society, parliamentarians and the business community.

The second workshop not only established the need but also the necessary modalities for collaborative and consultative relationships between these organs and COMESA. COMESA intends to convene another workshop in the

near future, to deal particularly with the role of national assemblies in the promotion of peace and security, and where allied issues such as good governance, corporate governance, local governance and other tenets of democracy will also be dealt with.

After the completion of the second round of the study, another meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held in April 2001 to consider the study report, which highlighted several peace and security issues of concern to COMESA.

These issues included:

- the role of other subregional organizations in peace and security, particularly ECOWAS, OAU, SADC and IGAD, and ways in which the COMESA programme could interlink with them;
- the root causes of the main conflicts, and of political instability and insecurity in the COMESA region;
- the general context of conflicts in the COMESA region - particularly four areas identified by the study, which highlighted the Greater Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region;
- causes of insecurity in the Indian Ocean States and the Front Line States (FLS) (in which the study differentiated between those associated with colonialism and post-colonialism, and those associated with estheticism);
- the problem of refugees and displaced persons in the COMESA region (giving clear evidence that the COMESA region has the largest concentration of both refugees and displaced persons in Africa);
- the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the COMESA region;
- an examination of best practices in peace-building, including trade-based practices and African traditional methods;
- the possibility of introducing a levy on imports from third countries to finance peace, and security building measures; and
- proposals for a new institutional structure, based on a draft protocol for dealing with the problems of peace and security in COMESA.

The study concluded by stating that, as it is indisputable that the maintenance of peace is a major precondition for socio-economic development in any country or region, it would be useful if the sovereign Member States of COMESA were to allow the organization to play an effective role in the promotion of peace and security through a legal mechanism or instrument.

### **Elaboration of the COMESA policy**

The second meeting of the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in


April 2001, after consideration of the revised study, made fresh recommendations to the COMESA Authority on an elaborated mandate for COMESA's role in peace and security. It should be noted that, although a protocol was not adopted, the decisions of the COMESA Authority are binding on the Member States. The final revised mandate was adopted by the 6th Summit, held in Cairo, Egypt on 22 and 23 May 2001. Here the COMESA Authority made general decisions, which included the following:

- COMESA should involve the private sector, NGOs and civil society in forums where issues of peace and security are being considered. There was a need for specific procedural criteria to be adopted on the rules for the accreditation of members of the private sector, NGOs and civil society attending the forum on peace and security.
- The responsibility for collaborating with the private sector, NGOs and civil society in addressing issues of peace and security could be delegated to the competent division within the existing structure of COMESA.
- The promotion of good governance as a way of preventing conflicts in Member States should go hand in hand with the promotion of corporate governance as a way of preventing conflicts.
- The promotion of trade-based practices of peace-building, which in the report refers to control of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the prohibition of trade in illegal diamonds, should be extended to include the control of drug trafficking.
- COMESA, in consultation with other stakeholders, such as the private sector, NGOs and civil society, should promote the ban against the manufacture, transfer, stockpiling, sale and use of landmines.
- The Member States of COMESA should be urged to attend the UN 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in order to participate in addressing the issue.
- The international community, and in particular the developed countries, should be urged to provide Member States with technical and financial assistance in the aim to eradicate landmines and rehabilitate their victims.

The COMESA Authority took the following decisions on the modalities for implementation of the COMESA programme on peace and security.

### *Three-tier structure*

The Authority reaffirmed the decision of the 5th Summit (Mauritius, May 2000), which agreed on a three-tier structure for dealing with issues of peace and security, as follows:



### *The Authority*

The COMESA Authority, which consists of heads of state and government in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty, is the highest decision-making body in matters of peace and security. It has power to delegate its functions to its Bureau, which in consultation with the Central Organ of the (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and other competent subregional organizations will carry out its functions of conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy.

Although the Authority will consider issues of peace and security at its annual Summit Meeting in the case of urgent issues, normally the Bureau will meet to consider such issues when necessary.

The Bureau, when considering any action regarding conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy, should take into account the need to avoid involvement of the Bureau member who may be affected by the matter in hand. It should also have the power to co-opt an additional member or members of the Authority to carry out a preventive diplomacy function on their behalf.

