Stephen Calleya

Since 1989, a series of conflict prevention and peace building proposals have been presented in an effort to create a multilateral security network among the Mediterranean states. The recent breakthrough in the Middle East peace process provides a more conducive atmosphere in which trans-Mediterranean security initiatives can develop. Inclusion of all the concemed parties in the region is a prerequisite to the successful establishment of a security forum in the littoral.

The most far reaching is the Italian-Spanish proposal involving all the Mediterranean states (from Mauritania to Iran). In a Conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). The scheme was presented in September 1990 at the CSCE conference held in Palma de Majorca on the protection of the Mediterranean's ecological system. It advocated a general debate on the security issue, focusing on the political, economic and social dimensions of security(1).

Despite wholehearted support from the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the United States, United Kingdom and Germany outrightly rejected the project on the grounds that it was too ambitious. France and Portugal also questioned the applicability of a Helsinki-type process, tailor made to deal with Europe during the Cold War. Without the support of the European Community and the influential United States, the aspiration of establishing a CSCM has been put on the backburner.

A more intensive sub-set of regional dialogue is the French initiative set up in the western sector of the Mediterranean in 1990, the so-called West Mediterranean Forum. Composed of five southern European countries—France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain—and the five Arab Maghreb Union members—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—the '5+5' talks were officially launched at a foreign ministerial level in Rome on 10 December 1990. The Rome gathering and the follow-up meeting in Algiers in October 1991 developed into flexible forums of discussion with participants mainly concentrating their diplomatic resources on finding a more balanced economic co-development approach in the region (Ghebali 1993, 97-99). Unfortunately, the third meeting that was scheduled to take place in Tunis in 1992 has never materialized. After a productive start, the French initiative remains relegated to diplomatic limbo following the breakdown in relations with Libya because of the Lockerbie affair and the deterioration of political stability in Algeria.

Nevertheless, the concept of creating a pan-Mediterranean security arrangement is still resonant as evident from other initiatives that have been proposed. In June 1992 a CSCM type gathering took place at Malaga and adopted a final document that was divided into three pillars.

The security pillar suggested the sketching of a charter handling trans-Mediterranean relations: the creation of a crisis-management and peaceful settlement of disputes regional centre, the ratification of a set of land based confidence-building measures, and a series of rules with the objective of transforming the Mediterranean into a denuclearized area.

The second pillar introduced the goals of co-development and partnership, both central themes of past and present European Union initiatives in the region. The economic programme put forward touched upon a broad range of issues including: the environment with particular focus on sustainable environment, the promotion of food production, trade exchanges, industrial cooperation, debt rescheduling and relief, encouraging foreign direct investment especially to upgrade communication and transport networks, and the management of tourism.

The third pillar dealt with the issue of human rights and was a carbon copy of the CSCE mechanism contending with the human rights dimension. It advocated a policy of complete transparency amongst the Mediterranean states in human rights issues and endorsed the principle that all countries concerned ensure the preservation of all religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities on their territory.

The Malaga document also embodied a preamble declaring that although the conference was not mandated to devise direct solutions to conflicts in the Mediterranean basin, its purpose was to 'launch a pragmatic process of cooperation which will gradually gain in strength and coverage, generate a positive and irrepressible momentum, and facilitate the settlement of these conflicts' (ibid, 100-101).

Although the CSCE avoids referring to the CSCM project in the Helsinki Declaration of July 1992 entitled The Challenges of Peace, it still recognizes the significance of the Mediterranean to the future of European security:

We recognise that the changes which have taken place in Europe are relevant to the Mediterranean region and that, conversely, economic, social, political and security developments in the region have a direct bearing on Europe (point 37).

The CSCE also commits itself to the widening of cooperation and increasing its dialogue with the non-participating Mediterranean states in an effort to

promote social and economic development, thereby enhancing stability in the region, in order to narrow the prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours and protect the Mediterranean ecosystems. We stress the importance of intra-Mediterranean relations and the need for increased cooperation within the region (point 39-40).

In spite of the indifference manifested by the CSCE towards the Italian-Spanish CSCM proposal, a Mediterranean meeting of the CSCE was convened in Malta in May 1993. In fact, the CSCE seminar was held in accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Document of 1992(2). As was the case at Malaga, the Seminar's participants were free to discuss problems pertaining to the Mediterranean without the inhibitions normally associated with the onus of a negotiated text.