### *COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs*

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Member States shall meet at least once a year

to consider modalities of promoting peace and security in the COMESA subregion.

### *Committee on Peace and Security*

Under the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Committee on Peace and Security has been formed. It is composed of high-level officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Member States. The committee shall meet at least once a year to consider modalities of promoting peace and security in the COMESA subregion, and make recommendations to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

### *COMESA Secretariat*

The COMESA Secretariat, under the general supervision of the Secretary-General, shall have the responsibility to initiate actions for conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy upon receipt of an official request from a Member State.

The Secretary-General shall consult the Bureau for directions upon receipt of information from any other stakeholders.

The Secretariat shall also:

- provide administrative, logistical and technical support to the Bureau towards the fulfilment of its functions;
- take responsibility for convening meetings of the Committee on Peace and Security;
- endeavour to utilize information on states or conflicts from other regional organizations, particularly the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and;
- establish a databank on conflicts in the subregion.

### *Cooperation with other organizations*

COMESA shall coordinate its conflict-prevention activities through the development of existing cooperation instruments, which include the following:

- the UN
- the OAU; and
- subregional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), East African Community (EAC), Community of Sahel and Sahara States (CEN-SAD) and other relevant bodies.

### *Consultation and areas of cooperation with the private sector, NGOs and civil society*

Areas of consultation with the private sector, non-governmental organizations, national assemblies and civil society shall include:

- resource mobilization;
- information-sharing;
- capacity-building;
- provision of peace workers;
- training in peace-building; and
- cooperation with other stakeholders (NGOs, civil society and members of the private sector).

The meeting recommended the following ways of collaboration with other stakeholders (NGOs, civil society and the private sector).

- The Secretariat should establish specific criteria on the procedure and rules for the accreditation of the private sector, NGOs and civil society.
- The responsibility for collaborating with the private sector, NGOs and civil society in addressing issues of peace and security could be delegated to the competent division within the existing structure of COMESA.

### *Human and financial resources*

At the recent Summit, it was agreed that, owing to financial constraints, the COMESA Secretariat should use the existing structure and resources of COMESA to discharge its functions regarding issues of peace and security. The meeting also recommended that the Member States, especially those who are serving members of the Bureau, should utilize their national resources as far as possible.

### *Operationalization of the COMESA model*

Although the COMESA model is relatively recent, the experience gained in the economic integration arena should be easily adaptable to issues of peace and

security. In addition, the implementation of the model will be supported by the COMESA Court of Justice, which is already in existence.

## COMESA Court of Justice

This court was established under Article 7 of the COMESA Treaty. The court replaced three judicial bodies that existed under the PTA. The court has been operational since 1998, and has already received about four cases, two of which relate to state rights and obligations.

The jurisdiction of the court as contained in the Treaty falls under several categories, including general jurisdiction; jurisdiction under arbitration clauses and special-agreements; jurisdiction of national courts; advisory opinions of the court; jurisdiction over matters of peace and security; and advisory opinions on peace and security.

### *General jurisdiction*

Article 23 of the Treaty provides for the general jurisdiction of the courts, which is to adjudicate on all matters that may be referred to it pursuant to the Treaty. Article 19 further provides that the court shall ensure adherence to law in interpretation and application of the Treaty. A superficial reading of the articles may make one think that they are in conflict. What Article 19 does is to qualify the general jurisdiction given in Article 23. The general jurisdiction under these two articles is to adjudicate as well as to give advisory opinions.

Matters brought under the court's jurisdiction according to Article 24 of the Treaty may be brought by a Member State which considers that another Member State or Council has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty or has infringed one of its provisions. On the other hand, a Member State may also apply for a determination by the courts if the legality of any act, regulation or decision is ultra vires or unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application. Article 26 also makes the provision that legal or natural persons resident in a Member State may apply to the court for the determination of the legality of any act, regulation, decision or directive of council as unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty. However, when the matter for determination relates to any act, regulation or decision by a Member State, such person shall not refer the matter for determination under Article 26 of the Treaty until he or she has first exhausted local remedies in the national court or tribunals.

The court also has the power to hear a matter brought by the Secretary-

General against a Member State or Member States which have failed to fulfill an obligation or obligations under the Treaty. This provision comes under Article 25.

### *Jurisdiction under arbitration clauses and special agreements*

Under Article 28 of the Treaty, the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:

- a matter arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract which confers such jurisdiction to which the common market or any of its institutions is a party; and
- a matter arising from a dispute regarding the Treaty between the Member States if the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the Member States concerned.

### *Jurisdiction of national courts*

Article 29 of the Treaty provides that decisions of the court on the interpretation of the provisions should defer to decisions of national courts. Except where jurisdiction is conferred on the court by or under the Treaty, disputes to which the common market is a party shall not on that ground alone be excluded from the jurisdiction of national courts.

### *Advisory opinions of the court*

The court also has jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion upon request to the Authority, the Council or a Member State regarding questions of law arising from the provisions of the Treaty affecting the common market under Article 32. In the exercise of its advisory function, the court is governed by the Treaty and the rules of court relating to references of disputes to the extent that the court considers appropriate.

### *Jurisdiction over matters of peace and security*

Article 23 as read together with Article 19 of the Treaty gives the court general jurisdiction to adjudicate matters referred to it pursuant to the Treaty with regard to adherence to law in its interpretation and application. As the

mandate for COMESA to address issues of peace and security is derived from the Treaty under Article 163 as read with Articles 3 and 6, the court has jurisdiction to determine issues of peace and security. However, it is important to note that this jurisdiction is confined to adherence to law in interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty. According to the Treaty, issues for determination by the court can be brought by any Member State under Article 24 or by the Secretary-General under Article 25.

### *Advisory opinions on peace and security*

Another way in which the court can be used to address issues of peace and security is the provision of advisory opinions to the Authority in its function of conflict prevention (Article 32). This Article provides that the Authority, Council or any Member State may request the court to give an advisory opinion regarding questions of law arising from the provisions of the Treaty affecting the common market. In this case, with the delegated powers of the function of conflict prevention, the Bureau or Authority can seek advisory opinions from the court.

### **Conclusion**

It is quite clear from the COMESA example that several lessons are to be learnt for regional integration groupings in Africa. These lessons include:

- Issues of economic development and integration cannot be dealt with in isolation from peace and security issues, both aspects have to be addressed hand in hand.
- There is a need for all subregional groupings to cooperate in addressing issues of peace and security in order to avoid duplication of effort. In this respect, COMESA recognizes the efforts of institutions such as IGAD and SADC.
- The OAU Centre for Conflict Management needs to play a greater role in the coordination of efforts of subregional organizations.
- The role of civil society cannot be ignored, and there is a need to involve representatives of this sector in addressing issues of peace and security.

## **Note**

<sup>1</sup> The views expressed in this paper, unless otherwise stated, are those of the author and not the COMESA Secretariat.

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# Final Recommendations

## of the UNESCO–ISS Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa

*Pretoria, South Africa, 23–24 July 2001*

### **Background**

On 23 and 24 July 2001, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa hosted a high-level expert meeting on peace, human security, conflict prevention and social development, with the participation of regional and continental organizations and selected representatives from civil society in Africa. The meeting took place under the terms of a cooperation agreement signed between UNESCO and the ISS in Paris on 22 February 1999 and followed the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, hosted by UNESCO in Paris on 27 and 28 November 2000.

The November 2000 meeting made a number of specific recommendations concerning Africa, including the need to give support to African initiatives; the need to strongly link conflict prevention to the promotion of human security, on the basis of dialogue within societies; and the need to strengthen education, training and scientific capacities to deal with the major challenges of conflict prevention and the building of human security. The Agenda for Action from the Paris meeting called, *inter alia*, for the convening of expert meetings in the different regions in order to draw up more specific agendas for the promotion of human security at the regional and subregional levels.

The Pretoria meeting is the first of a series of four on the same theme. Thus, three other meetings will be held in 2001, one in Karachi (Pakistan) for the South Asia region, in collaboration with the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA); one in Almaty (Kazakhstan) for the Central Asia region, in

cooperation with the National Commission for UNESCO; and the last in Santiago (Chile) for the Latin America and Caribbean region, in cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO).