The Seminar debate revealed that a significant number of Mediterranean non-European countries maintain a marked interest in keeping links, dialogue and cooperation with Europe active within the framework of the CSCE. Requests for more regular consultations were put forward and an interest was expressed in being associated in a more permanent structured relationship (ibid, 4).

Deliberations focused on the political, social, economic, and humanitarian factors behind demographic trends and migration. A call for accelerated economic cooperation was also put forward. This request emphasised that European markets should be further opened to exports of manufactured commodities; finance for projects and programmes in the field of agriculture should be increased; more support for private sector operations through the encouragement of joint ventures between European companies and nonparticipating Mediterranean states should be given; and support of macro-economic and sectoral reforms in these countries should be forthcoming (ibid, 5).

When discussing environmental issues, the delegations reaffirmed that all countries in the region should adopt national strategies for sustainable development in accordance with the recommendations of Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (IJNCED), held in Rio de Janiero. Regional cooperation and coordination were also to be encouraged. Actions which were debated comprised:

• Establishing and implementing the legal instruments of environmental impact assessment
• Strengthening national institutional capacity to integrate social, economic, developmental and environmental issues at all levels of decision-making and implementation
• Promoting the rapid introduction of solar and wind energy
• Establishing economic instruments with a view of integrating environmental costs in all economic activities and ensuring that prices reflect the relative scarcity and total value of resources (ibid, 5-6)
• Setting up a Mediterranean environment development agency eg. a Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development.

Consensus was also achieved on the necessity to review and reinforce a full range of legal instruments relevant to the Mediterranean region. Particular emphasis was directed toward those instruments aimed at protecting and restoring Mediterranean ecosystems as identified in the Mediterranean Action Plan and the Barcelona Convention. Other legal instruments, such as the conventions on Climate and on Biodiversity and the ECE Conventions on a European level, were also recommended for ratification. The elaboration of new conventions and protocols such as the Convention on desertification were also presented (ibid, 7).

Despite the limited concrete results that have been achieved through Mediterranean security initiatives since the end of the Cold War, gatherings such as the '5+5' forum, the Malaga conference, and the Malta Seminar, have at very the least been positive as an exercise in consensus. They have also succeeded in realising the primary objective of stimulating an informal exchange of views that is a prerequisite to more comprehensive security dialogue.

The Way Forward: A Council of the Mediterranean?

In an effort to overcome the obstacles that have kept the CSCM from being launched, Malta proposed another trans-Mediterranean security blueprint which complements its predecessor.

The idea for a Council of the Mediterranean (CM) was suggested at a symposium held in Tunisia in November 1992, by Maltese Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido de Marco(3). He envisaged a forum that could be established upon the Council of Europe model, creating the necessary facilities to involve all the parties concerned in a continuous dialogue towards the solution of problems affecting the area:

It is my government's view that the Mediterranean Sea should not be a divide, but through the rich diversity present in all Mediterranean countries, can be harmonised by structures for an on-going dialogue to serve mutual interests(4).

He also advocated the participation of all interested parties including the European Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, and the Arab League.

De Marco reiterated this proposal at the Third Conference on Mediterranean Regions organized by the Council of Europe in Taormina in April 1993(5). As guide-lines for membership of the Mediterranean Council he cited the following: adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, respect for the dignity of the human person and the Rule of Law, and respect for the establishment and development of representative institutions.

When outlining the structure of the Council, Guido de Marco conceived the creation of a Committee of Ministers and General Assembly with consultative powers where representatives of Mediterranean states could form a Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. This would be supported by a secretariat intended to coordinate the Council's activities in the political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural sectors(6).

Although the establishment of a CSCM appears to remain a priority for countries bordering the southern shores of the Mediterranean, support for the Council among the participants at the Taormina conference was widespread. Guido De Marco described the feedback to his proposal so far as being equivalent to what the French call approfondissement: an in depth consideration of the initiative. He added that the plethora of problems in the region, especially the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot triangle, the Palestinian issue in the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism across North Africa, and the Balkan conflict, are all forcing the leaders of the region to focus on matters in their own vicinity without realising that what is taking place domestically can occasionally be the result of derivations and extensions of constellations and potential conflict, the nuclei of which lie elsewhere.