Meanwhile, UNESCO is also preparing regional international conferences for 2002 on peace, human security and conflict prevention in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

### **Obstacles, challenges and prospective issues**

Africa is plagued by the twin phenomena of weak states and weak civil society. Notwithstanding, states continue to be important actors both politically and economically. Within that context, the institutional and administrative shortcomings of governments, parliaments, judiciaries and security sectors, as well as low social and economic indicators, need to be addressed if any progress on human security is to be achieved.

In this respect, capacity-building on a number of levels is necessary, as is improved access to information at the national, subregional and regional levels. Greater openness in the process of governing is also critical, both in terms of preventing crises and of improving governance and accountability.

However, in furthering the cause of human security, the political will of the parties involved is crucial. Apart from a lack of capacity, lack of will has been a major constraint on progress in regional integration and the development of regional codes of conduct, for example.

The Pretoria meeting focused on the following questions:

1. How can we ensure that regional, subregional and national bodies take the dimension of human security into account in their policy formulation and implementation?
2. Have the priorities that require long-term action been identified by these bodies or are they only dealing with urgent matters (crisis management)?
3. What capacities need to be built to promote human security, especially through education and training?
4. Which strategies can mobilize the most vulnerable populations so that they too have a stake in the democratic process?

### **The concept of human security**

Although in recent years there has been an expansion of both the concept of development and that of security, the two terms are not synonymous. While delegates enthusiastically subscribed to a wide definition of security as

encapsulated by the term ‘human security’, the concept requires some delineation. In fact, there is a close overlap between our understanding of security and the term ‘peace-building’. Therefore, for example, while delegates did not focus on the issue of development as such, the effects of (failed) development approaches and policies that impact very significantly on individual and communal security were considered to be of central concern.

Our focus on security does not imply a top-down approach to the strengthening of administrative structures or a state-centred approach to security thinking. Indeed, we reject an approach that relies upon structure to the exclusion of content and process.

Our concern with human security, therefore, provides space for community-based approaches to building stability and a host of initiatives between this and international responses and initiatives. Finally, in contrast to the short-term, problem-orientated focus of traditional strategic or security studies, our focus on human security attempts to lengthen the timescale within which security concerns are addressed, and broaden the scope beyond purely military issues.

### **Recommendations: A general overview**

The meeting aimed to develop recommendations that would build on existing institutions and programmes carried out both by UNESCO and/or regional and national organizations, as well as organizations such as the ISS and other partners, in order to avoid duplication of effort. In addition, an attempt was made to base recommendations on their potential feasibility.

Delegates recognized that a number of recommendations impact upon other actors, such as the broader United Nations system, funding agencies and civil society.

The recommendations can be implemented at a number of levels and by a number of actors:

- National: government and its agencies, with UNESCO playing a role in some of the initiatives.
- Subregional and regional: intergovernmental organizations such as the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with UNESCO playing a role in some of the initiatives.

In all of the above, domestic and regional civil society organizations were

identified as important actors, although their general weakness meant that expectations of delivery needed to be modest. Initiatives to strengthen the role of civil society organizations, think-tanks and regional institutes such as the ISS were therefore a recurrent theme.

UNESCO's core competency, that of capacity-building through education and training, can be focused in the following areas:

- skilled technical and administrative personnel at national governmental, subregional and regional intergovernmental level, who can manage projects effectively and engage in complex negotiations, such as the various rounds of the World Trade Organization;
- easily accessible and 'processable' information/resources.

These could be achieved on the basis of the draft UNESCO Medium-Term Strategy for 2002-2007, and in particular of its Strategic Objective 5 relating to human security and its Strategy on the Eradication of Poverty.

### *Key proposals*

1. The participants recognized the significance of UNESCO's **culture of peace** and related programmes. It was agreed that certain core values of promotion of human rights and good governance are universal. The development of region-specific programmes promoting a culture of peace would build on existing UNESCO programmes, but would be aimed at identifying specific problems facing regions. For example, in the Horn of Africa the specific problem could be the militarization of politics, while in other parts of the continent it could be religious or racial intolerance. Such programmes (e.g. Education for Peace) could be operational at a national level, but would be given added weight and create additional awareness if they were officially approved as joint programmes of UNESCO with the various subregional groupings, such as SADC or ECCAS, among others. UNESCO could develop pilot projects focused on human security for states that have very little capacity or resources. In addition, literacy programmes could be used to promote peace, human rights, democracy and tolerance.
2. As human security was still an emerging paradigm, with differing perceptions and emphasis, UNESCO would consider supporting a pilot study, possibly through the ISS, to investigate the development of **human security indicators**, which could raise the profile of critical human security issues. This would be complementary to the emphasis of the New Africa

Initiative, adopted by the Organization of African Unity at its July 2001 Summit in Lusaka (Zambia), on good governance, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Such a project could eventually involve a number of actors, including civil society, subregional and regional organizations. If adopted, these human security indicators could be used as benchmarks and early-warning mechanisms for the identification of focused programmes of action. For it to be African-owned, the process of developing such indicators would have to include the input of organizations and policy-making or academic institutions in Africa.

Participants also recommended that African institutions be encouraged to research and publish on the concept of human security and associated issues. UNESCO would possibly fund and encourage such projects.

3. **Early-warning systems:** Participants emphasized the importance of early warning and the challenge to translate this into early action. These mechanisms do not necessarily need to be intergovernmental, subregional or regional only, but delegates supported the development of early-warning mechanisms located in appropriate African research institutions with a focus that included non-military aspects of human security, particularly human rights and governance. The participants noted with appreciation the role played by established regional early-warning systems within civil society, such as that at the ISS.
4. Delegates also discussed the furthering of the human security agenda through **capacity-building of African parliamentarians**, through institutions that form part of the broader security sector, including the armed forces and criminal justice sectors, as well as in respect of civil society. It is apparent that many African legislative institutions have limited information on international agreements and protocols entered into by their governments (examples are the Palermo Convention and decisions on controlling the proliferation of small arms). Educational and capacity-building projects to address these problems could be channelled intergovernmentally and through civil society. Delegates noted that all regional organizations have established or are considering various types of regional parliamentary institutions as well as referring to the mooted Pan-African Parliament.
5. Encouragement was given to African Member States to promote **common legislative agendas in their national assemblies** on issues that have been identified as crucial to the promotion of human security, such as

HIV/AIDS, poverty, environment, human rights and good governance. It was also seen as important to consider vulnerable groups more broadly, in particular refugees, internally displaced persons, women, children, those affected by HIV/AIDS and persecuted communities and groups.

6. The participants also highlighted the fact that the overarching principles of the **African Union**, the **New Africa Initiative (NAI)** and the **Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)** are complementary to the concept of human security, and that it would be important to cooperate at an intergovernmental level to work towards attaining the principles contained therein. Delegates encouraged regional civil society organizations, such as the ISS, to assist in mobilizing and popularizing these initiatives in the run-up to the first Assembly of the African Union, to be held in South Africa in 2002. Such popularization should seek to provide space for civil society organizations within these continental initiatives and seek to embed the principles of good governance and democracy, tolerance and empowerment of the populations, politically, socially and economically, at all levels. They also require the development of benchmark levels of democracy to ensure some measure of assessment of progress. This would also facilitate accountability of national and intergovernmental agencies to their citizens.
7. One of the issues identified by the participants as a key constraint was **access to and dissemination of information**. In this framework, the UNESCO SecuriPax Network should be strengthened, in particular through regional and subregional networking in Africa.

The participants recommended the **establishment of a publicly accessible electronic resource centre**, focusing on intergovernmental organizations in Africa, which would be responsible for the collection and dissemination of official documentation, such as decisions, resolutions, and basic documentation such as protocols and other official agreements. This would provide two benefits: easy access to information by regional and national bodies; and a means by which governments and intergovernmental organizations could be held accountable for decisions and policies adopted.

However, the participants also pointed to the fact that the so-called 'information society' was a reality for only a small proportion of people in Africa. Other forms of dissemination of information needed attention, such as radio and publications, especially in countries where the **media** are controlled by the state. In addition, citizens may have access to international broadcasters, but little access to information and

developments directly pertinent to their own countries or regions. Participants stressed that the utilization of technology was a strong vehicle against the abuse of power. It provided for greater accountability and in this respect would need to be harnessed by organizations of civil society and UNESCO.

8. **Capacity-building of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations** in matters such as knowledge of codes of governance, and the more effective operation of such organizations, were also identified as areas in which UNESCO could help to address serious deficiencies.

In this respect, the identification for training of women's organizations and community-based organizations in rural areas would go a long way towards assisting vulnerable groups.