In any case, prospects that the Council of the Mediterranean can become a forum for preventive and proactive diplomacy in the medium to long-term, remain positive for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Arab -Israeli agreement in September 1993 will assist in attracting all of the countries in the littoral to the Council. Any attempt to institutionalise discourse and dialogue in the region is certain to flounder unless it embraces all of the actors with an interest in the Mediterranean.

Secondly, as a flexible security arrangement, the Council has the advantage of not only being an exercise in preventive diplomacy, but also an operation in positive diplomacy. As a forum for discussing common interests and common concerns, the CM has the potential to become a bridge of common understanding. Indirectly, it could promote the notion of a Mediterranean personality in an area where such a notion is certainly lacking(7).

Thirdly, given the diversity and complexity of issues in the region, pan-Mediterranean dialogue has a realistic chance of being nurtured and strengthened if it is initially limited to non-sensitive security concerns.

The recommendation of imitating the successful example of the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea must also be regarded as favourable. The Council must first convene to discuss such issues as energy, transport, communications, and culture. This could then be followed by a more comprehensive debate in search for the solution of questions such as: economic deprivation, ethnic friction, demographic explosion, migration, environmental degradation, intolerant fundamentalism, and outright conflict (de Marco 1993, 6).

Fourthly, the fact that Malta has proposed this initiative gives the proposal a certain edge. Although Europeans, the Maltese are very close to the Arab world and share a common Mediterranean culture. As a micro-state, Malta is also trusted by all parties concemed, as no country can realistically claim that the Maltese have ambitions other than to cooperate in a peace process.

Fifthly, prospects for the establishment of a CM remain favourable because the concept fits in perfectly with the new spheres of cooperation that the European Union (EU) has highlighted in its Euro-Maghreb Partnership document(8). For example, in order to improve relations in the social sector the EU proposes targeting specific cooperation ventures to assist in the development of poor rural and suburban areas which are identified as principal sources of migration. The EU also seeks to create networks linking professionals in the Maghreb with their counterparts in Europe with the aim of motivating the former to participate in the development of their own country(9).

Once the Council of the Mediterranean is up and running it will be able to make available its resources to the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter which provides: 'The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority' (Herrero 1992, 5).

As a result, the Council should also examine the possibility of creating an interlocking security policy that would enable it to request the assistance of NATO, the Western European Union, and Arab League resources in times of crisis. Making use of already existing security organizations will avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts in an area where the priority should be to invest any available monies in co-development investment projects. The Council, together with the United Nations, will also have to consider carefully which areas of security it is prepared to endorse. Concepts such as conflict prevention, peace keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcing, and peace-building will therefore have to be assessed in detail. The following guide-lines may serve as assistance in this complex endeavour.

The Council of the Mediterranean's principle objective should be to promote activities that will assist in nurturing a Mediterranean personality. Cultivating closer relations among the actors in the basin will facilitate the Council's task of establishing a conflict prevention network in the region. In accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nation's Charter, the Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre would be responsible for obstructing disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading further. Both diplomatic and military resources should be at the Centre's disposal so that it can launch any of the following measures: fact-finding and consultation missions, inspections and monitoring delegations, and effective economic and political sanctions. Preventive deployment units should consist of both civilian and military reserves that can be quickly marshalled to avert a crisis.

In reality, peace-keeping is the containment, moderation, and/or termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of an impartial third party intervention. Peace-keeping operations, based on chapter VI of the United Nation's Charter which deals with the 'pacific settlements of disputes', have traditionally involved the deployment of a peace-keeping force in the area with the consent of the parties. In the past, peace-keeping tasks included supervising demarcation lines, monitoring cease-fires, controlling buffer zones, disarming and demobilising warring factions and supervising borders. These traditional tasks have more recently been supplemented by operations that include facilitation of humanitarian relief and the protection of refugees(10).

With the demands on the United Nation's coffers continuously increasing, the Council of the Mediterranean could assume responsibility for coordinating peace-keeping operations throughout the Mediterranean region. This will entail guaranteeing that the basic conditions for successful missions are present. These include: a clear and practical mandate, the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate, the continuing support of the Security Council, the readiness of Council Member States to contribute the military police and civilian personnel, adequate financial and logistic support, and an effective command and control headquarters and network in the region.

Although the CM may not be in a position to provide all of the necessary resources to deal with this effort, it should be able to at least establish logistic units to act in times of crises. In addition to training military observers and infantry, the Council could draw up contingency plans that include the training of civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, and refugee and humanitarian aid specialists.

The Council of the Mediterranean will also be able to introduce diplomatic actions, if a conflict commences with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement in the shortest period possible. Measures could include the provision of good channels of communication for mediation purposes, and the option of imposing sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter when diplomatic undertakings on their own fail to achieve a settlement.

As a collective security organization, the Council must be prepared adopt coercive measures if peaceful means of settlement prove futile. Peace-enforcement action is provided for in Chapter VII, Article 43, of the UN Charter, on the decision of the Security Council, so that regional peace and security can be maintained or restored. Such exercises can include contending with an inter-state conflict where all state institutions have collapsed and can also include intervening in a domestic conflict so that humanitarian assistance can be provided.

As the United Nations does not yet have the resources to provide peace-enforcing units, the Council should envisage such a reserve which could be used in clearly defined circumstances. For instance, these forces can be deployed as a provisional measure when cease-fires have been breached, as stipulated in Article 40 of the UN Charter. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. Peace-enforcing assignments should not be regarded as an end in themselves but as a prelude to peace-keeping deployments once hostilities have ceased.

The CM must also make provisions for post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to preserve and reinforce a political settlement. It is therefore recommended that a specialized Post Conflict Mediterranean Agency is created whose primary task will be to identify and support projects that will consolidate peace, provide a sense of well being, and sustain economic reconstruction.

In tandem with other regional arrangements and organizations, such an Agency will be responsible for ending civil strife by carrying out any of the following measures: disarming the previously warring factions and restoring order, taking custody and possibly destroying weapon arsenals, repatriating refugees, dispatching advisory and training teams to assist security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation(11).

Promoting mutually beneficial projects between two or more countries will not only assist in alleviating their sporadic economic and social development, but will also enhance the confidence that is essential if peace is to be maintained. For this reason, the Post-Conflict Mediterranean Agency must coordinate its co-development and economic partnership initiatives with other regional and international financial institutions.

Conclusion

A recent report compiled by the North Atlantic Assembly Presidential Task force advocated that NATO establish an outreach programme directed towards the southern Mediterranean Basin:

NATO must look South as well as East, particularly in view of the fact that two thirds of the fifteen regional conflicts relevant to the Alliance that have occurred since the Suez crisis, have arisen in this region’(12).

It is evident that given the multitude of security challenges and risks that are present, it is no longer acceptable to have a situation whereby Mediterranean countries only meet in bilaterals because no Mediterranean forum for discussion exists. The series of Mediterranean security initiatives since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that a general will exists among the countries in the littoral to institutionalise discourse and dialogue.

While a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean remains the comprehensive security regional arrangement that should be sought in the long-term, the complementary Council of the Mediterranean blueprint appears to be better positioned to address the existing security vacuum in the short to medium-term.

The Council's main objective must be to start a political, economic, and social dialogue amongst Mediterranean countries. Once a trans-Mediterranean discussion forum is functioning in these fields, the Council can then commence deliberating more sensitive regional defence issues. However, if resolutions in this area are to be effective, they will have to be supplemented by a conflict prevention and peace-building mechanism specifically designed to tackle existing and potential threats.

Such contingency plans should focus upon developing crisis management principles and procedures for the entire Mediterranean region. The main concept is to be able to deploy 'tailor-made' forces for each eventuality. Establishing an interlocking security system with already functioning organizations such as NATO, the Western European Union, and the Arab League will assist the Council in achieving this objective. Multilateral agreements on intelligence exchange and air space surveillance, and substantial investments in facilities for the reception and sustainment of peace-enforcing and peace-keeping units, will enable the Council to considerably ameliorate the current Mediterranean security position.

A trans-Mediterranean security arrangement can only follow, and not precede, more intensive sub-sets of regional dialogue throughout the Mediterranean. Seen from such a lens, the Western Mediterranean Forum experiment and the Middle East peace process breakthrough should be regarded as stepping stones towards a more comprehensive regional security forum. A Council of the Mediterranean appears to be the next logical step towards conflict prevention and peace-building in the Mediterranean.

Notes