Participants also touched on the necessity of **developing a database or inventory of African NGOs**, which could facilitate improved networking among them as well as with intergovernmental organizations. Delegates noted that the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) already has an African Network for Civil Society. Participants also noted with appreciation the results from the OAU - Civil Society Conference hosted in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in June 2001 and the resolutions that flowed from it.

The meeting also identified a role for **civil society**, working together with UNESCO and other agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in developing the capacity of civil society organizations in Africa. The recommendations included acceleration in the accreditation of African NGOs based at UNESCO. This would allow a more balanced perspective by UNESCO on the needs of NGOs, especially those of Africa. It would also help to create the necessary links between UNESCO and elements of African civil society.

Furthermore, the UNESCO National Commissions could focus on scenario-building with youth and women, particularly in less-developed countries, similar to the UNDP African Futures - National Long-Term Perspectives Studies.

Participants again called on the ISS to assist in mobilizing civil society participation in the forthcoming Assembly of the African Union, and UNESCO urged African leaders, and South Africa as the host, to assist in such a process and provide for civil society participation during the Assembly.

9. In all the above, UNESCO and regional intergovernmental organizations

should strive to identify the role that **traditional African institutions**, such as the Council of Elders, can play. This would create a real sense of the ability of indigenous mechanisms to promote peace and human security.

*Pretoria, 24 July 2001*

# Appendices



# Organizing Committee

of the UNESCO–ISS Expert Meeting on Peace,  
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# Programme

## UNESCO–ISS Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa

*Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa  
23–24 July 2001*

**Monday, 23 July 2001**

CHAIR: MR L. B. HONWANA, REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTOR,  
UNESCO, PRETORIA

1. Welcome and introduction – Mr Jakkie Cilliers, ISS
2. Purpose of the seminar – Ms Moufida Goucha, UNESCO.  
'Programme of action on human security and conflict prevention –  
UNESCO SecuriPax Network'
3. A brief conceptual framework for human security – Representative  
from Institute for Global Dialogue
4. The view from the OAU – (Millennium Partnership for the African  
Recovery Programme; Omega Plan; Compact for African Recovery)
5. Discussion
6. Towards a common subregional agenda: The view from SADC
7. Discussion on Southern Africa
8. Towards a common subregional agenda: The view from ECOWAS
9. Discussion on West Africa
10. Towards a common subregional agenda: The view from IGAD
11. Discussion on the Horn of Africa
12. Towards a common subregional agenda: The view from ECCAS
13. Discussion on Central Africa

## Tuesday, 24 July 2001

CHAIR: MR JAKKIE CILLIERS, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

1. Towards a common subregional agenda: The view from COMESA
2. Discussion on COMESA region
3. Developing a common framework – presentation of framework agenda (to be developed during the meeting) – representative from the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Africa Leadership Forum
4. Discussion
5. Concluding remarks: Ms Moufida Goucha, UNESCO

*Tuesday evening:*

Cocktail dinner organized by UNESCO, Pretoria

## Wednesday, 25 July 2001

Morning: Guided tour of Pretoria

Delegates depart.

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# Final Recommendations

## First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions

on the theme

*What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*

UNESCO, Paris, 27–28 November 2000

1. Human security can be considered today as a *paradigm in the making*, for ensuring both a **better knowledge** of the rapidly evolving large-scale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened **mobilization** of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today.

As such, it is an adequate framework for:

- accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles;
  - contributing to sustainable development and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all human rights;
  - reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception;
  - providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations most affected by partial and interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well as by other countries.
2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities for the **strengthening of large coalitions working to further human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in particular at local level involving**

**all actors of society.** This in turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation of actions aimed at enhancing human security at the local, national, regional and international levels.

3. The promotion of human security today therefore requires an **enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives** in the fields of research, training, mobilization and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September 2000 for that purpose (<http://www.unesco.org/securipax>)
4. **The strengthening of the action of the United Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human security is essential today**, taking into account the objectives set out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as on the measures being taken to reach internationally agreed development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradication; education for all; the preservation of the environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle against AIDS.
5. The compounded impact of a growing number of threats to the security of populations requires the establishment of **innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the requirements of inducing participative preventive action, involving all social actors.** The intimate links that should exist between research projects and policy formulation in the field of prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into account the fact that current research on various dimensions of security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action, the peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms, contributing to

the establishment of such mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the populations that merit particular and urgent attention.

6. **Regional and subregional approaches** should be elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as stated by the United Nations Security Council.
7. Special attention should be paid to the **most highly populated countries**, given the fact that in these countries the interrelationship between population growth, diminishing natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of designing local approaches focusing on specific population groups.
8. **The development of human resources is a key factor, if not the most important, for ensuring human security.** Basic education for all and the building of capacities at the national level must therefore be placed high on the human security agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an important role in national capacity building in fields such as the setting up of early-warning mechanisms related to major risks and threats to human security; and high-level training for the elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive action policies.
9. Critical post-conflict issues such as **reconciliation processes and mechanisms** and the often harsh **impact of sanctions on populations** merit more in-depth analysis in terms of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for international instruments, in particular of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation

processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices, especially of the work of the various truth and justice commissions set up in last two decades in various countries. Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their impact on civilian populations.

10. The impact on human security of **migrations** and of movements of **populations displaced due to conflict** should be highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to countering practices in host countries that discriminate against legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the international community should be reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a semi-permanent character.
11. Due attention should be paid to countering the impact of **negative paradigms** (such as ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘African anarchy’, etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).
12. **The role of the state** in the promotion of human security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly evolving international processes linked to economic and financial globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.

# Agenda for Action

## of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace

*UNESCO, Paris, 27–28 November 2000*

**The participants** in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, organized by UNESCO on 27 and 28 November 2000, on the theme: ‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’;

**Thank** UNESCO for this initiative which allowed numerous peace research and training institutions to take part in the proceedings by means of a direct and fruitful dialogue;

Unanimously **note** that current and future human security considerations are taking on global proportions, and that all factors in the human security equation are interacting on a world scale, in such a way that the need to understand them as one single theme is a cognitive step that increasingly needs to be taken everywhere, based on an intensive sharing of everyone’s contributions;

**Aware** that peace research and training institutions, through their function as centres of training, analysis and policy elaboration, have a special responsibility in this respect, **undertake** to increase their cooperation in a common research effort to propose better ways to achieve peace, human security, development, respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic principles;

**Anxious** to disseminate their conclusions as widely as possible, **adopt** as the basis of their continuing project the following Agenda for Action:

- *Human security is indivisible. A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates the overall need for human*

*security, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The world's future depends upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals;*

- *Awareness of the global and universal nature of human security necessary to all forms of progress and acknowledgement of the appropriate role of the peace research and training institutions in this respect, call for a considerable evolution in people's minds;*
- *The representatives of peace research and training institutions share an important responsibility in this field, through their capacity to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis of the world in its current state, a clear perception of the changes awaiting it and a constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to provide general progress with the conditions necessary for human security, that is to say the possibility of its being of a lasting nature.*

*Consequently, the participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions,*

- *Decide to create the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace in order to remain united for the purpose of future activities;*
- *Welcome UNESCO's proposal to assign to the Network they have thus created, the SecuriPax Forum (<http://www.unesco.org/securopax>), aimed at facilitating the exchange of information and best experiences and practices in the field of human security;*
- *Decide to work together with a view to contributing to the promotion of concrete actions of general interest, ranging from joint efforts to define human security indicators to high-level training activities;*
- *Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple capacities, and this on the basis of all the contributions and recommendations made at this First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions;*
- *Express their willingness to organize regional and subregional meetings in the coming years in the framework of the International SecuriPax Network;*
- *Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda for Action to join them in the Network created and to share efforts with them.*



# SecurIPax Forum

## UNESCO Virtual Forum on Human Security

[www.unesco.org/securipax](http://www.unesco.org/securipax)

*Taking preventive action*

Welcome to the UNESCO Forum on Human Security.

This Forum should become a meeting place to exchange ideas and debate, presented in an interactive manner, about topical issues.

You can share your opinions on the subject of human security, ask or answer questions, begin or join a discussion, or simply describe the action that you would like to see in order to achieve greater human security for all. You can also send a message to the organizers of the Forum.

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We are greatly looking forward to your contribution.

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